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 Using a feminist transdisciplinary research approach, this dissertation 
interrogates the discursive configurations that constituted the framework of meaning 
within which the United States conducted its relationship with the Russian Federation 
between 1991 and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. It calls attention to the 
production and operation of what I refer to as “gendered Russian imaginaries” (i.e., 
the range of masculinities and femininities that have been assigned to narrative and 
visual depictions of Russia and Russians in American political and popular culture) 
that have been invoked as part of American cold war triumphalism to craft and 
support U.S. foreign policy.  
  
 The dissertation has two parts. While much has been written about the 
consequences of U.S. Russia policy, I explore its ideological causes in Chapters 1, 2, 
3, and 4. Chapter 1 enumerates the foundational precepts upon which my project 
relies, while Chapter 2 offers some necessary background information concerning the 
evolution and deployment of gendered nationalisms in the Russian Federation and in 
the United States. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the metaphors and analogies deployed 
throughout the congressional hearings that led to two pieces of U.S. legislation, the 
Freedom Support Act of 1992 and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.  
 Through visual, narrative, and discursive analyses of several popular culture 
texts, including 1997’s animated feature film Anastasia (Chapter 5), NBC’s hit 
television series The West Wing (Chapter 6), and Washington, D.C.’s popular 
International Spy Museum (Chapter 7), part two explores the ways in which Russia 
and Russians were visually and narratively depicted in U.S. popular culture at the turn 
of the twenty-first century.  
 Given the Russian Federation’s status as the world’s second-largest oil 
producer after Saudi Arabia, the importance of Russia to contemporary U.S.-Middle 
East politics can no longer be in any doubt. Consequently, the mistakes, assumptions, 
and triumphalist arrogance of the United States since 1991 must be reckoned with and 
accounted for. This dissertation contributes a feminist analysis to that endeavor by 
drawing attention to the links between cultural and national identities, the gendered 
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Introduction: Imagining Russia 
 
“If we cannot escape these discursive patterns, 
then we must at least acknowledge the staggering force of tradition 
in shaping national narratives and expose the fictions that pass as history 




 During the fall of 2005, the Italy-based fashion design company Diesel 
featured an advertisement that ran in the United States in GQ Magazine in which a 
shirtless young cowboy, culturally intelligible as white, rippled muscles bronzed by 
the sun, lay prostrate, sprawled in apparent contented exhaustion across a plush red 
and black sofa (figure 1). His brown leather boots are adorned with spurs, his heavy 
metal belt buckle is unfastened, his well-worn stonewashed jeans are unbuttoned, 
revealing his lower torso, and his crimson hat is pulled low over his eyes. Behind 
him, displayed prominently on the shelf, are matryoshka dolls, arguably the most 
globally recognized symbol of Russian national identity.2 That the dolls seem to be  
fashioned, not from the customary wood hand-painted by Russian artisans, but from 
malleable plastic, signals the advertisement’s use of a complex intertext that  
                                                 
1 Helena Goscilo and Andrea Lanoux, introduction to Gender and National Identity in Twentieth-
Century Russian Culture, ed. Helena Goscilo and Andrea Lanoux (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2006), 24. 
  
2 Dating back only to the late nineteenth century, traditional matryoshka (or “nesting” dolls) are 
individually carved and then hand painted. Designs are usually drawn from Russian folk art, fairy tales, 
and religious imagery. The term matryoshka comes from Matryona, a popular female name among 
peasants in pre-revolutionary Russia, which, in turn, is related to the Latin root “mater” meaning 
“mother.” As a result, the dolls are closely associated with motherhood and, because of their numerous 
“offspring,” fertility. For a more extensive history of matryoshka dolls, see L. N. Soloviova, Russian 






Figure 1: An advertisement for Diesel jeans. 
 
simultaneously relies on and reinforces its viewers’ conflation of heterosexual sex 
with a feminized Russia: The dolls’ plastic red mouths are open, hollow, and rife with 
(hetero)sexualized possibility. Having ostensibly just received the fatigued cowboy’s 
penis and ejaculate, they wait while he sleeps and will, the ad promises, be available 
to pleasure him again when he awakens. This advertisement for jeans, that most 
quintessentially American of products, seems to imply that, unlike the brazen and 
demanding American women the cowboy may have known, these inanimate, plastic 
matryoshka dolls signal the alleged virtues of “traditional” Russian womanhood:3 
                                                 
3 For complex historical reasons that I discuss more fully in the next chapter, idealized notions of 
conventional Russian femininity, or zhenstvennost, require that Russian women be passively 




Always already silent, they enjoy lying subserviently immobile while the cowboy, 
associated in the popular American mythos with notions of “Manifest Destiny” and 
nineteenth-century Westward expansion, achieves his orgasm, and, most 
conveniently, they can be deflated and packed away when not in use. 
 As an encounter between the United States and Russia, whose contentious 
relationship, known colloquially as the cold war, held geopolitics hostage in the latter 
half of the twentieth century,4 the Deisel advertisement traffics rather problematically 
in a particular U.S.-based imaginary that conceptualizes Russia, represented here by 
the silent, inanimate, plastic matryoshka doll, as not just inferior, but also female and 
                                                                                                                                           
hence, the Russian nation. For more information, please refer to Goscilo and Lanoux, introduction to 
Gender and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Russian Culture; Vera Tolz, Russia (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001); and Catherine Schuler, Women in Russian Theatre: The Actress in the 
Silver Age (New York: Routledge, 1996). 
 Expectations of zhenstvennost are heartily deployed by Anastasia International, an Internet marriage 
agency specializing in arranging Russian/Ukrainian-U.S. marriages. The results of a 2005 survey, for 
example, reveal that their willingness to “preserve traditional family values and consider their 
husbands to be the heads of the household,” “put their families ahead of career advancement,” “value a 
well-kept household,” and “dress stylishly and elegantly and look after themselves” make Russian 
women particularly attractive to U.S.-based men who, according to Anastasia International, are 
“disenchanted (or perhaps, ‘dis[en]franchised’) by the extremely career-oriented bent that women in 
[Western] countries predominantly demonstrate.” Survey results are available on-line at Anastasia 
International, “New Survey Reveals What is So Attractive in Russian Ladies,” http://www.anastasia-
international.com/media-publication36.html (accessed May 8, 2008). 
 
4 I use the term “geopolitics” to refer to the means by which “dominant and powerful sovereign nation-
states have tried to make sense of and represent their global spatial environment […] with a view to 
facilitating their foreign policy making.” Francois Debrix, Tabloid Terror: War, Culture, and 
Geopolitics (New York: Routledge, 2008), 9. Additionally, following political scientist David 
Campbell, I have chosen throughout this dissertation to substitute the lower case “cold war” for the 
more typical “Cold War” when referring to the dominant geopolitical paradigm of the last half of the 
twentieth century in an attempt to draw attention to that conflict as a discursive configuration integral 
to the creation of a post-war American national identity. Via a reading of recently declassified cold 
war-era U.S. national security documents, Campbell demonstrates that “the danger posed by the Soviet 
Union was not considered to be primarily—or even significantly—military” by the U.S. foreign policy 
elite. Rather, the perceived danger was cultural and ideological (i.e., concern for the infiltration of 
communism). Consequently, Campbell contends, the cold war was a discursive phenomenon, a product 
of a particular crisis in American national identity, “that was not dependent on (though clearly 
influenced by) the Soviet Union.” It should be noted, however, that Campbell’s argument here “neither 
maintains that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union (and other communist states) was benign nor that 
the United States willfully fabricated a danger where none could be perceived.” David Campbell, 
Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of 





subservient to the United States, signified by Diesel’s obvious homage to that 
quintessential American icon, the virile, masculine Marlboro Man.5 Instead of 
conquering the rugged American frontier, though, Diesel’s cowboy encourages the 
(hetero)sexual violation of a feminized Russia—the vanquished foe of what historian 
Ellen Schrecker calls “cold war triumphalism.” This is the hegemonic national/ist 
narrative that not only claims the United States “won” the cold war simply because it 
deserved to win (based on its allegedly superior economic, military, and political 
systems), but is also the basis for U.S. unilateralism in world affairs after 1991.6 
Additionally, the use of the matryoshka doll as a commodity to sell jeans, a classic 
American product, is, within the triumphalist narrative, both the ultimate proof and 
justification for the United States’ cold war “victory.” Not only has capitalism 
trumped communism (as U.S. pundits and officials had promised all along), but the 
symbols and traditions of imperial Russia, itself, which in 1917 had been subsumed 
by the specter of communism, can now be freely integrated into the global capitalist 
marketplace. 
This advertisement, then, in its efficient assemblage of the governing themes 
of American nationalism and U.S. foreign policy, is much more than an attempt to 
entice presumably elite white, young, heterosexual, male consumers to buy an 
                                                 
5 Like cultural theorist Arjun Appadurai, I use the term “imaginary” as a noun to signal the necessary 
interconnectedness between “the old idea of images, especially mechanically produced images (in the 
Frankfurt School sense); the idea of the imagined community (in Anderson’s sense); and the French 
idea of the imaginary (imaginaire), as a constructed landscape of collective aspirations.” Arjun 
Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Economy,” in Colonial Discourse/Post-Colonial 
Theory: A Reader, ed. Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 327. 
 
6 Ellen Schrecker, introduction to Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of 





expensive pair of jeans.7 It depicts a troubling conflation of American nationalism 
with the commodification of racialized, heteronormative gender configurations, 
thereby hailing its target audience,8 interpellating them simultaneously as both 
consumers and conquerors within the national governing mythology of cold war 
triumphalism, or what I refer to as the triumphalist mythscape, that has dominated 
U.S. political and popular culture for more than fifteen years.9 
 In response to a call for a feminist research methodology that advocates 
linkage rather than comparison as a means of “destabiliz[ing] the forms of hegemony 
that underwrite the production of knowledge in the modern period,”10 I employ in this 
dissertation a feminist transdisciplinary approach that attends to the connections 
between the hegemony of American heteropatriarchal nationalism in U.S. political 
and popular culture and its effects on U.S.-Russian relations. I interrogate the 
                                                 
7 Diesel’s men’s jeans range in price from roughly $150 to $300 USD, making them accessible to a 
very small niche market. Billing itself as an “innovative international design company” and “a leader 
in pioneering new styles,” Diesel has, according to its own website, become “part of the youth culture 
worldwide.” The company envisions its optimal clients as “independent people who follow their own 
unique path in life” and as “style-makers who express their individuality by the way they dress.” 
Diesel, “For Successful Living,” http://www.diesel.com/info/history.php (accessed March 21, 2008). 
 
8 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards and Investigation),” in 
Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, 127-86 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971). 
 
9 I rely for this term on the existence of cold war triumphalism as discussed by Schrecker as well as 
what sociologist Duncan S. Bell calls a “national mythscape,” which he defines as “the discursive 
realm, constituted by and through temporal and spatial dimensions, in which the myths of the nation 
are forged, transmitted, reconstructed and renegotiated constantly.” Duncan S. Bell, “Mythscapes: 
Memory, Mythology, and National Identity,” British Journal of Sociology 54, no. 1 (2003): 75. The 
notion of consumers and conquerors is from Tuszynska’s discussion of The Birthday Girl (2000), a 
feature film starring Nicole Kidman as a Russian mail-order bride, to which I will return shortly. 
Agnieszka Tuszynska, “Eastern Girls, Western Boys: The Image of Eastern European Women in the 
Birthday Girl,” in Vampirettes, Wretches and Amazons: Western Representations of East European 
Women, ed. Valentina Glajar and Domnica Radulescu, 203-14 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004). 
 
10 Caren Kaplan and Inderpal Grewal, “Transnational Practices and Interdisciplinary Feminist 
Scholarship: Refiguring Women’s and Gender Studies,” in Women’s Studies on Its Own, ed. Robyn 





gendered, heteronormative, and racialized dynamics of U.S. Russia policy between 
the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Using what feminist political scientist Cynthia Enloe terms a “feminist curiosity,”11 
that is, a mode of feminist inquiry whose objective is figuring out how things got to 
be the way they are so that they might be different, I examine the production and 
operation of particular assumptions about Russia and Russians that have been 
invoked to craft, support, and implement U.S. policies. 
 I draw explicitly on the methodologies and perspectives of cultural studies, 
political science (especially feminist international relations theory), women’s/gender 
studies, feminist development studies, performance theories, and history. Each of 
these locations of knowledge production has its own intellectual genealogy/ies, and, 
because my work here requires the flexibility of multiple and simultaneous 
perspectives, this project draws from and is in constant dialogue with each of them. 
Consequently, the questions and issues with which I am concerned have demanded 
that I be, concomitantly, an historian, a political scientist, a literary scholar, an 
economist, a performance theorist, a scholar of nuclear proliferation, and a cultural 
critic—just to name a few of the hats I have worn while researching and writing this 
dissertation. Consequently, my work operates simultaneously as both a research 
model and a theoretical paradigm within which to interrogate the ways in which 
gendered, racialized, heteronormative discursive configurations are integral to the 
formulation of nationalist narratives and foreign policy objectives. 
  
                                                 
11 Cynthia Enloe, Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link (New York: Rowman & 






By the early 1990s, American-style capitalist democracy appeared to have triumphed 
over communist totalitarianism, and, in Russia, the state assets of a former 
superpower became the objects of neocolonial conquest for largely U.S. and Western 
corporate and political elites.12 This is the point at which my work in this dissertation 
begins. Having emerged from a broader critique of the ways in which U.S.-based 
popular and political cultural texts utilize neocolonial strategies that rely upon the 
discursive construction of foreign nationals as Others to justify and legitimate the 
growth of U.S. military and economic geopolitical hegemony in this current era of 
globalization, my research interrogates the production and operation in U.S. popular 
and political culture between 1991 and 2003 of what I refer to as “gendered Russian 
imaginaries” (i.e., the range of masculinities and femininities assigned to narrative 
and visual depictions of Russia and Russians in American political and popular 
culture) in an attempt to understand not only what they mean, but also how, why, 
when, by whom and for what purpose(s) their meanings have been constructed. 
Interestingly, each of these gendered imaginaries is ethnically Slavic, which makes 
them white Europeans; however, as Russians, they are subject to a complex cold war-
era version of Orientalism.13 My analysis is framed on one end by the demise of the 
                                                 
12 I use the term “neocolonial” throughout as an inherent critique of the ways in which powerful 
nation-states behave as if they were colonial powers, particularly the ways in which private 
corporations, based largely in the global North and West, continue their exploitation of the resources of 
less powerful nation-states. 
 
13 The term “Slavic” is generally used to refer to the Indo-European peoples of Central Europe, Eastern 
Europe, and the Balkans who speak linguistically related languages. Pan-Slavism, a nationalist 
movement intended to unite all Slavic peoples under one government and against Western oppression, 
reached its height in the late nineteenth century. For example, one of the major reasons that the 
Russian Empire became embroiled in World War I was its promise, in the context of pan-Slavism, to 




Soviet Union and subsequent attempts to construct a post-Soviet Russia in the early 
1990s and on the other by the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which, as I will discuss 
in chapter 8, signaled a shift in the ways in which post-Soviet Russia sought to 
present itself on the global stage, and, consequently, the ways in which Russia and 
Russians were depicted in the U.S. Conceptualizing gender as a shifting signifier, I 
identify and examine five post-Soviet sites where gendered, racialized, 
heteronormative images of and assumptions about Russia and Russians have been 
invoked in U.S. popular and political culture texts to craft a cold war triumphalist 
American nationalism that serves not only as justification for a neocolonial U.S. 
Russia policy, but also for U.S. geopolitical unilateralism since the demise of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. I am particularly interested in the discursive interplay between 
textual sites and visual sights that, together, create knowledge about Russia and 
Russians in the United States. 
 This dissertation has two parts. While much has been written about the 
consequences of U.S. Russia policy, I explore its ideological causes in Part One. My 
exploration of the ideological causes of U.S. foreign policy is a composite task 
emerging, first, from Enloe’s call to “to use a feminist curiosity to develop 
explanations—that is, to discover causes” of particular events and situations, and, 
second, from U.S. foreign relations historian Michael H. Hunt’s search “for a 
relatively coherent, emotionally charged, and conceptually interlocking set of ideas” 
that form the core of U.S. foreign policy, “reflect the self-image of those who 
espoused them,” and “define a relationship with the world consonant with that self-
image.” He concludes that the existence and maintenance of a racial hierarchy in 





which white, European descent remains superior to others is one of three core 
ideologies at the foundation of U.S. foreign policy. The others are the promotion of 
liberty and an expressly anti-revolutionary political positionality.14  
 In this chapter, I provide several operational definitions, enumerate the 
foundational precepts that undergird my work, and discuss this project’s potential 
implications and theoretical interventions. In chapter 2, I provide some necessary 
background concerning the evolution and deployment of gendered nationalisms in the 
Russian Federation and the United States, arguing that Russia’s historically feminized 
presentation of itself has heavily influenced depictions of Russia and Russians in the 
U.S. media, particularly in film and television, over the course of the last century—
and most definitely after 1991.  
 Chapter 3 tackles the gendered, racialized, and heteronormative dynamics of 
the Freedom Support Act of 1992, the legislation that authorized U.S. bi- and 
multilateral assistance to the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Through 
an analysis of the legislation itself as well as the congressional hearings convened to 
discuss U.S. aid to Russia, I consider why and how U.S. bilateral aid to Russia took 
the form of technical assistance to the exclusion of all other options. I argue that the 
assumptions which helped to shape U.S. Russia policy immediately after the demise 
of the Soviet Union relied simultaneously—and rather incongruously—on the notion 
of a weakened, feminized Russia in urgent need of assistance, and on the continuation 
of a cold war-era conceptualization of the Russian Federation as duplicitous, 
irrational, and maleficent. I demonstrate that the metaphors and analogies used 
                                                 
14 Enloe, Globalization and Militarism, 12; and Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy 





throughout the hearings to justify and legitimate policy decisions reveal an explicit 
imperialist hubris embedded in U.S. Russia policy and rooted in racialized, gendered 
discursive configurations reminiscent of the colonial strategies of past empires.15 
 Chapter 4 asks, “Why did U.S. legislators’ sudden desire in the late 1990s to 
halt human trafficking coincide with clashes on Capitol Hill over who should most 
appropriately take the blame for what seemed to be the wholesale failure of U.S. 
Russia policy?” I conduct a close reading of the U.S. congressional hearings that led 
to the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) to argue 
that in U.S. political culture in the late 1990s, human trafficking became synonymous 
with sex trafficking (i.e., the illegal transnational trade in the bodies of (usually) 
women and girls for [predominantly] heterosexual sex), which, in turn, was 
inextricably linked with victimized Russian women, who were assumed to be white 
Europeans. According to anti-trafficking rhetoric, these women not only need to be 
saved not only from “evil” traffickers, but also from emasculated Russian men, who, 
unable to cope with the transition to capitalism and democracy, were incapable of 
supporting or protecting “their” women and children in the way that “real” men 
should. I then contextualize the anti-trafficking hearings within an overarching 
discursive analysis that takes into account their relative synchrony with the oversight 
hearings being held on Capitol Hill to assess what went wrong with U.S. assistance in 
Russia. I argue that these two conversations, one about a proposed U.S. anti-
trafficking law, the other about U.S. Russia policy, reveal much not only about the 
                                                 
15 By the term “imperialist” I mean not the material manifestations of colonial conquest (i.e., 
occupation of territory and the exploitation of resources), but an attitude of superiority over and the 





gendered dynamics of U.S.-Russian relations at the end of the twentieth century, but 
also about the epistemological limitations imposed on both policy debates by the 
inadequacies of language. Although well-intentioned, the members of Congress who 
championed the passage of the TVPA inadvertently deployed the rhetoric of Russian 
trafficking “victims” as a convenient political trope that operated equally well in both 
sets of hearings. Russian men, particularly political elites and law enforcement 
officials, were explicitly identified as the chief opposition not only to attempts to end 
sex trafficking, but also to the success of U.S. policies in the region. 
 In Part Two, I move from an exploration of the sites of U.S. foreign 
policymaking to one of sights, of the ways in which Russia and Russians were 
visually and narratively depicted in U.S. popular culture at the turn of the twenty-first 
century. Chapter 5 chronicles the political uses made of Grand Duchess Anastasia 
Nicholaevna, one of the Russian Empire’s most iconic and frequently mythologized 
figures, since her rumored escape from a Bolshevik firing squad in 1918. I first 
provide some historical background with regard to the execution of Russia’s last royal 
family during the Russian Revolution, after which I conduct a textual and semiotic 
analysis of Twentieth Century Fox’s 1997 animated feature film Anastasia. I reveal 
the film’s complicity with the rhetoric of U.S. Russia policy throughout the 1990s in 
its depiction of Russia as, quite literally, an orphaned teenage girl whom the United 
States must rescue in the name of democracy, freedom, and human rights. I conclude 
with a discussion of the two contentious debates in Russia, one social and political, 
the other cultural and historical, that characterized the context within which Anastasia 




 While a concern for Russia’s internal domestic affairs, including much-
publicized alleged human rights abuses and civil liberties violations, constituted the 
Clinton administration’s policy toward Russia, the George W. Bush administration 
left that country largely to its own devices and has demonstrated interest in Russia 
only as a potential geopolitical friend or (more recently) foe in the “war on terror.” 
Chapter 6 takes into account this shift in U.S. Russia policy by mapping the 
fictionalized depiction of U.S.-Russian relations on NBC’s television series The West 
Wing, whose seven-year run (1999-2006) was bifurcated by September 11, 2001. I 
argue that, before that date, the popular weekly drama offered a critical perspective 
on the major post-Soviet political, diplomatic, and military events and issues by 
subtly giving voice to alternative policy directions and possibilities, even as it utilized 
the gendered Russian imaginary so prevalent in U.S. popular and political culture. 
But after 9/11 and the advent of the “war on terror,” storylines concerning Russia, 
already gendered, were explicitly linked with Islamic fundamentalism.  
 Within the context of the “war on terror,” the link in U.S. popular and political 
culture between the gendered Russian imaginary and Islamic fundamentalism has 
been further complicated and partially constituted by Russia’s continued military 
engagement with Chechnya and its longstanding bilateral diplomatic and economic 
relations with Islamic fundamentalist regimes in the Middle East (most notably Iran), 
which pre-date the creation of the Russian Federation as a political entity. Chapter 7 
grapples with this shift in the gendered Russian imaginary through a reading of the 
public relations materials and cold war exhibits of Washington, DC’s International 




aural, and architectural methods by which female heterosexuality is explicitly 
conflated in the museum with the dangers of state-based violence and the threat of 
Soviet/Russian espionage. I argue that this tactic makes a duplicitous femme fatale of 
the Soviet Union (and, by extension, its successor state) in order to facilitate the 
museum’s use of the cold war as a cautionary tale to justify the “war on terror.” 
 In the last chapter, I detail the “casualties of cold war” to which I refer in the 
title of this dissertation. I discuss the tangible and intangible damages inflicted by the 
cold war, focusing particularly on the epistemological limitations that were imposed 
on the foreign policies of both countries and the potential implications of those 
limitations for the future of U.S.-Russian relations. 
 
Foundational Precepts 
Located at the vortex of several distinct although always already interrelated and 
interconnected intellectual genealogies, my project relies on three crucial 
foundational precepts: 
1. That stories told about the past have tangible effects in the present, 
particularly within the context of nationalist projects, which are always in 
flux and are, consequently, malleable; 
2. That nations, nationalisms, and relations between nation-states are 
constituted by and through gendered, racialized, and heteronormative 
discursive configurations; and 
3. That these always already gendered, racialized, and heteronormative 




range of cultural texts which are intrinsically imbued with political 
significance, operating as sites of public pedagogy that make meaning and, 
therefore, affect material conditions and experiences. 
 
Precept 1: Histories at work 
 Uniting the great variety of theoretical approaches to the origins of 
nationalism and the formation of nations is, first, an acknowledgment of the past from 
which those processes emerge and, second, a concern for the ways in which, and by 
whom, stories about that past are mobilized in the present to create what British 
sociologist Duncan S. Bell terms “governing myths” that “impose a definite meaning 
on the past, on the nation and its history” in an attempt to cohere a single, collective 
national identity.16 Sociologist Anthony D. Smith, for example, positions nationalists 
as social and political archaeologists whose task it is to “reconstruct a past era or 
civilization and relate it to later periods, including the present” in an attempt to 
provide for the nation “a suitable and dignified past.”17 Similarly, in case studies on 
Russia, Quebec, and West Germany, historian M. Lane Bruner specifically identifies 
three types of history (monumental, antiquarian, and critical) that are commonly used 
as what he terms “strategies of remembrance” in the creation of nationalism’s 
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governing myths.18 And, as political scientist Anatol Lieven and historian Ellen 
Schrecker demonstrate, the deployment of histories, particularly those concerning the 
“founding fathers” and the United States’ alleged “victory” over communist 
totalitarianism in the cold war, is fairly easy to detect in the governing myths of 
American nationalism, particularly since the events of September 11, 2001.19 
 Given this concern for the pedagogical uses of history in nationalist projects, 
recent theorists of nations and nationalism also tend to agree that the nation, an 
“imagined political community,”20 and its attendant ideology, nationalism, are 
cultural artifacts that are, like (and, arguably, because of) the stories they tell about 
themselves, historically contingent and always in flux. Consequently, the nation, 
itself, is a social construct always coming into being as what postcolonial theorist 
Homi K. Bhabha calls “a system of cultural signification” created via the dynamic 
and contentious process of its own narration of its constructed history.21 And, like all 
cultural artifacts, the nation, in the words of theorist John Hutchinson, is a “zone of 
conflict” that is by no means culturally homogenous, thus leaving it vulnerable to 
competing nationalisms that may pursue radically different methods for constituting 
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of the past. 
 
19 Anatol Lieven, America Right Or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (New York: Oxford 
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the nation of their ideological and political imaginings. The differences between 
competing nationalisms, Hutchinson contends, often manifest themselves in the 
competition between cultural nationalists, who “[emphasize] the role of inner 
traditions […] and promote decentralization or regional liberties,” and political 
nationalists, “who are inspired by external (Western) models which seek to modernize 
society from a central site.”22 But, as feminist theorist Anne McClintock points out, 
not one of these “sanctioned male theories” incorporates what feminist international 
relations (IR) theorist V. Spike Peterson refers to as a “gender-sensitive lens” to make 
sense of the origins of nations and the evolution of nationalisms. Using as a case 
study the Afrikaaner nationalist movement in South Africa, McClintock demonstrates 
nationalism’s reliance on claiming the legitimacy of either a “traditional” past or 
“modern” future “is typically resolved by figuring the contradiction in the 
representation of time as a natural division of gender.” Put more simply, women tend 
to be associated in national governing myths with ethnic/national/cultural authenticity 
and tradition, and men with progress and modernity.23  
 
Precept 2: Gendered nationalisms and geopolitics 
 From a feminist perspective, then, the most obvious question to be asked of 
normative theories of nationalism would seem to be, “Where are the women?” and 
“What does gender have to do with it?” The first question assumes that sex is a 
                                                 
22 John Hutchinson, “Nations and Culture,” in Understanding Nationalisms, ed. Montserrat Guibernau 
and John Hutchinson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 85. 
 
23 V. Spike Peterson, “The Politics of Identity and Gendered Nationalism,” in Foreign Policy Analysis: 
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biological category and attends to the experiences of women in and as part of 
nationalist projects. For scholars exploring this question, the identities of their 
subjects are determined by the presence (or, arguably, lack) of particular anatomical 
characteristics. The second question assumes that gender (i.e., the range of 
masculinities and femininities) is a fluid social construct, “an identity tenuously 
constituted in time” and “instituted through a stylized repetition of acts,”24 and is 
concerned with interrogating how and why socio-cultural fears of and assumptions 
about masculinities and femininities are wielded in the creation and maintenance of 
nationalist narratives. Although these two questions can yield quite different research 
projects, they are inherently interrelated. By incorporating them into their analyses, 
feminist scholars have worked to fill the theoretical gap left by the (mostly) male 
theorists of nationalism in an attempt to find new ways of conceptualizing and telling 
the nation’s constructed history25—a history that, as they have collectively shown, is 
reliant not only upon the material manipulation of women’s bodies, but also on the 
systemic deployment of gendered, racialized, and heteronormative discursive 
configurations.  
 Among the first to study women’s experiences in nationalist projects was 
feminist political theorist Kumari Jayawardena, whose Feminism and Nationalism in 
the Third World (Zed Books, 1986) revisions the histories of nationalist/revolutionary 
struggles in several countries, including India, China, Indonesia, Egypt, and Korea, to 
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incorporate the experiences of women into histories of those movements. At the same 
time, historian Linda K. Kerber chronicled the political transformation of acceptable 
women’s roles during the American Revolution in Women of the Republic: Intellect 
& Ideology in Revolutionary America (W.W. Norton & Co., 1986). These studies, 
both published in 1986, laid the foundation for subsequent histories documenting the 
experiences of women in nationalist projects and the convergence of nationalist and 
gendered discourses in moments of political and social upheaval in various national 
contexts. For example, Joan Landes researches women’s participation in the public 
sphere before and during the French Revolution, while Miranda Pollard’s work 
explores the effects of military defeat and Nazi occupation on French articulations of 
gender roles and relations in wartime France. Arguing that Vichy’s nation-building 
focused on returning France to an illustrious and largely mythical past, Pollard 
reveals the tactics by which the government promoted the family as the most 
important unit of a new France and elevated married mothers to a high social status 
even as women’s reproductive rights and educational and employment opportunities 
were severely curtailed. Similarly, Elizabeth Wood and Wendy Goldman each 
chronicle the Soviet Union’s retreat from its own revolutionary rhetoric by exploring 
the dynamic relationship between state policy and society. Wood explores the 
U.S.S.R.’s campaign to draw women into the public sphere and involve them in the 
world of politics by reconstructing how notions of gender sameness and difference 
both facilitated and complicated Bolshevik efforts at state building in the 1920s, 
while Goldman focuses on how women, the poor, and orphaned street children were 




interrogates the experiences of women under Mussolini’s dictatorship by examining 
the creation and impact of fascist sexual politics within the context of the changes in 
Italian society as a result of World War I and considering the response(s) by the 
fascist government to women’s increased participation in the mass politics of the 
interwar period.26  
 These historical studies concerning the exploitation of women and other 
marginalized populations rather dichotomously position nationalism and its 
proponents as the enemies of women; however, German historian Claudia Koonz 
demonstrates through an examination of the interrelated discourses of/on nationalism, 
anti-communism, motherhood, and family, the ways in which German women, no 
less than men, participated in and/or were complicit with Nazi policies. British 
historian Antoinette Burton is critical of women’s participation in state-based 
nationalist movements, which, as she and others have shown, are quite often part and 
parcel of an imperialist foreign policy. In Burdens of History: British Feminists, 
Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994), Burton focuses on the collaboration of organized British 
feminism in the Victorian and Edwardian periods with the ideological work of 
empire, imperialism, and colonialism in their treatment of and assumptions about 
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Indian women. Terming this “imperial feminism,” she shows how British women 
sought to link women’s political emancipation (i.e. suffrage) with the continued 
health and success of the British Empire in a time of increasing global insecurity.27 
And feminist international relations (IR) scholar V. Spike Peterson advocates 
recognizing women not only as symbols and victims of nationalism, but also as 
agential participants in nationalisms and violent conflicts.28 
 Similarly, in their rejection of the notion of “women” as a homogenous 
category, a way of thinking that emerged from Western feminists’ assumptions about 
shared experiences based on biological sex regardless of cultural, religious, or other 
differences, postcolonial and transnational feminist theorists have drawn attention to 
the differential relationships of women to and within the nationalist and/or imperialist 
state as it, itself a cultural construction, is embedded within specific historical 
moments and transnational practices such as colonialism and globalization. Arguing 
that even anti-colonial nationalism wielded as a liberatory tool from European 
domination has historically utilized “female bodies as the symbol of the nation to 
generate discourses of rape, motherhood, sexual purity and heteronormativity,” 
feminist theorists Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan point out that “nationalisms are 
not just patriarchal;” rather, women are often ready participants. Burton’s framing of 
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late-nineteenth and early twentieth century British feminism within an imperialist 
discourse is an example, as is the common understanding in the U.S., particularly 
since September 11, 2001, that it is the duty of the United States to “save” Muslim 
women from their oppression by the patriarchal cultures of Islamic countries—even 
while alarmingly high rates of sexual assault, domestic violence, and other gender-
based inequities continue unabated in the United States. It is nationalism, Grewal and 
Kaplan contend, that “creates these misrecognitions”29 and thus leads, as I have 
shown, to the absence in normative theories of nationalism of a consideration of 
either the experiences of women or the use of gendered discourses.  
 The impressive body of feminist scholarship on nationalisms is perhaps most 
efficiently encapsulated by sociologist Nira Yuval-Davis, who clearly demonstrates 
the dynamic relationship between women and the state, on the one hand, and gender 
and the nation on the other by offering a succinct four-point formula for thinking 
about gender relations and “the ways they affect and are affected by national 
projects.”30 They are: 
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1. Women as the biological reproducers of the nation, which involves the 
pressures of having or not having children according to state needs as 
differentiated based on dimensions of identity and difference. 
2. Through cultural reproduction and gender relations, which refers to the notion 
of “woman” as symbolic border guard of traditional and/or modern culture, 
constructions of “manhood” and “womanhood,” and “woman” used to prove 
modernity and/or as an homage to cultural traditions. 
3. The ways in which women are included (or not) as citizens while also always 
subjected to the gender-based regulations, rules, and policies of the state.  
4. The discourse of war for “womenandchildren” and the effects of 
militarization, particularly the increasing participation of women in the 
military. This mode of analysis also deals with the gendered affects of war on 
soldiers and victims (especially with regard to rape as war crime) and includes 
a discussion of the possible relationship between women, feminism and peace. 
 Because of its attention to representational politics, it is Yuval-Davis’ second 
point, concerning the cultural reproduction of gender relations, constructions of 
“manhood” and “womanhood,” and the use of women as the cultural signifiers of 
national identity, that is of particular concern to me in this project. Several feminist 
studies of nationalisms, including a few of those discussed above, support Yuval-
Davis’ analysis by incorporating into their projects an examination of the ways in 
which cultural texts ranging from legislation and newspapers to artwork and novels 
are part and parcel of the ideological discursivity of the gendered nationalist project. 
Through an examination of the popular Stalin-era women’s magazines Rabotnitsa 





(The Woman Worker) and Krest’yanka (The Peasant Woman), for example, historian 
Lynn Atwood explores the multiple incarnations of the “new Soviet woman.”31 
 But if Yuval-Davis and the other feminist theorists of nationalism are right, as 
I believe they are, about the deployment of gender-as-discourse in national identity 
formation, what happens when the gendered signifier of the nation travels across 
borders and, even more intriguingly, is deployed in an entirely different geographical, 
cultural, or historical context from that out of which it emerged? What, I wonder, do 
women and gender have to do with relations between nation-states? What about skin 
color/ethnicity and sexual orientation? When nation-states are gendered feminine, as 
feminist theorists of nationalism have demonstrated, what are the consequences for 
the formulation of foreign policies and the conduct of geopolitics? More specifically, 
how are gendered, racialized discourses wielded in U.S.-Russian relations? What are 
the effects on U.S. Russia policy when Russia is conceptualized in U.S. popular and 
political culture as a gendered subject? By what means, by whom, and for what 
purposes is the gendered nation politicized in/for its new context? 
 Addressing these questions necessitates turning to feminist international 
relations (IR) theorists, who focus their attention not on the relationship of women to 
the state and/or the use of gendered discursive configurations to create and maintain 
nationalisms, but on the significance of women and gender for relations between 
nation-states. Alternatively (and often simultaneously) utilizing the same two 
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questions undergirding feminist studies of nationalism (i.e., “Where are the women?” 
and “What does gender have to do with it?”), feminist IR scholars seek to understand 
how the activities and experiences of the majority of the world’s people have come to 
be excluded from the major theoretical frameworks commonly used to explain 
relations between nation-states, “while other people’s idealized traits, if not their 
daily activities, seem to inspire the models, concepts and processes” by which 
geopolitics is conducted.32 Collectively, through interrogations of war and peace, 
security, international political economy, human rights, the environment, and other 
related issues, they reveal the myriad ways in which gender-as-discourse and 
women’s bodies are co-constitutive of geopolitics and the political economies of this 
and other historical moments of globalization. Put another way, feminist IR theorists 
believe that “gender makes the world go ‘round.” 33 
 Building on feminist anthropologist Gayle Rubin’s notion of the sex/gender 
system34 as constitutive of social relations, feminist political scientist Cynthia Enloe 
argues that the real and imagined transnational traffic in gendered bodies is one, if not 
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the, bedrock of global politics. For example, she calls on scholars to revisit the 
alleged simplicity of an international politics and foreign policy dependent on 
heterosexual marriage and, more specifically, on wives, particularly those of 
diplomats and military personnel, doing what they are supposed to do. She also 
considers the feminized nature of migrant work, chiefly domestic service, as well as 
the work of women in the garment industry, which relies on “[f]eminized patterns of 
racial and regional inequality—interwoven with ideas about motherhood and 
feminine respectability.”35  
 Consequently, Enloe argues, material relationships between nation-states 
within and among (past and present) globalization processes cannot be understood 
without attention to the fact that gender-as-discourse, rather than simply a part of 
these processes, is constitutive of them. In her most recent work exploring the links 
between militarization and globalization, for example, Enloe focuses what fellow 
feminist IR theorist V. Spike Peterson terms a “gender-sensitive lens”36 on the ways 
in which “national security” becomes militarized. Enloe explains how the notion that 
international politics requires “rationality,” in combination with the gendered 
assumptions that men are “rational” and women are “emotional,” means that “a 
certain kind of masculinity” has become “the entry ticket into national security 
discussions.” As a result, “how one thinks about national security not only affects 
global relations but determines who is even allowed to sit at the table to take part in 
the security conversation.” According to the conventional understanding of the term 
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“national security,” anything can be a threat, from women’s fertility (i.e., the 
argument that there are too many people using the world’s scarce resources) to 
foreign militaries and non-state actors. Instead, Enloe suggests a reprioritization of 
that which should be “secured” under the conceptual and operational rubric of 
“national security,” positing that “human security” may be more useful than “national 
security” in thinking about issues of security and safety.37 She also offers a discussion 
of the gendered dynamics of U.S. interrogation techniques at Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo Bay. Arguing that the torture and harassment of detainees by U.S. 
military personnel was part and parcel of American nationalist ideas about 
feminization in opposition to the privileging of particular militarized forms of 
masculinity, she points out that, because no one has yet to ask about the causes and 
consequences of wielding ideas about masculinity and femininity, the ways in which 
militarization can lead to torture remain unknown.38 
 Enloe’s call to examine the affects of the deployment of gender-as-discourse 
on international politics requires the acknowledgement and interrogation of what 
Peterson terms “gendered hierarchies,” which are marked by a systemic discursive 
“denigration of the feminine” accompanied by a glorification of particular forms of 
masculinity.39 She demonstrates the myriad ways in which this process requires not 
only feminization, as Enloe points out, but also heterosexism, “the institutionalization 
and normalization of heterosexuality and the corollary exclusion of non-heterosexual 
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identities and practices.” The institutionalization of heterosexism within nationalist 
projects and as part of international relations also “normalizes the subordination of 
women and naturalizes rape as an expression of male power against women and 
‘insufficiently masculine’ men,”40 thus requiring a performance of virile—and often 
violently militarized—heterosexual masculinity that is able to define itself in 
opposition to both. For example, Enloe argues that the United States’ continued lack 
of support for global human rights and demilitarization treaties originates in the 
Pentagon’s deft ability to convince civilian officials that U.S. “national security” 
would suffer, and these civilian officials, afraid of not appearing “manly,” are either 
unable or unwilling to stand up against military personnel. Enloe concludes that 
American political culture “equates military experience and/or military expertise with 
political leadership,” and that the “political competition to appear ‘tough’ has 
produced U.S. foreign policies that severely limit the American capacity to play a 
useful role in creating a more genuinely secure international community.”41 This 
analysis is borne out in historian Robert Dean’s critique of the construction and 
deployment of heteronormative masculinity among U.S. foreign policy elites during 
the Viet Nam conflict.42 
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Precept 3: Cultural texts as sites of public pedagogy 
 As my discussion thus far has shown, theorists of nations and nationalisms 
argue that nations depend on and are constituted by governing myths assembled out 
of the stories the nation tells itself about its own past. Yet, as feminist theorists have 
demonstrated, these stories are inherently gendered, racialized, and heteronormative, 
often resulting in a mythical, idealized notion of “woman” as the symbolic 
representative of national identity accompanied, paradoxically, by a denigration of the 
feminine in national culture, the texts of which “help construct the gendered 
nation.”43 Added to this gender hierarchy is a racial hierarchy, both of which are then 
elevated to the level of international politics, causing a nation-state to define itself in 
opposition and/or abjection to its feminized, racialized Other. 
 Because the work of these scholars rests on the feminist theoretical tenet that 
gender is socially constructed, their research archives are comprised largely of a 
variety of cultural texts that, as sites of nationalist mythmaking, have significant 
material implications for the formation of (gendered, racialized, heteronormative) 
national identities and the conduct of international relations. Dean, for example, relies 
for part of his analysis on discursive and textual analyses of the memoirs of several 
high-ranking and prominent policymakers, while Cynthia Enloe examines a range of 
cultural texts, including women’s Victorian travel literature, advertisements, 
Hollywood films, and the utilization of U.S. corporate logos to critique the 
deployment of gender-as-discourse in nationalisms and international politics. For 
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instance, she points to the romanticized depictions of the imperialist project via films 
like Out of Africa (1985), a fictionalized account of the life of writer Isak Dinesen 
starring Meryl Streep and Robert Redford, that provided the basis for the fashion 
trend in “safari wear” pedaled in the mid-1980s by stores such as Banana Republic. 
As African nationalist movements recede into history, Enloe is concerned that these 
movies, with their white female stars and fashionable clothes, “are gaining an 
ideological potency, making white women and their white male lovers the ‘real’ 
people of Africa for thousands of European and North American film viewers,” thus 
affecting a drastic revisioning and reimagining of the violent and exploitative 
European colonization of Africa and Asia during the nineteenth century.44  
 It is Enloe’s call to “take culture—including commercialized culture—far 
more seriously” when considering the ways in which fears of and assumptions about 
gender are wielded geopolitically that forms the impetus for my research.45 As 
political scientist François Debrix contends, it is only after interrogating geopolitics 
as a culturally-produced and historically contingent discourse deployed through 
cultural texts in order to produce a desired (and profoundly simplistic) political 
understanding of the world that one can “start to appreciate, and perhaps even 
challenge and unsettle, the cultural work that is required to turn a given visualization 
of the world into a dominant or hegemonic political strategy.”46 But interrogating the 
power of cultural texts as performative sites of public pedagogy—and of nationalist 
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mythmaking—requires a discussion of the means by which these (gendered, 
racialized, and heteronormative) nationalist governing myths are locally and globally 
dispersed.47 If, as Debrix demonstrates, geopolitics is a discourse, then all the “modes 
of writing and representation used to convey public messages (political or not) are of 
necessity the media through which the geopolitical discourse circulates.”48 Much as 
Benedict Anderson theorized that modern forms of nationalism emerged from “the 
convergence of capitalism and print technology,” particularly in the form of 
newspapers,49 I argue that contemporary nationalisms are analogously constituted by 
a variety of cultural texts that include not only print cultures, but also, as critical 
pedagogical theorist Giroux contends, “all those audio, visual, and electronically 
mediated forms of knowledge that have prompted a radical shift in the production of 
knowledge and the ways in which it is received and consumed” in this contemporary 
moment of globalization.50 Thus, as I will demonstrate in the following chapters, 
television programs, films, museums, congressional proceedings, and Internet sites 
are all important as producers of “narratives, metaphors, and images that exercise a 
powerful pedagogical force over how people think of themselves and their 
relationship to [O]thers.”51 As systems of representation,52 these cultural texts are 
                                                 
47 Cultural texts are performative in the sense that they, acting as discourse, (re)produce that which 
they simultaneous describe. 
 
48 Debrix, Tabloid Terror, 11. 
 
49 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 46. 
 
50 Henry Giroux, “Cultural Studies, Public Pedagogy, and the Responsibility of Intellectuals,” 
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 1, no. 1 (2004): 67. 
 
51 Ibid., 62. 
 
52 According to cultural theorist Stuart Hall, a “system of representation” “consists not of individual 




integral technologies through which nationalisms can be mobilized and nations, both 
one’s own and an(O)ther, constituted. Because the texts of U.S. popular and political 
culture, as performative sites of public pedagogy integral to national identity 
construction, operate collectively to interpellate national subjects into the collective 
“we” of the nation, they are a powerful venue for what performance studies scholar 
Richard Schechner calls “make belief,” the means by which a performance (in this 
case of the nation as discursively assembled via cultural texts) “create[s] the very 
social realities [it enacts].”53 
 
Interventions and Implications 
My work in this project draws attention to the links between cultural and national 
identities, the politics of knowledge production, and the circulation of power in 
transnational contexts by incorporating the approaches and perspectives of 
transnational feminist cultural studies, theories of performance, and feminist theories 
of international relations into an analysis of American nationalism and U.S. foreign 
policy. I utilize a transdisciplinary methodological approach that conceptualizes 
popular and political culture texts as sites of public pedagogy that work discursively 
(although not always successfully) as systems of cultural representation to construct 
knowledge about Russia in particular times, places, and spaces for specific political 
purposes. I use transdisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary to describe my research 
                                                                                                                                           
establishing complex relations between them.” Stuart Hall, “The Work of Representation,” in 
Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, ed. Stuart Hall (London: Sage 
Publications, 2003) 17. 
 





approach in order to draw attention to the ways in which it necessitates a tolerance 
for—and, indeed, the embracing of—research approaches that are uncomfortable, 
ambiguous, and messy. It encourages active and purposeful shifting between and 
among multiple academic locations in order to make knowledge that could not have 
been made otherwise. Consequently, my work here operates simultaneously as both a 
research model and a theoretical paradigm within which to interrogate the ways in 
which gendered, racialized, heteronormative discursive configurations are integral to 
the formulation of national/ist narratives and foreign policy objectives. 
 In keeping with this goal, this dissertation makes two interrelated critiques. 
The first, in which I take up the challenge posed by feminist sociologist Kathryn Farr, 
who urges an examination of the cultural environments in destination countries 
(usually industrialized locations in the global West) where various systemic and 
institutionalized gender-based inequities are (often insidiously) rampant, is of the role 
the United States plays in sustaining the traffic in women from Russia to the United 
States.54 According to a report from the United Nations Center of International Crime 
Prevention released in May 2003, Russia now tops the list of countries providing 
women-as-commodities in the global economy. Although most Russian women end 
up in Germany, the United States ranks second as a prime destination for women 
trafficked out of Russia.55 The United States government has, of course, admonished 
Russia on (what it perceives as) that country’s continued neglect of human rights, 
                                                 
54 Kathryn Farr, Sex Trafficking: The Global Market in Women and Children (New York: Worth 
Publishers, 2005).  
 
55 According to the same report, 96 percent of humans trafficked internationally are female and nearly 
half are children. Mizus, et al., “Germany, U.S. receive most sex-trafficked women,” Off Our Backs 





including with regard to the traffic in women; however, it refuses to acknowledge its 
own complicity in the forced migration of women and children from Russia to the 
United States.  
This complicity is the impetus behind the second critique offered here, which 
is the disclosure of the institutionalized and systemic exploitation of gendered, 
racialized, and heteronormative neocolonial rhetoric at work in both the material 
conduct of U.S. policy toward as well as in popular representations of Russia in the 
United States. Despite U.S. overtures of friendship toward (or at least begrudging 
attempts at cooperation with) Russia since 1991, the relationship between the two 
countries continues to deteriorate—partly as a result of U.S. policies that take their 
shape within the context of anti-imperialist imperialist nationalism.56 Additionally, as 
historian Ellen Schrecker points out, there has been no systematic examination of the 
means by which triumphalism and cold war histories reassert themselves in 
government policies and popular imaginations. After all, as historian Robert Dean so 
astutely reminds his readers, U.S. foreign policy is not made in a vacuum. It is, 
instead, created and implemented by (usually elite, white) men “who act from a 
repertoire of possibilities that are a product of their experience.”57 A fourth 
foundational precept buttressing my research, then, is that the (predominantly) elite 
                                                 
56 U.S. foreign relations historian Robert L. Ivie uses the term “anti-imperialist imperialism” to 
describe a major tenet of contemporary U.S. foreign policy. As he rightly points out, the U.S. promotes 
democracy abroad as a means of creating a world order conducive to its interests, a foreign policy 
approach that not only perpetuates cold war themes, but also reveals “strong overtones of national 
insecurity and vulnerability that drive the desire to dominate others.” Ivie, “A New Democratic World 
Order?,” in Critical Reflections of the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History, ed. Martin J. Medhurst 
and H.W. Brands (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 252. See also Dimitri 
Simes, “Losing Russia,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 6 (2007): 36-52. 
 





white men who make and implement U.S. foreign policy are not immune to the 
“frameworks of knowledge”58 formed by long exposure to American nationalist 
governing myths bolstered by the political and popular cultural texts that constitute 
the triumphalist mythscape of U.S. popular and political culture, of which the 
gendered Russian imaginary is an integral part. On the contrary, with the recent 
developments in global communications technologies allowing for real-time 
“telediplomacy,” in combination with the rapidity with which the political 
configurations in Eastern Europe shifted after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
foreign policy elites—including security officials and intelligence officers—often 
obtain their information in the same way the rest of us do: via the Internet and 
television news programs.59 As a result, the members of the contemporary U.S. 
foreign policy establishment, so many of whom served as “cold warriors” in federal 
governmental positions throughout the 1970s and 1980s before being asked to 
drastically alter their cold war worldviews after 1991, have, as I have intimated and 
will demonstrate in subsequent chapters, been plagued by an “ideology of 
masculinity.” This mindset demands from its adherents a self-conception 
necessitating the “cultivation of imperial masculinity” (i.e., the drive for U.S. 
                                                 
58 Gerbner, “The Image of Russians in American Media and the ‘New Epoch,’” in Beyond the Cold 
War: Soviet and American Media Images, ed. Everette E. Dennis, George Gerbner, and Yassen N. 
Zassoursky (London: Sage Publications, 1991), 31. 
 
59 Royce J. Ammon defines “foreign policy elites” in the U.S. as “top members of the State 
Department and other officials in the foreign-policy establishment; influential members of Congress; 
opinion leaders in the society at large, such as the major media outlets and their chief personalities; and 
members of think tanks and top academics.” Royce J. Ammon, Global Television and the Shaping of 
World Politics: CNN, Telediplomacy, and Foreign Policy (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 
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information via the Internet and television, see Patrick O’ Heffernan, Mass Media and American 
Foreign Policy: Insider Perspectives on Global Journalism and the Foreign Policy Process (Norwood, 
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hegemony in the world) and “the willingness to use American military power to kill 
unseen foreigners.”60 Just as cold war triumphalism, with its intrinsic justification of 
geopolitical unilateralism, has become an integral part of American nationalism in the 
post-Soviet period, so has the masculinism, racism, and heteronormativity of the 
“imperial brotherhood” as interrogated by Dean become constitutive of the 
formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. 
 
American Nationalism and the Triumphalist Mythscape 
The dustcover of Schrecker’s Cold War Triumphalism features a color picture of U.S. 
President Ronald Reagan astride a white steed (figure 2). Bedecked in the requisite 
attire of a rugged cowboy (white hat, plaid shirt, blue jeans and boots), the 
photograph, originally taken in June 1980 by Tony Korody, was digitally altered for 
the 2004 dustcover. In this new image, Reagan appears to have ridden through a 
storm whose forceful winds continue to whip past him. The revised photograph is 
also slightly out of focus, the visual effect of which is that of waking up from a dream 
(as that experience is normally depicted on television and in film). The white horse 
and Reagan’s white cowboy hat and light-colored shirt fairly glow in a picture that 
has clearly been chosen with a certain degree of irony to signal the mythical 
proportions of cold war triumphalism and its white, masculine, heterosexual hero, 
Ronald Reagan—a hero whose iconography draws explicitly on the American 
“Marlboro Man,” thus linking it to the more contemporary Diesel jeans cowboy. 
Interestingly, if conceptualized as two still photographs taken from the same film, this 
                                                 














picture and the Diesel jeans advertisement discussed previously could operate as a 
metaphor for U.S. post-Soviet geopolitical engagement.  
 The photograph of Reagan is the first scene, the public performance presented 
by the United States to the world: the heroic (white, male) victor of the cold war, a 
champion of “freedom” and “democracy,”61 bravely riding through gale force winds 
(or terrorist attacks) to face whatever challenges lie ahead. What follows in the Diesel 
ad is that which lies behind that performance: the exploitation of marginalized 
populations in order to achieve U.S. economic and national security. That the 
“violated” subject in the Diesel ad is both feminine and symbolic of Russian imperial 
culture is, within the context of the triumphalist mythscape, no coincidence. 
 The commonality linking these two images is the rugged, heroic (white) 
cowboy whose public triumph is easily depicted and described using the same images 
as that which are used to depict and describe his sexual violation of the plastic 
matryoshka dolls. Thus, what is missing is a third photograph portraying the events 
that occur between the image of a mythical Reagan and the sexually sated cowboy. 
The narrative constructed from these pictures has a beginning and it has an end, but, 
if you will forgive the pun, the climax is missing. Why? Might it be that the 
exploitative brutality of neocolonial U.S. Russia policy, represented here by the 
missing scene that would, if it existed, depict the national hero raping a series of 
                                                 
61 I have chosen to use quotation marks around the words “freedom” and “democracy” in this context 
to signal what feminist philosopher Namita Gotswami contends are the imperialist ambitions of the 
United States that, instead of the physical appropriation of land (the current occupation of Iraq and 
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applied, for example, via economic pressures to encourage states to adopt U.S.-style democratic 
governments) are the only meanings and applications of these concepts. Namita Gotswami, “Feminism 
against Empire,” paper presented as part of the lecture series, The Possibilities of Women’s Studies: 




plastic blow-up dolls, does not fit easily into the cold war triumphalist mythscape? 
This conspicuous absence serves as the primary catalyst for my work in this 
dissertation as I seek to expose the gendered, racialized, and heteronormative 
discursive configurations that were deployed by the U.S. in its conduct of U.S.-
Russian relations between the dissolution of the Soviet Union 1991 and the U.S.-led 














 In the last chapter, I explained the four basic foundational tenets that 
undergird my work in this dissertation: 
1. That stories told about the past have tangible effects in the present, 
particularly within the context of nationalist projects, which are always in 
flux and are, consequently, malleable; 
2. That nations, nationalisms, and relations between nation-states are 
constituted by and through gendered, racialized, and heteronormative 
discursive configurations; 
3. That these always already gendered, racialized, and heteronormative 
(his)tories a nation tells about itself are widely promulgated via a wide 
range of cultural texts which are intrinsically imbued with political 
significance, operating as sites of public pedagogy that make meaning and, 
therefore, affect material conditions and experiences; and 
4. The (predominantly) elite white men who make and implement U.S. 
foreign policy are not immune to the “frameworks of knowledge”2 formed 
                                                 






by long exposure to American nationalist governing myths bolstered by 
the political and popular cultural texts that constitute the triumphalist 
mythscape of U.S. popular and political culture. 
In this chapter, I demonstrate in more specific detail the ways in which I have applied 
these precepts to my own work throughout the remainder of the dissertation. I first 
provide some information concerning the historical development and deployment of 
gendered, racialized, and heteronormative discursive configurations in Russian and 
American nationalisms. I then explore the effects and consequences of those 
deployments, focusing on the depiction of Russia and Russians in U.S. media, 
particularly film and television, over the course of the last century. 
 
Gendered Russian Nationalism 
Russian nationalism—even the concept of a Russian nation—has been and, as argued 
by any number of scholars, continues to be problematic.3 Peter the Great declared 
Russia an empire in 1721, but it was a land-based imperial power in which the 
“colonies” were accessible by land travel, and colonial administrative policies were 
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Change: Sex, Class and Race in Literature and Culture, ed. Judith Newton and Deborah Rosenfelt, xv-
xxiv (New York: Methuen, 1985). 
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often simultaneously adopted in the metropole. Thus, for Russia, one of the largest 
empires in the history of the world at the turn of the nineteenth century,4 there has 
never been a concept of “over there-ness” as was arguably the case with regard to 
Britons’ conceptualization of the British Empire at its zenith, and is certainly true 
with regard to the normative conceptualization in the United States of contemporary 
American military and economic expansion. As a result, a long history of fluid 
territorial boundaries that may (or may not) encompass Russia’s “colonies” as well as 
constant debates about the inextricability (or not) of Russian national myth from 
Ukrainian history have made virtually impossible the construction of a Russian 
nation—even after 1991.5  
For three hundred years, the Russian Empire operated within a clear familial 
paradigm in which the Batiushka-Tsar’ (Father Tsar), the Christian god’s divine 
representative on earth, dealt with matters of state and politics, while Matushka-Rus’ 
(Mother Russia) symbolized the intangible, mystical (and mythic) Russian nation.6 
Not only have Russian women historically been “regarded as ‘the breeders’” and 
“perceived as the passive symbols of the nation,” there is a long tradition among the 
intelligentsia to “transform Russia into a feminized subject conceptualized by (mostly 
male) intellectuals/politicians/nationalists as irresistibly attractive, but at the same 
                                                 
4 In the twentieth century, the Soviet Union was eventually able to extend its own borders, whether 
geographical and/or ideological, to match those of the Russian Empire at its zenith. 
 
5 Russia’s August 1991 declaration of independence from the U.S.S.R. effectively “shrank [the borders 
of Russia’s imagined community] almost to those of Muscovy at the end of the sixteenth century, 
which meant that over 25 million Russians found themselves living outside the borders of the new 
Russian state.” Tolz, Russia, 12. Evidence of the impossibility of a stable Russian national identity 
remains clearest in the case of the breakaway republic of Chechnya, whose Muslim leaders have 
repeatedly requested sovereignty since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
 
6 Goscilo and Lanoux, introduction to Gender and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Russian 





time unknown and therefore frightening, thus provoking a simultaneous feeling of 
love and hatred.”7 Literary scholar Eric Naiman, for example, contends that 
throughout the 1920s, the Gothic literary tradition, which “is rooted in a woman’s 
(culturally induced) disgust with her own body,” was used widely in the literature, 
both fiction and non-, of the New Economic Policy (NEP).8 Naiman claims that anti-
NEP writers of the 1920s created a biologically deviant female body that became 
rhetorically representative of all that was anomalous in the NEP. He analyzes 
Bolshevik political theorist Aleksandra Kollontai’s use of language, images, and 
metaphors in her longest novella, Vasilisa Malygina (1923), and in her work with the 
Workers’ Opposition, accusing her of writing “misogynistic fiction” and of 
employing images of the female body to personify the politically and ideologically 
deviant forces she felt were at work within the Communist Party. Naiman also reads 
the poetry of Bolshevik supporter Vladimir Mayakovsky to link the NEP’s centrality 
of heterosexual sex—particularly violent sex—that measured the male subject’s 
social significance through his violation of the female Other, with its Silver Age 
forerunners.9  
A thorough understanding of Naiman’s argument here requires a brief 
discussion of the period in question, referred to as Russia’s “Silver Age.” Usually 
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8 Eric Naiman, “When a Communist Writes Gothic: Aleksandra Kollontai and the Politics of Disgust,” 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 22, no. 1 (1996), 11. The NEP was a stop-gap 
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associated with the urban centers of St. Petersburg and Moscow with their large 
communities of avant-garde artists and intellectuals, the short period between the 
1905 February Revolution and the start of the First World War  
[…] saw the arts explode in kaleidoscopic splendor, as the most brilliant 
talents in Russian art, literature, poetry, music, and the ballet combined and 
recombined their genius to produce a dazzling and ever-changing array of new 
creations that overwhelmed the senses. There seemed to be no end to the 
brilliance and variety that Russia’s Silver Age could achieve, and no limits to 
the heights to which its creations could ascend. 10 
But, despite this praise, cultural historians of this period, most notably theatre scholar 
Spencer Golub,11 have demonstrated quite successfully the negative use(s) these 
artists made of notions of biologically essentialized heteronormative femininity. 
According to Golub, creative (mostly male) intellectuals of the late imperial period 
co-opted female iconicity (both physiological and psychological) to express 
frustration with their own artistic and emotional isolation engendered by the dismal 
failure of the February Revolution and the humiliating defeat of the Russian navy by 
the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War, both in 1905. Playwrights, for example, 
created two personae, the femme fragile and the femme fatale, both of which 
anticipated the Bolsheviks’ exploitation of women as simultaneously positive and 
negative symbols of Russian morality in the 1920s. Golub argues that these theatre 
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artists, “unable to leap out of [themselves] to realize [their] social causes as social 
change, […] repeatedly leapt into [their] existential other”: Russia-as-woman.12 Their 
plays’ characters “expressed the creative intelligentsia’s ‘will to death’ disguised as 
beauty, engendered by the conflicting influences of the fin de siècle and the delayed 
mal du siècle of 1905.” In short, intellectuals and theatre artists of the Silver Age 
transformed their own social impotence into feminized versions of their former 
selves, replete with “a hopeful/hopeless metaphysics of passive expectancy.”13 In 
considering this, it is helpful to envision, as feminist theatre historian Catherine 
Schuler suggests, The Seagull’s Nina Zarechnaia and the actress who played her, the 
Silver Age’s most famous femme fragile, Vera Kommissarzhevskaia. 
Kommissarzhevskaia’s enormous popularity rested on her ability to transform the 
psychological fragmentation of the Chekhovian heroine into a new “modern” version 
of Russian femininity that, encouraged by the messianic and self-sacrificial themes of 
Silver Age intellectuals, “required the bearer to project the image of a fragile, 
ethereal, and rather helpless child.” 14 
 In this context, the irony of Golub’s title, The Recurrence of Fate, is not lost, 
for, as he contends, the Bolsheviks “had little tolerance for gender ambiguity and 
female metaphors,”15 and the fluidity of gender identity promulgated by Silver Age 
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14 Schuler, Women in Russian Theatre, 156 and 165. It is hardly surprising in the notoriously anti-
Semitic Russian Empire that Kommissarzhevskaia’s opposite, the feared femme fatale who “seemed 
purposely to confuse sex with love and embodied the paradox of love and death,” was dark-haired 
Jewish actress Ida Rubenstein, who played such characters as Salomé and Cleopatra. Golub, 
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theatre artists portended a similar fate for them as for the women whose oppressions 
and stereotyped characteristics they assumed as their own. The transitional period 
between the end of the Russian Empire and the creation of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics “trapped Russians in limbo, between remnants of a discredited 
past, with its values and hierarchies, and a ‘radiant future’ in the making, inspired by 
untested theories and faith in perfectibility.”16 The Bolsheviks sought this perfection, 
their promised socialist utopia, by utilizing a universal heterosexualized male 
normative in the creation of the new Soviet citizenry that confirmed the ideological 
death of “woman” while, simultaneously, rendering real women, with their physically 
marked feminine bodies, politically, socially and culturally deviant.17 During the 
process of (re)building the nation after the civil war, women were forgotten as direct 
participants in the revolutionary project, but were deemed necessary to its completion 
as physical conduits through which to “[define] the life and image of the new Soviet 
culture.”18 This project proceeded in two directions simultaneously. The first was 
informed by the gradual institutionalization and naturalization of Bolshevik 
educational theorist Nadezhda Krupskaia’s notion of “worker-mother,” which 
emphasized the value of the work women were already doing and sought to improve 
their educational opportunities and social conditions. This went hand in hand with the 
Bolsheviks’ desire to universalize its citizenry based on a heteronormative 
masculinized model. 
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 The second, pervasive among the oppositional intelligentsia, was the equation 
of women and the female body, specifically female genitalia, with what they, 
Bolshevik political theorist Aleksandra Kollontai and Bolshevik poet/playwright 
Vladimir Mayakovsky among them, viewed as the ideologically deviant and 
conciliatory NEP. Naiman posits that the sex act may have been synonymous with all 
forms of contamination and that women’s bodies, in general, and female genitalia, 
specifically, came to symbolize the lurking specter of politically “deviant” saboteurs 
against whom leading anti-NEP Bolshevik theorists issued constant warnings. He 
argues, for example, that Kollontai’s pamphlet, The Workers’ Opposition, written just 
before the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 to demand a party purge of “bourgeois 
elements” that had allegedly become insensitive to the needs of the working class, 
charts the gradual moral and physical corruption of the party (partiia—a feminine 
noun in Russian) and turns “her” into a “defiled, leaking internal space no longer 
secure against penetration.”19 
 Naiman’s argument corresponds well to that of historian Choi Chatterjee, who 
examines the gendering of Soviet narratives about the two 1917 revolutions, the first 
in February that ended with the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, the second in October 
in which the Bolsheviks came to power. She asserts that the February Revolution (a 
failure from the Bolshevik perspective), which is generally believed to have started in 
St. Petersburg when women began rioting to demand bread to feed their families, was 
feminized in Soviet popular and political culture as an example of how not to have a 
socialist revolution: “[T]he unruly participation of women” who intentionally strayed 
                                                 





from Lenin’s plan for systematic and organized rebellion had, according to the Soviet 
nationalist governing myth, cost the Bolsheviks a much-desired win. In contrast, the 
successful October Revolution was gendered masculine and upheld in Soviet popular 
and political culture as an exemplary revolution.20 
 This powerful conflation of gendered and nationalist discourses in the many 
eras of Russian nation-building has a long history and manifests itself in three 
specific ways: 1) Russia in comparison and competition with the global West, 
identified by its allegedly different religious, cultural, economic, and political 
institutions, 2) “Russians as creators and preservers of a unique multi-ethnic 
community […] profoundly different from European and Western empires,” and 3) 
“Russians as members of a community of Eastern Slavs, the origins of which lay in 
Kievan Rus.”21 Each of these possible approaches to Russian nationalism is explicitly 
gendered in that it depends on discourses of “progressive” masculinity and 
“traditional” femininity to construct a single “modern” Russian nation.22 For example, 
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22 Several scholars touch on this issue in their work, among them are: Schuler, Women in Russian 
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by charting “the evolution of the problematic morphology of the new Soviet Woman” 
and interrogating “the strategies of narration and emplotment used in Soviet 
propaganda for women,” Chatterjee exposes the dichotomous, paradoxical and often 
contradictory messages provided by the Soviet government during International 
Women’s Day celebrations throughout the 1920s and 1930s regarding the status and 
expectations of Soviet women. According to her, Soviet women were discursively 
transformed from a symbol of the traditional backwardness of Russia into “a cultural 
marker that broadcast the progressiveness and modernity of the Soviet Union to the 
world.” This is not to say, though, that the specter of women’s “backwardness” 
disappeared altogether from Soviet propaganda, but its use as a subtext of 
International Women’s Day literature should not, Chatterjee argues, be dismissed “as 
a mere reflection of Bolshevik misogyny. Rather, it served as a counterpoint to 
illustrate the achievements of Soviet women.” For instance, while women’s presence 
and participation in work and civil society increased, so did their enrollment in 
educational institutions of all levels and types. By the mid-1930s, International 
Women’s Day propaganda was underscored by “the growing pervasiveness of the 
idea of woman as both a qualified wage earner and consumer,” which served to create 
the mythological Stalinist heroine, who was both ultramodern in her financial and 
emotional independence and decidedly not in her implicit reliance on father-Stalin to 
reinforce “premodern notions of personal subjection and political subordination.”23 
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For the Bolsheviks, the idea was never to dismantle patriarchy, but to replace the 
authority of local males (husbands, brothers, fathers) with “that of the absent, 
omnipotent male of socialist patriarchy.” As a means of achieving this goal, the 
Bolsheviks told the history of women “in the tragic vein familiar to those steeped in 
the literary traditions” of Russia’s most famous (male) writers, a rhetorical strategy 
that served as justification for the Soviet government’s self-appointed mission to 
rescue and rehabilitate Soviet women from their “backwardness.” Thus, the status of 
women in the U.S.S.R. functioned “as a marker or an index of progressiveness” and, 
by the advent of the mythological Stalinist heroine of the 1930s, served as proof of 
the country’s modernity and its “vanguard position among European nations.”24  
 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, communism was in constant conversation 
with liberalism and fascism when it claimed to have solved the “woman question,” 
and, Stalin’s “rhetoric of feminist liberation,” asserts Chatterjee, did create a 
discursive environment in which to publicly express any sexist views (as they were 
rather narrowly conceptualized in that time, space, and place) was simply 
unacceptable. To do so would threaten the legitimacy of Stalin, the Soviet Union, and 
its policies as it worked to define itself partially in contrast to the freewheeling 
capitalist West and fascist Germany and Italy. According to Stalinist historiography, 
then, “Soviet women owed everything to the Stalinist Five-Year Plan” because it 
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managed to convert the backward baba into the modern New Soviet Woman and 
convince men to treat her with respect—at least outwardly.25  
 Unfortunately, though, as the Soviet system collapsed, so did the façade of 
gender “equality,” not only materially (in terms of women’s decreased employment 
opportunities, lack of political participation, and inability to access disappearing 
social services, et cetera), but also discursively. There has been a marked change in 
attitudes toward gender, women’s representation in the media, and “the acceptability 
of blatantly discriminating practices and statements.”26 According to Russian feminist 
Anastasia Posadskaya, the events of 1991 and the resultant quest for democracy and 
capitalism in the Russian Federation resulted in the widespread use of women’s 
bodies as commodities, particularly in pornography and prostitution, and the 
revitalization of Russian Orthodoxy meant a concomitant “resurgence of traditional 
attitudes toward gender relations.”27 Binary notions of sexual difference have been 
adopted, and the post-Soviet belief that domestic and family roles are women’s 
natural focus has been promoted in opposition to the tenets of Marxist-Leninism. This 
has included a discussion in the popular media of a national demographic crisis and 
fertility issues accompanied by pro-natalist pressures through government legislation, 
as well as the utilization of a historicized gender binary in which the state is equated 
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with masculinity, the nation with femininity. According to feminist scholars Gascilo 
and Lanoux,  
For the greater part of three centuries, Russian and Soviet heads of state have 
fostered a cult of masculinity, epitomized by imperial Russia’s all-male cadre 
of bureaucrats, military schools, and exclusive institutions for nobles, and 
subsequently by the Soviet Union’s ideological founding fathers, New Men, 
and Stakhanovite workers. By contrast, Russian nationhood historically has 
assumed female form, whether in the image of Mother Russia (Matushka-
Rus’, rodina-mat’), the Russian literary heroine, or the foreign currency 
prostitute—all endowed with the traits of irrationality, passion, enigma, 
submissiveness, and suffering invariably imputed to women.28 
 These same gender binaries resurfaced in Russian popular and political culture 
after 1991 as “post-Soviet self-commentary […] adopted an apocalyptic rhetoric of 
doom and self-flagellation” not unlike that which was promulgated during the Silver 
Age,29 and Russian politicians of all ideological perspectives utilized gendered 
imagery and metaphors, reminiscent of and often directly referencing and/or quoting 
writers from the late nineteenth-century Slavophile and Silver Age intelligentsia, to 
advance their particular political agendas.30 Prominent since 1991, for example, has 
been the routine narrative deployment of the Russian prostitute “in the symbolic 
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battle for Russia’s soul.” According to Russian and Slavic studies scholar Eliot 
Borenstein,  
[…] the collapse of the Russian state, the decline of patriotism, and the 
absence of a workable national idea share center stage in the Russian media 
and culture industry with tales and images of sexually uninhibited young 
women offering their bodies and their services to paying clients.31 
This material prostitution, which has long been used to signify national humiliation 
(as a male, rather than female, experience) in Russian/Soviet national narratives, is 
often configured as metaphorical: Russian popular and political culture has created a 
national/ist narrative in which Russia itself has been transformed into a “nexus of 
buying and selling, where everything of value is offered cynically to the highest 
bidder.”32 
 
Gendered American Nationalism 
The demise of the Soviet Union coincided with the culmination in U.S. popular and 
political culture of a long discursive process that feminist literary scholar Susan 
Jeffords terms the “remasculinization of America,” “a revival of the images, abilities, 
and evaluations of men and masculinity in dominant U.S. culture” in the years since 
the United States’ unexpected and humiliating defeat in Viet Nam.33 But that Jeffords 
points to the remasculinization of America after the mid-1970s suggests that gender-
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as-discourse, particularly attempts to masculinize the state while feminizing the 
nation, has long been constitutive of American nationalism. Feminist literary scholar 
Annette Kolodny’s close reading of dozens of American pastoral narratives written 
by men between the eighteenth and late twentieth centuries illustrates the ways in 
which the United States’ westward expansion and, later, industrialization, relied 
heavily on gendered imaginaries in which the land, unknown and potentially 
dangerous, was alternatively conceptualized as either a nurturing mother (the hope 
and promise of sustenance) or as a passive virgin awaiting domination by the 
masculinized U.S. state and its (male) explorers. These gendered imaginaries, 
Kolodny contends, provided a conceptual framework within which to view the vast 
expanses of the unknown land in the American west as feminine and, consequently, 
less alien and threatening.34 
 The gendered imaginaries enabled by American men’s pastoral writing, 
having emerged as they did from European colonial and pastoral narratives, are the 
bedrock of a messianic and chauvinistic American nationalism that, fueled by the 
United States’ alleged “victory” over the Soviet Union in the cold war, has been the 
source of the United States’ belief not only that “the default mode of humanity is to 
become Americans,” but that, consequently, the United States has a divinely-inspired 
duty to spread its vision of “democracy” and “freedom” to the rest of the world.35 
According to journalist Anatol Lieven, the essential elements of this “exceptional 
nationalism” are “faith in liberty, constitutionalism, the law, democracy, 
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individualism and cultural and political egalitarianism,” all of which have remained 
constant throughout American history and have been recently expanded to 
incorporate a “belief in the absolute superiority of free market capitalism, unlimited 
economic opportunity and consumerism” and, more controversially, “racial tolerance 
and equity” and “the rights of women.”36 The convergence of these values with 
American “exceptionalism” explains the United States’ historical tendency toward a 
type of geopolitical isolationism that, rather than a desire to withdraw completely 
from world affairs, enables the U.S., as unique among nation-states, to position itself 
as a reluctant and involuntary participant in the dealings of “inferior foreigners”—as 
long such dealings do not undermine U.S. national sovereignty. This (often explicitly 
racist) chauvinism legitimates U.S. military unilateralism: Because Other nation-
states are always already hostile and inferior, the U.S. “is free to dictate to them or 
even conquer them for their own good,”37 a logic that was used most recently to 
justify the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.  
 Paradoxically, while the United States looks for and embraces opportunities to 
spread its core values internationally, its neocolonial (and usually military) offensive 
has long been billed as its best defense against perceived threats of all kinds, whether 
local or global. A fervent messianic nationalism, made more salient by the demise of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 and conflated with masculinity through militarization, has 
historically gone hand in hand with paranoia and a perception of national 
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vulnerability (i.e. threats to “national security”) that rely on “an obsession with 
domestic subversion [and a] belief in an outside world dominated by enemies and 
potential traitors.”38 The maintenance of the cold war in the U.S., for example, relied 
in equal parts on repeated affirmations of America’s greatness as well as on the 
notion that communism, whether foreign or homegrown, posed an immediate threat 
to the singularly American values enumerated above. And, as Lieven rightly points 
out, an obsession with internal subversion during the cold war largely overshadowed 
any potential threat by the Soviet Union, resulting in an “anticommunist hysteria [that 
has] become part of American political culture.”39  
 What Lieven’s otherwise sound exploration of American nationalism’s causes 
and consequences ignores, however, is the role of gender—not to mention skin color, 
ethnicity, socio-economic status, sexual orientation, and other dimensions of 
identity—in creating and maintaining its governing myths. For instance, Lieven does 
point out that American nationalism is dependent for its continued maintenance upon 
the (his)tories the United States tells itself about its past. Consequently, not unlike 
many of the nationalisms explored by feminist and other critical scholars, American 
nationalism “continuously looks backward, to a vanished and idealized national 
past.”40 But what he neglects is that this past is not without its identitarian valences; 
the American past is the gendered, racialized past of colonial conquest and slave 
labor as described by Kolodny. 
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 The employment of a gender-sensitive lens enriches Lieven’s work by 
pointing to American nationalism’s reliance on unmarked masculinity to sustain 
itself. What Lieven misses in his discussion of anti-communism and the legacy of the 
cold war as constitutive of contemporary (i.e. post-1991) American nationalism, for 
example, is what Dean terms the “ideology of masculinity” within which he contends 
that U.S. cold war-era foreign and domestic policymakers were inextricably 
embedded, thus affecting in direct and material ways not only the decisions they 
made, but also the conceptual frameworks within which such decisions were 
formulated.41 Like Lieven, Dean argues of the immediate post-war years of the last 
century that as U.S. foreign policymakers “began forming a new global imperial 
alliance under U.S. leadership, in opposition to the Soviet Union,” they contributed to 
the creation of “a ‘national security state’ dedicated to the containment of 
communism and the expansion of a corporate capitalist world economic order.” They 
accomplished this task by deploying “alarmist rhetoric to persuade the American 
public that the Soviets posed an immediate and direct threat to U.S. interests and to 
world peace.” Unlike Lieven, however, Dean goes further. By incorporating a 
concern for the manipulation of gender-as-discourse into his analysis, he is able to 
argue convincingly that “[g]ender, sexuality, and the production and control of sexual 
secrets played a central role in many political struggles of the Red Scare era.” In their 
zeal to make a clear enemy of the Soviet Union, U.S. cold war-era policy elites 
“depicted the foreign service as a bureaucracy staffed by effete ‘cookie-pushing’ Ivy 
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league internationalist homosexuals and ‘pinks,’” thus “conflat[ing] fears of domestic 
political subversion and foreign aggression with anxieties about the maintenance of 
domestic social and sexual order.” Consequently, according to Dean, 
“[c]ountersubversive rhetoric linked behavior that subverted the ‘natural’ relations 
between the sexes with behavior that subverted the proper political relations of 
American society,” and  
Communism, depicted as an implacable, expansionist, militarily threatening 
enemy in its external imperial incarnation, was portrayed domestically as an 
“infection”; a conspiratorial, protean invasion of the boundaries of state and 
society, undermining national strength from within.  
 As such, communism, conflated with sexual “deviance,” could be—and was—easily 
linked to progressive politics through, for example, pejorative rhetoric about the 
“party girls” allegedly sent to enlist young men in the U.S. Communist Party. A 
conceptual progression from communism to sexual deviance to progressive politics 
also facilitated the post-war feminization of diplomacy and the foreign service while 
serving as a catalyst for McCarthyism, embedded within which was what Dean calls a 
“sexual inquisition” inside the State Department that was meant to publicly expose 
closeted homosexuals and other “less masculine” men who, the FBI argued, were 
easy targets for blackmail by Soviet intelligence. Dean concludes about America’s 
cold war-era governing myths that “[g]ender and the politics of sexuality and 
‘deviance’ were not peripheral issues; they were central to the operations of power 
within the state.”42  
                                                 





 This gender-sensitive analysis of McCarthyism reveals the gendered paradox 
at the heart of American nationalism: Its sustainability requires the paranoid rhetoric 
of a national (feminized) vulnerability to (feminized) threats of all kinds as a means 
of legitimating the state’s (masculinized and, usually, militaristic) expansionism, 
which has been justified by historicized references to the uniqueness of American 
“values.” Put another way, America, the feminized nation, must be conceptualized as 
vulnerable to threats, which are also feminized, making them, by their very nature, 
both dangerous and easy to defeat. Thus feminized, the nation to be protected and its 
threats to be eradicated together facilitate the state’s easy justification of its 
oppositional and (often) violent, masculinist bellicosity.  
 Dean concludes, for example, that the ideological origins of the Viet Nam 
conflict were rooted in attempts by U.S. foreign policymakers to live up to an 
idealized notion of American masculinity, and waging a war in Viet Nam was their 
chance to demonstrate their manhood in opposition to effeminate diplomats and 
“pink” communists. And feminist literary scholar Susan Jeffords argues that 
American cultural representations of Viet Nam—most of which were created by 
white men in the late 1970s and 1980s—signaled the remasculinization of American 
culture in the wake of the United States’ humiliating (and emasculating) military 
defeat. Jeffords’s analyses of several cultural texts, including novels, personal 
narratives, films, and television series, shows that the discourse of the war (re)equated 
masculinity and militarization with American national identity by positioning 
patriarchal figures, usually portrayed as veterans of Viet Nam, as representative of 




and active-duty military representatives were feminized as incompetent and 
ineffectual. This analysis is borne out exceptionally well in The A-Team (1983-1987), 
NBC’s action-adventure series about a group of fictionalized Viet Nam veterans 
living underground as “soldiers of fortune,” who, having been accused of robbing the 
bank of Hanoi in the final days of the Viet Nam conflict, elude a succession of 
bumbling and confused U.S. military personnel while concomitantly working to end 
injustice and strife wherever and whenever they can. According to Jeffords, The A-
Team is just one example of a slew of 1980s cultural texts that depicted ex-soldiers, 
particularly Viet Nam veterans, as “’victims’ of society, government, and the war 
itself,” thus “provid[ing] ‘evidence’ of a group of men who were themselves victims, 
on a par with women, blacks, and other disenfranchised groups.” This “evidence” 
made possible the argument that “(white) men were not oppressors but instead, along 
with women and men of color, themselves victims of a third oppressor, in this case 
the government,” which was explicitly feminized by virtue of its ineffectuality in and 
eventual defeat by Viet Nam.43   
 In American political culture, President Ronald Reagan capitalized on this 
popular anti-governmentality by casting himself as the masculine hero of his own 
morality tale in which he, as a self-positioned government outsider-made-American 
President, promised to single-handedly make government bureaucracy accountable 
for the failures of Viet Nam, first, by promoting the ingenuity and spirit of American 
individualism (which is in direct and explicit opposition to Soviet communism) and, 
second, by 
                                                 





[…] decreas[ing] the size of government itself and cut[ting] unwieldy 
bureaucracies that had come, according to Reaganites, more to serve the 
interests of lawmakers and bureaucrats who depend on their budgets than to 
address the real needs of citizens.44 
Thus, Jeffords demonstrates the ways in which masculinized, heroic anti-
governmentality, represented in American popular and political culture by the “hard 
[white, male] bodies” of actors Clint Eastwood, Sylvester Stallone, Bruce Willis, and 
Ronald Reagan, was narratively and visually deployed in the 1980s to avenge the 
emasculating failures of Viet Nam.  
 The ideological reach of this governing myth, already considerable by the end 
of the 1980s, benefited enormously from contemporaneous developments in Eastern 
Europe. Having led the United States to its inevitable “victory” over the Soviet Union 
seemingly overnight, Ronald Reagan, the quintessential icon of a rugged and virile 
American masculinity, and outpacing his apparently inconsequential sidekick, Soviet 
Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, became the hero of the cold war. As Schrecker rather 
sarcastically describes the logic of the triumphalist narrative, “[f]reedom, democracy, 
justice, courage, and the sheer grit and resolve of the American people triumphed 
over despotism and darkness.” She argues that this grave misuse of history to justify a 
post-Soviet national/ist present is “oversimplified and distorted,” leaving “no room 
for victims (as opposed to losers).” 45 
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The (Geo)Political Traffic in Gendered Imaginaries 
I asked in the last chapter, “What happens when the gendered signifier of the nation 
travels across borders and is deployed in an entirely different geographical, cultural, 
or historical context from that which it emerged?” I argue that it is in the sites and 
sights of the American triumphalist mythscape, of which the gendered Russian 
imaginary is an integral part, that answers to this question may be found—particularly 
because Russia’s configuration of itself as the world’s prostitute, recycled and 
reconfigured from the Silver Age, has been heavily influential in American 
imaginaries of post-Soviet Russia. Communication theorist George Gerbner contends 
that U.S. media outlets, because they are largely sympathetic to U.S. government 
policies, depict foreign countries in the way that the government wants them to, using 
information gleaned predominantly from government sources.46 For instance, linking 
a November 1985 New York Times survey in which 28 percent of those polled 
believed that the U.S.S.R. was an enemy of the U.S. during World War II to what 
media mogul Ted Turner, in the May 17-23, 1989 issue of Variety, called “hate 
films,”47 Gerbner argues that, because the media is a major producer and provider of 
images of foreign nationals for American audiences, the knowledge that most 
Americans have about Russia comes from the media. Consequently, like the rest of 
us, U.S. foreign policy elites are by no means immune to the (geo)political 
knowledge, the “belief” in an often polarized geopolitical imaginary in which the 
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global West and East are diametrically opposed, produced by and through these 
cultural texts.48  
 As the single ideologically binding and delimiting geopolitical imaginary of 
U.S. foreign policy for most of the last century, the cold war served as the primary 
catalyst for an overwhelming number of cultural texts, many of the most (in)famous 
of which are filmic, that, as historian Harlow Robinson deftly illustrates, narratively 
and visually depicted the Soviet Union, Russians, and/or communists according to the 
ebb and flow of U.S.-Soviet relations.49 According to Robinson, before World War II, 
Hollywood representations of Soviets/Russians in films such as Tovarich (1937), 
Ninotchka (1939), and Comrade X (1940) were largely negative, but after the 
December 1941 Japanese attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor brought the 
U.S. into an (albeit temporary) alliance with the U.S.S.R. against the Third Reich, 
representatives from the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration called on Hollywood 
producers to revision their representations of the Soviet Union and its citizens in 
order to provide the American movie-going audience with a less negatively valanced 
understanding of their new ally. Producers were happy to comply, and a number of 
pro-Soviet films, most notably North Star (1943) and Days of Glory (1944), quickly 
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made their way through the long production process and into U.S. cinemas. Ironically 
though, as Robinson notes, 
Just how quickly and apparently easily many Hollywood figures adapted to 
the changed situation is evident in the fact that the same writer, Melchior 
Lengyel, supplied the original story both for Ninotchka (before) and for Days 
of Glory (after). What a difference a war can make.50 
 However, neither the war nor the difference it made lasted much beyond the 
Yalta Conference in February 1945,51 and Hollywood was soon embarrassed by its 
wartime pro-Soviet sentiment, particularly because, according to Robinson, those 
films were a primary catalyst that sparked the controversial post-war investigation by 
the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) into alleged communist 
influence in American culture and education.52 While making note of the precipitous 
decline in the production of films featuring Russian/Soviet characters and plots 
between the mid-1940s and 1960, Robinson rightly points out that those fifteen years 
at mid-century marked the height of the cold war, and the sparse but negative filmic 
depictions of the Soviet Union during that time were integral to the geopolitical 
development of that country as the United States’ “primary military, economic, and 
ideological adversary.”53 This apparent fact of U.S. foreign policy persisted in 
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popular and political culture with precious little relief until the late 1980s, when 
Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev began the dual processes of glasnost (openness) 
and perestroika (restructuring) that, within a few short years, not only enabled the 
collapse of the entire Soviet system, but also rendered nonexistent Hollywood’s chief 
antagonist—almost. 
 Although Robinson does briefly mention that “[t]he seduction/ideological 
conversion of a Soviet woman through American/capitalist fashion and luxury […] 
became a standard feature of Hollywood screenplays about the U.S.S.R.,”54 what is 
surprisingly absent from his account of roughly a century’s worth of Hollywood 
filmic depictions of Russia and Russians—including those made after the demise of 
the Soviet Union in 1991—is any sustained analysis of the implicit sexism, 
heteronormativity, and Orientalism embedded in many of the films he discusses. In 
contrast, feminist literary critics Valentina Glajar and Domnica Radulescu contend 
that since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, “women from [Eastern Europe] in 
particular, have become a favorite and convenient site for the accumulation of 
stereotypical images feeding Western lust for the exotic and fear of the ‘barbaric.’” 
Because they are white and European, Slavic women  
[…] are not drastically Other and thus are endowed with an aura of 
familiarity, or of Europeanness, and yet they are not fully familiar, or 
European either, as they come from the more remote regions of Europe, 
perceived as almost Oriental, as almost exotic, yet not fully so.55 
                                                 





 Feminist scholar Roumiana Deltcheva goes further, asserting that since the 
fall of the Soviet Union, “the Slavic slut, ready to sell her body and soul for 
greenbacks, has become as much of a fixture in Western cinema as the Russian 
villainess used to be in James Bond movies during the Cold War.” Although “exotic” 
and Other, Slavic women are white people from (albeit peripheral) European spaces 
and are, therefore, easy scapegoats for Western media pundits who interpret “their 
social downfall […] as a consciously chosen path, rather than as the result of 
social/political circumstances imposed upon them.” Pointing to the “perspective of 
geographical differentiation” of Eastern Europe as articulated “within artistic 
representations by Western artists,”56 Deltcheva contends that post-1991 filmic 
depictions of Eastern European women fall into three basic categories (or some 
combination thereof): “the scrupulous slut, the conniving trickster, and the helpless 
victim.” Each of these three stereotypes “carr[ies] distinct negative connotations that, 
in their totality, reinforce the idea of Otherness as negation: negation of voice, 
negation of space, negation of experience.”57  
 For example, with a nod to Edward Said, feminist literary scholar Agnieszka 
Tuszynska offers a critical reading of a film entitled The Birthday Girl (2001), 
starring Nicole Kidman as Nad’ya, a Russian mail-order bride, to argue against the 
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dichotomous notions of Self and Other that occupy Western epistemologies. She 
points out that “[i]n order to make the process of othering more efficient and 
unambiguous in its exclusionary implications, the West has employed a rigid system 
of binary oppositions, which draw clear lines between ‘us’ and ‘them.’” This, of 
course, is also a statement about who has geopolitical power and the ability to wield 
it, when and why, a struggle that manifests itself, Tuszynska contends, in The 
Birthday Girl as both the depiction of and the site at which global East and West 
“confront each other in a much-telling setting which renders the Eastern European 
woman a commodity and the ultimate ‘other.’”58 In the film, Nad’ya’s refusal to 
speak and her ready willingness to fulfill in complete silence her British husband’s 
sexual fantasies of bondage and sado-masochism operate as a “microcosm of the 
modern world’s power structure, in which domination is not always exercised through 
violence, but more and more often through multidimensional—economic, social, and 
ideological—oppression.”59 As Nad’ya is both a woman and Russian, her gender, 
national origin,  and ethnicity intersect, making her white, British (Western) husband 
feel both like a “man” and a “conqueror,” while her (hetero)sexuality becomes “the 
aim of modern-day colonialism; her body is invaded and transformed for the purpose 
of the Englishman’s entertainment.” But then, abruptly, the film’s narrative shifts as 
Nad’ya, like all typical Hollywood femmes fatales (a common filmic archetype that I 
will discuss more fully in chapter 6), turns out to be not what she seems, and is, 
instead, “transformed into the cinematographic ‘type’ of the cunning Russian woman-
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spy, who maims Western men with her deceptive sexuality and uses them for her own 
ends.”60 Not coincidentally, this narrative shift occurs just as Nad’ya begins to 
express her thoughts and desires verbally—using excellent English-speaking skills 
that her husband (and the viewing audience) has been led to believe she does not 
possess. The moment she begins to speak, she becomes an enemy. 
 Tuszynska contends that The Birthday Girl places the relationship between 
Nad’ya and her British husband within the context of the much-heralded and 
allegedly inherent differences between the global East and global West in which the 
East is depicted in Western post-Soviet news media and popular culture as 
economically devastated and underdeveloped, while the West is discursively 
constructed as a parental figure to Eastern Europe, suggesting that region’s alleged 
“infantile nature, and thus its inferiority and inability to govern itself in a responsible 
and mature manner.” She rightly points out that this “same rhetoric […] is 
characteristic of the language used in patriarchal, sexist societies to refer to women,” 
thereby comparing men’s treatment of women in heteropatriarchial societies to the 
post-Soviet treatment of Eastern Europe by the industrialized “democracies” of the 
global West, a topic to which I will return in the next chapter.61 
 Given these feminist analyses of the gendered, racialized Hollywood 
depictions of Russia and Eastern Europe produced since 1991,62 it is easy to see now 
why the Diesel Jeans advertisement with which I began the last chapter is so 
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problematic. First, the ad unambiguously suggests that a passive, feminized Russia is, 
geopolitically speaking, available and willing to do whatever the masculinist United 
States commands—a notion that potentially reinforces not only what U.S. foreign 
policymakers think they already know about post-Soviet Russia, but also U.S. 
neocolonial attitudes about the (un)limits of U.S. geopolitical power. Second, the 
Diesel Jeans advertisement is an example of a disturbing discursive trend in U.S. 
popular and political culture between the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 
U.S. declaration of war on Iraq in 2003 in which post-Soviet Russia was explicitly 
sexualized and gendered in U.S. popular and political culture. Conceptualized as 
politically and ideologically “backward,” the Russian Federation was frequently 
depicted as a feminized and/or emasculated entity that was potentially duplicitous, 
antagonistic, sexually voracious, a threat to U.S. national security, and/or an innocent 
victim of circumstances beyond its control and, consequently, in need of salvation 
and resurrection. These gendered Russian imaginaries, as discursive systems of 
cultural representation and nationalist mythmaking, bolstered a triumphalist 
American nationalism whose narrative worked to “make belief” about a strong, 
masculinist U.S. national identity in opposition to that which was Russian/Soviet. 
Alarmingly, though, given the “rise in mass abuses and violence against [Slavic 
women], either as a result of new ethnic wars or of the new social phenomenon of the 
trafficking of women and girls for sex from East European to Western countries,” 
Glajar and Radulescu argue that 
[W]hat happens to women in society is directly related to the ways in which 




artistic constructions of that culture. This relationship is not seen in terms of 
one-sided views of mimetic representations of reality but in terms of dialogue 
and interconnectedness between a culture’s ideological constructs, artistic 
representations, and its social realities.63 
 The production and operation of the gendered Russian imaginary within the 
triumphalist mythscape re/inscribes the Russian Federation as a gendered, racialized 
Other to the United States, thus creating a cultural atmosphere in which the 
exploitation of feminine and/or emasculated bodies as representative of Russia makes 
plausible the material traffic in “real” women and girls from Russia into the United 
States for work in the sex industry. Radulescu contends that the reductive 
representations of Eastern European women in American culture as embodying some 
essence of an “exotic” culture fuels the seemingly-boundless desire in the West for 
“whatever is perceived as ‘exotic’ femininity,” especially that which is not visibly 
Other. This, she argues, “can easily be translated into the practice of objectifying and 
treating flesh and blood women as inferior beings” and may well be both cause and 
consequence of the increasing numbers of Russian and Eastern European women and 
girls who are trafficked to the West for work in the sex industry.64 This link between 
cultural representations and material reality enables me to consider the ways in 
which, once the deployment of gender, heterosexuality, and ethnicity in national 
governing myths works to create gendered, racialized nationalisms, those national 
performances travel and are then translated and transformed in different spacetimes 
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within and among the circuits of power that constitute this and previous historical 
moments of globalization. For instance, the Soviet Union’s fashioning of its gendered 
national identity in the 1910s and 1920s, itself built on a long tradition of gender-as-
discourse as it developed in the imperial period, has been instrumental in forming not 
only post-Soviet Russian conceptualizations of itself as the world’s prostitute, but 
also U.S.-based knowledges about the Russian Federation since 1991. Consequently, 
I posit an expanded conceptualization of “trafficking” to connote the exploitative 
cultural representation of Other gendered, racialized, heteronormative bodies in 
media and popular culture to justify particular political agendas. If the process of 
trafficking is “a practice which treats human beings as commodities,”65 and the noun 
“traffic” refers to the movement of an entity though an area or along a route across all 
kinds of borders, then certainly the depiction of Russia and Russians in U.S.-based 
English-language media and popular culture can be considered a form of “imagined” 
trafficking that has direct material effects on both U.S. foreign policy toward Russia 
and on the continued “real” trafficking of Russian women into the United States for 
work in the sex industry.
                                                 






Freedom for Whom? Support for What? 
Making Feminist Sense of U.S. Russia Policy 
 
 
“The ‘freedom’ guaranteed to some individuals in society 





 In the little more than two years between the fall of the Berlin Wall in the 
summer of 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, U.S. 
policymakers who had lived their lives within the context of the cold war came to 
realize that the geopolitical changes in Eastern Europe necessitated a conceptual 
reorientation of their understanding of the hostile relationship between the United 
States and the Soviet Union and between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the countries of the defunct Warsaw Pact. Despite their understandable 
penchant for suspicion, developed during a time when the Soviet Union was 
considered an “evil empire,” legislators recognized that they would have to support, 
with cautious optimism and as friends in need, a unified Germany, new democratic 
governments in Poland and Hungary, and, in early 1992, the Newly Independent 
States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. They appreciated and embraced with 
enthusiasm the historical importance of their task, which they interpreted as nothing 
less than the creation of an entirely new geopolitical paradigm. Representative 
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Howard L. Berman (D-California), presiding as chairperson over a March 1992 
hearing before the House Subcommittee on International Operations, most concisely 
expressed the consensus inside the Beltway: “We have won the Cold War. Now it is 
profoundly in our interests to build a lasting and stable peace.”2  
 The provisions by which the United States would accomplish this momentous 
task—the building of a “lasting and stable peace”—were codified as U.S. Public Law 
102-511, the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open 
Markets Support Act of 1992. Colloquially dubbed the Freedom Support Act (FSA), 
the legislation authorized U.S. bi- and multilateral assistance to the independent states 
of the former Soviet Union.3 It amended or repealed several cold war-era prohibitions 
on economic, humanitarian, and other forms of assistance to the region and extended 
the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, which authorized 
U.S. aid only to Hungary and Poland, to incorporate assistance to the successor states 
of the Soviet Union. Described as “the most important piece of legislation coming 
down the pike with regard to foreign policy in years”4 and as “every bit as much a 
policy statement as a legislative package,”5 the Freedom Support Act was and 
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3 Multilateral aid is given by donor countries to international financial institutions, usually the 
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remains the first and only proposal that not only identified specific U.S. concerns 
about the status of Russia’s political and economic systems and enumerated ways to 
alleviate them, but also addressed strategies for reorienting the entirety of U.S. 
foreign policy in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It thus operates as both 
a blueprint for U.S. Russia policy since 1991 and, more broadly, for the ways in 
which a triumphant United States, concerned with how the world’s only remaining 
“superpower” should conduct itself in the absence of a clear geopolitical adversary, 
reified its masculinist credentials on the global stage by self-consciously positioning 
itself in opposition to an (often gendered, racialized) Other.  
 My task in this chapter is not to chronicle the material consequences of the 
Freedom Support Act, but to decipher its ideological causes. I utilize a cognitive 
approach to foreign policy analysis in order to expose “the complex processes by 
which certain frames used in policy debates employ themes that resonate with popular 
ideology and are woven in and through the everyday practices of policy 
construction.”6 I interrogate the ideological assumptions undergirding the 
Congressional hearings that constitute the bulk of the Freedom Support Act’s 
legislative history, focusing particularly on the ways in which those assumptions were 
repeatedly manifest in the metaphors and analogies utilized by policymakers and 
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witnesses throughout the hearings. I identify and critique the salience of discourses 
touting “modernity,” capitalist democracy, “freedom,” American exceptionalism, and 
conventional notions of “development” that converged during the hearings, held 
between June 1991 and May 1992, to formulate the ideological foundation upon 
which post-Soviet U.S. Russia policy rests. 
 I also bring together the work of feminist development and international 
relations theorists to offer a feminist assessment of the objectives and provisions of 
the FSA. What, I ask, was the legislation optimally designed to do? What were the 
gendered implications and consequences of its objectives and provisions when put to 
work on the ground in Russia? Which issues are most prevalent, and which were 
(often unintentionally) omitted? Whose perspectives and concerns were taken into 
account in the formation and implementation of the FSA, and whose were excluded? 
In short, for whom and/or what did the Freedom Support Act of 1992 work to 
facilitate “freedom” and why? And who and/or what did the FSA “support?”  
 Because the demise of the Soviet Union corresponded with the ascendancy of 
neoliberal economics,7 it is hardly surprising that the apparent a priori domination in 
the FSA of the material interests of U.S.-based corporations and the ideological 
interests of American nationalism reveals the corporatized neocolonialism that fueled 
the inception and implementation of U.S. Russia policy.8 The FSA’s pro-business 
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priorities also reveal the striking absence among U.S. policymakers—despite what 
was, at that time, roughly twenty years’ worth of feminist critiques of capitalist 
democracy and conventional cold war-era development paradigms—of any concern 
for or consideration of how U.S. Russia policy would affect ordinary Russian people, 
particularly women, children, and other historically marginalized groups who were 
most negatively affected by U.S.-led “reform” efforts in the 1990s. Finally, I contend 
that in their formulation and implementation of the FSA, U.S. policymakers relied 
simultaneously on three interconnected gendered Russian imaginaries, the damsel in 
distress, the evil mother-figure, and the wily temptress, thus revealing the gendered, 
racialized, and heteronormative tropes operating within the discursive frames that 
shaped U.S. Russia policy in particular, and U.S. foreign policy more generally, 
throughout the 1990s. 
 
The Freedom Support Act 
Enacted on October 24, 1992, in the last months of the George H.W. Bush 
presidency, the Freedom Support Act was, as its title indicates, intended to “support 
freedom and open markets in the independent states of the former Soviet Union.”9 It 
authorized U.S. monetary support of and participation in multilateral Russian aid 
programs as well as bilateral aid in the form of technical advice and assistance on 
projects leading to the democratization of the new country’s political system, defense 
conversion, and the systemic privatization of Soviet-era state-run industries. At its 
most basic level, the Freedom Support Act was an extension to the former Soviet 
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Union of the provisions of Public Law 101-179, the Support for Eastern European 
Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, whose goal was  
To promote political democracy and economic pluralism in Poland and 
Hungary by assisting those nations during a critical period of transition and 
abetting the development in those nations of private business sectors, labor 
market reforms, and democratic institutions.10  
In its authorization of U.S. federal bi- and multilateral aid to the NIS,11 the Freedom 
Support Act retained the basic spirit of the SEED Act while also adding to the latter’s 
focus on economic and political reforms a concern for the conversion for civilian 
purposes of the Soviet-era military and defense infrastructure. Title II of the FSA 
enumerates the following economic assistance activities to the NIS: 
1. To fulfill urgent humanitarian needs. 
2. To foster “a democratic and free society.” 
3. To establish free market systems “based on the principle of private ownership 
of property.” 
4. For the purpose of “creating conditions that promote trade and investment, 
and encouraging participation of the United States private sector in the 
development of the private sector” throughout the NIS. 
5. To assist with food distribution and production. 
                                                 
10 Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989, U.S. Public Law 101-179, enacted by the 101st 
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6. To promote programs that improve health and human services, particularly 
“voluntary family planning services, housing, and other services and policies 
that are components of a social safety net, particularly for infants, children, 
and people with disabilities.”12 
7. For education and educational television, especially the development of 
textbooks and imparting to television professionals throughout the NIS the 
knowledge needed to produce educational television programming that 
promotes the “basic skills and the human values associated with a democratic 
society and a free market economy.”13 
8. To promote energy efficiency and production through market-based pricing 
policies and concern for the environmental consequences of production. 
9. To ensure civilian nuclear reactor safety. 
10. For environmental conservation and resource management. 
11. For the improvement of the transportation and telecommunications 
infrastructure and management. 
                                                 
12 Justifiably negative critiques of U.S. Russia policy throughout the 1990s point repeatedly to the 
failure of U.S. and IMF/World Bank assistance efforts to preserve the social safety nets that had 
existed in the Soviet Union. See especially Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mandelbaum, ed., 
Sustaining the Transition: The Social Safety Net in Postcommunist Europe (Washington, DC: Council 
on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1997); and Judyth L. Twigg, “What Has Happened to Russian Society?” in 
Russia after the Fall, ed. Andrew C. Kuchins (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2002), 147-162. 
 
13 This provision is clearly the result of the testimony of several witnesses, including two from the 
U.S.-based Children’s Television Workshop, which produces Sesame Street, who testified before the 
Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs on May 6, 1992 in advocacy of U.S. funds earmarked 
specifically for the development of children’s educational television in Russia. The inclusion of such a 
provision in the Freedom Support Act is an explicit acknowledgement by Congress that television can 
be a powerful pedagogical tool. Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs, The Role of Children’s 
Educational Television in the Transformation of the Former Soviet Union, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., May 





12. To address the problem of illegal drugs, including “[p]romoting drug 
education, interdiction, and eradication programs.” 
13. To attend to issues of migration, particularly “[p]rotecting and caring for 
refugees, displaced persons, and other migrants; addressing the root causes of 
migration; and promoting the development of appropriate immigration and 
emigration laws and procedures.” 
Regardless of the sheer magnitude and breadth of the planned U.S. portfolio, the 
provisions and objectives of which were ostensibly meant to effect a total political 
and economic transformation in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, 
these thirteen seemingly disparate thematic areas to which U.S. aid could be applied 
cohered to facilitate the continued military prowess and increasing economic 
dominance of the United States on a transformed geopolitical stage. It is items two, 
three, and nine, which explicitly promote democratization, privatization, and defense 
conversion, that form the core of the U.S. assistance program as outlined in the 
Freedom Support Act; the other items are subsets of these three paradigmatic issues 
and provide for the economic interests of a variety of U.S.-based business sectors, 
from educational services and health care, to telecommunications and transportation.  
 The primacy of democratization, privatization, and defense conversion in the 
FSA is embedded in the legislation’s concern for the interrelated processes by which 
they would be concomitantly achieved. In addition to its attention to the development 
of business opportunities for the U.S.-based aerospace and agricultural sectors,14 the 
FSA called for the establishment of American Business Centers throughout the NIS 
                                                 





that would operate as sites of information on and for the administration of potential 
cooperative agreements and commercial partnerships between U.S.-based businesses 
and local NIS ventures.15 It also called for the establishment of the Democracy Corps, 
a non-governmental, non-profit organization to be incorporated in the District of 
Columbia, whose express purpose was to set up and operate sites throughout the NIS. 
Through technical advice and assistance and small grants (under $5000 USD) to 
people and organizations identified by Corps consultants as able to do the work of 
democratization, the Democracy Corps was to assist in the development of 
“institutions of democratic governance (including judicial, electoral, legislative, and 
administrative processes),” the non-governmental organizations that constitute civil 
society (“including charitable, educational, trade union, business, professional, 
voluntary, community, and other civic organizations”), and the development of a 
market economy.16 The Freedom Support Act also incorporated into its support of 
freedom and open markets nonproliferation and disarmament programs and activities 
that explicitly addressed U.S. lawmakers’ concerns about the potential threats to the 
national security and territorial integrity of the United States in the absence of central 
control of the Soviet Union’s massive stockpile of nuclear, biological, chemical, and 
conventional weapons.17 The FSA also included provisions for the commencement of 
U.S. Information Agency and State Department activities throughout the former 
Soviet Union, particularly diplomatic missions and educational programming.18 A 
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reading of the Freedom Support Act reveals that U.S. assistance in three crucial 
areas—economic reform, democratization, and defense conversion—was deemed by 
policymakers to be the best and most efficient way of “support[ing] freedom and 
open markets” in the former Soviet Union and ensuring that its successor states, 
particularly Russia, would be effectively integrated “into the community of 
democratic nations,” thus becoming part of “a peaceful and stable international order” 
in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise.19 
 
Implementation 
Thirteen billion dollars in U.S. federal monies were allocated in fiscal year 1993 as 
part of the Freedom Support Act. This figure constituted the bulk of a twenty-four 
billion dollar G7 aid package announced by President George H.W. Bush on April 1, 
1992 and included an authorized increase in the allowable annual U.S. contribution to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).20 Although subsequent years saw variations 
on the amount of U.S. dollars Congress was willing to allocate for NIS assistance, 
available U.S. financial resources earmarked for the former Soviet republics 
throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century were divided between the 
                                                                                                                                           
 
19 Ibid., sec. 101. From a U.S. perspective, the import of being able to accept Russia into a “community 
of democratic nations” rested on the notion of a “democratic peace,” the assumption, commonly held 
among conventional International Relations scholars and U.S. foreign policymakers, that democracies 
do not wage war against each other. For critique of the “democratic peace” theory, see Ivie, “A New 
Democratic World Order?,” 256-258.  
 
20 Freedom Support Act, sec. 1001. The G7 (Group of 7), currently known as the G8 as a result of the 
addition of Russia in 1997, was an international forum for the governments of Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Interestingly, U.S. President 
George H.W. Bush did not discuss the proposed multilateral aid package with either Russian Finance 
Minister Yegor Gaidor or the other G7 heads of state. For more on this, see James M. Goldgeier and 
Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia after the Cold War (Washington, 





IMF’s multilateral structural adjustment programs on the one hand, and U.S.-
administered bilateral efforts on the other. According to the provisions of the FSA, all 
U.S. bilateral efforts were coordinated and governed by a single presidential 
appointee within the State Department.21 In the Clinton administration, this position 
was held by Ambassador Richard L. Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President 
and Secretary of State on Assistance to the NIS, who, according to anthropologist 
Janine R. Wedel, designated the bulk of his oversight responsibility to the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID). In turn, USAID, fearful that it had 
no expertise in Eastern Europe, relinquished much of its portfolio to a private entity, 
Harvard University’s Institute for International Development (HIID).22  
 The specific provisions of U.S. aid to Russia in the first post-Soviet decade 
were consistent with trends in Western aid to Eastern Europe more generally, which 
took the form of technical assistance (rather than direct government-to-government 
monetary aid) and was intended to foster the privatization of state-owned enterprises 
and the development of markets for Western-produced goods and services.23 As is 
apparent from a series of relevant Congressional hearings held between June 1991 
and May 1992 (to which I will return in the next section), the Marshall Plan, the U.S. 
plan for European recovery after World War II, was the point of reference for U.S. 
aid to Eastern Europe, but as Wedel points out, there were some significant 
differences: While the Marshall Plan had been ninety percent grant aid in the form of 
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capital assistance (i.e. monies allotted directly to European governments that did not 
have to be paid back), aid to Eastern Europe in the 1990s was comprised largely of 
export credits, loans, and debt relief.24 Western assistance to Eastern Europe and the 
NIS after 1991 thus equaled advice, not cash, and Wedel joins the many critics of 
U.S. Russia policy, arguing that this “help” did not in any way attend to the needs of 
the people of Eastern Europe. Goldgeier and McFaul concur, pointing out that the 
U.S. financial commitment in Russia throughout the 1990s, despite being in the tens 
of billions of dollars, was wholly inadequate to successfully implement even the 
policy priorities of the Freedom Support Act, let alone those issues (such as social 
welfare, health care, and education reform, all of which are the sectors through which 
women, children and other marginalized populations are most likely to interact as 
citizens) that, although mentioned in the Freedom Support Act as within the 
framework U.S. Russia policy, took a back seat to the Harvard Institute for 
International Development’s (HIID) economic “reform” efforts.  
 Under the direction of Harvard economics professor (and neoliberal economic 
theorist) Jeffrey Sachs, who had in the late 1980s successfully guided Poland and 
Hungary through their own economic transformations from communism to 
capitalism, HIID helped to define the “reform” agenda for the NIS by facilitating a 
rapid transition from communism to capitalism. Known colloquially as “shock 
therapy,” the Harvard Project’s approach to economic reform in Russia assumed that 
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a free market economy is the “natural” or “normal” state of the economy. In theory, 
“shock therapy” requires several concurrent measures, including price liberalization, 
macroeconomic stabilization, privatization of state resources, and free international 
trade and investment, all of which must be done as rapidly as possible in order, first, 
to create a new capitalist system in place of the old state-based command economy, 
and, second, to prevent the supporters and beneficiaries of communism from 
mounting an effective counter-action.25 With the authority to administer U.S. federal 
funds in the billions of dollars, all earmarked for Russian assistance programs, Sachs 
and his team at Harvard identified a group of pro-Yeltsin Russian “reformers,” led by 
economists Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidor, and designated them as the exclusive 
administrators of U.S. aid monies in Russia.26 
 Desperate for foreign aid in the months immediately after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, the Russian Duma approved Yeltsin’s request for a year’s worth of 
executive powers to issue laws by decree in 1992-1993. In this climate, Yeltsin turned 
to his friends and advisors, Chubais and Gaidor, who hired economists from the 
Harvard Project to work as consultants to the Russian government. Together, and 
with Yeltsin’s support, this team of Russian and U.S.-based economists took optimal 
advantage of their ability to make sweeping changes to Russia’s economic 
infrastructure, without parliamentary oversight, by liberalizing prices and selling off 
the assets and resources of the former Soviet Union. This money trail (i.e. from the 
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U.S. government to USAID to HIID to the Chubais Clan and back to HIID’s 
economists as paid consultants) left precious little room for transparency or 
accountability and created a situation in which a single private entity (Harvard 
University’s HIID) was not only responsible for implementing and overseeing U.S. 
bilateral assistance to Russia, but was also its chief recipient.27 Ironically, the 
implementation of U.S. aid in Russia circumnavigated the very democratic processes 
it was supposed to facilitate. 
 
Consequences 
U.S. bilateral reform efforts, driven by the principals of “shock therapy,” resulted in 
increased hardships for the majority of Russians. The removal of price controls 
resulted in high inflation, putting the prices of most consumer goods beyond reach, 
and the rapid privatization of state-run industries wiped out the Soviet Union’s 
“extensive and universal social safety net” that, although “meager,” reliably provided 
education, health care, pensions, job security, housing, transportation, child care, 
vacations, and so forth.28 Although the pension system did remain a political priority, 
other elements of the social network evaporated as the transition to capitalism meant 
that the state could/would no longer maintain those programs. The result was 
widespread and extreme poverty caused predominantly by unemployment or low-
                                                 
27 According to Wedel, Harvard-based members of the Chubais Clan, to which the Harvard Project 
assigned the entirety of its Russia portfolio, included Sachs, Harvard economics professor and chief 
World Bank economist (and eventually Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs under 
Clinton) Lawrence Summers, and Harvard economics professor Andrei Schleifer. 
 
28 Judyth L. Twigg, “What Has Happened to Russian Society?,” in Russia after the Fall, ed. Andrew C. 




paying jobs.29 This led to other social ills: Heavy drinking was ubiquitous and illegal 
drug use increased, as did rates of violent crime and reported cases of HIV/AIDS. 
Life expectancy plummeted while the number of premature deaths from suicide, 
alcohol-related causes, or infectious/parasitic diseases skyrocketed, the latter because 
medicines were often unavailable to the poor. Journalist Naomi Klein provocatively 
suggests that Russians, who were quite literally disappearing after the implementation 
of “shock therapy,” have been the victims of “economic genocide.”30 
 Russian society at the end of the first post-Soviet decade was starkly divided 
into a precious few haves and a large majority of have-nots, and it is widely 
acknowledged that women and children were most negatively affected by Western 
“reform” policies and programs throughout the NIS.31 As feminist scholar Valentine 
Moghadam rightly points out, Eastern Europe had “one of the most educated 
workforces in the world,” and women occupied high-skill jobs in large numbers. But 
with the demise of the Soviet system, educated women were among the first to lose 
                                                 
 
29 Roughly 60 percent of the Russian population lived in poverty at the end of the first decade of 
“reform.” While this figure may seem high and does contradict other studies claiming a significantly 
lower rate of poverty, because of the new poverty standard implemented in 1990, “the poverty 
situation in the 1990s has been worse than the official statistics suggest: if the poverty standard which 
prevailed in the pre-reform era had operated in 1999, then 60 percent of the Russian population would 
be counted as poor. It should be noted, however, that the quasi-official poverty line for the 1980s […] 
was generous by international standards,” making it possible that even their alarmingly high figure of 
sixty percent may still be low. Shorrocks and Kolenikov, “Poverty Trends in Russia during the 
Transition.” 
 
30 According to Twigg, “vodka remains cheaper than milk, supported by a state that relies on almost 
$500 million in annual revenues from alcohol duties,” and the high rates of crime “have bestowed 
Russia with the world’s largest prison population.” Twigg, “What Has Happened to Russian Society?,” 
153. For more information concerning the stark consequences of economic “reform” efforts in Russia, 
see Walter Lafeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002, 9th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Companies, Inc., 2004), 389-395; and Klein, Shock Doctrine, 239. 
 




their jobs, “constitute[ing] an estimated 70 percent of Russia’s unemployed.” 32 Many 
companies fired or refused to hire women in an effort to avoid granting maternity 
leave or paying child care benefits, which were still required by Russian law, and 
women who did work “tended to be confined to traditional, low-paying, ‘female’ 
occupations.”33 As early as 1993, feminist sociologist Anastasia Posadskaya argued 
that “reform” had already become a masculine project to the detriment of women, 
whose perspectives had been entirely excluded. She points out that with the removal 
of Soviet-era quota systems, women’s representation and participation in politics 
decreased exponentially, which resulted in women’s collective inability to participate 
in the planning and distribution of societal resources as “legislative bodies began to 
play a real role in policymaking.”34 Additionally, women’s bodies were utilized 
ubiquitously as commodities in pornography and prostitution, and the concomitant 
disappearance of social services such as child care and the resurgence of Russian 
Orthodoxy operated in conjunction with public rhetoric about Russia’s demographic 
crisis and natalist pressures through government legislation to encourage traditional 
conceptualizations of gender roles, particularly the glorification of motherhood.35 
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Lastly, in Russia, as throughout the world, poverty is “largely a female phenomenon,” 
and one of its most accessible palliatives has become sex work, to which increasing 
numbers of women throughout the NIS have turned as an employment option.36 
 Even this cursory review of the objectives and ultimate results of U.S.-led 
“reform” efforts in Russia demonstrates quite clearly that the Freedom Support Act 
certainly did not support “freedom” for most people living in the former Soviet 
republics, particularly women, children, and other marginalized groups. Rather, the 
legislation deviates not at all from the “twentieth century tradition of linking 
American national security to the hegemony” of capitalist democracy in its strenuous 
preservation of the “freedom” of the United States to protect its own national security 
interests through defense conversion and nonproliferation programs (thus mitigating 
the once-significant threat posed by the Soviet Union’s formidable military arsenal to 
the territorial borders of the U.S. and its European allies) and providing financial 
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support for U.S. businesses to develop and make use of new commercial 
opportunities throughout the NIS.37 
 
The Ideological Causes of U.S. Russia Policy 
In hindsight, it is easy to forget that the Freedom Support Act was not always what it 
is; it may well have been quite different were it not for a specific set of circumstances 
and assumptions that converged in the early 1990s to drive the post-Soviet U.S. 
foreign policy agenda. Before they were codified as U.S. Public Law 102-511, the 
provisions of U.S. assistance to Russia were discussed and debated on Capitol Hill in 
a series of Congressional hearings between June 1991 and May 1992 wherein 
legislators had an opportunity to gather information about the changes taking place to 
and within the Soviet Union and to hear advice and suggestions from expert witnesses 
concerning possible U.S. responses to those changes. As the only official record 
reflecting the salient concerns driving the formulation of the first post-Soviet U.S. 
foreign policy agenda, a reading of the published transcriptions of these hearings 
reveals much about the mindset of legislators as they set about completely revisioning 
the entirety of U.S. foreign policy in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise. 
 Although held most obviously in response to events in Eastern Europe, the 
hearings were from the outset shaped, first, by legislators’ anxiety about the economic 
recession gripping the United States and, beginning in the early months of 1992, their 
partisan concerns about the increasingly acrimonious presidential election campaign 
between Democrat William J. Clinton of Arkansas and the incumbent, Republican 
                                                 
 





George H.W. Bush of Texas. The congressmen involved in these hearings—and 
“men” is the appropriate term here—were, regardless of their political affiliations, 
largely concerned with how their constituents would react in an election year to the 
perception that the U.S. was expending its already scarce resources to support the 
(re)construction and development of a series of countries that had, for the last half-
century, been its mortal enemy. Consequently, House and Senate committee members 
from both parties were forced to reconcile public demands for fiscal conservatism 
with the material reality that the successor states of the Soviet Union were in political 
and economic meltdown. The result was perceived threats to U.S. national security 
accompanied by legislators’ collective nationalistic desire to respond to these 
converging crises by trumpeting American altruism and the alleged superiority of the 
economic and political systems that had, from their perspective, triumphed in what 
U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker called the “titanic struggle between freedom 
and totalitarianism.”38  
 The belief that United States had won this “titanic struggle” caused U.S. 
policymakers to miss the opportunity after the demise of the Soviet Union “to create a 
‘concert of powers’ in support of regulated capitalist growth, world stability and the 
relief of poverty, preventable diseases and other social ills.”39 The pursuance of these 
objectives would, indeed, have been an extraordinary evolution in U.S. foreign policy 
priorities, which have since the end of World War II been focused on the continued 
survival and independence of the United States, its concomitant territorial integrity 
and expansion, its military and economic security, and the extension and 
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sustainability of the country’s democratic values and ideals.40 But the demise of the 
United States’ only state-based geopolitical adversary became not an occasion for 
reevaluation, circumspection, and/or self-reflexivity on the part of the U.S. foreign 
policy elite; rather, it became one within which to arrogantly celebrate the “victory” 
of capitalism over communism and of “freedom” over totalitarianism. Indeed, the 
events of 1989-1991 vindicated the nationalist narrative of American exceptionalism 
and prompted “[a]n instantly reconfigured history” in which the United States was the 
rightful and predetermined victor of the cold war as a result of its adherence to 
democratic values.41 
 Constitutive of American nationalism in the post-Soviet period, this 
triumphalist mindset was a dominant discursive frame within which foreign 
policymakers were operating in 1991 and 1992. As Lieven points out, the narrative of 
progress dominates the teaching of and conversation about history in the United 
States, which means that the notion that “the default mode of humanity is to become 
American” is not only widespread, but was further substantiated by the demise of the 
Soviet Union and its attendant socio-political system, communism.42 This thinking is 
embedded within U.S. foreign policy, which assumes that U.S. interests are universal 
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interests.43 Bolstering this belief was neoconservative political scientist (and 
sometimes consultant for the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations) Francis 
Fukuyama, whose belief that the triumph of capitalist democracy over communism 
signaled the “end of history” is the stuff of legend among scholars critical of 
neoliberal economic and modernization theories and neorealist approaches to 
international relations. Among the most (in)famous and easily the most influential of 
the cold war triumphalists, Fukuyama originally posited his thesis in the 1989 issue of 
the National Interest, and, despite several different perspectives published around the 
same time, the notion that the world had reached the “end of history” immediately 
became “so deeply internalized as to be usually beyond self-awareness and therefore 
beyond discussion,” which led to an assumption among foreign policymakers that 
everyone everywhere was on the same historical timeline in 1991 and that everyone 
everywhere wanted, or should want, an American-style capitalist democracy.44 
Cumings believes that the “end of history” thesis posits a “deeply conservative 
argument in favor of the status quo” by “[creating] a discourse of power that says in 
essence, you’ve never had it so good, so what are you complaining about?” Thus, any 
protest against or critique of the status quo is always already illegitimate, the effect of 
which has been that people who live in the global West, particularly the United 
States, have been convinced not to think about the possibilities provided by other 
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socio-political systems, because they already live in the best imaginable one, to which 
the forces of history have inevitably brought them.45 Consequently, legislators’ 
collective belief in the superiority of the U.S. political system and American cultural 
values form the bedrock of U.S. Russia policy. 
 
Why help Russia? 
 The granting of U.S. assistance to what was still the Soviet Union was by no 
means a foregone conclusion when Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) convened the 
first hearing on the matter before the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs on 
June 6, 1991. Although Biden believed that the goal of the U.S. should be to play “a 
constructive role in helping transform [the U.S.S.R.] into a free market democracy,”46 
he, like many of his colleagues, was not at all sure of what that role should be. It was 
not until a hearing on the future of the Soviet economy thirteen days later, on June 19, 
1991, that he stressed that, although there remained some rather contentious debates 
on the issue of “whether and how we might promote constructive political and 
economic change within [the Soviet Union], which has long been our global 
adversary,” consensus had been reached on Capitol Hill that what happens in the 
U.S.S.R. affects the United States. The U.S. should thus provide technical assistance 
and advice to encourage the development of a free-market democracy, but legislators 
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agreed that assistance should be contingent upon significant changes to the Soviet 
Union’s command economy.47 
 Although in early agreement that the U.S. should provide some sort of 
assistance to the Soviet Union, legislators demanded that they be able to explain to 
their constituents why, during an economic recession, U.S. tax dollars should be sent 
abroad, to a country that had been the United States’ geopolitical adversary for the 
last half century. The answer was two-fold. First, despite what legislators earnestly 
believed to be the end of the cold war, early witnesses made the convincing argument 
that the Soviet Union/Russia was no less a threat to U.S. national security in 1991 and 
1992 than the U.S.S.R. had been at the height of the cold war. The difference, 
witnesses claimed, was in the nature of the threat, which lay in the possibility that the 
crumbling Soviet Union could erupt into violent chaos and that the military, already 
under-resourced, would lose control of that country’s stockpile of thousands of 
nuclear weapons. Although the security and defense experts called upon to testify 
assuaged fears among legislators that the Soviet military would instigate and/or join a 
coup and expressed confidence that “[t]he Soviet procedures to try to counter an 
accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons are very substantial and very 
significant,” their collective inability to predict whether or not Soviet nuclear 
weapons, well-guarded by special KGB and military forces and requiring both human 
and mechanical arrangements to arm and launch, could “fall into the hands of some 
rebel groups or terrorists, particularly if order breaks down even further” and leads to 
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“full fledged civil war” did not, in the end, inspire confidence among subcommittee 
members. In fact the final verdict on the potential for threats to U.S. national security 
from the Soviet Union was that, regardless of the political and economic situation, 
“[t]he Soviet[s] will field a very modern, survivable, lethal strategic arsenal that will 
threaten to blow away the United States or anyone else if they would gravely threaten 
or directly attack the Soviet Union.”48 The continuance of the Soviet/Russian nuclear 
threat to U.S. national security—and, consequently, Russia’s status as a femme 
fatale—was utilized in subsequent hearings to undergird the urgent need for U.S. 
assistance. Such assistance was, legislators pointed out to each other, to their 
constituents, and to the Bush administration,49 in the best interest of the national 
sovereignty and territorial security of the United States.  
 Second, having won the cold war in what was being billed in U.S. political 
and popular culture as a stunning triumph of capitalism and democratic values, 
policymakers believed that the United States was uniquely positioned to help its 
former adversary to mature into a “normal,” “modern,” “civilized” society that 
would, in time, not only become part of an envisioned global free-market economy 
and a stable “democratic peace,” but also (most conveniently for those legislators 
eager to mollify their apprehensive constituents during an economic recession) create 
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new markets (or, more tellingly, “new frontiers”50) for U.S. exports. It was widely 
assumed, for example, that the threat to U.S. national security presented by the 
possibility that unsavory political leaders would surface in the context of the Soviet 
Union/Russia’s political chaos could be mitigated by effecting a permanent sea 
change in the economic and political structure of Eastern Europe. On April 9, 1992, 
Senator Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode Island) encouraged those present at a hearing before 
the full Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to learn from previous mistakes made 
by the U.S. in response to revolutionary events in Russia. Recalling the U.S.’s failure 
to assist Alexander Kerensky’s flailing provisional government during the spring and 
summer of 1917, Pell reminds his audience that while Kerensky “may not have been 
what we would call a democrat, […] he was a lot more palatable than the alternative 
that followed” in the wake of the October Revolution. He goes on to point out that the 
Bolsheviks were able to exploit the frustrations and desperation of a war-weary 
people, and Lenin was welcomed “as a savior, a man on a white horse.” According to 
Pell, the U.S. faced in 1991 and 1992 a “similar opportunity to encourage democratic 
reform, not only in Russia, but in the other countries of the former Soviet Union,” and 
it should do so lest a “new man on a white horse” advocating political positions 
distasteful to U.S. interests come to power. Paraphrasing U.S. Secretary of State 
James A. Baker, Pell asserts (rather controversially in light of recent critiques not 
only of the cold war, but also of the Korean and Viet Nam conflicts) that the United 
States “won two hot wars and one cold war in this century” and strongly admonishes 
                                                 
 





his colleagues in Congress not to let the opportunity to effect political and economic 
transformation in Eastern Europe pass by.51 
 The three priority items of the Freedom Support Act—democratization, 
privatization, and defense conversion—were, at their foundation, supported and 
legitimized by a conceptualization among U.S. policymakers of the Soviet Union and, 
later, its successor state, as simultaneously weak and in need of assistance as well as 
chaotic, duplicitous, and irrational, both of which operate as the feminized Others 
needed in order to “systematically […] create a conception of international politics as 
a realm characterized by ever present ‘threats’ and ‘dangers’” and to “[present] the 
world as disorderly and hostile.”52 For U.S. policymakers, the political, economic, 
and military instability of the Soviet Union (and, later, Russia) significantly increased 
the possibility of chaos, violent skirmishes between political factions, and, at worst, 
civil war, all of which weakened Soviet state-based institutions and, according to U.S. 
defense and security experts, made that country a potential threat to U.S. national 
security. Consequently, the Soviet Union/Russia was as much a threat in its 
(feminine) weakness as it had been when it waged cold war as a strong (masculine) 
state, making it the ultimate femme fatale; a wily temptress disguised, alternatively, as 
a backward baba in need of education and training and a seemingly innocent damsel 
in distress in need of protection, salvation, and resurrection, Russia’s unpredictability 
and potential for violent chaos made its very weakness a threat. Thus, the question of 
whether to provide assistance at all was, in and of itself, a gendered one. 
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Modernity as development 
 Having “won” the cold war, the United States was justified in its assumption 
that those who are “modern” are well-equipped to help those who are not, which was 
translated in the Freedom Support Act into policies that emphasize the unidirectional 
transfer of knowledge and expertise from West to East.53 Consequently, according to 
Wedel, cold war-era development paradigms emphasizing the deregulation and 
reduction of government institutions were essentially cut and pasted onto Eastern 
Europe without regard for the substantial differences between the NIS and the 
countries of the global South to which those same paradigms had been originally 
applied—with dubious success, as feminist development theorists have pointed out. 
The NIS became the “the new South,” an “impoverished, backward ‘other’ in need of 
salvation from the developed North/First World,” which reinforced the authority of 
the United States to map the course of Russian political and economic reforms.54  
 Although never explicitly stated but always assumed, it is clear from the 
earliest congressional hearings that the notion of transforming Russia into a “normal, 
civilized society” meant making it into a U.S.-style capitalist democracy.55 It was 
Konstantin Kagalovsky, a senior economic advisor to the Russian government, who 
came closest to offering an explicit definition of “normal” when he informed the 
House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East that Russia’s goal was to 
become a “normal country with a normal political democracy and a normal market 
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economy” as quickly as possible.56 What this objective inferred—and not very 
subtly—was that, while the United States had reached the pinnacle of “normalcy” and 
“civilization,” Russia was both abnormal and uncivilized, a notion that had been 
given currency the previous June when Graham Allison of Harvard University’s John 
F. Kennedy School of Government asserted that the then-Soviet Union was “rather 
like the story of the prodigal son” in which a child, stubbornly believing that their 
way is best, “wandered away from civilization for quite a long period of time and is 
now trying to come back.”57 In other words, despite having been a worthy adversary 
of the U.S. throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union and, 
later, the Russian Federation, remained “primitive” and “backward” by Western 
standards of modernity, which are grounded in capitalism and premised upon the 
notion that the natural historical progression of societies is from “traditional” agrarian 
systems to “modern” industrialized economies and market production.58 The noted 
exception to this, as discussed above, was in its nuclear capability. 
 Allison’s literal and figurative assignation of a child-like state to the Soviet 
Union was, although the first use of that particular metaphor, not the last. In fact, after 
the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991, the metaphor expanded into a full-
fledged familial colonial trope in which the child, Russia, called out to its parent, the 
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United States, for help as it struggled to find its way in the confusing and cut-throat 
capitalist world from which it had intentionally disengaged in 1917. This process was 
conceptualized by witnesses and committee members alike in terms of life stages 
between infancy and adolescence. During the earliest hearings in June 1991, for 
example, the political and economic upheaval in the Soviet Union was expressed in 
terms of death and rebirth: “As the old Soviet economy dies, a new one is being 
born.”59 Several months later, the successor states of the Soviet Union were 
collectively described as “the political parallel to a teenager who has just gotten a 
driver’s license and now wants to drive a car as fast as he can in whatever direction 
he can go,”60 and the citizens of those new countries had become “the orphans of 
communism”61 to whom the United States, “as a world power,” must send emergency 
humanitarian assistance in the form of medical supplies and foodstuffs.62  
 As “children of their own time,” Russians were in desperate need of 
leadership, and it was the “responsibility” of the United States,63 whose experience, 
entrepreneurial spirit, and values (i.e., democracy and capitalism64) had triumphed 
over the communist system, to provide it. The most appropriate and effective help 
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that the United States could offer, argued political scientist William E. Simon Roberts 
of the U.S.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (who was opposed to 
direct U.S. monetary assistance to the Soviet Union), would “[focus] on leading the 
Soviets to our ideas of liberty. The best aid package would be the ideas that account 
for our own success.”65 
 The widespread assumption among U.S. policymakers of the United States’ 
uniqueness to aid the struggling Russia in its metaphorical infancy was heavily 
bolstered by ideas about and standards of Western modernity, which was discursively 
constituted throughout the hearings by democratic political institutions and a 
capitalist economy unencumbered by trade regulations. In his testimony before the 
Subcommittee on European Affairs, U.S. State Department representative Robert 
Zoellick argued that the people of the United States had “held fast” for half a century 
to their ideological commitment to capitalist democracy so that “freedom and liberty 
could finally light the lives of hundreds of millions of people frozen in a backward 
and frightening age.” He claimed that the people of Eastern Europe “will need the 
leadership, spirit, and example that only America can supply.”66 The “backward and 
frightening age” of communism, according to several expert witnesses, meant that, 
politically speaking, Eastern Europe in 1991 looked startlingly as it had in 1914, 
before Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was assassinated 
in Sarajevo, igniting ethnic and nationalist tensions throughout the Balkans and, 
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ultimately, World War I. According to Donald R. Kellerman, director of the London 
Times-Mirror International’s Center for People and the Press,  
[A]fter fifty years of world war, cold war and communism, Europe has 
resumed the twentieth century. If Rip van Winkle had fallen asleep in 1914 
and awakened in 1991, he would find many of the same problems that were 
there when he had dozed off. 
Consequently, Kellerman argued, the United States must provide assistance to Russia 
in order to support the establishment and maintenance of democratic institutions as a 
means of proactively fending off any potential for ethnic or nationalist conflicts.67  
 If the political situation in Eastern Europe in 1991 so closely resembled the 
nationalist chaos of 1914, then the economic and agricultural situation was no better. 
In June 1991, Senator Biden argued that the Soviet Union would need assistance 
“bringing the Soviet economy into the twentieth century, let alone the twenty-first 
century.”68 Similarly, Soviet/Russian agricultural technologies and methods were 
equated with those of the United States in the nineteenth century. One witness spoke 
of Soviet farmers’ “primitive” attitudes and their “traditional” allegiance to collective 
farms,69 while James C. McCullagh, U.S.-based publisher of the Russian-language 
agricultural journal Novii Fermer, argued on behalf of technical assistance in 
agricultural modernization due to the fact that Russian farmers were, like their 
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nineteenth-century American counterparts, “tied to the land and to bread and very, 
very fundamental things.”70 
  
Why technical advice as opposed to direct financial support? 
 Given the emphasis in the hearings on the United States’ unique position to 
assist Russia and, with it, the many interrelated reasons behind the decision to provide 
assistance to Russia in the first place, the issue of what type(s) of assistance gained 
currency in the hearings once it had been decided that, yes, the U.S. should render 
some sort of aid—if for no other reason than to protect its own national interests. U.S. 
bilateral assistance to Russia was provided in the form of U.S. government contracts 
to U.S.-based corporations, NGOs, and non-profit think-tanks, which were, via the 
Harvard Project through the Chubais Clan in St. Petersburg, charged with the task of 
providing technical advice and assistance on the ground in Russia. And since the goal 
of U.S. aid was, first and foremost, to protect U.S. national interests by creating an 
ally in the envisioned global “democratic peace” as well as markets for U.S. exports, 
it was up to these civilian government contractors to teach Russians how to be 
“normal” and “civilized” by U.S. standards. This tutelage included lessons on how to 
create a political, economic, and military security infrastructure that would enable, 
promote, and sustain democracy and a free-market economy and halt the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction. This deviation from “old-style foreign aid,” U.S. 
Secretary of State James A. Baker asserted, was in direct correlation with what the 
NIS had specifically requested, i.e., not direct monetary support, but the knowledge 
                                                 
 





of how to create democratic institutions and operate within a free-market economy.71 
Russian “reformers,” themselves, had asked not for money, but for knowledge and 
advice. 
 Additionally, there was broad consensus on Capitol Hill during the summer of 
1991 that the U.S.S.R.’s centralized state apparatus was losing its grip over its 
constituent republics and that Gorbachev was in “way over his head.” Senator Biden 
believed that the Soviet premier, having “unleashed some forces” with “no idea of the 
consequences of his actions,” was “running to catch up to a plan he never had.”72 
Several witnesses concurred, pointing to a “crisis of leadership” at the top echelons of 
the Communist Party, and the inability of U.S. policymakers to rely on Gorbachev’s 
continuing credibility or legitimacy, particularly given the rising popularity of the 
recently-elected President of Russia, an as-yet-unknown Boris Yeltsin. There was 
concern that any direct U.S. assistance would serve to bolster the flailing Soviet 
government rather than be used as a catalyst for change.73 This political chaos, argued 
economist Marshall I. Goldman of Harvard University’s Russian Research Center, 
meant that the Soviet Union, whose economy he likened to a “Third World country,” 
was simply unable to either absorb or administer such large amounts of capital.74 The 
argument against direct monetary assistance to the Soviet Union and, later, Russia, 
was summed up quite nicely several months later by U.S. Under Secretary of 
Commerce for International Trade, J. Michael Farren, who argued that the U.S. 
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should provide only technical advice and assistance and not direct monetary aid for 
two reasons. First, “there [are] simply no mechanisms available [in the Soviet Union] 
to make the decisions or allocate” the use of billions of U.S. dollars. Second, “the 
appeal that we got from everyone that we spoke to was come and tell us what we 
have to do. Give us the technical assistance.”75  
 Conveniently, the claims of politicians and witnesses alike that “everyone” in 
the U.S.S.R./Russia was asking for technical advice and assistance as opposed to 
monetary aid foreclosed whatever other forms U.S. assistance might have taken and 
handily enabled the United States to perform its unique global role as father-teacher-
protector of the sick, bleeding child who had for so long been its geopolitical 
adversary. According to U.S. foreign relations historian Robert J. McMahon, 
although U.S. foreign policy is dictated by the interests of the U.S., that self-interest 
is most often downplayed by policymakers who highlight the altruism of the United 
States and the alleged “universality of U.S. objectives.” This strategy, he contends, 
enables those same policymakers to present U.S. interests (i.e., “needs that might 
conceivably conflict with those of others”) as “utopian objectives completely in 
harmony with the needs of all other members of the international community.” That 
U.S. interests happen to coincide with what U.S. leaders believe is best for the world 
is merely a happy coincidence that serves as further proof of American 
exceptionalism.76 
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 For example, legislators concerned about rousing the ire of their constituents 
during an election year by sending U.S. funds to Russia during an economic recession 
made sure to incorporate into the Freedom Support Act a version of the American 
“bootstrap” myth, appropriately modified to address what U.S. policymakers and 
pundits identified as their most immediate goals for Russia: democratization, 
privatization, and defense conversion. The legislative debate concerning U.S. Russia 
policy in the early 1990s coincided with the ascendance of neoliberal economic 
theory and the demise of the welfare state, both of which were legitimated by the 
demise of the Soviet system in Eastern Europe and resulted in a conceptual shift from 
a focus on collective rights to individual liberties that “proclaim[ed] the death of 
society in the name of the individual and his [sic] family dedicated to ‘traditional 
family values.’” This meant that citizenship, already gendered masculine, was 
“conceived of as being primarily concerned about the individual’s responsibility for 
his [sic] own fate and that of his [sic] family.”77 One obvious result of this 
problematic and ubiquitous discourse of “democracy” is that it vilifies the role of the 
state in providing rights and support; people, the neoliberal model argues, should do 
for themselves with little to no government oversight or regulation. Echoing this 
neoliberal consensus between Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill, one 
witness, Russian scholar Dmitri Simes of the Carnegie Institute for International 
Peace, argued that the U.S. cannot save people in the N.I.S. “in spite of themselves”; 
rather, the U.S. should commit to helping only those who help themselves. That, 
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according to him, is the extent of the “American responsibility.”78 Similarly, 
Republican Senator Jesse Helms made abundantly clear that the Freedom Support Act 
would not be another Marshall Plan. There would be no financial “bailouts”; instead, 
Russian leaders would have to commit to political and economic reform and be 
willing to work to achieve it for themselves with limited direct financial assistance 
from the U.S.79 
  
 Pathologizing Russia 
 Unlike the cold war-era conceptualization of development, which had focused 
on turning “underdeveloped” countries in the so-called Third World into “developed” 
ones, the countries of Eastern Europe (the “Second World”) had been, according to 
U.S. pundits and policymakers, misdeveloped rather than underdeveloped. 
Consequently (and not unpredictably), assistance to Russia had at its foundation an 
ideological commitment to eradicating the principles, systems, and bureaucratic 
structures of communism once and for all. U.S. technical advice and assistance was 
therefore justified as the best and only way to “stem the hemorrhage” caused by the 
communist system and its advocates.80  
 Although not utilized until the very last congressional hearing on May 14, 
1992 to describe the social, political, and economic situation throughout the former 
Soviet republics, the conceptual imagery of a personified Russia bleeding profusely 
and uncontrollably was built upon the foundations laid by witnesses in previous 
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hearings who relied heavily on metaphors in which Russia was made the equivalent 
of an ailing patient in urgent need of help recovering from a disease. In his testimony 
before the Subcommittee on European Affairs, for example, Harvard University’s 
Graham Allison encouraged U.S. lawmakers to assist the Soviet/Russian people in 
their recuperation from what he termed “a deep and long illness” caused by “having 
lived in that asylum for seventy years.”81 Similarly, Representative Dave McCurdy 
(D-Oklahoma) assigned Russians the status of trauma victims, arguing that U.S. 
institutions and values “must serve as the foundation for the transformation of 
societies traumatized by decades of totalitarianism.”82 
 Throughout the hearings, Russia’s figurative “hemorrhaging” took on three 
interrelated forms, all of which caused great consternation among U.S. policymakers. 
The first was the rapid disintegration of the Soviet state, economic, and military 
infrastructure, which, as I discussed briefly above, evoked concern for U.S. national 
security on a number of levels. Even though witnesses assured committee members of 
their relative confidence in the stability of Soviet command and control of its nuclear 
arsenal, those same experts were by no means confident that Soviet nuclear 
technology could not somehow find its way to “some rebel groups or terrorists.”83 
The potential for this so-called “brain drain” from highly skilled Soviet/Russian 
nuclear scientists to what were, from a U.S. perspective, undesirable groups (such as 
Islamic fundamentalist regimes in the Middle East or terrorist organizations 
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throughout Central Asia) was a high priority throughout the hearings. While U.S. 
policymakers called for the conversion of the Soviet-era military-industrial complex 
into civilian production, witnesses acknowledged that “the decay of the Soviet 
imperial system” would mean significant reductions in Soviet defense spending and, 
consequently, inadequate resources for the support of active duty and retired military 
personnel and their families, which could lead Soviet military scientists to trade 
nuclear and other WMD technologies on the black market for much-needed cash, thus 
the perceived “hemorrhaging” of cold war-era Soviet knowledge and technology.84 
 Second, Russia’s “hemorrhaging” took the form of the potential for 
ethnic/nationalist conflicts, which one witness, a senior executive in charge of NIS 
operations for a corporation headquartered in Des Moines, Iowa, referred to as a 
“cancerous reservoir of hate” that is “quite alien to all of us in the United States.”85 
Predicated on the rather arrogant assumption (particularly given that it was made by a 
(presumably) white man from a Midwestern American city not exactly known for its 
racial or ethnic diversity) that the United States is largely devoid of racial and ethnic 
conflict, this statement is indicative of the general belief among hearing participants, 
legislators and witnesses alike, that one of the most important lessons the United 
States could—and, therefore, should—impart to the newly independent states of the 
former Soviet Union was cultural pluralism founded on a respect for human rights 
and civil liberties—in short, democratic values. Ironically, while the assumption that 
the U.S. does democracy correctly and is therefore uniquely positioned to teach others 
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is ubiquitous throughout the hearings, the sole hearing that specifically addressed the 
role the United States should play in ensuring and protecting “minority rights” 
throughout the former Soviet Union was held on May 5, 1992, just a week after the 
commencement of the riots in Los Angeles.86 The temporal coincidence was not lost 
on hearing participants, but only one witness, Father Bryan Hehir of the U.S. Catholic 
Conference, pointed explicitly to the irony, positing that “this may not be the best 
week for the United States to talk about cultural pluralism.” But as a means of 
justifying his own presence and the raison d’etre of the hearing, he offered a caveat, 
insisting that the U.S. has “a lot of experience with it and we have done better than 
most societies.”87  
 The third form of Russian “hemorrhaging” discussed during the hearings was 
the global public health risk posed by the widespread environmental degradation 
caused by decades of alleged misdevelopment under communism and the Soviet-era 
nuclear reactors that Senator Biden termed “little more than ticking time bombs.”88 
According to one environmental expert, the United States has “a straightforward 
interest in seeing the orphans of communism grow up healthy, because otherwise the 
rest of us are going to be unhealthy.” That same witness urged Congress to 
incorporate into any U.S. assistance plan a strategy by which the U.S. would work to 
help the people of the former Soviet Union “stop poisoning themselves and their kids 
and their land and their air and their water.” Of particular concern was the pollution 
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of Russia’s water supply as a result of underground nuclear waste storage facilities, 
because Russia’s water does not just stay in Russia; it flows into the Arctic Sea, 
which flows into the Bering Straight, and, from there, into the Pacific Ocean.89 The 
goal of “containing” the Soviet Union, which had been the modus operandi of U.S. 
foreign policy for the last half century, had unexpectedly unraveled. Russia was now 
not only far from contained, but it was “hemorrhaging,” and U.S. policymakers 
scrambled to reorient cold war-era strategies in response to the uncontrolled 
expulsion of Russia’s bodily fluids.  
 From a feminist perspective, though, Armitage’s ascription of human qualities 
to a series of nation-states and his discursive conflation of hemorrhaging with the 
economic and political instability of an entire region of the world has significant 
discursive consequences for U.S. Russia policy. Reliant upon normative assumptions 
about the common medical causes of uncontrolled bleeding (i.e. either menstruation 
or hemophilia), Armitage’s metaphor operates simultaneously not only to gender this 
sick, bleeding child undeniably feminine, but also to blame its mother (Mother 
Russia), the “backward,” politically regressive communist baba, for causing its 
potentially fatal illness.90 It also forces an identification of post-Soviet Russia with 
one of the most famous European aristocrats to be afflicted with the illness, Alexei 
Nikolaevich Romanov, the thirteen year-old son of Tsar Nicholas II and the heir 
apparent to the Russian Empire when he was assassinated by a Bolshevik firing squad 
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in 1918. The implicit invocation of this boy’s suffering reflects the repeated strategy 
used by hearing participants that conflated the euphoria of transition with the last 
days of the Russian Empire: Support U.S. aid to Russia, or suffer the potential 
consequences.  
 Russia is thus an ailing child whom the United States must help or else risk 
losing its self-identity and perceived global reputation as the world’s defender of 
peace and freedom. On the other hand, though, this sickly child retains in its 
impressive stockpile of nuclear weapons the ability to pose a significant security 
threat to the territorial boundaries of the U.S. (whether directly through military 
engagement or indirectly through the “brain drain” of technological knowledge and 
skills). And although on the road to recovery, the child may also at any moment be 
thwarted in its resurgence by an evil mother figure, the retrograde (i.e., “uncivilized,” 
“abnormal,” and “traditional”) baba, whose nationalist xenophobia, political 
conservatism, and apparent historical penchant for totalitarianism lurk in the shadows 
of the child’s fledgling political and economic reforms. These complex gendered 
imaginaries in which Russia operated dramaturgically as both threat and victim fits 
perfectly within the altruistic nationalist narrative policymakers felt obligated to 
maintain even while worrying about how to defend to their constituents in an election 
year U.S. aid to Russia. The offering of technical advice and assistance not only 
enabled the U.S. to fulfill its self-appointed altruistic role as global defender of peace 
and freedom, but also to strengthen its own waning economy, particularly the private 
business sector, through government grants for consultants to travel to Russia and 





 Capitalism as “freedom” 
 Despite the rhetorical commitment by the United States via the FSA to 
democratization as one of the three dominant pillars of its Russia policy throughout 
the 1990s, subsequent analyses of U.S. Russia policy have identified the virtual 
absence of both money and programming for democracy-building in the NIS. 
Goldgeier and McFaul provide evidence that monies earmarked for democratic 
reform “were only shadows of the amounts spent on economic technical assistance,”91 
and in her study of Western support for grassroots organizations in Russia, Sarah 
Henderson demonstrates that, as in economic aid to the NIS, the short-term needs of 
(mostly) U.S.-based donors—rather than long-term, sustainable development 
strategies—were at the core of the aims and objectives of civic aid.92 Although 
intended to “[establish] commercial partnerships between the people of the United 
States and the peoples of the independent states,”93 the overarching purpose of the 
American Business Centers authorized by Title III of the Freedom Support Act was to 
further U.S. economic interests by assisting U.S.-based small- and medium-sized 
businesses “facilitate their entry into the commercial markets of the independent 
states.”94  
 Additionally, U.S. lawmakers specifically promoted the establishment of 
American Business Centers in areas in which agribusiness could be successfully 
conducted (thereby “facilitat[ing] the demonstration and use of United States 
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agricultural equipment and technology”) and/or to which U.S. environmental goods 
and services could be exported.95 Thus, the potential throughout the former Soviet 
Union for widespread food shortages and environmental disaster, along with an 
expressed desire on the part of U.S. legislators to avert these humanitarian crises, 
became an economic advantage to U.S.-based businesses in the agricultural and 
energy sectors. Sec. 706 of Title VII, entitled ‘Agricultural Trade,’ authorizes the 
promotion of U.S. agricultural exports to the former Soviet Union, and U.S.-based 
energy sector companies were promised U.S. financial assistance in their attempts to 
‘penetrate’ the emerging market in the region by working with NIS officials to clean 
up Soviet-era nuclear sites and commercial nuclear waste.96 This conflation of U.S. 
economic interests with the concern legislators expressed in Title II for 
“environmental conservation and resource management,” “urgent humanitarian 
needs,” and “food distribution and production” conveniently enabled the U.S. to don 
the garb of a white knight to perform the role of magnanimous friend to a neighbor in 
need while, simultaneously, protecting its own overarching objective to “design and 
implement programs to provide adequate commercial and technical assistance to 
United States business seeking markets in the independent states of the former Soviet 
Union.”97 
 The U.S. was more direct in announcing its self-interest in Title V, which 
argued that the state of the Soviet-era military infrastructure was, in 1992, an explicit 
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and direct threat to the national security of the United States and that commitment to 
and progress toward nuclear and conventional nonproliferation and disarmament were 
crucial criteria for U.S. aid in this and other areas.98 According to the FSA, the 
nonproliferation programs and activities for which U.S. assistance could be used 
were: (1) dismantling weapons of mass destruction, (2) putting a stop to the 
proliferation of these weapons, whether physical via storage and/or transport or 
through the dispersal of technical knowledge and expertise, and (3) the conversion of 
defense/military industries for civilian purposes, including training scientists for new 
civilian careers (FSA 1992, sec. 501). But because NIS commitment to and progress 
toward these U.S.-identified issues were designated by the Freedom Support Act as 
criteria for receipt of the U.S. aid authorized therein, lawmakers effectively ensured 
that the U.S.-based defense/military industry would reap extraordinary economic 
benefits through lucrative consulting contracts via a proposed research and 
development foundation that would not only assist the independent states of the 
former Soviet Union to make good on these criteria and, consequently, maintain their 
aid in other areas, but also to facilitate the coming together of U.S. and former Soviet 
scientists for research projects intended for “peaceful purposes.” This foundation, to 
which the impoverished former Soviet states were expected to make a financial 
contribution in order to participate, was intended to establish useful links between 
research/academia, the business sector, and scientific technologies and, in the process, 
create new markets for U.S. technologies and researchers-as-consultants.99  
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 Despite what is so clearly the United States’ willingness to provide assistance 
to the NIS with the explicit goal of strengthening U.S.-based corporations, the 
prioritization of U.S. economic and national security interests is certainly 
understandable within the conventional context and traditions of U.S. foreign 
policy.100 But since the Freedom Support Act was ostensibly intended to support not 
only open markets, but also freedom for Russia and emerging Eurasian democracies, 
a glance at the FSA’s moniker, mission statement, and general provisions would seem 
to indicate that it authorizes plenty of U.S. assistance for both, even while creating a 
false dichotomy between political and economic processes, between democratization 
and the transition to capitalism. But the dichotomization is one-sided: According to 
the Freedom Support Act (and the conventional wisdom of neo-liberal economic 
theory), while a capitalist infrastructure can be achieved without attention to the 
processes of democracy, democracy is predicated upon the establishment of free 
markets. Within the constraints of the FSA, then, democratic processes are allegedly 
inherent in the practice of capitalism (and, consequently, do not need to be fostered; 
rather, they will develop automatically), but capitalism is not necessarily inherent in 
the practice of democracy.  
 The relative (and ironic) unimportance of democracy to “freedom” as the term 
is utilized in the Freedom Support Act is manifest in the ubiquitous placement of 
capitalism’s building blocks, most notably the privatization of state-run industries and 
the creation of open markets, throughout the FSA’s ten sections. In contrast, Title IV, 
entitled “The Democracy Corps,” is the sole section dedicated to the methods by 
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which democratization would/should take place in the NIS. Embedded even within 
this section is the directive that democratization efforts should bolster “the 
development of democratic institutions, a market-oriented economy, and a civil 
society.”101 The inclusion of this component within the mission of the Democracy 
Corps,102 U.S. Russia policy’s sole form and method of U.S. assistance earmarked 
specifically for democratization, signals that, in the Freedom Support Act, “freedom” 
is not only equivalent to the specific combination of open markets with democracy, it 
is also dependent upon them. This explains why the FSA’s constitutive definition of 
“democracy” and its prescribed approach to building democratic institutions 
incorporate “economic pluralism” and the development of a “market-oriented 
economy.”103 It also explains why prescribed economic “reform” projects did not 
reciprocate these efforts by including democratization activities. Consequently, the 
conflation of democracy with capitalism with freedom in the Freedom Support Act 
indicates that the United States was interested in building only capitalist democracies 
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throughout the former Soviet Union to the exclusion of other types of political 
systems.104 The growth and stability of the market thus became the yardstick by 
which the success of U.S. Russia policy was measured, and, as often happens, 
democracy was subordinated to “the purposes of [economic] liberalism and thus to 
the state in promoting and protecting private enterprise,” causing democracy to be 
discursively conflated with free market capitalism.105 For U.S. policymakers in 1992, 
“freedom,” although conflated with the notion of “democracy,” meant economic 
freedom, the freedom defined by neoliberals as the degree to which economic actors 
are able to operate without restraint or interference from state-based entities and/or 
institutions. The FSA thus codifies the freedom of U.S. corporations to develop and 
utilize new markets for their goods and services and promotes that of Russians to 
engage fully in the global market economy. It supports freedom in the Russian 
Federation only insofar as that “freedom” augments the “security” and economic 
prosperity of the United States.   
 
Imperial Masculinity: The U.S. as Global Abuser 
To reiterate, the objective of U.S. Russia policy as enumerated in the Freedom 
Support Act was threefold: democratization, privatization, and defense conversion. 
Democratization, as policymakers understood it, required the complete eradication of 
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the vestiges of communism, which would then be replaced with ideological and 
institutional apparatuses to support the development and maintenance of democratic 
political and free-market economic systems. The second (but, as I have attempted to 
demonstrate, far from secondary) goal, privatization, meant not only the 
implementation of a free-market economy in Russia, but also the creation of new 
markets and resources for U.S. businesses. The best possible way of achieving these 
goals, policymakers decided, was through technical advice and assistance in the form 
of U.S.-based consultants who, funded by U.S. government contracts, would travel to 
and throughout Russia teaching Russians how to create, maintain, and function within 
a capitalist democracy. A not insignificant source of the many problems caused by the 
neoliberal assumptions embedded in the modes and methods of the Freedom Support 
Act, Wedel argues, was that, in policymakers’ efforts to eradicate traces of 
communism, Western donors like HIID actually perpetuated some of the most 
problematic components of that system while laying waste to other, more favorable 
aspects. For example, their top privatization priority was large company towns with 
their “socialist amenities such as health and day care, as well as employee retreat 
centers,” but they gave little thought to the fact that their strategy to single out 
“reformers” whose perspectives and approaches agreed with their own, but that were 
not popular among Russians would require reform by government decree, thus 
making capitalist democracy look and feel an awful lot like the central planning they 
were working to dismantle. Western-style economic “reforms” in Russia were often 
instituted forcibly, usually via presidential decree, thus by-passing the very 




in increased negative public opinion among Russians about the West, in general, and 
the U.S., in particular.106 
 When President Clinton made democratization “the linchpin of his foreign 
policy, he perpetuate[d] a twentieth century tradition of linking American national 
security to the hegemony of one form of government,” thus revisioning U.S. foreign 
policy as “anti-imperialist imperialism” that insists upon democracy as the only 
means by which to create a world order conducive to its own interests. As a result, 
post-Soviet U.S. foreign policy rhetoric was rife with the quest for a new democratic 
world order, which perpetuates the notion of American exceptionalism while, 
simultaneously, revealing “strong overtones of national insecurity and vulnerability 
that drive the desire to dominate others.”107 The aspiration of policymakers in the 
Freedom Support Act to ensure the development of “a peaceful and stable 
international order”108 was rooted in their confidence in the notion of a democratic 
peace, “the premise that peace and security depend on spreading democracy 
globally.” But this idea not only hides the fact that “democracy,” as I have intimated 
above, is a contested term, but also enables the United States “to legitimize its 
economic agenda of world capitalism under the sign of a quest for [liberal, capitalist] 
democracy.109  
 The lack of material support by the U.S. for democratization in the Freedom 
Support Act meant that, in effect, the United States ignored the concerns of women 
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and other marginalized populations, as they were the groups most negatively affected 
by the dismantling of Soviet-era social welfare networks during privatization. The 
consensus among feminist theorists of liberal democracy is that, even while 
potentially providing the best opportunity for the advancement of women—assuming 
gender is taken into account in its formulation,110 democratization is a gendered 
concept whose working definitions within liberal theories are “constrained and 
limited.”111 In an article published just two years after the demise of the Soviet Union, 
feminist political theorist Zillah Eisenstein contends that the theories of democracy 
being promulgated in Eastern Europe during the foundational years of the transition 
were “old” in the sense that they assumed that the citizenry to which democracy was 
being applied was male, and politics were thus reduced to the economy and the 
market.112 The only successful trajectory for Eastern Europe and Russia became 
synonymous with a specific ideology—capitalist democracy—as the only possibility, 
but twenty years’ worth of feminist critiques of this system had demonstrated quite 
clearly that this form of democracy requires revisioning using gender as an integral 
category of analysis.113  Similarly, feminist development theorists had also argued 
against the a priori ascendance of capitalist democracy as the ultimate achievement of 
modernity, pointing out the myriad ways in which conventional cold war-era 
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development strategies meant to create capitalist democracies in the image of the 
United States have had negative consequences for women and other marginalized 
groups throughout the so-called Third World.114 Paradoxically, the U.S. insistence 
throughout the 1990s on democratization in support of its own interests, which 
manifested itself in U.S. development and foreign policy approaches, has meant that 
the new democratic world order for which lawmakers had advocated in the wake of 
the Soviet Union’s demise “is more democratic in name than in practice.”115   
 Although varied in the material specificity of its logistical applications, the 
intention (societal transformation), mode (unilateral and pedagogical, what Russian 
scholar Stephen Cohen derisively calls the “tutelage approach”116),and 
implementation (via U.S.-based consultants and the investment in Russia by U.S. 
businesses) of U.S. assistance to Russia required nothing short of “active 
penetration,”117 both ideological and material, of regions throughout Russia deemed 
strategically important by U.S. government contractors as a means of achieving U.S. 
goals. As is clear from the Freedom Support Act, post-Soviet U.S. foreign 
policymakers—the overwhelming majority of whom were, not surprisingly, elite 
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white men—“used America’s core political ideals to support an imperial policy of 
ideological expansion” (Sullivan 2002, 63) in which American-style institutions and 
values were exported to Russia in order to incorporate that country into the economic 
and political systems of the global west. This required significant changes to Russia’s 
economic, political, social and military structures and processes, but the U.S. 
approach, which, rather incongruously, makes “reform” a prerequisite for the receipt 
of aid (rather than providing aid to facilitate “reform”), has insisted that those changes 
be made on U.S. terms.118  
 Nor is it a coincidence, for example, that the acronym for the Support for East 
European Democracy Act of 1989 is SEED. Used as a verb, “to seed,” the SEED Act 
ascribes an active, agential role to the United States as the masculine planter of 
democratic values and institutions deep into the passively fertile cultural landscape of 
a feminized Eastern Europe. Although it authorized bi- and multilateral U.S. 
assistance to Hungary and Poland two years before deliberations began on Capitol 
Hill concerning what became the Freedom Support Act of 1992, the latter is, at its 
foundation, merely an extension of the provisions of the former to the successor states 
of the Soviet Union. As such, it was referenced fairly frequently throughout the 
hearings by legislators and witnesses alike.  
 Similarly, despite the rhetorical and linguistic emphasis on democracy-
building in the SEED Act, the primary discursive (and, later, practical) emphasis in 
the Freedom Support Act was, as I have shown, not on democratization, but on the 
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privatization of Russia’s economy and, consequently, on that country as an 
unexplored—if potentially risky—“frontier” for “some very substantial commercial 
opportunities […] for American companies.”119 Legislators and witnesses alike 
conceptualized the former U.S.S.R. as rife for investment by U.S. companies and 
potential new markets for the sale of U.S. goods and services. For example, witness 
Paul Konney, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Tambrands, Inc., a 
White Plains, NY-based tampon manufacturer with production facilities in Russia, 
Uzbekistan and Ukraine, emphasized the prospect generated by the reforms taking 
place in Eastern Europe for “marrying up” the interests of U.S. corporations with the 
untapped “production capacity of a region so rich in human and natural resources.”120 
To accomplish this goal, he argued, the provisions of the SEED Act could be applied 
to the Soviet Union. Konney’s support of the SEED Act coincided with that of SEED 
Act author and European Affairs Subcommittee Chairperson Biden, who argued that, 
rather than going through the trouble of creating an entirely new law, the provisions 
and goals of the SEED Act should simply be extended to include the successor states 
of the Soviet Union. In the end, the Freedom Support Act did basically that, and 
Biden, a Democrat who authored the SEED Act, chided the Republican Bush 
administration mercilessly for its torpor and lethargy, calling the Freedom Support 
Act “hardly visionary” and referring to it as “SEED 2.” Biden’s intention in applying 
the SEED Act to Russia, though, was made clearest when he called upon 
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representatives of the U.S. business community to offer their suggestions for how to 
ensure that “the seeds of a market economy [are] planted deep in Russian soil.”121  
 As my analysis of the Freedom Support Act and the relevant legislative 
hearing have shown, the gendered trope “link[ing] the colonized to eroticized 
geographies of ‘virgin land’” and to “symbolic fantasies of rape and rescue” that is so 
common in imperialist discourse appears with alarming regularity in the legislative 
hearings of the Freedom Support Act and is thus connected not only to policymakers’ 
conceptualization of Russia as gendered inherently feminine, but also to their notion 
of the United States as the masculine cold war “victor” destined to save Russia both 
from itself and for global capitalism.122 This bolsters feminist theorist Kathryn 
Temple’s contention that the desire of the United States to dominate others 
economically and militarily is analogous to an individual abuser whose goal is to 
“retain power and control over his individual victim,” thus making the U.S. (with its 
constituent political and economic elite) a “global abuser” exemplary of “a patriarchal 
power model that equates power with one’s capacity to control others.”123 As signaled 
by the use of the term “active penetration” to describe the goal of U.S. businesses in 
Russia, the language used throughout the hearings to describe the mode of and 
strategies for U.S. assistance to Russia was overtly gendered and, given the discursive 
configuration of Russia as feminine, often suggestive of forced (hetero)sexual 
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intercourse, which was justified by the potent combination of cold war triumphalism 
and American exceptionalism. According to the narrative of U.S. aid created 
throughout the hearings, a masculinist U.S., gloriously triumphant in its cold war 
“victory” and assured of the right(eous)ness of its political and economic systems, 
welcomed the historic opportunity to play its predestined role as “a beacon and a 
model” to “these new Russians” by providing unidirectional technical advice and 
assistance.124
                                                 
 






Crime, Corruption, and Chaos:  
Sex Trafficking and the Failure of U.S. Russia Policy 
 
 
“This is the Russia that many in the West now say we have lost.  
Lost not in the sense of having mislaid, by accident,  
but through our own actions and mistakes.  
Lost as a selfish, thoughtless man loses a woman who loves him— 






 Feminist development theorist Joe Doezema argues that recent attempts by 
Western anti-trafficking advocates to halt the transnational trade in (usually female) 
bodies for sex work are analogous to the “white slavery” panic of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries in which white Western women were thought to be at 
risk of abduction for prostitution in Other(ed) geographical areas, most notably South 
America. Although the direction of the traffic in women has switched (i.e., from 
North to South at the turn of the twentieth century to Eastern/Southern women 
trafficked to the West/North at the turn of the twenty-first), Doezema points to the 
strikingly similar rhetoric used to create both narratives: young, naïve, innocent 
women are lured by evil traffickers into a horrendous life of sex, crime, and drugs. 
She argues that both narratives operate/d as cultural myths related to concerns about 
women’s sexuality and racialized Others as a means of curtailing women’s voluntary 
migration as nation-states experience/d what she terms a “boundary crisis” involving 
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“fears of loss of community identity” in the wake of “displacement, mass migration 
and globalisation.”2 
 Although Doezema does not discount reports that trafficking in human beings 
for sex work occurs, she wonders, given the widely acknowledged (even among anti-
trafficking activists) difficulty of collecting reliable data on this illegal activity, 
whether the anti-trafficking campaign, much like the mythologization of “white 
slavery,” might “revolve around a relatively few number of cases that conform to the 
stereotype of the innocent girl lured or abducted into the sex industry.”3 The 
contemporary (i.e. since the late 1990s) anti-trafficking narrative, Doezema argues, 
reveals one form of the “implicit racism” embedded in Western anti-trafficking 
rhetoric, which assumes that non-Western women are unable to act as agents in their 
own lives. As trafficking “victims,” these women are at the mercy of, rather than 
active participants in, local and global socio-economic systems, making it impossible 
for women to make a choice to enter the sex industry; rather, they only do so when 
“duped” by traffickers. In this discourse they are thus presented as helpless and 
childlike, which, as Doezema points out, is inherent in what feminist theorist Chandra 
Mohanty critiques as Western feminists’ “colonial gaze.”4 In opposition to this 
narrative, and given the scarcity and/or unreliability of the available data, there is 
evidence to suggest, in fact, that not only are “[t]he majority of ‘trafficking victims’ 
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[…] aware that the jobs offered them are in the sex industry,”5 but that, despite the 
attention given it by U.S.-based politicians, activists, and the media, sex trafficking 
accounts for a relatively small number of human trafficking cases, most of which 
involve men as well as women and children for forced labor in industries ranging 
from domestic service to garment industry sweatshops to agriculture.6 
 I explore in this chapter how the contemporary anti-trafficking narrative of 
“victims” and “villains” as described by Doezema (along with the attendant Western 
“hero”) ceased to be abstract in legislative hearings on the issue and was, instead, 
superimposed over an ongoing diplomatic confrontation between Russia and the 
United States. Before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the last years of the 
twentieth century were widely considered to have been the nadir of post-Soviet U.S.-
Russian relations. In the wake of Russia’s August 1998 financial collapse, followed 
closely by charges of corruption and money laundering at the highest echelons of the 
Russian government (including accusations leveled at President Boris Yeltsin 
himself), the Republican-led U.S. Congress convened a series of hearings between 
September 1998 and October 1999 whose collective purpose was to assess the 
effectiveness (or not) of U.S. Russia policy as administered by the Democratic 
Clinton administration.  
 Almost simultaneously, several legislators, most notably the late Senator Paul 
Wellstone (D-Minnesota) and Representative Christopher Smith (R-New Jersey), 
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began to advocate the passage of a U.S. anti-trafficking law through a series of 
hearings that began in the summer of 1999. Together, along with a mark-up session 
concerning a House version of the proposed bill held on August 4, 1999 before the 
House Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, these hearings 
constitute the bulk of the legislative history of Public Law 106-386, the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act (TVPA).7 Signed into law on October 28, 2000—two months 
before the enactment of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish 
Trafficking in Women and Children—the U.S. law became a global model for anti-
trafficking legislation and continued that country’s self-perceived role as a global 
leader in human rights advocacy. The TVPA focused on what Clinton administration 
officials called the three Ps: prosecution of traffickers, protection of “victims,” and 
prevention activities aimed at vulnerable populations in identified source countries. 
 Debate continues among scholars, immigration and law enforcement officials, 
legislators, and even sex workers themselves about the suitability of the TVPA and its 
effectiveness for combating human trafficking,8 but in this chapter I will focus on the 
timing of the legislation the late 1990s to halt human trafficking, which coincided 
with clashes over who should most appropriately take the blame for what appeared at 
the time to be the wholesale failure of U.S. Russia policy. I first conduct a close 
textual analysis of the U.S. Congressional hearings that led to the passage of the 
TVPA to argue that in U.S. political culture in the late 1990s, human trafficking 
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became discursively synonymous with sex trafficking (i.e., the illegal transnational 
trade in the bodies of (usually) women and girls for (predominantly) heterosexual 
sex), which, in turn, was inextricably linked with “victimized” Russian women, who 
were assumed to be white Europeans. According to the anti-trafficking rhetoric in the 
Congressional hearings, Russian women ostensibly needed to be saved not only from 
“evil” traffickers, but also from emasculated Russian men, who, unable to cope with 
the transition to capitalism and democracy, were incapable of supporting or protecting 
“their” women and children in the way that “real” men should.  
 I then contextualize the anti-trafficking hearings within an overarching 
discursive analysis that takes into account their relative temporal synchrony with the 
oversight hearings being held on Capitol Hill to assess what went wrong with U.S. 
assistance in Russia. I argue that these two co-constitutive conversations, one about a 
proposed U.S. anti-trafficking law, the other about U.S. Russia policy, reveal much 
not only about the gendered dynamics of U.S.-Russian relations at the end of the 
twentieth century, but also about the epistemological limitations imposed on both 
policy debates by the inadequacies of language. Although well-intentioned, the 
members of Congress who championed the passage of the TVPA inadvertently 
deployed the rhetoric of Russian trafficking “victims” as a convenient political trope 
that operated equally well in both sets of hearings: Russian men, particularly political 
elites and law enforcement officials, were explicitly identified as the chief opposition 






On Capitol Hill 
According to journalist Anthony M. DeStephano, it was through Sheila Wellstone, 
the wife of Senator Paul Wellstone, that the issue of “human trafficking” was first 
brought to the attention of the U.S. Congress in the late 1990s. In 1997, law 
enforcement officials raided a brothel in an upscale, predominantly white 
neighborhood just outside the District of Columbia, arresting not only the brothel 
owners, but also the sex workers, whom police learned had been illegally brought into 
the U.S. from Ukraine and Russia and forced to work as prostitutes. According to 
DeStephano, although the brothel owners were prosecuted, the sex workers, 
themselves, faced no criminal charges. But as they were living in the United States 
illegally, they were deported after the trial (during which law enforcement officials 
charged them for their housing), “sent back to homelands in no better shape and 
certainly with no better job prospects that they’d had when they’d left.”9 The 
treatment of the sex workers by local law enforcement officials angered Wellstone, 
and she encouraged her husband to bring the issue of human trafficking to the 
attention of his Congressional colleagues and then work with them to create 
legislation that would improve the ways in which U.S. law enforcement officials and 
state and federal institutions responded to trafficking situations. Shortly thereafter, the 
first public mention of human trafficking on Capitol Hill was made by Senator 
Wellstone on the floor of the U.S. Senate where, on March 10, 1998, International 
Women’s Day, he introduced a resolution denouncing the transnational traffic in 
women for sex work and domestic labor by using as visual aids maps of routes used 
                                                 
 




by emigrants from the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. The 
proposed resolution, he argued, would put the U.S. Congress on record as opposing 
the transnational traffic in women and girls. 
 Although Wellstone did acknowledge the fact that women are trafficked for 
reasons other than sex work, his presentation featured stories of young, naïve, and/or 
economically desperate women from Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet 
Union having been duped into prostitution by manipulative traffickers. As a result, 
Wellstone’s floor speech served not only as the impetus for what became, over the 
course of the next two years, bipartisan support in both houses of Congress for the 
creation of U.S. anti-trafficking legislation, but also, unfortunately, to crystallize 
before it began the discursive limits of the Congressional conversation on human 
trafficking. That Wellstone chose in this first public discussion of human trafficking 
among legislators to focus chiefly on sex trafficking meant that his colleagues, 
heretofore largely unaware of these human rights abuses, were introduced to the issue 
as one that affects predominantly women and girls forced to work as prostitutes 
serving heterosexual male clients. This heteronormative perspective ignored the 
likelihood that boys and men are also trafficked for sex work. Additionally, 
Wellstone’s focus on sex trafficking to the exclusion of other forms of human 
trafficking meant that his colleagues on Capitol Hill were introduced to the issue of 
trafficking-as-forced prostitution rather than as constitutive of global labor migration, 
more broadly conceived. The focus on trafficking-as-forced prostitution led in 
subsequent Congressional hearings to the discursive conflation of human trafficking 




and (girl) children could be trafficked for reasons other than for forced prostitution, 
but also that men (or boys) could be trafficked at all.  
 Doezema’s critique of Western anti-trafficking rhetoric rings true when 
applied to Wellstone’s floor speech: his “victims” were young, naïve women preyed 
upon by evil traffickers. But, for Wellstone, just as in the subsequent Congressional 
hearings that constitute the legislative history of the TVPA, “victims” were frequently 
identified as Russian, Ukrainian, or, more generally, Eastern European (i.e. 
culturally/ethnically Slavic and racially white) women who, as a result of the 
combination of extreme economic hardship and delusional desperation, were 
deceptively led by their fellow Russians (or Ukrainians) into a life of prostitution, 
drugs, and crime. Thus, in the discourse created by and deployed in the U.S. Congress 
during the late 1990s, villainous Russian/Eastern European organized crime networks 
worked in concert with complicit, corrupt, and/or ineffectual Russian/Eastern 
European government and law enforcement officials to prey upon young, innocent 
Russian/Eastern European women, who became the trafficking “victims” passively 
awaiting rescue by the heroic (and, lest we forget the perceived results of the cold 
war, triumphant) United States in its self-appointed role as a global human rights 
leader.  
 On June 28, 1999, more than a year after Wellstone’s floor speech, the first 
hearing concerning the issue of trafficking was held on Capitol Hill before the U.S. 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).10 The Commission’s 
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chairperson, Representative Christopher Smith (R-New Jersey), had already 
introduced a bill in the House, H.R. 1356, the Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act 
of 1999. Smith believed that this bill would aptly address Sheila Wellstone’s concerns 
about the treatment of sex trafficking survivors by U.S. law enforcement officials and 
government agencies, first, by incorporating protection and prevention efforts for 
victims and, second, by treating traffickers “exactly as we do those who commit 
rape.”11  
 The bill’s title, along with the hearing it precipitated, The Sex Trade: 
Trafficking in Women and Children in Europe and the United States, illustrates quite 
clearly that in the year since legislators had first been informed of the existence of 
trafficking through Senator Wellstone’s floor speech, the broad issue of human 
trafficking for forced labor in a wide variety of industries had been prematurely 
delimited to incorporate only sex trafficking. Including this first hearing before the 
bipartisan and bicameral CSCE, there were a total of three Congressional hearings 
and one public legislative markup session held between June 1999 and April 2000 to 
hear expert testimony on what lawmakers of both houses interchangeably referred to 
as “trafficking” or “sex trafficking.” For example, while Smith is clear in his opening 
remarks that the hearing before the CSCE has been convened to hear expert testimony 
specifically concerning sex trafficking, he almost immediately and then for the 
remainder of this and subsequent hearings in the House substitutes the abbreviated 
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term “trafficking.”12 Similarly, in the two-part hearing held before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, chairperson Sam 
Brownback’s (R-Kansas) opening remarks make clear that the hearing is intended to 
address all forms of trafficking in women and children.13 Despite this claim, however, 
the overwhelming majority of the invited witnesses testify on the causes and 
consequences of sex trafficking, and Brownback refers specifically in his opening 
remarks to the commercial sexual exploitation of women and children, pointing out 
that “[e]very year, approximately 1 million women and children are forced into the 
sex trade against their will internationally.”14 In the second part of that same hearing, 
Brownback uses his opening statement to again refer specifically to the global sex 
trade, calling the transnational traffic in the bodies of women and children for forced 
prostitution “a new phenomenon and does not really look like anything we have seen 
before.”15  
 Most telling, though, is that with the exception of twelve witnesses with 
expertise in human rights, transnational crime and corruption, global affairs, and 
immigration, most of whom were called upon from the State Department to address 
questions regarding the Clinton administration’s policy toward human trafficking, the 
bulk of the “expert” testimony on the scope of “trafficking” came from thirteen non-
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governmental researchers and activists (including five sex trafficking survivors—one 
from Nepal, two from Mexico, one from Ukraine and one from Russia) who were 
involved exclusively with projects and/or organizations dedicated explicitly to putting 
a stop to sex trafficking. Indeed, of the twenty-five witnesses called to testify over the 
course of three hearings between June 1999 and April 2000, the majority of them 
were part of the anti-sex trafficking campaign, which indicates the clear emphasis in 
Congress on ending that form of labor trafficking to the exclusion of others. 
Additionally, one of the witnesses, Laura J. Lederer of the anti-sex trafficking 
Protection Project, testified at each of the three hearings.16 Providing roughly the 
same statement each time, Lederer’s description of how young, innocent, poverty-
stricken women are easily lured into the global sex trade mirrors precisely the 
narrative that Doezema so powerfully critiques.  
 This narrow focus on sex trafficking is hardly surprising; the very title of H.R. 
1356, the Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act, exposes Christopher Smith’s belief 
that sex trafficking, although not the only form of labor trafficking, is by far “the 
most brutal” and that to include all forms of forced labor practices under the rubric of 
one law assumes that they are all the same and should thus be treated as such by law 
enforcement officials.17 But by the time the Senate began its hearing in February 
2000, the strenuous admonishments by several human rights and immigration experts 
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that U.S. anti-trafficking legislation should not be limited to commercial sexual 
exploitation had resulted in proposed legislation entitled, more broadly, the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act to reflect its allegedly expanded scope. 
Regardless, Brownback’s insistence that both parts of the Senate hearing would be 
about all forms of trafficking in women and children was belied by its exclusive focus 
on sex trafficking. Of the thirteen witnesses who appeared before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs18—and despite the 
knowledge that there are other organizations whose work has focused on other kinds 
of labor trafficking—an overwhelming majority (nine, including four former self-
identified involuntary sex workers) specifically addressed the causes of sex 
trafficking and/or the experiences of and consequences for women who are trafficked 
into the sex industry.19 In contrast, earlier hearings held before the CSCE and in the 
House, which were explicitly and unapologetically focused only on sex trafficking, 
were actually more balanced in terms of perspectives and experiences of the 
witnesses. In fact, it was in these early hearings that legislators heard increasingly 
vigorous objections to Smith’s singular focus in H.R. 1356 on sex trafficking as 
separate from and to the exclusion of other forms of trafficking and forced labor.20 
Although these objections seemed to have influenced the scope of the proposed U.S. 
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anti-trafficking legislation to incorporate sex trafficking as just one form of forced 
labor trafficking, the conceptualization by legislators of “trafficking” as “sex 
trafficking” persisted. This is apparent in the renewed insistence by Department of 
Justice civil rights attorney William R. Yeomans toward the end of the final hearing 
on the TVPA that any U.S. legislation should “criminalize a broader range of 
trafficking,” including not only sex work, but also domestic service, migrant labor, 
and sweatshop labor.21 In the end, despite the ongoing debate about the scope of the 
proposed anti-trafficking legislation, the stated purpose of the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act of 2000, whose title would suggest a wider reach than Smith had 
originally proposed in his Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act, is “[t]o combat 
trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are 
predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of 
traffickers, and to protect their victims.”22 
 
“Modern Day Slavery” 
Predicting that the numbers of women trafficked for work in the global sex industry 
could soon reach those of the African slave trade in the eighteenth century,23 the 
Protection Project’s Laura Lederer initiated what became the frequent deployment in 
the anti-trafficking hearings of an analogy between sex trafficking and slavery, 
specifically the African slave trade and the subsequent enslavement of kidnapped 
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Africans and their descendents in the United States. Witnesses began utilizing this 
analogy not only as a means of explaining to legislators the magnitude of the 
problem, but also to convince them of the integrity at the heart of their legislative 
attempts to solve it. Wendy Young of the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women 
and Children, for example, referred to sex trafficking as “an increasingly prevalent 
phenomenon” equivalent to “modern day slavery,”24 and Theresa Loar of the 
President’s Interagency Council on Women, who contextualized sex trafficking 
within the broader problem of violence against women, called sex trafficking “one of 
the most egregious violations of our time” and a “modern form of slavery.”25 Finally, 
Department of Justice civil rights attorney William R. Yeomans described trafficking 
as “slavery in its modern manifestions.”26  
 Later, legislators themselves got on the “slavery” bandwagon as the Senate 
hearing shifted from a small group of legislators trying to convince their colleagues of 
the importance of anti-trafficking legislation to a massive bipartisan effort to 
convince the Clinton administration, particularly Clinton’s State Department, that 
additional legislation focused on women and children and authorizing increased 
federal personnel and reporting was necessary to combat the transnational traffic in 
human beings for forced labor. In his statements before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, subcommittee chairperson Brownback openly 
employed the rhetoric of slavery, referring to sex trafficking as “the new slavery” and 
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admonished his colleagues to listen carefully to the expert witnesses so that they may 
learn together how to craft a “comprehensive scheme to penalize the full range of 
offenses involved in elaborate trafficking networks.”27  
 The analogy between slavery and sex trafficking, as well as the histories and 
painful legacy of U.S. race relations to which it implicitly refers, made the bodies of 
enslaved Africans and their descendents discursively equivalent to the young, female 
“victims” of sex trafficking as constructed by the anti-trafficking discourse. And, as 
Lederer pointed out to legislators, it also presented an opportunity for the United 
States to do at the turn of the twenty-first century what the British Empire had done at 
the turn of the nineteenth, that is, take the lead in eradicating the slave trade, albeit in 
a contemporary form.28 Thus, accomplishing the obliteration of sex trafficking would 
demonstrate to the world the right(eous)ness of the United States’ cold war “victory” 
and, perhaps, provide an opportunity for the United States to exorcise its guilt by 
righting an egregious wrong from its own past. The rhetorical strategy that analogized 
the institution of African slavery with the transnational trade in women and girls for 
sex work clearly appealed to legislators’ desire within the American nationalist 
narrative to accept and fulfill the United States’ self-perceived responsibility to 
“eradicate this terrible scourge” and ensure “that every man, woman, and child be 
afforded the opportunity to live in a world of freedom.”29 Lederer used this strategy 
advantageously on two additional occasions. The first was at the hearing before the 
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CSCE in which she, in an attempt to encourage continued Congressional progress on 
the proposed anti-trafficking legislation, locates the eradication of sex trafficking 
within the historical trajectory of the U.S. women’s movement, predicting that “[o]ne 
of the hallmarks of the 21st century will be the emancipation of women worldwide.” 
She then congratulates legislators for being on “the right side of history” with regard 
to protecting the rights of women, particularly by addressing sex trafficking as a 
human rights issue.30 The second occasion was during a prepared statement two 
months later when she argued that the “commercial sexual exploitation of women and 
children is one of the last, unfortunately the last, even in the women’s movement, the 
last, of the issues, but definitely not the least to be examined by our society,” 
suggesting to legislators that they had the opportunity, by “shin[ing] a light on what is 
taking place,”31 to trump even feminist activists by leading the way on anti-trafficking 
legislation that would protect the predominantly white and male policymakers’ 
“daughters” from horrendous treatment by would-be slave-traders in the new 
century.32 
 
Voluntary Sex Work v. Forced Prostitution 
At the crux of the conversation about sex trafficking on Capitol Hill was the 
combination of the perceived social immorality of sex work in the United States and 
the ideological differences between and among contemporary U.S.-based feminists 
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concerning the root causes of sex trafficking and the difference between voluntary sex 
work and forced prostitution. Some feminists argue that sex work is a legitimate 
survival strategy chosen by women and should be respected as such. They argue that 
“[p]rostitution itself is […] not the problem, but the context within which women 
engage in prostitution—such as forced prostitution and trafficking, as well as the 
often bad conditions under which the work is done—is problematic.”33 Consequently, 
they contend that voluntary sex work must be clearly delineated from sex trafficking 
and forced prostitution. In contrast, neo-abolitionists, whose moniker is an explicit 
reference to those who, during the nineteenth century, sought to eradicate the 
enslavement of Africans, conceptualize all sex work as a form of slave labor. 
According to them, sex work is inherently oppressive, sexually exploitative, and part 
of the cycle of violence against women, making the notion of “voluntary” sex work 
irrelevant. Given that “[t]he United States has perhaps the strongest anti-prostitution 
laws of any industrialized country and will not endorse any form of prostitution 
whether ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary,’” the neo-abolitionist position was featured 
throughout the TVPA hearings.34 For example, Lederer rather arrogantly presumed to 
“speak safely for many women’s organizations” when she lauded Smith’s efforts to 
pass anti-sex trafficking legislation, arguing that “sex and labor aren’t the same and 
can’t be equated.”35 
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 An attempt to grapple with the ideological divergence between “forced” 
prostitution and “voluntary” sex work was made only once in the course of the TVPA 
hearings when  Wellstone tried to glean from Undersecretary of State for Global 
Affairs Frank E. Loy how, for the purposes of “victim” protection, U.S. federal and 
local law enforcement and state institutions would define and identify “victims” of 
sex trafficking. In an earlier hearing in the House, Smith had touted the provision 
incorporated into his proposed anti-trafficking legislation that “include[ed] relief for 
deportation of victims, provided it is established that they were really innocent 
victims.”36 Whether Wellstone had read the transcript of this hearing and wanted 
clarification is unknown, but it is clear that his concern several months later was 
whether or not a woman who voluntarily agreed to be trafficked for sex work and was 
subsequently abused or exploited in the performance of that work would then be able 
to avail herself of the “victim” protection provisions of the proposed U.S. anti-
trafficking legislation. Unfortunately, Loy’s answer neglected to address Wellstone’s 
concern about a potential legislative loophole; instead, he insisted that the issue of 
forced versus voluntary prostitution would have no bearing on the application of the 
proposed legislation, because  
[…] the key is whether the trafficker[s] themselves are engaged in an act of 
transporting someone across international borders by illegal techniques for 
illegal profit, and then whether the act for which they are doing so falls within 
what we would hope would be a very broad definition of sexual exploitation.37  
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Loy and Wellstone had reached a communicative stalemate made more complicated 
by the strictly-enforced five-minute timeframe granted each legislator to ask 
questions of the witnesses. While Wellstone wanted assurances from the State 
Department that the widest possible definition of “victim” would be utilized in the 
protection of those who had been trafficked, Loy remained singularly focused on the 
prosecution of traffickers, both within existing U.S. law that made all forms of 
prostitution illegal and within the proposed provisions of the TVPA. Thus, bolstered 
by already-existing U.S. federal laws against all forms of prostitution, neo-
abolitionists successfully made Wellstone’s question discursively impossible within 
the context of U.S. policies toward prostitution and the proposed anti-trafficking 
legislation: according to the neo-abolitionist U.S. policy, all forms of sex work are 
exploitative, which means that all women engaged in prostitution are “victims.” 
Ostensibly, there can be no legislative loophole. 
 Although it was Wellstone’s 1998 floor speech that largely contributed to the 
discursive limitations of the trafficking debate in Congress to “sex trafficking” and its 
“victims” in the first place, it is ironic that it is he who attempted to open it back up 
again by acknowledging the possibility that some women, those who may have at one 
point or another chosen sex work as a viable and legitimate form of labor, could well 
be excluded from the protections of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act if they did 
not adequately meet the definition of “victim” as outlined in the TVPA and applied 
by local law enforcement officials. Although discursively impossible within the neo-
abolitionist rhetoric in which all prostitutes are “victims,” Wellstone’s question, 




which to earn their living, was the closest the Congressional hearings came to 
countering the implicit racism that Doezema argues is embedded in contemporary 
anti-trafficking discourse. Wellstone’s question also attempted to counter the 
hearings’ implicit sexism, which was based on the perceived social immorality of sex 
work in a U.S. context and relied on the construction and rhetorical deployment of an 
“innocent” “victim” who has been unwittingly tricked into selling her body for sex. 
This is the sympathetic prostitute around whom a case can be made, as it was in the 
Congressional hearings, for protection rather than prosecution despite her illegal 
activities, because it was not her choice to step beyond the bounds of an appropriately 
feminine performance; she ostensibly did so out of dire financial necessity. 
Additionally, the discursive focus on poverty and violent coercion makes it 
inconceivable that she could have chosen sex work; she would rather be doing 
something—anything—else. Trafficking “victims” (i.e., as in the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act) must be “sexually blameless” in order to appeal to the public and to 
the concerns of policymakers.38 In contrast, Wellstone’s question, along with the 
testimony of several Clinton administration officials that sex trafficking should be 
considered in tandem with other forms of labor trafficking, acknowledges the 
possibility that women from countries identified as sources of labor for the sex 
industry may well have the mental capacity to choose for themselves how and where 
to earn their livelihoods. Were she able to exist discursively, this, of course, would be 
the unscrupulous sex worker who, having voluntarily chosen prostitution, is not, 
                                                 
 




therefore, an appropriate “victim” and deserves what she gets, whether a beating at 
the hands of traffickers or deportation at the hands of U.S. immigration officials. 
 Much as in the Congressional hearings that constituted the partial legislative 
history of 1992’s Freedom Support Act (which I discussed at length in the last 
chapter), heteropatriarchal familial metaphors explicitly identifying the United States 
as the masculine patriarch best suited to rescue and protect young, female “victims” 
were used freely throughout these congressional hearings to evoke and mobilize 
bipartisan support for U.S. anti-trafficking legislation. State Department 
representative Harold Hongju Koh, for example, attempted early on to empathize 
with legislators from their shared perspective as fathers, pointing out that “trafficking 
often hits us so hard because it often involves children like our own.”39 Koh’s 
approach worked on Representative Eni F. H. Faleomavaega (D-American Samoa), 
who added later in that same hearing, “I have a 13 year-old daughter, and I wish that 
every parent, every father, every brother could have a real sense of appreciation [for] 
what women and children go through.”40 Similarly, Smith appealed not only to his 
colleagues, but also to legislators and law enforcement officials abroad, asking, 
“What are you doing? These are your daughters. […] These are people you should be 
putting sandbags around to protect them.”41 
 Even a cursory examination of these familial metaphors exposes the 
heteropatriarchal assumptions that undergird them: A parental concern for the 
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protection of “children” rapidly (and, given the largely male composition of the 
Congressional committees before which these hearings took place, not unexpectedly) 
became a fatherly concern for the protection of “daughters.” Similarly, while the 
United States is assigned the role of patriarchal protector in this anti-trafficking 
narrative, the governments of source countries are also assigned an inferior masculine 
role as fathers and brothers who are unable or, worse, have no desire to protect “their” 
daughters. Smith, for example, appeals to those governments to “stop exporting and 
exploiting your women,”42 and, later, Lederer assures U.S. legislators that several of 
the most prominent source countries “are expressing a real interest in stopping 
trafficking in their women and children.”43 Although these two statements imply 
ownership of women and children by nation-states that are discursively configured as 
masculine, their own masculinity is implicitly inferior to that of the United States 
because, unlike the U.S., they have not taken the appropriate steps to protect “their” 
women from the horrors of what was frequently referred to by hearing participants as 
“modern day slavery.”  
 
Russian “Victims” and “Villains” 
I have thus far discussed the anti-trafficking narrative constructed through the 
Congressional hearings that constitute that partial legislative history of the TVPA 
only in the abstract, that is in terms of Doezema’s analysis that draws on the classic 
nineteenth-century melodramatic stock characters of “victim,” “villain,” and an 
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implied “hero.” Not surprisingly given the highly politicized forum on Capitol Hill, 
the United States was rhetorically cast in the role of the heteropatriarchal hero with 
the messianic responsibility of rescuing innocent, young, non-Western female 
“victims” from the clutches of foreign (i.e. racially/ethnically Other and largely 
masculine) transnational crime networks and complicit and/or ineffectual law 
enforcement officials. While Doezema does, indeed, critique this implicitly racist 
depiction of both “victims” and “villains,” arguing that “victims” and traffickers alike 
are conceptualized in anti-trafficking discourse as always already Other/ed, I am 
interested in this section in how and why, throughout the TVPA hearings, U.S. 
legislators unambiguously associated a specific national/ethnic identity—Russian—
with these roles and what implications such an association had on U.S. Russia policy, 
particularly within the context of the debate that raged on Capitol Hill concerning the 
apparent wholesale failure of U.S. Russia policy in the wake of that country’s August 
1998 economic collapse and subsequent revelations a year later concerning the 
alleged illegal capital flight from Russia of IMF loans.  
 Throughout the 1990s, it was predominantly the House Committee on 
International Relations that took the responsibility in Congress for monitoring the 
progress and results of the Freedom Support Act (see Appendix III). Beginning in 
June 1996, a U.S. presidential election year, hearings were held before the 
Republican-chaired committee fairly regularly as a means of assessing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Clinton administration’s Russia/NIS policy. In 
addition, the debate over “Who lost Russia?” had surfaced in the news media at 




while the Freedom Support Act was still being debated in Congress)  when a New 
York Times op-ed asked “Who is Losing Russia?”44 But with the total collapse of the 
Russian economy in August 1998 and subsequent allegations that IMF and perhaps 
even U.S. funds were being squandered by corrupt Russian politicians, the blame 
game on Capitol Hill hit its zenith, precipitating hearing after hearing in which 
indignant legislators of both political parties demanded an explanation from a parade 
of Clinton administration officials of just what, exactly, had gone wrong in Russia—
despite billions of dollars in U.S. aid (see Appendix IV).  
 Although hardly encouraging before August 1998 with regard to either the 
slow trajectory of Russia’s political and economic transition or its continued sales of 
conventional weapons and technology to several of its more (from a U.S. perspective) 
unsavory neighbors, particularly Iran, Congressional hearings held after that date 
were particularly somber, as terms such as “state of crisis,” “catastrophe,” “financial 
disaster,” and “total failure” were used alternatively to describe both Russia and U.S. 
Russia policy. For example, a hearing before the House Committee on International 
Relations regarding U.S.-Russian relations that began on July 16, 1998, just weeks 
before Russia’s economic collapse, featured testimony from witnesses on precisely 
these issues; however, in the second part of the hearing on September 17, 1998 these 
concerns were unceremoniously preempted by legislators’ accusations that high-level 
Russian government officials had been lying to the United States with regard to the 
progress of their “reform” efforts, and that the Clinton administration had 
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intentionally ignored signals that those efforts were not working.45 Accusations that 
the White House had been somehow negligent in effecting a transformation in 
Russia’s political and economic structure was the dominant theme of hearings about 
U.S. Russia policy in the year following August 1998. But a year later, in late August 
and early September 1999, reports began to surface in the U.S. news media that high-
level Russian government officials had illegally diverted billions of dollars in Russian 
foreign aid, including from the IMF and the World Bank, through the Bank of New 
York for personal use,46 after which Congressional hearings focused explicitly on 
crime and corruption in Russia and how the United States should move forward in the 
wake of its apparently failed Russia policy, for which the Clinton administration, 
particularly Vice President Al Gore (who was, at the time, running for President 
against Republican George W. Bush of Texas), was held largely responsible.  
 It was within the context of this last evolution in thinking about who was to 
blame for a failed U.S. Russia policy in an environment of apparently ubiquitous 
Russian crime and corruption that the hearings concerning sex trafficking began in an 
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attempt to create and enact U.S. anti-trafficking legislation that would be effective 
“the world over” in stopping the transnational trade in human bodies for forced labor, 
particularly women and children for sex work.47 The House Committee on 
International Relations acted throughout the 1990s as the primary Congressional 
monitor of U.S. Russia policy. Its jurisdiction continued after August 1998 with two 
hearings, one to assess what it termed the “crisis” in Russia on September 17, 1998, 
the other in June 1999 to consider U.S. achievements, if any, in Russia after seven 
years of aid. The CSCE also held a hearing after Russia’s August 1998 economic 
collapse to assess the status of human rights in Russia, and the House Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services convened a hearing to examine the Russian economy 
and U.S. policy toward Russian economic reform. Among and between these 
committees, there was considerable overlap in committee membership. Smith served 
as chairperson of both the CSCE and the House Subcommittee on International 
Operations and Human Rights and led the charge on anti-trafficking in the House. He 
also served on the CSCE with Brownback, a member of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the chairperson of the Senate Subcommittee on Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs, which heard testimony on trafficking in the Senate. 
Additionally, several members of the House Committee on International Relations, 
which convened the bulk of the hearings concerning U.S. Russia policy, were also 
members of Smith’s Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights. 
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Less than a month after this subcommittee’s hearing on sex trafficking, its members 
joined the full Committee on International Relations to begin a series of hearings 
exploring the pros and cons, successes and failures of U.S. Russia policy. And in the 
Senate, as the “Who lost Russia?” debate raged before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, several of its members were engaged with the issue of sex trafficking via 
their participation in hearings before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs.  
 Given the chronological trajectory of the relevant Congressional hearings in 
combination with the extensive personnel overlap, it is no wonder that legislators’ 
attempts to stop sex trafficking became discursively conflated on Capitol Hill with 
what expert witnesses identified as rampant crime and corruption in Russia. Louise 
Shelley of the Center for the Study of Transnational Crime and Corruption, for 
example, cites the NIS specifically, arguing not only that law enforcement officials 
and policymakers there view trafficked women as “deserving of their fate or 
motivated by financial necessity and therefore do not investigate or prosecute crimes 
involving sexual trafficking and prostitution,” but that they are also largely corrupt 
and, in some cases, actually working with traffickers.48 In effect, the causes of sex 
trafficking were largely associated with the political and economic chaos throughout 
the NIS, particularly in Russia, that had, according to the anti-trafficking narrative, 
enabled a few corrupt (male) politicians and government officials to amass enormous 
wealth at the expense of their fellow Russians, predominantly women and children. 
These women and children, reduced to poverty and ill health and unable to be 
                                                 
 




protected by those same corrupt and/or ineffectual political leaders, were being lured 
by transnational criminal networks into the global sex trade at alarming rates. Theresa 
Loar of the President’s Interagency Council on Women most explicitly made this 
association at a hearing on Trafficking in Women and Children in the International 
Sex Trade when she asserted that what was happening in Russia—the crime, 
corruption and economic and political instability that allegedly left women vulnerable 
to traffickers—was “something that […] I don’t think anyone could have anticipated. 
All of us had extremely high hopes for Russia, which have not been realized and 
probably will not be realized in the foreseeable future.”49  
 Thus, the “villains” of the anti-sex trafficking narrative created in Congress 
were precisely who Doezema says they were: always already racially/ethnically Other 
and complicit, corrupt, and/or ineffectual government and law enforcement officials 
or organized criminal networks. But, as Russia was the source country that received 
the lion’s share of legislators’ attention, the “villains” were also assumed throughout 
the hearings to be principally Russian men in varying positions of local and federal 
leadership. Legislators’ preoccupation with Russia was revealed early on in the CSCE 
hearing when witness Anita Botti of the President’s Interagency Council on Women 
offered a list of geographical areas from which women and children are trafficked 
that included Central America, Southeast Asia, Russia, Ukraine, Poland and the 
Czech Republic, after which chairperson Smith singled out Russia. He noted that that 
country was “conspicuously absent” from international efforts to halt sex trafficking 
and asked Botti to specifically address “where Russia stands [on the issue], since it is 
                                                 
 




the country of origin of so many of the women who are exploited.”50 There was no 
subsequent discussion, in this or in any other Congressional hearing, of similar 
concerns with regard to the other geographical areas of origin as identified by Botti 
and subsequent expert witnesses, and this early fixation on Russia as the source for 
trafficked women and children, like that on sex trafficking to exclusion of other forms 
of human trafficking, resulted in a limited conversation steeped, this time, in cold 
war-era tropes reliant upon a villainous (emasculated) Russia, its “suffering” 
(feminized) people (specifically identified as women in post-Soviet Russia), and a 
sympathetic (masculine) United States. Although other regions, most notably 
Southeast Asia and Central America, were mentioned as source countries, the former 
Soviet Union in general, and Russia in particular, were the geographical areas that 
elicited the long-term interest of legislators. 
 Smith continued his fixation with Russia during a legislative mark-up session 
for his H.R. 1356, the Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act of 1999, before the 
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights (of which, as I have 
mentioned, he was also chair). His opening statement is a veritable anti-Russian 
diatribe in which he points out that “[o]ne of the ironies of the fall of the Soviet 
Union […] has been that the explosion of poverty that has occurred has resulted in a 
very fertile ground for organized crime—the syndicates, the Russian mafia, the 
Ukrainian mafia—to prey upon these women.” Additionally, Smith reports that when 
Russian policymakers and law enforcement officials are asked about sex trafficking 
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and what they are doing to stop it, reactions range from complete denial to bewildered 
requests for more information to explicit complicity. Not surprisingly, it is this last 
reaction Smith finds particularly repugnant, and he claims that Russian law 
enforcement officials believe that if sex trafficking is occurring right under their 
noses, it is because “[Russian] women are just more beautiful” than women of other 
national ethnicities.51 Subcommittee member Matt Salmon (R-Arizona), who served 
with Smith on the full House Committee for International Affairs as well as on the 
CSCE, also jumped in that same mark-up session onto the anti-Russia bandwagon, 
pointing specifically to the rampant government corruption and complicity in that 
country that enables sex trafficking to “go on with a wink and nod.” In an implicit 
reference to the ongoing hearings before the House Committee on International 
Relations concerning Russia’s August 1998 economic collapse and the alleged 
squandering of assistance funds by Russian government officials, he points out that 
the U.S. “put[s] out millions and millions of dollars in aid to Russia” and demands 
that the bill in question, H.R. 1356, include the possibility for economic sanctions as a 
means of enforcing government accountability for “some of the money that we are 
sending over there.” His reasoning is that “[w]hen their government turns a deaf ear 
to this kind of human suffering and misery, I think we have a responsibility to be a 
little more scrutinizing in how we dole out the money.”52 
 The inclusion in any U.S. anti-trafficking law of the potential for economic 
sanctions against those countries that fall short of U.S. anti-trafficking standards met 
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with opposition from the Clinton administration, which argued that sanctions would 
only serve to worsen the very economic conditions that, according to experts, were 
the chief cause of women and children being made vulnerable to sex traffickers in the 
first place. But several of Salmon’s Republican colleagues could not foresee a 
situation in which countries, particularly Russia, that had been identified as major 
source countries of women trafficked into the sex industry would be induced to 
expend their already scarce resources on halting that practice unless the proposed 
U.S. anti-trafficking legislation included an incentive to do so—namely, economic 
sanctions. Seconding Salmon’s support of sanctions, subcommittee member Thomas 
Tancredo (R-Colorado) claimed that the threat and possible implementation of 
sanctions were the only way of stopping sex trafficking in “a country where almost 
every level of the government is actually participating in it, either directly, frankly, or 
indirectly, by suggesting that it is really not much of an issue, it is sort of a cultural 
thing and no big deal.”53 
 By the time sex trafficking was taken up in the Senate, U.S. legislators were 
confident in their identification of Russia as the chief offender in the anti-sex 
trafficking narrative. Not only did this facilitate an understanding of the issue as the 
purview of the Brownback-chaired Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs, but it also enabled the specific identification of trafficking “victims” as 
Russian (i.e. racially white and ethnically Slavic) women whose economic and social 
disadvantages in the “new” Russia left them vulnerable to being “lured” by traffickers 
and whose fear of authority figures, rooted in a legacy of Soviet oppression, made 
                                                 
 




them unlikely to seek help from law enforcement officials in destination countries.54 
Three of the five sex trafficking survivors who were invited to provide testimony as 
part of Congress’s consideration of anti-trafficking legislation served as witnesses 
during the second part of the Senate hearing before Brownback’s subcommittee on 
April 4, 2000. And although just one of the women was Russian (the others were 
from Mexico and Ukraine, respectively), this final hearing on what would become the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, although intended to be a hearing on 
human trafficking, broadly defined, quickly became a hearing focused only on sex 
trafficking—with Russia as the primary antagonist. The frequent discursive conflation 
made in U.S. political and popular culture between Russia and Ukraine is clear in this 
hearing: While two of the three sex trafficking survivors were from those countries, 
only Natalia Khodyreva of the Russian-based anti-sex trafficking organization the 
Angel Coalition was on hand to speak on behalf of the experiences of Russian 
women. No Ukraine-based anti-trafficking expert was invited to testify in this or any 
other hearing, nor were anti-trafficking experts from either Mexico or Nepal, the 
identified source countries of the three additional sex trafficking survivors asked to 
testify before the Senate subcommittee.  
 Not unpredictably, given what legislators had learned from U.S. State 
Department officials, activists, and scholars throughout the hearings, Khodyreva 
argued during her testimony that the traffic in Russian women for work in the global 
sex industry  
                                                 
 




[…] is a consequence of a socioeconomic situation in Russia and job 
discrimination against women. So many educated women cannot find the 
appropriate job that will provide a good living condition, they have no choice 
but to take a job with low qualifications abroad. But most of them find 
themselves in forced prostitution or slavery-like conditions.55  
Given the textbook symmetry of Khodyreva’s testimony to the overall narrative about 
sex trafficking as constructed by and during the Congressional hearings on the issue, 
it seems that to have merited an invitation to this last hearing, witnesses (including a 
few State Department officials and several representatives of human rights/anti-
trafficking organizations who had all testified on the issue at at least one previous 
hearing) were expected to reify the very narrative with which Sen. Paul Wellstone 
initiated the debate in his floor speech back on International Women’s Day in March 
1998. Even subcommittee member Wellstone himself, using a shrewd rhetorical 
strategy intended to reinforce and underscore for his Senate colleagues the 
importance of Khodyreva’s testimony, offers a summary of her statement for the 
record, reiterating that in terms of the former Soviet Union  
[…] the bitter irony is that the economic disintegration means that these 
women have not always been poor or many of them were actually highly 
educated, who at one time may have been gainfully employed and now they 
have no employment. So they are looking for a way to go to another country 
to find a job, but not of course being forced into prostitution.56 
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That Wellstone ends this final hearing on sex trafficking precisely where he began the 
conversation roughly two years before, with clearly identifiable Russian “victims” 
and implicit Russian “villains,” illustrates the essential stagnancy in Congress of the 
anti-trafficking narrative’s discursive frames, which, as I show, correspond almost 
exactly to those critiqued by Doezema, with the addition of a specific national/ethnic 
identity assigned to both “victims” and “villains.” Particularly intriguing, however, is 
that while concerns about the crime, corruption, and chaos that supposedly 
characterized Russian politics and society at the end of the twentieth century were 
omnipresent in the Congressional hearings regarding the proposed U.S. anti-
trafficking legislation, the issue of sex trafficking, which had its first hearing on 
Capitol Hill before the CSCE in June 1999, was almost entirely absent from 
contemporaneous Congressional hearings on the successes and failures of U.S. Russia 
policy—despite the fact that Smith and Wellstone each served on the respective 
committees that convened those hearings. The sole reference during the hearings on 
the successes and failures of U.S. Russia policy to a concern about the “threats of 
trafficking of arms, drugs, [and] women and children” as a result of Russian 
“reforms” during the 1990s was made by invited witness James O. Finckenauer, 
Professor of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University and an expert on transnational 
organized crime.57 Even Wellstone remained surprisingly silent on the issue in 
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hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.58 And in a three-part 
hearing before the House Committee on International Relations held during October 
1999, legislators explored charges of corruption at the highest levels of the Russian 
government, the alleged mismanagement and laundering of Western aid monies, 
Russia’s chaotic domestic situation (which, according to expert witnesses, included 
rampant anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, extreme poverty, widespread health 
epidemics, the potential for totalitarianism/fascism, and a war in the Islamic republic 
of Chechnya), and the tenuous state of U.S.-Russian relations as a result of Russia’s 
continued sale of conventional weapons technology to Iran. The printed transcript of 
the three-part hearing indicates that Smith, a member of this committee, did not 
directly participate on either October 6 or October 19; on October 7, however, he did 
submit for the record an opening statement in absentia detailing his primary concerns 
about U.S. Russia policy, particularly his outrage at the Clinton administration for 
supporting the wrong “reformers” in Russia and its inability to account for the 
billions of dollars in U.S. aid spent there.59 He also criticized what he termed Russia’s 
“war of vengeance” in Chechnya as well as (then) newly-appointed Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin’s apparent path “toward militarism and authoritarianism.”60 It is 
unknown whether Smith’s lack of participation at the first and last installments of this 
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hearing, in combination with his absence from the second, indicate that he was never 
actually in the hearing room with his colleagues and their invited witnesses at any 
point during this three-part hearing. What is clear from the record, however, is his 
surprising silence on the issue of sex trafficking as a consequence of the apparent 
failures of U.S. Russia policy and the resultant crime and corruption in Russia. 
Congressional hearings provide clear and specific opportunities for legislators and 
then witnesses to present their remarks to hearing participants. Each legislator is then 
given five minutes to ask whatever questions they would like of the witnesses based 
on the witnesses’ prepared testimonies. That Smith failed to avail himself of these 
opportunities to advance his own agenda and make clear for his colleagues the 
importance of his proposed anti-sex trafficking legislation within the broader context 
of U.S. Russia policy—particularly because he had not been reticent to do so in 
earlier subcommittee hearings on sex trafficking—seems a clear indication that 
human trafficking, which (as I have illustrated) became discursively conflated with 
“sex trafficking,” was ghettoized by/in Congress as a “women’s issue” and not 
incorporated into the “big ticket” items of international relations such as the causes 
and consequences of crime and corruption in Russia and the apparent failure of U.S.-
led reform efforts as a result of that crime and corruption. 
 The hearings held after the August 1998 collapse of Russia’s economy in 
which legislators demanded to know what went wrong in Russia concluded that, in 
the final assessment, it was Russians, or, more specifically, crooked Russian 
politicians masquerading as “reformers,” who were largely to blame for the continued 




signaled the failure of (or at least a necessary reorientation of) U.S. Russia policy. 
Not surprisingly, this same group of Russians, along with inept and/or corrupt law 
enforcement officials and the reportedly increasing power and influence of 
transnational Russian criminal networks, were simultaneously to blame for the traffic 
in women from Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe for work in the 
global sex industry. A few legislators did acknowledge, however, that U.S. policies 
early on in the transition process, particularly “shock therapy” with its rapid 
privatization of state-owned industries and high rates of inflation, may have 
contributed to some of the problems facing Russia in the late 1990s, most notably the 
alarmingly high numbers of Russians, particularly women and children, living in 
poverty. But regardless of the extent to which U.S. policies were implicated in what 
one hearing participant called Russia’s “state of crisis,”61 the discursive assignation of 
blame for Russia’s economic, political and social problems to particular Russian men, 
whether corrupt “reformers” or inept and/or complicit law enforcement officials, 
enabled the United States to remove itself from the equation: Russia was in disarray 
as a result of Russian corruption, not U.S. policies, and trafficking was happening as a 
result of the alarming disarray of Russian institutions and legal apparatuses—even 
after several years and several billions of dollars in Western aid monies.  
 Conveniently, such a conclusion meant that the United States was not 
responsible for the desperate poverty that, according to anti-trafficking experts 
(including St. Petersburg-based hearing witness Khodyreva), had left Russian women 
vulnerable to organized transnational crime networks. And even if U.S. Russia policy 
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had, to whatever minuscule extent, contributed to Russia’s problems, the increasing 
numbers of (white) women and children being trafficked out of Russia for work in the 
global sex industry gave the United States an opportunity to redeem itself by leading 
the charge against sex trafficking.  
 The opportunity to lead the charge against sex trafficking is, I contend, why 
U.S. legislators’ commitment to halt human trafficking coincided in the late 1990s 
with partisan clashes over who/what should most appropriately take the blame for 
Russia’s continuing political and economic problems and the apparent failure of U.S. 
Russia policy. The focus in those hearings on crime and corruption at the highest 
echelons of Russian government was synchronous with hearings on sex trafficking in 
which the “villains” were Russian crime syndicates and inept and/or complicit law 
enforcement officials, and “victims” were Russian women. Operating within the cold 
war triumphalist narrative, this presented legislators with the perfect opportunity to 
“rescue” Russian women from “evil” or incompetent Russian men, who, as Smith and 
Tancredo reported in the hearings, had little to no interest in taking action to halt sex 
trafficking themselves and were, therefore, unable to protect their “daughters” in the 
way that “real” men rightly should. This enabled the anti-trafficking narrative in the 
United States, like that regarding Russia’s continuing political and economic 
problems, to proceed without the inclusion of the United States as an actor embedded 
in the process. There was no acknowledgement in the anti-trafficking narrative that 
the U.S. may have contributed in some way to either the cause of women’s migration 
from Russia (i.e. poverty and lack of employment or educational opportunities in 




within the territorial borders of the U.S..62 This latter omission is particularly 
intriguing given the professed shared objective among legislators to attend to the 
causes of sex trafficking as a means of preventing it, because, as one witness put it, 
“[t]here are all those customers on that other end there that are creating the need for 
the supply.”63 At only one point in any of the three hearings on sex trafficking was 
there a consideration of or attempt made to characterize those “customers” in the U.S. 
who would solicit women for illegal sex. On April 4, 2000, William R. Yeomans of 
the U.S. Department of Justice reported that Mexican women working as prostitutes 
in brothels in Florida and the Carolinas were frequented by “migrant laborers.” These 
“johns” were discursively constructed not as white American men, but as racially 
Other/ed men who were, themselves, most likely illegal immigrant workers.64 
Clearly, the identification of a “john” as a dark-skinned, Spanish-speaking illegal 
immigrant not only erased the likely complicity of U.S.-born men in the commercial 
sexual exploitation of women and children globally, but also enabled some legislators 
to target illegal immigration as a primary cause of sex trafficking into the U.S..65 This 
resulted in United States’ rhetorical placement within the anti-trafficking narrative as 
an outside observer, as an involuntary destination country for illegal immigrants (e.g. 
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“johns” and “victims”) and transnational criminals (the “traffickers”), and the obvious 
choice to lead international efforts to end sex trafficking. 
 It can be no coincidence, though, that U.S. legislators learned of and began 
their efforts to end sex trafficking at the end of the 1990s, only after large (enough) 
numbers of white women from Eastern Europe and the NIS began appearing as 
commodities in the global sex industry.66 International laws outlawing human 
trafficking date back to the “white slavery” panic in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries when white European women were reportedly at risk for 
abduction into forced prostitution in Other geographical areas, most notable South 
America. Although historians have demonstrated that “white slavery” was a largely 
non-existent phenomenon utilized as a metaphor for a number of societal anxieties, 
including the voluntary emigration of women from Europe for work,67 it operated as a 
powerful cultural myth that mobilized the international community and resulted in the 
passage of an international anti-trafficking law in 1904 as well as the 1949 United 
Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons.68 The 
outbreak of two world wars and subsequent anti-colonial conflicts during the mid-
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twentieth century effectively halted human transnational migration, and concerns 
about “white slavery” and human trafficking disappeared for the better part of fifty 
years—until the increase in global trade, tourism, and migration corresponded in the 
1970s with the liberalization in the global West of sexual mores and values. As a 
result, East Asian women began to be trafficked to Western Europe during the early 
1980s, followed shortly thereafter by women from Central America, West Africa, and 
the Caribbean in the late 1980s. Then, in 1989/1991 with the demise of the Soviet 
system in Eastern Europe, the supply of women for illicit sex started to come 
increasingly from that geographical region, particularly from Russia and Ukraine,69 
thus pointing to the possibility that U.S. legislators suddenly became interested in the 
issue in the late 1990s precisely because Russian and Ukrainian women are white 
Europeans. This suspicion is, of course, bolstered not only by the catalyst behind 
Wellstone’s Senate floor speech (i.e., a 1997 police raid of a massage parlor outside 
the District of Columbia that revealed Russian and Ukrainian sex trafficking 
“victims”), but also the targeting of Russian government and law enforcement 
officials as the primary “villains” of the anti-sex trafficking narrative. Additionally, 
U.S. State Department officials repeatedly testified that they became aware of the 
extent and seriousness of sex trafficking only in the mid-1990s, contextualizing the 
phenomenon within the increasing power of transnational criminal networks and the 
growing supply of vulnerable women that began concomitantly with the collapse of 
                                                 
 




the Soviet system, to which Representative Barbara Lee (D-California) replied 
disbelievingly, “It sounds like we have just had our head in the sand on this.”70  
 
From “Mother Russia” to “Miss Russia” 
I have thus far presented a critical assessment of recent attempts by U.S. legislators to 
halt the transnational trade in women and children as part of the global sex industry. 
But, as perceptions and subsequent discursive depictions of Other countries (whether 
rhetorical, textual, televisual, and so forth) are drawn in part from those countries’ 
representation of themselves, from their national performance on an international 
stage,71 it is hardly surprising that by the late 1990s U.S. legislators had come to 
associate Russia not only with crime, corruption, and chaos, but also with 
prostitution. In Chapter 2, I discussed briefly the operationalization by Russian 
politicians of gendered themes, imagery, and metaphors taken directly from and/or 
reminiscent of late-nineteenth century Russian imperial and Orthodox assumptions 
about masculinity and femininity that reappeared continually in representations of the 
Russian nation throughout the 1990s.72 I pointed out that since the demise of the 
Soviet Union, there has been a marked change in attitudes toward gender, the 
representation of women in the media, and “the acceptability of blatantly 
discriminating practices and statements.”73 This has included the widespread use not 
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only of women’s bodies as commodities, particularly in pornography and prostitution, 
but also of prostitution as a metaphor for Russia’s relationship with Other countries, 
particularly those in the global West, to whom Russia (in the self-assessment of its 
media) seems to have become nothing more than a “nexus of buying and selling, 
where everything of value is offered cynically to the highest bidder.”74
 Historically, (female) prostitutes and prostitution have performed a significant 
dramaturgical function in Russian cultural mythology as “a sign of Russian national 
humiliation—of the desperation of a[n emasculated] country forced to sell off its 
natural and spiritual resources to unscrupulous clients from other lands.”75 In Russian 
literature, this has meant the fictional depiction of women not only as “a source of 
great virtue” (i.e. Mother Russia, the Motherland, etc.), but also, simultaneously, as “a 
kind of pathological entity” in opposition to which Russian men have defined their 
masculinity.76 In the post-Soviet era, this virgin/whore dichotomy has meant that 
Russian women are conceptualized as  
[…] the site of antagonisms between what is considered truly Russian and 
what is corrupted by the West (as in Russian beauty contests), between what is 
demeaned by capitalist influence (prostitution and crass consumerism) versus 
what is esteemed in mythologies of motherhood in Russian folklore; between 
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what is pornographic (naked female dancers in night clubs and new fashion 
trends) and what is pleasurable.77 
Women in post-Soviet Russia are thus always already positioned within Russian 
nationalist discourse as (hetero)sexed and gendered subjects, which creates a clear 
and distinct link between domestic beauty pageants, for example, and the 
transnational traffic in Russian women, because the contests “provide an increasing 
use of the feminine body as a public icon” that is subsequently “taken up as part of a 
[Russian] national iconography.” As a result, and in the context of an emerging 
capitalist market, “[t]he prostitute […] is the new ‘protagonist’ who threatens bodily 
and/or moral purity, and so it is Russian cultural purity which is at stake in her 
activity.”78 The ubiquity of sex and (hetero)sexuality in Russian culture throughout 
the 1990s, which was a defiant oppositional  response to the perceived puritanism of 
Marxist-Leninism, linked the commodification of women’s bodies with Western 
consumer culture and transformed the cultural mythology of the virtuous “Mother 
Russia” into “Miss Russia,” the sexually promiscuous beauty pageant contestant-
turned-sex worker.79 
 This is, in large part, the Russia that Russians themselves presented to the 
international community: The rapid drive to join the global capitalist economic 
system in the 1990s meant that everything—including Russian women—was for sale. 
It is no wonder, then, that U.S. legislators, all of whom were raised, first, within the 
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limited epistemologies of the cold war that made Russia/the U.S.S.R. and its 
constituent political and economic systems an anathema to the United States and, 
second, in a rather puritanical environment (ironically, not unlike that created by 
Marxist-Leninism in the Soviet Union) where sex work is considered immoral, zeroed 
in on the discursive and material exploitation of Russian women by Russian 
nationalists across the political spectrum.80 These epistemological foundations, in 
conjunction with the essentialization of Russia-as-prostitute and the sexual 
exploitation of Russian women through pornography and sex work,81 has meant that 
U.S. legislators and policymakers have learned what they think they know about post-
Soviet Russia from an already limited Russian nationalist narrative constructed 
predominantly by male artists, journalists, intellectuals, and so forth. Representative 
Tancredo, for example, pointed out to his colleagues on the Subcommittee on 
International Relations and Human Rights that sex trafficking “is [Russia’s] second 
biggest product.”82 Interestingly, the ubiquitous operationalization of women’s bodies 
in Russian popular culture was well enough known in the U.S. at the turn of the 
twenty-first century to have made it into the dialogue of a third-season episode of 
NBC’s hit dramatic series, The West Wing. One of the show’s recurring characters, 
Communications Director Toby Zeigler, is asked to credential a Russian reporter who 
has been refused credentials by the newly-elected Russian president. Assuming that 
this incident is just further proof that the Russians have little to no understanding of 
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democratic principles, particularly freedom of speech or the press, Toby agrees to 
meet with the reporter, who proudly announces that her newspaper is “the highest 
daily in Russia,” to which Toby replies, “It’s hard to tell if that’s because of your 
reporting, your editorials or the naked women on page three.” Later, having learned 
that the reporter has been refused Russian credentials solely because her journalistic 
integrity is shoddy, at best, Toby encourages her to stop writing, give up her column 
inches, and “put another naked woman in there.”83 
 The essentialist depiction of Russian women not only in Russia, but also in the 
United States, left much to be desired in the decade or so after the demise of the 
Soviet Union. In Russia, they were both titillating sex objects and symbols of national 
(masculine) humiliation; in the U.S., they were simultaneously constructed and 
conceptualized as sex objects and “victims” of “one of the most shocking and 
rampant human rights abuses world wide.”84 Radulescu posits that these cultural 
representations are linked to the rise in Russian and Eastern European women and 
girls who are trafficked to the global West as part of the sex trade. She argues that the 
cultural products that objectify women from Eastern Europe and rhetorically 
construct them as authentic, as embodying some sense of an “exotic” culture, “can 
easily be translated into the practice of objectifying and treating flesh and blood 
women as inferior beings,” especially if, as in the case of the U.S. anti-trafficking 
narrative, they are “not visibly Other.”85 If, as I believe, U.S. legislators’ concern 
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about sex trafficking in the late 1990s was a contemporary version of the “white 
slavery” panic, it crystallized within the context of the cold war triumphalist 
mythscape in which the U.S. had “won” its fifty-year ideological and nuclear stand-
off with the Soviet Union, making the United States, with its “triumphant” political 
and economic systems, the sole advocate of peace and freedom in a post-Soviet and 
pre-9/11 world recovering from roughly a century’s worth of global conflict. 
Consequently, with the convergence of two conversations on Capitol Hill, one about 
how to stop the transnational trade in (white, Russian) women for work in the global 
sex industry, the other about what went wrong in Russia, two specific characteristics 
of American nationalism surfaced to drive the agendas of both sets of Congressional 
hearings. First, just as they had been less than a decade before, when creating the 
Freedom Support Act, U.S. legislators were caught up in adherence to an American 
nationalist messianism that not only ignores U.S. complicity in global affairs, but also 
assumes that the United States is the world’s sole guardian of freedom. Second, the 
unresolved histories and epistemologies of the cold war, during which anti-
communism became an indelible and unquestioned part of U.S. political and popular 
culture, led U.S. policymakers to continue to rely on state-based paradigms of 
what/who counts as an “enemy,” thus resulting in the continued identification of that 
same old cold war-era adversary: Corrupt and/or inept Russian (i.e. former Soviet) 
men wielding institutional power over the oppressed masses of Russian society, who, 
in the case of the new “white slavery”/anti-sex trafficking narrative, were 
conveniently universalized as Russian women whom the benevolent United States 




ineffectual (Russian) state institutions. This resulted, rather ironically, in the 
operationalization of the “white slavery” myth to conjure a gendered Russian 
imaginary that led to the discursive (re)victimization within U.S. anti-trafficking 






Death and the Maiden:  








I discovered the existence of Anastasia International, Inc., which advertises 
itself as “the industry leader” in East-West matchmaking,2 while doing preliminary 
research in the fall of 1996 as part of my senior-year independent study course on 
radical women activists in late imperial Russia. I was in the college library 
surrounded by dozens of identical neon yellow signs warning all potential users of the 
library’s brand new Internet-enabled computers that the Web was to be used for 
“legitimate research purposes” only; e-mail, surfing, pornography (the librarians 
knew it when they saw it), and other recreational activities were expressly prohibited. 
The librarians were notorious hawkers, but as I was conducting “legitimate research,” 
I knew I had nothing to worry about, so I went ahead and typed “Russian women” 
into whatever search engine the college library was using at the time and came up 
with more than a thousand hits, all of which were in English. Rather impressed with 
myself and feeling fairly optimistic that I would be able to find a few good sites to 
examine for the project on which I was working, I started scrolling down the list just 
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to have a better idea of my options. A site entitled AnastasiaWeb.com caught my eye, 
and I clicked on it.  
At first, I did not understand what I was seeing, but I know I did not see what 
I expected. There were none of the familiar pictures, no stern faces or imperial 
portraits, no Orthodox regalia or photos from that infamous basement at Ipatiev 
House, where Russia’s last royal family was assassinated by a Bolshevik firing squad 
in 1918. Just photographs of gorgeous women, all thin, culturally intelligible as white, 
and predominantly blonde, and all in what were clearly meant to be sexually 
provocative poses. I scrolled down a bit more and started reading: This was a site 
dedicated to matching Western (i.e., American) men with Russian or Ukrainian 
wives. It advertised “romance tours” to more than a dozen cities, including Moscow, 
St. Petersburg, Odessa, and Kiev, where, depending on the tour purchased, a 
(presumably heterosexual) male client could meet up to twenty women over the 
course of five days with the option of choosing one of them as his wife. According to 
the website, the agency, Anastasia International, Inc., a U.S.-based “family run 
business” with offices in Bangor, Maine and Moscow, Russia, would take care of all 
travel visas, immigration paperwork, and other such legalities.3  
While trying to comprehend what I was looking at, a stealthy research 
librarian approached my terminal and, pointing vigorously to those ubiquitous neon 
yellow signs, demanded to know if I had neglected to read the rules regulating 
Internet research. Fortunately, some quick thinking (and the fortuitous coincidence 
that she recognized me from the recent campus theatre production in which I had 
                                                 
 




starred with the Dean’s son) kept me out of hot water. But as soon as she returned to 
her desk, I navigated back to the page displaying the original results of my search for 
“Russian women,” and, scrolling less perfunctorily this time, I soon came to the 
frustrating conclusion that none of these sites, all of which advertised the 
(hetero)sexual availability to English-speaking men of Russian and/or Ukrainian 
women for marriage and/or more temporary companionship, would be remotely 
useful to me in my research. I was also angry that, although not trafficked according 
to U.S. and UN definitions of the term, these women certainly were being explicitly 
used as commodities within the sex/gender system, which is reliant upon the 
exchange of female bodies to sustain heteropatriarchal capitalism.4 I remember 
thinking to myself as I gathered my coat and backpack and headed for the library’s 
print holdings in Russian history, “So much for this new-fangled Internet thing.” 
 As exasperating as that experience was, it did get me thinking for the first 
time about constructed knowledges and their potential implications. What might be 
the consequences, I began to wonder, if English speakers geographically located in 
the global West knew post-Soviet Russia largely as a pick-up joint, and Russian 
women in terms of their ability to use the promise of sex to snag a Western husband? 
And given the implicit understanding shared collectively by these sites’ users that the 
women listed are not only ready and willing to abandon Russia and relocate to their 
future husband’s home in the West, but also that they are unable to find suitable 
Russian men with whom to share their lives in Russia, what might Westerners 
conclude from these sites about both Russia and Russian men? An enormous 
                                                 
 




conceptual leap is hardly required to posit that if these sites were all Westerners knew 
of Russia, it would be quite easy to believe (1) that all Russian women exist as 
titillating sexual objects in the service of Western men, (2) that post-Soviet Russia, 
poverty-stricken since its emasculating “defeat” by the United States in the cold war, 
is a terrible place from which these (hetero)sexually available women are trying to 
escape, (3) that Russian men—including the ineffectual, emasculated state and its 
officials—are ill-equipped, both financially and sexually, to “keep” Russian women 
for themselves, and (4) that Western men are preferred by Russian women because 
they are better endowed. The pun is intentional, for it signals the production and 
deployment on these international matchmaking sites of fears of and assumptions not 
only about masculinity and femininity, but also about ethnicity and socio-economic 
status, that echo the rhetoric and language used on Capitol Hill in the formulation of 
U.S. Russia policy throughout the 1990s. It also calls attention to the importance of 
virile masculinity to triumphalist American nationalism: the demise of the Soviet 
Union meant not only that the assets of the state were up for grabs to the Western 
corporate elite, as I discussed in chapter 3, but so were Russian women, who were 
depicted in the Western media and by the international matchmaking industry as “‘the 
best-kept secret of the Cold War,’ a ‘beautiful princess’ who is unlucky to have been 
born into a poor country and to be mistreated by an alcoholic and violent local 
male.”5 
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Stereotypes,” in Sexuality and Gender in Postcommunist Europe and Russia, ed. Aleksander Stulhofer 




 As Russian literary scholar Tatiana Osipovich rightly points out, “the fairy-
tale quality of such representations not only reconfirms Anglo-American patriarchal 
values but, most important, also symbolically reinforces the dominance of capitalist 
North America over its former communist enemy,”6 thus lending the status of 
metaphor to the narrative created and deployed by the “mail-order bride” industry. 
But what complicates the representational politics of this geopolitical fairy tale is the 
explicit titular reference by Anastasia International, Inc. to Grand Duchess Anastasia 
Nicholaevna Romanova, the youngest daughter of Russia’s last tsar, who was 
executed along with her family in 1918. Anastasia International lends the name of one 
of Russian history’s most renowned individuals to each of the site’s potential brides, 
thus conflating into a single essentialist identity these Russian Everywomen searching 
for their very own Western Prince Charming. The company’s historically referential 
moniker thus conjures assumptions about and nostalgia for the opulent, aristocratic 
milieu of imperial Russia within which Anastasia lived with her family before the 
1917 October Revolution that brought down the three hundred-year-old Romanov 
dynasty and transformed the Russian Empire into the Soviet Union. This powerful 
discursive combination provides Western men, chiefly those in the U.S. who, unlike 
their European counterparts, are entirely devoid of even the potential for hereditary 
aristocratic lineage, the opportunity to play the part of the chivalric knight in shining 
armor to a downtrodden but beautiful Russian princess. Interestingly, this 
quintessentially historicized European “utopian fantasy” has a more contemporary—
and decidedly less class-specific—American analogue: the cowboy of the Wild West 
                                                 
 




as epitomized in the Diesel jeans ad and the photograph of Ronald Reagan, both of 
which I discussed in the introduction.7 
 An American nostalgia in the 1990s for the Russian Empire, particularly the 
class and gender politics at the heart of such nostalgia, is the catalyst for my work in 
this chapter. I am interested in the discursive interplay between the gendered rhetoric 
of the East-West matchmaking industry, principally that of Anastasia International, 
and the neocolonial pedagogical message of Twentieth Century Fox’s 1997 animated 
feature film entitled Anastasia. Such an interplay reflects and influences not only 
what U.S. viewers think they may know about post-Soviet Russia, but also, 
potentially, the future trajectory of U.S. Russia policy. Given the apparent ease with 
which Grand Duchess Anastasia, as an object of knowledge that “circulate[d] and 
work[ed] in different and linked ways in different times and places,”8 became an 
inextricable part of U.S.-based conceptualizations of the Soviet Union and Russia in 
the last century, an attention to the logics and paradoxes of haunting, the constant 
“politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations” within which people must 
learn to exist,9 necessarily drives my approach here. Because the notion of haunting 
                                                 
 
7 Film theorists Ella Shohat and Robert Stam argue that “to explain the public’s attraction to a text or 
medium one must look not only for the ‘ideological effect’ that manipulates people into complicity 
with existing social relations, but also for the kernel of utopian fantasy reaching beyond these relations, 
whereby the medium constitutes itself as a projected fulfillment of what is desired and absent within 
the status quo.” Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, “From the Imperial Family to the Transnational 
Imaginary: Media Spectatorship in the Age of Globalization,” in Global/Local: Cultural Production 
and the Transnational Imaginary, ed. Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1996), 162.  
 
8 Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan, “Postcolonial Studies and Transnational Feminist Practices,” 
Jouvert: A Journal of Postcolonial Studies 5, no. 1 (2000), par. 5, http://social.chass.ncsu.edu/ 
jouvert/v5i1/grewal.htm (accessed March 24, 2008). 
 
9 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 




“hinges on the relationship between visibility and invisibility, on appearance and 
disappearance,”10 I build in this chapter on Derrida’s notion of hauntology as a 
method of inquiry by embracing feminist sociologist Avery Gordon’s call to follow 
the ghost in order to account for exclusions and invisibilities—and the inevitable 
instrumentality of their present absence.11 
 These absences are the “representational violence” to which I refer in this 
chapter’s subtitle. I use this term to refer to the ways in which an object of knowledge 
(in this case Anastasia) is mistranslated in the act of transposition between sites, 
whether geographical, temporal, literary, filmic, et cetera.12 This mistranslation 
becomes the ghost—the present absence—whose story must be told not only as a 
means of “repair[ing] representational mistakes,” but also to understand “the forces 
that make things what they are” in an attempt to expose the constructedness and 
political utility of knowledge so that it might be remade.13 As I will demonstrate in 
this chapter, Twentieth Century Fox’s 1997 Anastasia, a transparently ahistorical 
animated remake of the company’s 1956 live-action film starring Yul Brynner and 
                                                 
 
10 Diana Taylor, “Dancing With Diana: A Study in Hauntology,” The Drama Review 43, no. 1 (1999), 
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11 Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997).  
 
12 The notion of transposition as I am using it here belongs to Russian literary scholar Caryl Emerson, 
who defines it as the “retelling of a narrative in different genres.” I am concerned here with genres, but 
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Caryl Emerson, Boris Godunov: Transpositions of a Russian Theme (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1986), 7. 
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Ingrid Bergman, utilizes much the same neocolonial rhetoric. As part of this rhetoric, 
the entirety of post-Soviet Russia was conceptualized by U.S. policymakers during 
most of the 1990s as a damsel in distress, to conceptualize the relationship between 
the United States and Russia as do the legislative hearings that resulted in 1992’s 
Freedom Support Act (which I discussed in chapter 3). Building upon this 
neocolonial rhetoric and playing upon notions of chivalric American masculinity, 
Anastasia International, Inc. reorients this feminized conceptualization so that it 
corresponds to normative categories of biological sex. Put another way, the rhetoric 
of 1997’s Anastasia reflects that of the Freedom Support Act in its assumption that all 
Russia, albeit explicitly narratively and visually represented by a young, female 
protagonist, is in trouble and needs help. Anastasia International, on the other hand, 
clearly differentiates the post-Soviet experiences of Russian women from that of 
Russian men by implicitly arguing that the former, impoverished by the (masculine) 
state and (often) physically abused, must be rescued from the latter. The assignation 
of blame for the bleak conditions faced by women in post-Soviet Russia to Russian 
men, who are variously depicted as ineffectual, inebriated, and violent, is consistent 
with the concerns expressed by Congress during the so-called “Who lost Russia?” 
hearings and in those resulting in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 
(which I discussed in the previous chapter).  
 Not surprisingly, both these post-Soviet cultural texts make savvy political use 
of an American imperial nostalgia in the interest of economic gain. But their potential 
as sites of pedagogy ensures their (perhaps unintentional) contribution to popular 




knowledge are transnational. They not only ensure that Anastasia’s ghost is part and 
parcel of “the horizontal and relational nature of the contemporary economic, social, 
and cultural processes that stream across spaces,” but also that ghost’s politicized 
embeddedness in local and global “regimes of power.”14 My overarching concern in 
this chapter, then, is to sort out the ways in which, given the complex convergence in 
these texts of gender and class politics with American nationalism and post-Soviet 
U.S.-Russian relations, Anastasia’s ghost was deployed in the 1990s, and what that 
deployment might reveal about the social, cultural, and political context in which 
post-Soviet U.S. Russia policy was formulated.  
 
Conjuring the Ghost 
Having been successfully repressed by the Bolsheviks for more than seventy years in 
a disinformation campaign that was “so thorough that even the most expert foreign 
intelligence officers and diplomats could not unmask it,”15 the historiography of the 
Romanovs’ imprisonment and execution has since 1991 been meticulously researched 
and documented. Relying on declassified Soviet-era materials, eye-witness 
testimonies, and material evidence, in conjunction with several books written and 
published in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s by monarchist Russian émigrés 
(including White Army investigator Nicholas Sokolov’s 1924 account of his official 
inquiry into the royal family’s disappearance) and depositions taken in Europe 
immediately after the October 1917 revolution of several people who had been close 
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to the Romanovs, a number of historians, including Edvard Radzinsky, Robert K. 
Massie, and Greg King,16 have worked to reconstruct the circumstances of the 
Romanovs’ imprisonment and the events leading up to and surrounding their 
execution. 
 Their research concludes that the following is a likely scenario: Around 
midnight on the night of July 17, 1918, the members of imperial Russia’s last royal 
family, all of whom had been placed under house arrest eighteen months earlier, were 
escorted by their Red Army captors into a small, unfurnished room in the basement of 
the house in which they were being held.17 Yakov Yurovsky, the Red Army officer in 
command, explained to the prisoners that their picture needed to be taken as proof 
that they were still alive and in custody. But, after a few moments, he ordered not a 
photographer, but eleven additional soldiers, all armed with revolvers, into the room. 
Standing before the tsar, he announced the decision of the Soviet Ural Executive 
                                                 
 
16 Edvard Radzinsky, The Last Tsar: The Life and Death of Nicholas II, trans. Marian Schwartz (New 
York: Anchor Books/Doubleday, 2003); Robert K. Massie, The Romanovs: The Final Chapter (New 
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17 Although the Bolsheviks had taken over the government in Petrograd (the wartime—and anti-
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Committee to execute him and fired a single shot at point-blank range. Nicholas II 
died immediately.  
 Following Yurovsky’s lead, the other executioners opened fire. Tsarina 
Alexandra Feodorovna and the eldest grand duchess, Olga, both died quickly, as did 
the family doctor, Nicholas’s valet, and the cook. Alexei, the young heir to the throne 
and a hemophiliac, tried to shield himself with the body of his father as one of the 
soldiers kicked him in the head and Yurovsky fired two shots into his ear. But 
Alexandra’s lady-in-waiting and the three youngest grand duchesses, Tatiana, Marie, 
and Anastasia, remained alive as bullets fired into their chests ricocheted inexplicably 
around the room. The young women frantically attempted to shield themselves from 
the panicked executioners, who, having been given explicit orders to aim for the 
prisoners’ hearts in order to avoid excess bloodshed, went after them feverishly with 
rifle butts and bayonets when bullets failed. But even the repeated thrusts of bayonets 
into the upper bodies of the three grand duchesses met with surprising resistance as 
the young women and Alexandra’s lady-in-waiting screamed, bled, and fought their 
executioners for approximately twenty minutes. 
 According to the reports of eye-witnesses in their interviews with Sokolov 
during the 1920s, less than an hour later, as the eleven corpses were being wrapped in 
sheets and loaded onto a truck in the courtyard, one of the grand duchesses to have sat 
up and began screaming, followed by two of her sisters. The soldiers, already 
panicked by the unexpectedly lengthy ordeal inside the house, were at their wits’ end. 
Afraid that gunfire in the open courtyard in the middle of the night would attract 




bayonets and stabbed the grand duchesses over and over again until their screaming 
stopped.  
 The bodies were taken to an abandoned mine shaft approximately thirteen 
miles from Ekaterinburg where they were laid out on the ground and disrobed. As the 
soldiers were removing the clothes of one of the daughters, they found rows of 
diamonds, tightly sewn together, gleaming from the gash in her corset. It was at this 
point that Yurovsky and his men learned what they could not have known 
beforehand: At some point during the family’s imprisonment at their summer 
residence in Tsarkoe Selo, but before they were moved to the town of Ekaterinburg in 
the foothills of the Ural Mountains, the tsarina had instructed her daughters and lady-
in-waiting to sew some of the dynastic jewels into their underclothes. Historians have 
surmised that the tsarina, hoping their relatives in Europe (who included Nicholas’s 
cousins, King George V of England and Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany) would 
somehow secure their release and provide them refuge from the political turmoil that 
had toppled the Romanov dynasty, intended to use the jewels as a means of support 
when they were able to escape to Europe. In all, more than eighteen pounds of 
diamonds were collected from their corsets and these, along with a belt of pearl 
necklaces from the body of the tsarina and other assorted valuables, were put into 
sacks. Their clothes were burned and their bodies dumped into the mine shaft, which 
Yurovsky then collapsed by throwing hand grenades into the pit. Several days later, 
as the White Army threatened to overtake the town, Yurovsky and his men returned 
to the mine shaft, exhumed the bodies and moved them a few miles deeper into the 




attempt to make them unrecognizable, the bodies were reburied and remained in that 
spot in the woods outside Ekaterinburg for more than seventy years.18  
 The execution of the Russian Empire’s last royal family remained a Soviet 
state secret until the demise of that country in 1991, but rumors of the escape of at 
least one of Nicholas II’s five children began almost immediately after the Bolshevik 
government announced to the world in a July 1918 press release that the tsar had been 
executed, and the tsarina and the twelve year-old heir to the throne, Alexei, had been 
“sent to a place of security.”19 Announcements of the tsar’s death were also published 
in the major Soviet newspapers, Pravda and Isvestia. No mention was ever made of 
the status or location of the four grand duchesses, and as the days, months, and years 
passed without any sort of resolution, it became increasingly easier to imagine that 
one or all of the children had somehow escaped. 
 This unlikely scenario, fueled simultaneously by Moscow’s sustained 
disinformation campaign and the hopes of monarchist émigrés who had successfully 
fled the Revolution, led to a fascination in the United States with the Romanovs and, 
more specifically, with the youngest grand duchess, eighteen-year-old Anastasia 
Nicholaevna, whose rumored narrow escape in the summer of 1918 from the firing 
squad that had killed her father fueled a seventy-year scholarly and popular obsession 
in the United States with discovering the “truth” about what happened to the last royal 
family of imperial Russia. Had the tsar’s wife, Alexandra Feodorovna and their five 
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children been killed along with the tsar on July 17, 1918? Might the young heir to the 
throne, twelve year-old Alexei, or maybe one of the couple’s four daughters, have 
escaped somehow? Certainly the preponderance of claimants to Romanov lineage 
appearing in Europe and the United States in the decades after 1918 fueled these 
questions, none more so than Anna Anderson, whose declaration in the early 1920s 
while a patient in a German sanatorium that she was Anastasia sparked a flurry of 
controversy and debate. However, thanks to the declassification of relevant Soviet 
government materials and the painstaking reconstructive work of historians, 
scientists, and forensic archaeologists since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 
mystery was, for all intents and purposes, finally resolved in the mid-1990s. In The 
Romanovs: The Final Chapter, Massie chronicles the archival research and the 
findings of dozens of scientific experts to make a compelling case for the authenticity 
of the human remains unearthed from a shallow grave in the woods just outside 
Ekaterinburg, Russia in 1992. And in 1994, while forensic archaeologists were still 
sorting out who was who among the exhumed Romanovs, DNA tests posthumously 
disproved Anderson’s claim to be Grand Duchess Anastasia. For a number of reasons, 
though, the official burial in St. Petersburg’s Cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul on 
July 17, 1998 of the skeletal remains of what many believe to be the Russian empire’s 
last royal family was and remains highly contentious.20 
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 Held on the eightieth anniversary of the royal family’s execution, the burial, 
held in St. Petersburg’s Cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul, the historical burial place 
of the Romanov tsars since Peter the Great, was intended by then-Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin to signal a positive step taken by a new country attempting to rebuild 
itself out of the ruins of the Soviet Union. As the Romanov burial approached, 
Yeltsin’s approval ratings were at an all-time low, and he needed the burial to be an 
event of momentous historical importance in order to help smooth ruffled feathers 
and retain control of the government.21 He also wanted desperately to close the door 
on what he called, in his brief speech at the burial, “one of the most shameful 
episodes in [Russian] history.”22 But Patriarch Alexei II, the head of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, refused to officiate at the ceremony because he doubted the 
authenticity of the human remains. Both imperial and Orthodox traditions require the 
participation of the Patriarch to certify a tsar’s funeral, and Alexei II’s marked 
absence was a patent affront to Yeltsin’s plans for a “grand reconciliation” between 
the state-enforced atheism of Russia’s Soviet past and its present attempts at religious 
inclusion. As a result, the legitimacy of the burial was tenuous, at best.23 
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From the Patriarch’s perspective, if the human remains interred in the Cathedral of Saints Peter and 
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 Additionally, in the months before the burial, a heated dispute raged between 
those predominantly monarchists and/or Orthodox believers who decried the burial of 
the remains of individuals whom they believed to be anonymous commoners in the 
historic crypt of the Romanov tsars, and leftists, largely communists and socialists, 
who were disgruntled that the Russian and St. Petersburg governments would, by 
providing the former tsar and his family a state-sponsored burial, implicitly condone 
the violence inflicted upon the Russian people by Nicholas II and his ancestors. 
Nicholas II was a notoriously inept ruler whose inattention to the anachronistic 
structures and institutions of his empire, combined with escalating hostilities in 
Europe and internal nationalist and revolutionary dissent within Russia, resulted in 
several poor decisions, not least of which was his choice to order the imperial guard 
to open fire on a group of peaceful protestors in St. Petersburg’s Palace Square in 
February 1905. Widely known as Bloody Sunday, this event signaled not only the 
commencement of Russia’s first revolution, but also the beginning of the end for the 
Romanov dynasty. A Communist Party spokesperson told the St. Petersburg Times 
that Bloody Sunday was the primary reason for the Party’s objection to the Romanov 
burial.24 
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17, 2004). 
 
24 John Varoli, “Petersburg Funeral Set for July 17,” St. Petersburg Times, March 9-15, 1998, 




Anastasia on Stage and Screen 
In the midst of these national political disputes, Twentieth Century Fox’s 1997 
animated feature film Anastasia, based on that production company’s own 1956 live 
action film of the same name,25 opened in St. Petersburg at the end of March 1998—
barely four months before the scheduled burial of what the Russian Orthodox Church 
still refers to as “the Ekaterinburg remains,” and less than seven months before 
Russia’s disastrous August 1998 economic collapse in which “the two purported 
economic achievements of the Boris Yeltsin era—control of inflation and a stable, 
convertible currency—were wiped out.”26 Russian media coverage of the strange 
political and ideological alliances forged between Orthodox priests and members of 
the Communist party to prevent the burial of the Ekaterinburg remains in St. 
Petersburg appeared almost simultaneously with harsh reviews of Anastasia. For 
three weeks in a row in the St. Petersburg Times, a weekly English-language 
newspaper, the lead story was either about the growing controversy surrounding the 
impending Romanov burial or the Russian audience’s response to Anastasia.27 
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 The movie’s protagonist is a teenager name Anya28 who, having come of age 
in a provincial Soviet orphanage after losing track of her family and identity during 
the violence of the Russian Revolution (the precise details of which remain 
ambiguous throughout the film), goes in search of both in a “journey to the past” that 
takes her first to dreary, industrialized Leningrad and then west to Paris. Anya’s 
“journey to the past” is the title of one of the film’s musical numbers, and its “past” is 
the era of the Russian Empire, before the October 1917 revolution. Although the film, 
with the exception of its prologue, takes place in 1926, the creators chose to use the 
imperial (and post-1991) moniker, “St. Petersburg,” rather than the Soviet 
“Leningrad” to refer to the former capital of imperial Russia. This practice is 
compatible with the rest of the film: the Soviet Union is neither mentioned not labeled 
as such; instead, the term “Russia” is used to refer to the U.S.S.R.. 
 What is perhaps most striking about the 1997 film is that it blatantly ignores 
the revelatory details of the early 1990s that exposed the facts behind the execution 
and burial of Russia’s last royal family. For instance, Massie’s book chronicling the 
exhumation of and DNA tests conducted on the Romanov remains was published in 
the United States in 1995—two years before the U.S. release of the animated 
Anastasia on Thanksgiving weekend in 1997. There was also high profile news media 
coverage of the location, exhumation, and identification of the Ekaterinburg remains 
in the years before Massie’s book was published.29 Consequently, when it opened in 
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St. Petersburg in March 1998, Anastasia sparked a bitter debate concerning the 
appropriateness of the hugely ahistorical film for Russian children as well as non-
Russian adults—particularly as final plans for the official burial of the Ekaterinburg 
remains were being heatedly discussed. This, of course, draws attention to the power 
of filmic narratives as sites of public pedagogy that construct knowledge about the 
events, places, and people they depict. A St. Petersburg historian, for example, 
worried that “[t]his monstrous marvel of American culture […] poses a bigger threat 
to American audiences, who will misinterpret the history of Russia.”30 One Russian 
language reviewer, after lambasting the film, suggested that, in retaliation, Russia 
should make a film about the Kennedy assassination in which the president had not 
actually been killed but, instead, hid out on Aristotle Onassis’ yacht.31 Other Russian 
reviewers reacted to the film’s ahistoricism with similar derision.32 
 Despite its genre (animation), likely target audience (children, probably girls), 
and blatant ahistoricism, Anastasia was, and remains, enormously popular among 
American audiences. In its opening weekend in the United States, the film, which was 
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32 Ivan Fedorov, “Sleduya za kameroi,” Sodruzhestvo (Moscow), March 25, 1998, EastView 
Information Services (accessed July 12, 2005); and Tat’yana Tolstaya, “Anastas’ya, ili zhizn posle 
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by all U.S. film industry accounts Twentieth Century Fox’s overwhelmingly 
successful attempt to beat cartoon monolith Disney at its own animation game, earned 
$14.2 million, making it the largest-grossing opening ever for a non-Disney animated 
film and, even more impressively, the second most popular film that weekend behind 
box office frontrunners Mortal Kombat: Annihilation and John Grisham’s The 
Rainmaker.33 The film’s box office success was accompanied by the marketing of 
Barbie-style action figures and an interactive website featuring historical information 
on the Romanovs, information about the production of the film, links enabling users 
to listen to music and view pictures from the film, play games, and order DVD 
versions of the film and its sequels from the Fox Online Store.34 As evidenced by its 
financial success, the continuing popularity of Anastasia in the U.S. ensures that the 
film operates as a site of public pedagogy that, as I will demonstrate, employs the 
gendered, (hetero)sexualized rhetoric and cultural codes of cold war triumphalism to 
reify the notion of Russia as a weakened, defeated foe. 
 Based on Anna Anderson’s claim that she was Anastasia, which not even 
those who had been closest to the Romanovs could disprove at the time, Anderson’s 
story of torture and survival became the basis for the hit Broadway play, Anastasia, 
which opened at New York’s Lyceum Theatre at the height of the cold war in 
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December 1954.35 Adapted by Guy Bolton from Marcel Maurette’s original French, 
the play is set among Berlin’s Russian émigré community during the early months of 
1926. Intent on reaping the lucrative financial rewards that will inevitably come to 
him should he locate the missing Anastasia, former White Army General Bounine, 
late of His Majesty Nicholas II’s imperial guard, has located a woman whose physical 
appearance (including the visible scars on her palms) closely resembles what he 
imagines the “real” Anastasia would look like had she survived. The play chronicles 
Bounine’s attempts to (re)make Anna, who not only suffers from amnesia and 
inexplicable episodes of hysteria, but may well be (hetero)sexually promiscuous, into 
a grand duchess while continually challenging its audience to question the perceived 
differences between material reality and representation. In thinking about this play 
within its socio-historical and geopolitical context, then, it is easy to extrapolate to a 
broader metaphor: Which is “real,” the play asks, the Soviet Union or the Russian 
Empire? If Anna, like her puppet master Bounine, is a cheat and a fraud, then the 
Russian Empire is, at last, a thing of the past, and the Soviet Union, whose existence 
the United States did not officially acknowledge until 1933, is legitimized. But if 
Anna is the “real” Anastasia, then the survival of this youngest member of the 
imperial family signals the endurance of empire—even in the face of horrific tragedy. 
Tellingly, the play’s third and final act takes place during Orthodox Easter, thus 
confirming the “real” identity and attendant resurrection of its protagonist and, 
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concomitantly, the illegitimacy of the Soviet Union—a country led by those who not 
only executed the tsar (the political arm of Empire), but also his noncombatant wife 
and children.  
 Twentieth Century Fox’s 1956 movie version of Anastasia was by no means 
either low-budget or low profile. Encouraged by the play’s New York success, studio 
president Darryl F. Zanuck purchased the rights to Anastasia in 1955 and spared no 
expense in catapulting the movie into immediate production, hiring famed director 
(and anti-Soviet Ukrainian émigré) Anatole Litvak and casting matinee idol Yul 
Brynner. He also achieved a major cultural coup by propelling Ingrid Bergman back 
onto her iconic pedestal as Hollywood’s preeminent leading lady seven years after 
she had been systematically dethroned for having an extramarital affair with Italian 
director Roberto Rossellini.36 Zanuck’s efforts reaped extraordinary critical, popular 
and financial success and garnered a Best Actress Oscar for Bergman.37  
 The vigorous media ramp-up to the premier at New York City’s Roxy Theatre 
on December 13, 1956 included Life magazine’s November 26, 1956 cover story on 
Bergman’s triumphant return to the United States and featured what has arguably 
become one of the most famous pictures from her long career: an Anastasia publicity 
photograph in which she is costumed in the traditional gown of the Russian imperial 
court (figure 3). But even though Bergman’s photo dominates the magazine’s cover,  
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the issue’s central headlines signal that her return to American cinema, while perhaps 
interesting to Life’s readers, is by no means the most politically important event 
covered in that week’s issue. Rather, it is the focus on the Soviet repression of 
populist Hungarian and Polish attempts to overthrow the Communist leadership in 
those countries to which Bergman’s picture seems, upon first glance, to refer.38 This 
famous color image is a medium close-up of Bergman’s left profile set against a black 
background, and the placement of text on the cover seems as if she (as Anastasia) is 
looking, perhaps scornfully, perhaps resignedly, at the only two headlines that grace 
the coveted space directly underneath the title of the magazine: “Russian Terror 
Inside Hungary” and “Pro-Soviet Traitors in the New Poland.” It is only by reading 
down to the cover’s lower left-hand corner that the reader learns, via a headline in a 
font approximately half the size as that which announced the recent events in 
Hungary and Poland, that Bergman is in a new film. 
 With this issue, Life magazine was continuing its on-going coverage of 
political and military developments in Eastern Europe. On November 5, readers were 
invited to consider whether or not the “crisis” in the Soviet Union’s satellite states 
signaled “new cracks in the Red Empire” while learning about the “desperate fight for 
freedom” against the U.S.S.R. taking place in Poland and Hungary. In the next issue 
                                                 
 
38 At the Twentieth (Communist) Party Congress in February 1956, Soviet General Secretary Nikita 
Khruschev gave his famous “secret speech” detailing Josef Stalin’s crimes against the party and 
against the national interests of the Soviet Union, effectively acknowledging that there were many 
potential paths to communism and that the U.S.S.R. was but one of them. This slight loosening of the 
ideological tether by which the Soviet Union held its satellite states in Eastern Europe opened the door 
for rebellion against communist rule in Poland. Relative success there incited popular rebellion in 
Hungary, which the Soviet military forcefully and decisively crushed on November 4 and 5—two days 
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(November 12), readers had learned more about the popular rebellions by “patriots” 
against “tyranny” in Eastern Europe, and on November 19, an editorial entitled “To 
the Heroes of Hungary” had paid tribute to the lives and actions of those who fought 
against the Soviet Union during the height of conflict on November 4 and 5. The next 
week, November 26, Life’s photographs documenting the destruction wrought in 
Hungary by Soviet forces accompanied by an exclusive first-person account of the 
conflict seem misplaced in an issue devoted not only to Bergman’s role in Anastasia, 
but also to the impending Christmas shopping season.  
 As evidenced by this issue of Life magazine, 1956’s Anastasia was 
inextricably bound up in the political culture of the cold war. After all, it had been 
just three years since the execution of accused Soviet spies Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg,39 and the infamous House Committee on Un-American Activities would 
not be abolished until 1975. The coverage of Soviet brutality in Hungary alongside 
the return of Bergman in a film about a missing Russian princess tortured by the 
Bolsheviks appears, at first glance, to be at odds with the issue’s rhetorical 
positioning of the annual Christmas shopping season as a normative rite of passage 
for all Americans. However, the issue draws successfully on a host of cold war 
cultural codes to implicitly create a meta-narrative (while simultaneously confirming 
that which already existed) not only about the Soviet Union’s continued use of 
violence and force—even against noncombatants—in the name of communist 
expansion, but also about the ascendancy and superiority of the U.S. (capitalist) 
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system, which allegedly permits the unencumbered practice of religion (the material 
reality of American-style Christmas and the fictionalized depiction of Russian 
Orthodox Easter converge in Anastasia), the copious availability of a wide variety of 
consumer goods, and the freedom to and means by which to purchase them. Life’s 
coverage of Anastasia’s premier serves to remind the magazine’s readers that, 
according to the U.S.-based narrative upon which U.S. foreign policy toward the 
U.S.S.R. was based in 1956, violence and tyranny are endemic to the Soviet Union 
while, conversely, the United States is committed to protecting, celebrating, and, 
where possible, recovering the rights and freedoms lost by those, represented by 
Bergman’s Anastasia, who have suffered at the hands of that system. 
 Ignoring the new information about the death of the imperial family learned in 
the early 1990s, Twentieth Century Fox’s animated Anastasia deviates very little 
from the plot of its 1956 predecessor. After a brief prologue in which the Russian 
Revolution is depicted as the result of a curse leveled upon the royal family by the 
film’s villain Rasputin,40 the audience is introduced to an amnesiac Anya as she 
leaves the bleak Soviet orphanage in which she has been raised and embarks on a 
journey, both personal and geographical, to learn the details of her forgotten past. 
This quest is at the core of the film’s narrative and is sustained via two overarching 
themes, both of which are apparent in the film’s opening moments. The first of these 
is the importance of the heteropatriarchal nuclear family. The tsar was the “Little 
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Father” (Batiushka-Tsar’) of the Russian empire,41 and the destruction of the royal 
family creates easy, although never explicitly defined, villains for Twentieth Century 
Fox’s fairy tale of the missing Russian princess. The first few minutes of the movie, 
for example, feature a little girl dancing with her father at a ball in honor of the 
Romanov dynasty’s tercentenary, and the audience is informed through the elderly 
voice of an as-yet-unseen female narrator (actor Angela Lansbury) that “[t]here was a 
time not very long ago when we lived in an enchanting world of elegant palaces and 
grand parties. The year was nineteen hundred and sixteen and my son, Nicholas, was 
the tsar of imperial Russia.” Forgetting for the moment that 1916 was neither the year 
of the Romanov tercentenary nor of the October Revolution, the narrator’s 
affirmation of imperial Russia’s splendor and of the close familial relationship with 
her son and the little girl, her granddaughter, Anastasia, provides for the audience a 
context within which to situate politically and historically the depicted events as well 
as to identify the film’s heroes and villains.  
 This narrative of the unnamed, unseen Bolsheviks as destroyers of blissful 
domesticity is one of the movie’s key presuppositions, bolstered early on by a long, 
lingering shot of an animated adaptation of what is arguably one of the most famous 
portraits of the royal family and a slow zooming in of the camera on a little girl 
accompanied by the voice of the Dowager Empress proclaiming: “So many lives were 
destroyed that night. What had always been was now gone forever. And my 
Anastasia, my beloved grandchild… I never saw her again.” Anya’s central objective 
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throughout the film is to learn who she is and to find her family, goals that are made 
quite clear in the song, “Journey to the Past”:  
Somewhere down this road 
I know someone’s waiting. 
Years of dreams just can’t be wrong! 
Arms will open wide, 
I’ll be safe and wanted 
Finally home where I belong. 
Well, starting now, I’m learning fast 
On this journey – to the past.42 
 
Not only does Anya find both her identity and her grandmother in Paris, she also 
finds heterosexual love with one of her Russian traveling companions, a former 
servant of the Romanovs, and, like Bergman’s Anastasia in 1956, relinquishes her 
title and the Romanov fortune for it.  
  Anastasia’s second overarching theme, the rhetorical construction of 
Russia—conflated in this movie with the Soviet Union and all things communist 
(although the word “communist” is not used at all)—as a site of absence, loss, and 
suffering in contrast to the abundance and gaiety of 1920s Paris, reveals that 
dominant structures of feeling in the United States concerning Russia in the post-
Soviet period are not all that different than they were at the height of the cold war. 
The title sequence features the glittering golden domes of St. Petersburg’s famous 
Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ43 rising above luminous white clouds as the 
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orchestral music swells and the film’s title, “Anastasia,” appears majestically in the 
font commonly used in the global West to replicate Old Church Slavonic, explicitly 
linking Anastasia and the royal family to the ancient traditions and mysticism of the 
Russian Orthodox Church as it is imagined in the global West. The camera then 
slowly pans down below the dazzling white cloud cover to reveal an industrialized, 
polluted Leningrad in the dead of winter, 1926. Ten years have passed since the 
opening of the film and the lyrics to the first song, “A Rumor in St. Petersburg,” 
unambiguously reveal the film’s politics and, hence, its place within the cold war 
triumphalist narrative: 
St. Petersburg is gloomy! 
St. Petersburg is bleak! 
My underwear got frozen standing here all week! 
 
Oh, since the revolution, 
Our lives have been so gray! 
Thank goodness for the gossip that gets us through the day!44 
 
The frozen “bleakness” of industrial Leningrad is in stark contrast to the warm spring 
and festive atmosphere that greets Anya and her traveling companions when they 
reach Paris. As they travel from East to West, the color palette of the film changes 
from drab browns and grays to lush primary colors, which match the color palette of 
the movie’s opening scenes depicting the opulence of imperial Russia. Thus, by 
focusing on the style of aristocracy rather than on the political and historical contexts 
of the Russian Revolution (e.g., the fact that the institutions and structures on which 
the empire was built were disintegrating, as evidenced by the 1905 revolution, 
Russia’s catastrophic defeat by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War that same year, and 
                                                 




its inability to mount an effective defense against Germany during World War I), the 
film invites a nostalgia for imperial Russia as an authentic “home,” which, when the 
film was released in the U.S., was helped along by the marketing of Nicholas and 
Anastasia Barbie-style dolls, thus reifying the structures of kinship at work in the 
film. The off-screen violence of the revolution destroyed Anya’s family, so she must 
literally travel West in order to find “home, love, family.” Also proof that a capitalist 
economy trumps communism is Anya’s new wardrobe, because, “Where better to 
shop,” the film asks with its frenzied montage during which Anya visits Chanel and 
Gucci, “than in Paris?”  
 In this movie, it is clearly the West, represented by Paris, and not her native 
St. Petersburg, that “holds the key to [Anya’s] heart.” In its reliance on the imperialist 
rhetoric that is constitutive of cold war triumphalism, 1997’s animated Anastasia and 
the historical Anastasia both serve as focal points from which to examine how 
geopolitical struggles for self-determination and political legitimacy are played out on 
cultural stages and, in this case, also on the body of a dead teenage girl whose 
material remains were, during the movie’s respective releases in the U.S. and Russia 
in November 1997 and March 1998, lying in fragments in an Ekaterinburg morgue 
awaiting reburial more than eighty years after her execution. 
 
A Reflection of U.S. Russia Policy 
During the 1990s, one of the major debates among legislators and foreign 
policymakers on Capitol Hill was a concern for how to (re)define “ourselves” as a 




(according to American national governing myths) been the clear economic, military, 
and political opposite/antagonist of the United States. The strategies by which the 
U.S. worked to reconstitute itself in the wake of this conundrum of national identity 
lies is reflected in 1997’s Anastasia, which operates as a socio-political allegory for 
U.S.-Russian relations during the 1990s: In 1991, the Russian state was (as in 1917) 
unable to prevent the disintegration of its empire and, as a result, lost its masculinist 
credentials as a geopolitical power broker. Thus, discursively relegated in the U.S.-
made Anastasia to the status of a bewildered female orphan trying to find her way 
“home” to American-style capitalist democracy, Russia needs to be “rescued” from 
the havoc caused by seventy-four years of communist rule. As a means of 
reconstituting the United States’ own masculinist global performance in a decade in 
which it had no clearly definable enemies, the Russian Federation became in U.S. 
political and popular culture doubly ontologized as Other—both feminine and 
foreign—and distinctly not the “we” of the American nation. And, ostensible, it was 
through cultural globalization and economic “reforms” that the U.S. would be able to 
“rescue” Russia. 
 The film, then, is a lens through which to read U.S. Russia policy during the 
1990s, which was the consequence of an American nationalist hubris justified by the 
United States’ alleged “victory” in the cold war. Derisively labeled the “tutelage 
approach” by journalist and political scientist Stephen Cohen,45 the Clinton 
administration’s plan empowered U.S.-based pundits, politicians, and policymakers to 
paternalistically teach Russians how to create for themselves an American-style 
                                                 
 




capitalist democracy. Broadly, it aimed for nothing less than the immediate and total 
transformation of the new country’s state-based economy and one-party political 
system in order to bring it into a global community of democratic nation-states. The 
theoretical rationale was that democracies would not, by virtue of their shared 
interests, go to war against each other; therefore, growing the number of democracies 
around the world would lessen the chances for large-scale military conflict. Thus, 
using as their foundation legislation passed in the last months of the George H. W. 
Bush administration (the provisions of which I discussed at length in chapter 3), 
President Bill Clinton and his advisors marshaled a post-Soviet U.S. foreign policy, 
colloquially referred to as the Clinton Doctrine, whose aim was to ensure democratic 
alliances through the eastward expansion of NATO and increase foreign markets for 
U.S. goods and services.46 
 But U.S.-led efforts to assist in Russia’s economic and political transition to a 
capitalist democracy did not in any way meet Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s 
expectations. Not only did the United States refuse to forgive Soviet debt (the bulk of 
which was assumed by Russia after 1991), but it refused to make its considerable 
financial resources available directly to Russian governmental institutions, preferring 
instead to provide assistance in the form of goods and services as coordinated by the 
United States Agency for International Development (U.S. AID) and contingent upon 
Russia’s “progress” toward economic “reform” as defined by U.S. officials.47 Yeltsin 
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anticipated considerable financial support akin to the Marshall Plan; what he got 
instead was:  
1. Aggressive U.S.-led attempts to expand NATO into Eastern Europe, realized 
beginning in 1999 with the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland (and, as of 2004, the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania) against the express wishes of the Russian Federation.  
2. A concern that the U.S. would withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty (a threat on which President George W. Bush finally made good in 
2001). 
3. The growth of U.S. military presence on Russia’s territorial borders as U.S. 
troops moved onto bases in the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, which meant increased U.S. military 
expenditures (from $260 billion to over $300 billion in an allegedly post-cold 
war era) and profitable contracts for U.S. arms producers Boeing, Lockheed 
Martin, and Raytheon.48 
4. Increased U.S. political, economic and cultural hegemony throughout the 
former Soviet Union, particularly with regard to the export of American-style 
institutions and values via U.S. AID assistance programs and an influx of U.S. 
corporate giants such as McDonald’s, Chevron, Proctor & Gamble, and Ben & 
Jerry’s ice cream.49  
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 Despite U.S.-led multilateral attempts to assist Russia’s economic recovery 
and transition to capitalist democracy, conditions throughout the country continued to 
deteriorate until by March 1998, when Anastasia opened in St. Petersburg and 
Moscow, Russia’s unemployment rate was at an all-time high, demographic and 
public health crises loomed large, and almost half the population was living in 
poverty.50 As Goldgeier and McFaul make clear, however, although U.S. attempts at 
reform were largely rhetorical, and its restricted financial support was sorely 
inadequate for such a large country, these circumstances also mean that Russia’s 
financial woes, including its August 1998 economic collapse, were by no means 
entirely, or even predominantly, the fault of U.S. policies in the region. But these 
details meant little to those in Russia who were struggling to make ends meet in the 
spring of 1998. By then, it had become increasingly clear to Russian officials that 
U.S. aid was contingent upon Russia’s progress toward “democracy,” “human rights,” 
and “free-market economy” as defined by U.S. policymakers. Because post-Soviet 
Russia had continuously fallen short of U.S. expectations in these areas, U.S. material 
support for reforms was significantly less than what was promised in the wake of the 
Soviet Union’s demise, and almost a decade’s worth of U.S.-led multilateral attempts 
at economic, technical, and political assistance, combined with Russia’s own efforts 
to reconstitute itself, had resulted in the degeneration of Russian civil society.  
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 Widely considered the nadir of post-Soviet U.S.-Russian relations before the 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in early 2003, the spring of 1998 was characterized by 
pervasive and increasing anti-Americanism caused by the confluence of three 
interconnected circumstances: (1) threats of NATO expansion eastward, (2) promised 
U.S. aid that had failed to materialize, (3) and the persistent influx of U.S. cultural 
products—including the premier of Twentieth Century Fox’s animated Anastasia, 
which purported to tell the story of the most famous member of Russia’s last royal 
family, in a country where, eighty years earlier, the “real” Anastasia’s execution had 
taken place.51 During its 1997-1998 theatrical release in the U.S. and Russia, 
Anastasia could not help, given the prominence of the impending Romanov burial in 
Russian national politics, but implicitly recall the violence and brutality of the 
Bolsheviks at a time when communism had been discredited as a colossal failure and 
the Soviet Union as aberrant, a deviation from what would have been, were it not for 
the Bolsheviks, the unimpeded historical development of the Russian Empire. The 
film thus presented a direct challenge to Russia’s ownership of Anastasia’s ghost. 
 1997’s Anastasia relies on the discursive notions of kinship and 
heterosexualized gender constructs constitutive of the Clinton Doctrine, which 
emphasized the patriarchal United States’ ability to assist a nascent Russia. Featured 
at the beginning of the film wearing the imperial military garb that the historical 
Nicholas II wore in his most famous official portraits, the film’s animated tsar 
joyously lifts his daughter into his arms, dancing effortlessly with her across the 
parquetted palace floor. This act of fatherhood, in combination with Nicholas’s 
                                                 
 




uniform and medals (an unambiguous visual representation of his alleged military 
prowess), implicitly conflates the political and military security of empire with the 
familial protection allegedly provided by fathers within the dominant 
heteropatriarchal nuclear family paradigm. Empire is thus made equivalent to family. 
But since that family, along with the Russian Empire, is destroyed, the film makes 
clear to its viewers that Nicholas II, the Batiushka-Tsar’, was unable to protect either 
his daughter or his empire from the violence of the Bolshevik Revolution. Similarly, 
since post-Soviet Russia, in its failed performance of masculinity, was/is so clearly 
unable to protect its own people from hardship, Anastasia posits that it is the global 
West, particularly the United States, that should step up to the plate in this regard. 
Fundamentally a children’s movie, Anastasia does not delve explicitly into policy 
debates about what sort of assistance, how much, and when, but its narrative and 
visual pedagogy does make a solid case for the superiority of the global West over 
“bleak,” “gloomy” Russia. 
 
Reckoning with the Ghost 
Released in the U.S. in November 1997 and in Russia the following March, 
Twentieth Century Fox’s ahistorical animated Anastasia unintentionally embraces, 
reflects, and promotes the neocolonial rhetoric utilized in the Congressional hearings 
that resulted in 1992’s Freedom Support Act, thus revealing how pervasive (and 
persuasive) this rhetoric had become. The film conflates post-Soviet and imperial 
Russia, arguing via its chief female protagonist that Russia should be “rescued” from 




splendid and luxurious way of life and, more specifically, shattered the domestic bliss 
enjoyed by Anya and her family. Anya’s quest for “home, love, [and] family” 
constitutes the movie’s primary plot, and the narrative’s fused embodiment of each 
respectively as a specific geographical location (Paris), family (the Romanovs), and 
time (a romanticized imperial Russia) establishes Anastasia’s rightful “home” in the 
global West with her grandmother and the other aristocrats of the Russian Orthodox 
émigré community who continue, according to the film, to live lives steeped in the 
fantastic style and opulence of the Russian imperial court. Consequently, this 
animated Anastasia, based on a romanticized nostalgia for a loving, close-knit nuclear 
family—signified in the film by Anya’s relationship with her father, Tsar Nicholas II, 
and her paternal grandmother, Dowager Empress Marie Feodorovna—traffics in an 
imperial nostalgia that not only glorifies the Russian Empire, but concomitantly 
denigrates that which replaced it.  
 As simultaneously a reflection and performative component of the 
triumphalist mythscape, the movie casts Russia, the site of Anya’s horrific past (and 
conflated with the Soviet Union and all things communist), as an antagonist to the 
heroic West, which is the location of Anya’s future as constituted by her 
grandmother, the Russian émigré community and her young (heterosexual) love 
interest. That eighteen year-old Anastasia Nicholaevna was executed along with her 
family in 1918 is evidence within the film’s narrative contribution to the triumphalist 
mythscape of the callous depravity of communism, communists, and the Soviet 
Union (all conflated with post-Soviet Russia) that results in the material existence of 




Anastasia’s escape to the West justifies the story the United States tells itself about its 
alleged “victory” in the cold war. It allows the United States to gain and retain 
prominence as the justifiable winner of that conflict because it, unlike Russia, is able 
to protect those same “womenandchildren” from the civil liberties and human rights 
violations of which the Soviet Union and, now, the Russian Federation have been 
deemed guilty.52 
 Similarly, the strategies used by Anastasia International to market their 
commodity—Russian and Ukrainian women—to Western men echo the anti-Russian 
sentiments of not only the congressional hearings that led to 2000’s Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act, but also the contentious debate on Capitol Hill over U.S.-
Russia policy—both of which took place largely after the catastrophic collapse of 
Russia’s economy in 1998. But, unlike Anastasia, the anti-Russian rhetoric deployed 
on the company’s websites differentiates the post-Soviet experiences of Russian 
women from those of post-Soviet Russian men and explicitly blames the latter for the 
destitution that has caused the former to search for husbands in the West. This 
differentiation operates concomitantly (1) to allay potential clients’ suspicions that the 
agency and the women it is peddling are frauds, and (2) to evoke potential clients’ 
empathy for the women’s collective plight as the simultaneous victims of poverty at 
the hands of the failed, emasculated post-Soviet Russian government and (often) 
violence at the hands of inebriated Russian men who have proven unable to negotiate 
the transition from communism to capitalist democracy. According to Anastasia 
International, for example, Russian women have suffered so much since the demise of 
                                                 
 




the Soviet Union that there is no fee charged them for using the company’s 
matchmaking services. The company’s own research has revealed that the women 
listed on their site make, on average, “about 1600 rubles per month, an equivalent of 
about $59.” Consequently, Anastasia International “would much rather let the lady 
spend her money on a new dress, than pay a fee for using [its] services.”53 What is 
understood here is that the money spent on the new dress would ostensibly be in 
preparation for meeting the Western man who is reading these informational 
materials provided by Anastasia International to assure its potential clients of the 
matchmaking company’s veracity—as well as that of the women for which it hopes to 
facilitate East-West marriages. 
 The company assures its potential clients that Russian women believe in 
“traditional values and desire to devote themselves to the man of their dreams. […] 
They expect their man to be the head of the family.”54 “Furthermore,” Anastasia 
International contends, “Russian women look for what’s positive in a man. They 
don’t care about your looks, or possessions; they care about your personal qualities. 
They look for sensitivity, trust and understanding.” The apparent lack of these 
qualities in Russian men, in combination with “the sharp increase in regional wars 
[particularly Russia’s continued military engagement in the breakaway Islamic 
republic of Chechnya], alcoholism, smoking, stress and suicide,” has, according to 
Anastasia International, left post-Soviet Russia devoid of marriageable men. And, the 
website continues, because the life expectancy of Russian men is some twenty years 
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less than that of Russian women, “[t]here are currently over 20 million more females 
than males living in the territory of the former U.S.S.R..” Accordingly, not only are 
there few men in Russia, but there are few men in Russia; that is, Russia has, both 
literally and figuratively, been entirely depopulated of masculine men with the ability 
and/or willingness to support families.55 Thus emasculated, the Russian Federation 
and its male citizenry can no longer “protect” and “provide for” the women living 
within its territory, and Western men who can, by virtue of their economic prosperity 
and geographical location in the global West, are justified in picking up the slack left 
by their failed Russian counterparts. This interpretation is validated by Anastasia 
International, which points out that because “Western men offer [them] more security 
and stability,” “Russian women believe that men living in North America make better 
husbands then [sic] Russian men.”56 The implicit message embedded in this rhetoric 
is that neither the agency nor the women listed could possibly be fraudulent given the 
colossal failures of Russian masculinity, at both federal and local levels, that have 
apparently forced thousands of women, encumbered by poverty and (often) violence, 
to make the decision to leave Russia by searching for Western husbands with whom 
they can make their homes in the West.  
 This narrative bolstering the legitimacy of East-West matchmaking, however, 
also makes explicit use of Anastasia’s ghost to evoke among its potential clients a 
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nostalgia for the opulence, grandeur, and traditional gender roles of imperial Russia 
by offering a clear transposition of the myth of Anastasia that, like 1997’s animated 
Anastasia, is updated for a post-Soviet world. First, as Tanya Osipovich points out, 
marriage to a Russian woman is a plus for an American man because her culturally 
intelligible whiteness “would not produce outsiders’ immediate suspicion regarding 
the character of their matrimonial arrangement.” Secondly, marrying a Russian 
woman enables a Western man to live out his own fairy tale in which he, the noble 
prince, rescues his Russian “princess” from the poverty caused by incompetent and 
ineffectual (male) Russian government officials and violent, inebriated Russian 
men.57 In the United States, however, marriage to a princess may well be desirable for 
some, but remains virtually impossible given American society’s historical lack of 
hereditary aristocracy. Thus, an opportunity to live out the utopian fantasy of a fairy 
tale as depicted in Anastasia and via the marketing strategies of Anastasia 
International is, for most American men, their only chance at conceptualizing 
themselves as both a dashing, heroic prince and as an integral part of U.S. Russia 
policy. Within the context of American nationalism, the fairy tale of an East-West 
marriage takes on a potentially triumphalist connotation in which “rescuing” a down-
and-out Russian “princess” through heterosexual marriage is part and parcel of a post-
Soviet U.S. foreign policy that emphasizes American beneficence, which, in turn, 
serves as proof of capitalist democracy’s superiority.58 And by selecting a Russian 
woman as his bride, an American man is able to serve his country through 
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heterosexual marriage to a beautiful, compliant, traditionally feminine Russian 
woman. Heterosexual marriage to a Russian woman thus represents not only the 
perfect attainment of (male) utopian fantasy, but also serves, metaphorically, as the 
best hope for harmonious post-Soviet U.S.-Russian relations.  
 Thirdly, a concerted effort by Anastasia International to differentiate the 
experiences of Russian women not only from Russian men, but also from American 
women, limits the wide range of available gender performances within American 
culture by reifying normative gender roles. Virile, nationalistic notions of American 
masculinity are glorified, while contemporary performances of American femininity, 
made possible by the suffragist and feminist movements of the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, are explicitly denigrated. According to Anastasia International, 
“Russian women are affectionate, family oriented, and unlike American women, 
comfortable with their femininity.” They are eager to please, have no interest in 
competition or careers, and, the international matchmaking industry promises, are 
content to stay at home and raise children without making unreasonable demands for 
non-essential material goods.59 Similarly, as I have shown, the animated Anastasia 
relies on gendered symbols and kinship structures, particularly the importance of the 
heteropatriarchal nuclear family, to reify traditional gender politics. 
 Consequently, these contemporary Russian “princesses,” informed by 
Anastasia’s ghost, become what feminist theorist Susan Bordo terms a “text of 
femininity” that is constitutive of historical constructions of gender which are 
“always homogenizing and normalizing, erasing racial, class, and other differences 
                                                 
 




and insisting that all women aspire to a coercive, standardized ideal.” As she is 
narratively and visually depicted in 1997’s Anastasia and on Anastasia International, 
Grand Duchess Anastasia Nicholaevna Romanova becomes “a graphic text for the 
interpreter—a text that insists, actually demands, that it be read as a cultural 
statement” about normative gender roles within the context of U.S.-Russian relations 
in the 1990s.60 In both these post-Soviet cultural texts, Anastasia becomes the 
victimized femme fragile whom the United States must rescue from her tragic death 
in the name of democracy, freedom, and human rights. This narrative indicates that 
one of the ways in which the United States sought to revision itself in the absence of 
its cold war antagonist (the Soviet Union) was through a cultural deployment of 
Anastasia’s ghost, first, to create a feminized representation of Russia in the United 
States and, second, to ground post-Soviet U.S.-Russian relations within the 
framework provided by heteropatriarchal marriage and kinship structures. This 
celebrates a form of American triumphalism rooted in a nostalgia for empire and 
implemented via the Clinton administration’s vigorous attempts to remake post-
Soviet Russia’s political and economic systems in the image of the United States. 
 Paradoxically, despite the importance of Anastasia’s ghost to Russian and 
American nationalist narratives and as an allegory for U.S. Russia policy during the 
1990s, the transnational hypervisibility of the mythic Anastasia as a site of 
ideological contestation has relegated the historical Anastasia to invisibility. The 
iconic publicity still photograph of Ingrid Bergman as Anastasia that served as the 
cover of Life magazine’s November 26, 1956 issue has an explicit antecedent: an 
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official photograph of the “real” grand duchess dressed in the traditional costume of 
the Russian imperial court, likely taken in honor of the Romanov tercentenary in 1913  
when Anastasia was thirteen years old (figure 4). This photograph was also very 
clearly the basis for Anya’s court regalia in 1997’s animated Anastasia, as evidenced 
by the design of the dress worn by the doll marketed as part of the movie’s wide U.S. 
release in the fall of 1997 (figure 5). These images can help tell the gendered, 
heteropatriarchal story of U.S. Russia policy in the 1990s, which operated within the 
same cold war triumphalist cultural framework out of which 1997’s Anastasia 
emerged. Twentieth Century Fox’s 1997 animated version of the story would not  
 
 






Figure 5: Anya’s ball gown 
 
have been possible were it not for the critical and popular success of its predecessor. 
Thus, there is a direct and credible link between the 1913 photograph of the teenage 
grand duchess, 1956’s image of Bergman as Anastasia, and the animated 1997 
version with its corresponding three dimensional Barbie-style doll. In this 
chronological succession of imagery, the “real” Anastasia is gone and, with her, the 
“real” causes of the Russian Revolution. They are replaced in the American 
triumphalist narrative by U.S.-based fictionalized accounts of the myth—proven false 
since the early 1990s—of Anastasia’s escape from a Bolshevik firing squad, and a 





Similarly, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the concomitant 
ascendancy of the internet as a site of transnational communication and exchange, it 
is hardly surprising that Anastasia International, Inc., whose only quantifiable articles 
of trade are Russian women, should choose a name with such specific connotations to 
Russia’s imperial past. To peddle the site’s wares to wary Western men, the historical 
Anastasia necessarily disappears and, with her, the political and economic turmoil of 
the Russian Empire. Instead, what remains is an idealized American triumphalist 
nostalgia for the style and grandeur of an empire (allegedly) prematurely eradicated as 
a result of excessively violent revolutionary upheaval and civil war that included the 
brutal death of the Bat’iushka-Tsar and his family and the ascent of a totalitarian 
regime that was, for more than half of the last century, rhetorically constructed as a 
serious security threat to the national sovereignty of the United States and its allies 
abroad.  
Throughout the cold war, the rhetorical bellicosity of the United States was 
matched by that of the Soviet Union, and both countries relied on the material 
existence of their enormous nuclear stockpiles as a means of mutual assured 
destruction (MAD). After the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse, though, the United 
States’ dichotomous rhetorical strategy, reliant upon nationalist notions of “us” versus 
“them,” could no longer be used to mobilize a unified nationalist political culture, and 
American pundits and policymakers were forced to envision U.S. national identity not 
in terms of the existence of the Soviet system, but in terms of its absence and failure. 
The recurrent “rescue” of Anastasia by the U.S. as depicted in 1997’s Anastasia and 




attempts in the 1990s to revision the Russian Federation as both the victim and the 
perpetrator of its own crimes. Both texts reflect the operationalization in the Freedom 
Support Act of narratives of kinship and domesticity that constitute nationalist 
struggles for power, sovereignty, and political legitimacy, but Anastasia International 
goes further than Anastasia by arguing explicitly that Russia’s male leaders are 
responsible for both the demise of the Soviet Union and the country’s continued 
failure to live up to U.S. expectations of progress toward capitalist democracy and 
human rights (as defined in U.S. terms), while Russia’s women were left with 
emasculated, ineffectual men unable to cope with the economic hardships that 
accompanied the transition to a free-market economy. 
 As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, this is the American triumphalist 
trope as it developed in the late 1990s. Thus, in their exploitation of the symbols of 
Russia’s imperial past for capitalist gain, the two cultural texts that I have 
interrogated in this chapter, Twentieth Century Fox’s 1997 Anastasia and the 
websites of Anastasia International, deploy Anastasia’s ghost as a metaphor for post-
Soviet U.S. Russia policy by implicitly casting the emasculated Russian Federation as 
an antagonist to the heroic West. This deployment also reveals a nostalgia for the 
grandeur of imperialism by making a revered sepulcher for Russia’s imperial past out 
of the brutal death of a teenage girl. And the material existence of the historical 
Anastasia’s publicly accessible tomb in St. Petersburg’s Cathedral of Saints Peter and 
Paul continues to guarantee the operation of her ghost embedded in the highly 
politicized histories to which it always already refers. Perhaps even more importantly, 




as a sort of morality tale about the gendered consequences of violence and death, calls 
into question the fitness of Russian men to “save” Russian women, thus reifying the 
configuration in contemporary U.S. popular and political culture of a heroic 
American masculinity whose cold war “victory” has resulted in an obligation to save 






“It’s a Cold War Mentality:” 
 U.S.-Russian Relations on The West Wing 
 
 




 Regardless of the many different approaches to theorizing the origins and 
mechanisms of nationalism, which I discuss in chapters 1 and 2, each argues that the 
maintenance of nationalism relies upon “the centrality of nationalist story-telling, on 
the evocative narrative of the links between the past, present and future,”2 making 
popular media crucial to contemporary nationalist projects. And because visual 
technologies have become so ubiquitous, particularly through the globalization of 
film and television, images have displaced words as the central makers of meanings 
and identities.3 Visual imagery is thus performative in that, like other texts of other 
genres, it “generates meaning through a set of signifying practices which constitute 
the object of knowledge.”4 In other words, film and television texts are performances 
that make belief about the things, people, places and events they depict.5 The 
                                                 
1 President Josiah Bartlet to the Russian Ambassador in “Galileo,” The West Wing, DVD, directed by 
Alex Graves, November 29, 2000 (Burbank, CA: Warner Home Video, 2004). 
 
2 Bell, “Mythscapes,” 66, italics in original. 
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historical inextricability of filmic technologies from the European and U.S. 
imperialist projects of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries means that 
television, as film’s descendent, is inherently embedded in nationalist storytelling as a 
prominent circulator of a national mythology “based on generalization and deliberate 
simplification and packaged into easily comprehended and reproducible narratives.”6 
Contemporary popular media thus operate within and as part of nationalism to create  
[…] an artificial though nonetheless real symbolic order that operates to 
provide not information but confirmation, not to alter attitudes or change 
minds but to represent an underlying order of things, not to perform functions 
but to manifest an ongoing social process.7 
Consequently, contemporary national mythscapes are largely constituted by televisual 
imagery, and television (as both technology and performance) has become an integral 
pedagogical tool through which nation-states recount and circulate their own stories 
about themselves and their Others.8 
 One technique by which this nationalist process of identity-making occurs, 
and with it the identification of “us” and “them,” is in the illustration and fictional 
depiction of international relations in film and television. As foreign relations 
historian Robert W. Gregg demonstrates, films (and, as I will argue in this chapter, 
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television series such as NBC’s long-running primetime ratings powerhouse The West 
Wing) have the potential to “enhance our knowledge of international relations.” Not 
only do “they dramatize the abstract ideas and the mundane events” so that major 
geopolitical events like war and espionage “can be brought more vividly to life on the 
screen than on the printed page or in the lecture hall,” but audiences also have the 
potential to become “armchair participants” in the action of international politics, 
because “directors are able to stage the action and bring us ever so much closer to it.” 
Most importantly for my purposes here, however, is that in an attempt to make the 
story have meaning for general audiences, filmic—and televisual—narratives tend to 
condense the complex, abstract concepts of international relations, such as 
sovereignty, violent conflict, human rights, nationalism, and the balance of power, so 
that entire countries, groups, ideas, and political movements are personified by 
particular characters within the narrative structure of the text.9  
 The work of George Gerbner makes clear that good and efficient use was 
made of this strategy in the depiction of U.S.-Soviet relations on U.S. television 
during the latter part of the cold war. According to his analysis of images from the 
Cultural Indicators data bank of annual network samples housed at the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Annenburg School, along with their archive of television scripts, U.S. 
prime-time television was the chief offender in promulgating frequent and largely 
negative stereotypical images of the Soviet Union and its citizens for U.S.-based 
audiences. In his analysis of 44 programs with 103 Soviet characters between 1976 
and 1991, Gerbner reports that there were more Soviet men than women (a ratio of 
                                                 
 





three to one), no children or elderly people, and five general categories of characters: 
KGB/security personnel/spies, diplomats, ballet dancers, sports figures, and scientists. 
Two-thirds of Soviet men and nearly as many Soviet women depicted on primetime 
television “play[ed] out the roles of hunter and hunted, but, as Gerbner rather 
sarcastically reports, “[t]his being American television, most of the hunters fail, and 
their prey escape to ‘freedom’” in the global West.10 
 Gerbner thus concludes that “[t]he image of Russians throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s is largely frozen into a frigid Cold War [sic] formula.”11 Linking a 
November 1985 New York Times survey in which 28 percent (i.e., more than a 
quarter) of those polled believed that the U.S.S.R. was an enemy of the U.S. during 
the Second World War to what media mogul Ted Turner, in the May 17-23, 1989 
issue of Variety, called “hate films,”12 Gerbner points out that, because the U.S. 
televisual media is a major producer and provider of images of foreign nationals for 
American audiences, the knowledge that most Americans (including policymakers) 
have about Russia comes from the media. And because U.S. media outlets are largely 
sympathetic to U.S. government policies, they depict foreign countries in the way that 
the government wants them to, using information gleaned predominantly from 
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government sources,13 thus putting to political use for nationalist projects the fictional 
narratives and visual imagery of film and television. Given television’s 
embeddedness in those nationalist projects, the dramaturgical strategy of creating one 
character to stand in for an entire country (the Soviet Union), group (the KGB), or 
socio-political system (communism) serves to reinforce a historically constructed 
international social order in which the gendered and racialized discourses of 
colonialism are wielded explicitly to privilege some groups of people while 
denigrating the nation-state’s Others.14 
Although ostensibly a “post-cold war” text, NBC’s hit dramatic show The 
West Wing (1999-2006) utilized this cold war-era dramaturgical strategy in its own 
depiction of post-Soviet U.S.-Russian relations throughout the series. Like most 
filmic and televisual narratives that incorporate international politics, The West Wing 
(whose title refers to the administrative wing of the White House in Washington, DC, 
where most of the series’ action takes place), reinforces the dominant 
conventional/realist perspectives of U.S. foreign policy in which nation-states are the 
central actors, and conflict between them is conceptualized as inevitable. The series 
also relies mightily on the right(eous)ness of an idealized United States and its 
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fictional policymakers, all of whom are senior west wing staffers, thus “reflect[ing] 
America’s best image of itself.”15 
 Interestingly, though, while The West Wing is undoubtedly nationalist at its 
core, scholars contend that the show often exceeds the narrow parameters of 
American political discourse. Patrick Finn, for example, argues that “[p]art of the 
show’s motive seems to involve an attempt to define a new political mythology.” 
Similarly, political scientist Samuel Chambers asks if it might not be “possible to 
locate within the conception of political dialogue presented by [West Wing creator 
and principle writer from 1999-2003 Aaron] Sorkin a certain alternative vision of 
democracy, a vision that exceeds the current scope of American politics.” Even 
communication scholars Shawn and Trevor Parry-Giles, whose work on The West 
Wing focuses on the construction and ideological meaning of the U.S. presidency, 
argue that despite the series’ overt reinforcement of an American nationalism that is 
profoundly gendered, racialized, and militaristic, The West Wing frequently 
challenges these “existing conceptions of U.S. nationalism” and tends “to offer a 
multi-faceted sense of U.S. national identity.”16 
 As an ardent fan of The West Wing since its premier in September 1999, I, like 
these scholars, have been alternatively frustrated and exhilarated by the show’s 
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political indecision, particularly with regard to its fictionalized depiction of U.S.-
Russian relations. Interestingly, the unique intersection of the self-professed 
progressive political ideologies of the show’s creative team with contemporaneous 
U.S. political culture simultaneously produced an overarching meta-narrative 
reminiscent of cold war-era rhetoric in which a feminized Russia remains elusive, 
enigmatic, and potentially threatening to U.S. national security (thereby reifying 
Russia as feminized Other to—and, therefore, the principle geopolitical antagonist 
of—the United States), while individual episodes seem to advocate specific changes 
to “real-life” U.S. Russia policy that, if made, would force a measure of self-
reflexivity in the formation and implementation of that policy.   
 As a sociopolitical allegory, The West Wing tells a particular story about 
Russia within a specific socio-historical context and with the histories and legacies of 
the cold war still fresh in the minds of its U.S. audience.17 But the valence of this 
story necessarily shifted during the run of the series to suit the changing needs of the 
story the United States tells about itself between The West Wing’s U.S. premiere in 
September 1999 and its final episode in May 2006. My task in this chapter, then, is to 
map the fictionalized depiction of U.S.-Russian relations on The West Wing, whose 
seven-year run was bifurcated by September 11, 2001. Through a feminist discursive 
analysis of several relevant episodes, I demonstrate that before that date the popular 
weekly drama offered a critical perspective on the major post-Soviet political, 
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diplomatic, and military events and issues by subtly giving voice to alternative policy 
directions and possibilities, even as it utilized the gendered Russian imaginary so 
prevalent in U.S. popular and political culture. But after 9/11 and the advent of the 
“war on terror,” storylines concerning Russia, already gendered, were explicitly 
linked with Islamic fundamentalism.  
 
The West Wing and U.S. Political Culture 
Created by self-proclaimed political leftist Aaron Sorkin, who wrote or co-wrote most 
of the episodes in the first four seasons, The West Wing, which presents a 
fictionalized depiction of the conduct of U.S. politics from inside the White House, a 
dominant and high-profile site of U.S. domestic and international policy-making, 
utilizes dramatic plots that often reference, parallel, and/or were analogous to recent 
“real-life” events and situations. The first two seasons, in particular, are rife with 
storylines obviously inspired by consultant and former Clinton administration press 
secretary Dee Dee Meyers’ contributions concerning events within the Clinton White 
House—despite Sorkin’s continued insistence that he does not model his characters 
and scenarios from “real life” events.18 Sorkin is also considered a “master of 
miracles out of chaos” for his ability to dramatize contemporary events with speed 
and efficiency, often resulting in The West Wing’s rapid response to geopolitical 
developments.19   
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 At the height of its popularity, and especially after Republican George W. 
Bush became president in January 2001, The West Wing served as a semi-
contemporaneous alternative to the conservatism of U.S. politics, and Sorkin was 
widely lauded as “the country’s loyal opposition” to a president for whom 52 percent 
of eligible U.S. voters did not vote.20 A good part of the series’ unprecedented 
popularity rested, then, upon the fortuitous convergence of events and personalities 
that resulted in what was widely considered a constitutional crisis in U.S. presidential 
politics. After winning the first of its four consecutive Emmy Awards for Best Drama 
in September 2000, the critically successful show began to attract a wide popular 
following. At the same time, its ensemble cast, led by the ardently anti-Bush 
Hollywood movie star Martin Sheen as fictional U.S. president Josiah Bartlet, a 
liberal New Hampshire Democrat with a Ph.D. in economics, stumped for Democrat 
presidential hopeful Al Gore during his highly contentious and controversial election 
campaign against Bush in the fall of 2000.21  
                                                                                                                                           
weeks after September 11, 2001—west wing senior staffers, trapped in a lock-down triggered by a 
security breach, discuss the histories and consequences of terrorism with a group of high school 
students. 
 
20 Tad Friend,“West Wing Watch: Snookered by Bush,” The New Yorker, March 3, 2002, 
http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?talk/020304ta_talk_frien (accessed March 17, 2005). 
 
21  For more information on Sheen’s political activities and affiliations, see Finn, “The West Wing’s 
Textual President”; and O’Connor and Rollins, introduction to The West Wing.  
  According to journalist John Levesque, television critics polled by the trade publication Electronic 
Media in spring 2000 ranked The West Wing first ahead of then-audience favorites, The Simpsons, ER, 
and Friends. But by fall 2000, the show had found its niche with television viewers and had reached 
the Neilson Top 10. “Aaron Sorkin’s Smart Women Always Seem to Get Dumber,” Seattle Union 
Record, November 22, 2000, http://b4a.healthyinterest.net/news/000032.html (accessed March 17, 
2005). Given the series’ narrative lean to the political left, it is interesting to note that according to 
Hollywood Reporter, viewership of The West Wing was, at least in its early years, evenly split between 
Republicans and Democrats. This, Patrick Finn contends, means that West Wing viewers have in 
common not their political ideologies and affiliations, but their socio-economic status: In the fall of 
2000, The West Wing was the number one most watched television program in households making 




 Additionally, by the end of the 1990s, when The West Wing was being 
developed for television, two issues converged in U.S. popular and political culture 
that made the series’ foreign policy focus on U.S.-Russian relations almost inevitable. 
First, the cold war, “the dominant meta-issue of international relations” for more than 
forty years, was “rapidly fading into history, the magnitude of its impact on the lives 
of hundreds of millions of people increasingly hard for a new generation to 
imagine.”22 Second, as I discussed in chapter 4, U.S. policymakers and pundits were 
embroiled in a hotly-contested debate over what went wrong in Russia, a country into 
which the U.S. and its global partners had injected billions of dollars since 1991 in 
the form of assistance packages designed to foster democratic institutions and a free-
market economy. On Capitol Hill, Democrats blamed Republicans, Republicans 
blamed Democrats, and everyone blamed the Clinton administration, particularly 
Vice President Al Gore, whose mid-decade bilateral meetings with Russian Prime 
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin appeared to have amounted to very little in the face of 
the August 1998 collapse of Russia’s economy, its continued sale of conventional 
weaponry to Iran, and unremitting incursions by the Russian military into Chechnya, 
an Islamic republic approximately the size of Connecticut on Russia’s southeast 
border. Thus, given Sorkin’s concern for and ability to incorporate into West Wing 
episodes contemporary political events and issues, along with his access to 
information provided by consultants Meyers, Peggy Noonan (former senior advisor to 
Ronald Reagan), and Marlin Fitzwater (press secretary in the Reagan and George 
H.W. Bush administrations), it comes as no surprise that U.S.-Russian relations 
                                                 
 




constituted a significant portion of the series’ narrative, particularly in seasons two 
and three, during which The West Wing’s major foreign policy concerns paralleled the 
historical shift from a concern for democracy-building and economic transition in 
Eastern Europe, which had dominated U.S. foreign policy throughout the late 1980s 
and 1990s, to terrorism and Islamic fundamentalisms after 9/11. 
 
Gendered Discursive Configurations 
Despite its status as a “post-cold war” text, The West Wing in no way deviated in its 
depiction of U.S.-Russian relations from the cold war-era narrative strategy that 
assigned particular characters to stand in for entire countries, groups, political 
movements, or ideologies. A grand total of ten Eastern European (i.e., former Soviet) 
characters show up in West Wing episodes, all of whom function dramaturgically as 
representatives of various Eastern European political factions.23 Three are educated 
and socially influential Belorussian men seeking the advice of U.S. legal scholars in 
drafting their county’s first post-Soviet constitution;24 one is a pro-capitalist 
Ukrainian legislator who arrives intoxicated for his previously-scheduled low-level 
meeting at the White House and demands to speak with the president. Arriving with 
him is a Ukrainian woman, whom one of show’s protagonists surmises is “either a 
security attaché or a hooker.”25 The remaining five Eastern European characters are 
                                                 
 
23Given the oft-made discursive conflation in the Western media of “Soviet” with “Russian” with 
“Eastern European,” I have enlarged my analytical scope in this chapter from a particular focus on 
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24 “The Wake-Up Call,” The West Wing, DVD, directed by Laura Innes (February 9, 2005; Burbank, 
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Russian: First to appear is the Russian ambassador to the United States, played by 
British actor Charlotte Cornwell,26 followed by two men negotiating the details of an 
upcoming U.S.-Russia summit on behalf of (fictional) newly-elected Russian 
President Peter Chigorin (who, although a recurring character, never appears 
onscreen), and anti-Chigorin journalist Ludmilla Koss.27  
 As inextricably embedded in the televisual legacies of the cold war as The 
West Wing was, the show was also certainly not immune to the importance of gender 
as a category of identity in contemporary U.S. culture. Despite its puzzling reputation 
for its “depiction of strong women in powerful roles,” The West Wing “articulates a 
specific vision of [American] nationalism ordered by gender roles and historically 
rooted gender norms.”28 This was a common critique leveled against the series in 
general and principle writer Sorkin specifically,29 and it is borne out in the gendered 
narratives The West Wing uses to tell its fictionalized story of U.S.-Russian relations. 
Just as in Gerbner’s examination of cold war-era prime-time televisual texts, the ratio 
of male to female Eastern European characters in The West Wing is slightly more than 
three to one: seven of the ten are men, and just three are women. Yet, it is the women, 
rather than the men, who represent ideologies and groups that are, from the point of 
view of the “real-life” United States government, the fictional Bartlet administration, 
and U.S.-based West Wing viewers, essentially negative and in opposition to U.S. 
foreign policy goals.  




27 “Enemies Foreign and Domestic,” The West Wing, DVD, directed by Alex Graves (May 1, 2002). 
 
28 Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles, The Prime-Time Presidency, 16. 
 




 In its frequent attention to U.S.-Russian relations, The West Wing presented 
fictionalized narratives often inspired by “real-life” events and issues confronting the 
two countries to both respond to and posit its own theories about the direction of 
Russia’s post-Soviet political evolution and the success (or not) of U.S. policies in the 
region. Consequently, just as U.S. legislators were concerned throughout the 1990s 
with the possibility that latent but powerful conservative forces in Russia and 
throughout Eastern Europe could potentially topple political and economic reform 
efforts there, The West Wing joined that debate by manipulating U.S. cultural fears of 
and assumptions about femininity and masculinity to offer a brilliantly subtle 
cautionary tale about U.S. Russia policy. “Will Russia,” the tale asks, “finally become 
a capitalist democracy that engages diplomatically and economically with the global 
West? Or will the reform processes of the 1990s ultimately be defeated by latent 
conservatism?”  
 Given The West Wing’s nationalist idealism, the latter is never really a 
possibility—at least not within the fictional universe of the Bartlet administration, but 
cunning and argumentative female characters who represent feared retrograde 
political perspectives are offered up in its fictionalized depiction of U.S.-Russian 
relations as examples of the sorts of Russians with whom U.S. leaders would have to 
contend should U.S.-led reform efforts in Eastern Europe fail. These cantankerous 
and blatantly anti-American female characters exist in opposition to their befuddled 
male counterparts who, although overwhelmed by the sudden social and political 
changes they have endured since 1989, are supportive of U.S. (and the Bartlet 




nuclear non-proliferation, and the development of a global free-market economy. 
“Which would you rather have,” The West Wing seems to be asking its audience 
through its gendered assignation of particular qualities to its Eastern European 
characters, “a bewildered Russia in need of U.S. guidance and support as it works 
toward political and economic reform, or a Russia that is, like its antecedent the 
Soviet Union, quarrelsome, antagonistic, and deceitful?” The answer, of course, is 
obvious: Confused white men working for change—even if they do not exactly 
inspire confidence—are better than bad-tempered white women who, in their 
duplicity and aggressiveness, represent and put into practice the worst qualities (from 
a U.S.-based perspective) of the Soviet system. 
 
Vassily Konanov as Boris Yeltsin: “Our Kind of Crazy” 
This foregone conclusion is apparent in an early second-season episode featuring a 
thinly-disguised fictionalized depiction of former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, 
whose heavy drinking and resultant capriciousness were the cause of much 
consternation among U.S. President Bill Clinton’s staff throughout the 1990s.30 
Entitled “The Lame Duck Congress” for its central focus on President Bartlet’s 
continuing disagreement with congressional Republicans over ratification of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,31 the episode aired for the first time on 
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November 8, 2000—the day after election day in the United States—and was the first 
of six West Wing episodes to feature a plotline concerning Russia and/or Eastern 
Europe.32 Although I am well aware of the potential pitfalls that come with explicitly 
assigning authorial intentionality, given writer/creator Sorkin’s and the cast’s (and, 
consequently, the series’) ideological lean to the political left, along with the “real-
life” U.S. political context within which The West Wing’s second season was readied 
for and launched on primetime television in the fall of 2000, one possible 
interpretation of “The Lame Duck Congress” is as a measured response to the 
critiques of Clinton’s Russia policy leveled by Governor George W. Bush of Texas 
against Democratic nominee Vice President Al Gore throughout the notoriously 
contentious 2000 presidential campaign. The episode argues that, although Eastern 
European reformers are admittedly “crazy,” they are “our kind of crazy”; therefore, 
the United States should stay the course in Eastern Europe. This means not only the 
maintenance of multi- and bilateral aid as outlined in the Freedom Support Act of 
1992 and subsequent related legislation (which I discussed in detail in Chapter 3), but 
also the continued support of political leaders who demonstrate support for U.S. goals 
and objectives—including, by November 2000, former Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin and his hand-picked successor, the then-enigmatic Vladimir Putin.  
                                                                                                                                           
 U.S. ratification of the treaty was one of the top foreign policy goals of the Clinton administration, 
but Republicans refused to move forward on it until changes were made to the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty enabling the United States to build a national missile shield that would guard 
against long-range attacks. Russia’s opposition to a U.S. missile shield made those changes unlikely. 
Eric Schmitt, “Democrats Ready for Fight to Save Test Ban Treaty,” New York Times, August 30, 
1999, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed September 2, 2007). 
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“Galileo” (November 2000), “Somebody’s Going to Emergency, Somebody’s Going to Jail” (February 
2001), “Enemies Foreign and Domestic” (May 2002), “Evidence of Things Not Seen” (April 2003), 




 Sorkin’s skillful use of narrative in combination with the widespread media 
coverage of particular “real-life” events enabled “The Lame Duck Congress” to 
operate in November 2000 as a site of public pedagogy in which the Clinton 
administration’s attempts at political and economic reform in Eastern Europe are 
overtly validated. The episode’s secondary plotline utilizes Ukraine as a dennotative 
stand-in for Russia, and the White House visit of intoxicated, irrational Ukrainian 
parliamentarian Vassily Konanov is loosely based on Yeltsin’s first visit to the United 
States in 1989, just after he had won a seat in the Congress of People’s Deputies of 
the U.S.S.R.. The official issue on that occasion, as reported by George H.W. Bush 
administration press secretary Marlin Fitzwater (who, by 2000, was enjoying his 
private sector career as a consultant on The West Wing), was one of protocol: Should 
U.S. President George H.W. Bush agree to meet with Yeltsin, then a relatively low-
ranking and often vociferously oppositional member of the Soviet Union’s legislative 
body, the White House would risk giving the impression that it was either retreating 
from its official support of Soviet Premier Gorbachev’s reform policies or “trying to 
provide a platform for dissent.”33  
 This is precisely the issue at stake in “The Lame Duck Congress,” and writer 
Sorkin makes clear via several successive scenes early in the episode that Konanov, 
who has been invited to the White House to meet with the president’s advisors on the 
Balkans, is, under no circumstances, to do anything but that. In the episode’s first 
scene, for example, White House Press Secretary C.J. Cregg makes this point crystal 
clear to the press corps, and a bit later, after the daily meeting of the senior staff in the 
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Oval Office, President Bartlet confirms with Chief of Staff Leo McGarry that 
Konanov will not be taking any high-level meetings. Responding in the affirmative, 
Leo reminds the senior staff that “[i]f anybody happens to see Vassily Konanov in the 
hallways, walk in the other direction.” The episode’s early moments thus set up very 
clearly the fact that this as-yet-unseen Eastern European politician, although welcome 
at the White House, is not strategically important enough to the United States to merit 
a meeting with even a member of the senior staff, all of whom constitute the show’s 
protagonists and are thus the characters with whom West Wing audiences most readily 
identify.  
 A passing familiarity with Sorkin’s tendency toward the comically ironic, 
however, is enough for viewers to realize that the exact opposite of what is supposed 
to happen is likely to occur. Konanov’s imminent arrival at the White House is 
inauspiciously announced by Bartlet’s personal aide, Charlie Young, who reports to 
Deputy Chief of Staff Josh Lyman that, rather than attending his meeting with the 
president’s Balkan advisors as scheduled, Konanov is not only “sitting in the car in 
the driveway [and] refusing to get out unless he can speak to the president,” but he is 
also reportedly drunk. Viewers also learn that accompanying Konanov is a woman 
whose identity is so ambiguous that she could be either “a security attaché or a 
hooker.” Within a matter of seconds, and in direct violation of Leo’s directive that the 
senior staff “walk in the other direction,” Konanov becomes Josh’s problem, and the 
stage is set in this humorous episode for the inevitability that the drunk and bellicose 




and very bad English at whomever is within earshot, will somehow get precisely what 
he has asked for: A meeting with the president. 
   Just as his reputation for drunken irrationality and profligate behavior paves 
the way for Konanov’s arrival at the White House in “The Lame Duck Congress,” 
Boris Yeltsin’s first visit to the United States in 1989 was “preceded by his reputation 
as a hothead with a conspicuous bad habit.”34 Yeltsin’s manic schedule, rambling 
loquacity, and all-night drinking earned him a feature spot in the “Style” section of 
the Washington Post, in which he was described as not only a “radical legislator” and 
“political maverick,” but also an “imbiber nonpareil.”35 This well-earned reputation 
stuck with him throughout his post-Soviet political career, and his prominent position 
as Clinton’s chief partner in negotiating U.S.-Russian relations throughout the 1990s  
meant that his erratic behavior was often used in U.S. popular and news media to 
paint Russia—and Russian reformers—with a broad brush.36  
 Three issues in particular dominated news headlines about Russia between 
July 1999 and the premiere of “The Lame Duck Congress” in November 2000. The 
first, which I discussed briefly in chapter 4, involved a scandal in which high-ranking 
Russian government officials were suspected of laundering billions of dollars in 
International Monetary Fund loans through the Bank of New York. This revelation, 
which implicated Yeltsin and several prominent U.S.-backed Russian politicians, 
prompted a U.S. congressional investigation into the successes and failures of the 
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Clinton administration’s Russia policy.37 However, although majority leader 
Representative Dick Armey (R-Texas) called Clinton’s Russia policy “the biggest 
foreign policy failure since Vietnam,”38 the anticipated campaign-season battle 
between congressional Republicans and the Clinton White House never materialized, 
and U.S. Russia policy remained essentially intact—with assurances from Treasury 
Secretary Lawrence H. Summers that specific safeguards, including audits of IMF 
loans, would be implemented in the future to prevent money laundering.39  
 The second issue dominating news headlines about Russia was the generally 
strained state of U.S.-Russian relations. Not only was Russia still reeling from the 
U.S.-led military intervention in Kosovo and, with it, the material evidence of NATO 
expansion,40 but Russia’s unresolved military conflict with Chechnya as well as its 
unremitting consistency in refusing to agree to U.S.-proposed amendments to the 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were the source of much consternation in 
Washington.41 Clinton and Yeltsin reached a tenuous impasse in Beijing at the end of 
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1999 over Clinton’s continued efforts to get Yeltsin to first acknowledge and then 
address the Russian military’s alleged human rights violations in Chechnya. Having 
at last heard enough of what he interpreted as U.S. attempts to meddle in the 
sovereign affairs of Russia, Yeltsin is reported to have warned Clinton that Russia 
remains a great power with “a full arsenal of nuclear weapons.”42 As a subsequent 
New York Times editorial put it, 
President Boris Yeltsin of Russia is known for his occasional bombast, some 
of it playful, some angry, some merely erratic. But when the man who 
commands the largest nuclear stockpile in the world rattles that arsenal after 
he gives his vintage bear hug to President Jian Zemin of China, the scene is, at 
best, unsettling.43  
 The third major news issue was the ascendance to the heights of Russia’s 
political establishment of former KGB officer Vladimir Putin and, with it, the 
frequency and seeming impulsiveness with which Yeltsin appointed and then 
disposed of prime ministers.44 The general tenor of this coverage focused on the 
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normalcy of unpredictability when dealing with Yeltsin’s Russia and reiterated a U.S. 
State Department spokesperson’s assurances that U.S. Russia policy, because it has 
been focused not on personalities, but on Russia’s political and economic reform, 
would be unaffected by the latest government shake-up in Moscow.45 This normalcy 
of unpredictability, however, did not stop the same reporter from posing the question, 
“Is Russian President Boris Yeltsin crazy?” After explicitly referencing Yeltsin’s 
recent “zombie-like public appearances [that] reinforce fears about his state of mind,” 
the article goes on to argue that, clinically speaking, Yeltsin is quite sane; however, 
lurking behind this façade is a desire to maintain his hold on power for as long as he 
possibly can.46 Similarly, his surprise resignation (and concurrent appointment of 
Putin as acting president) on December 31, 1999, was described as “political theater,” 
a “classic Yeltsin move—unpredictable but shrewd.”47 
 Given Yeltsin’s prominence in negotiating U.S.-Russian relations throughout 
the first post-Soviet decade, it is significant that the Russian president’s reputation in 
the global West was forged predominantly through a “prism of news clips” featuring 
“embarrassing shots of him toppling over at official ceremonies, frugging at a rock 
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concert or recovering from heart surgery in a government dacha.” As the examples 
provided above make clear, these and other similar incidents were reported in U.S. 
print media, where U.S. readers learned that “Russians have also seen [Yeltsin] act 
out rituals that date back to the czars, shaking his finger at quaking local bureaucrats, 
ordering them to raise wages that Moscow had already cut back.”48 According to 
news reports, it was not just when traveling abroad that Yeltsin’s behavior and 
decisions were erratic; he behaved irrationally at home in Russia, as well.  
 Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the overarching commonality 
between the three dominant Russia-related issues covered by the news media between 
July 1999 and November 2000 is a concern for Yeltsin’s penchant for capriciousness 
that is both sardonic and sincere. While Yeltsin’s erratic behavior and heavy drinking 
made for a good story and enabled an easy and unfortunate discursive conflation of 
Yeltsin, the Russian people’s international representative, with actual Russians in 
Russia, there was genuine concern in the media and among Washington insiders that 
the Russian president’s eccentricities would be the cause of some sort of worst case 
diplomatic or military debacle involving Russia’s hefty nuclear stockpile. With the 
specter of the August 1998 collapse of Russia’s economy lurking in the minds of U.S. 
policymakers, these new issues, along with the disclosure in October 2000 that Russia 
continued to sell conventional weaponry to Iran in violation of a 1995 deal between 
Gore and Chernomyrdin, cohered as clear evidence that, according to the most 
informed pundits, Russia remained at the end of the 1990s very much a threat to U.S. 
national security—despite billions of dollars in U.S. bi- and multilateral aid. This 






assessment opened the door first for Republican legislators on Capitol Hill to question 
Clinton’s Russia policy49 and, later, provided Republican presidential nominee 
George W. Bush solid ammunition during the contentious 2000 U.S. presidential 
election campaign with which to attack Gore, whose mid-decade work with 
Chernomyrdin was a key part of that policy.50  
 It is possible, then, to read “The Lame Duck Congress” as West Wing 
writer/creator Aaron Sorkin’s firm rejection of Republican-led critiques of Clinton’s 
embattled Russia policy, particularly given the strategic incorporation into this 
election-season episode’s plot of a “drop in” meeting between pro-Western Ukrainian 
politician Vassily Konanov and U.S. President Josiah Bartlet.51 Konanov, as Yeltsin 
did in 1989, does finally get his meeting with the president. After shuffling Konanov 
from office to office and still concerned about diplomatic protocol, Deputy Chief of 
Staff Josh Lyman appeals to his boss for help. Understanding that all reformist 
Konanov wants is to gain political capital within the context of Ukrainian domestic 
politics by being able to return home and say that he met with the U.S. president, 
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Chief of Staff Leo McGarry instructs Josh to orchestrate a “drop-in” in which 
Konanov will meet with a low-level White House staffer while President Bartlet, who 
just happens to be walking by, will “drop in” and talk briefly to Konanov.  
 Although there is no formal record of what transpired in George H.W. Bush’s 
“real-life” “drop in” meeting with Boris Yeltsin in 1989, the fictionalized televisual 
encounter on The West Wing between a U.S. president and a pro-Western (i.e. pro-
democratic and pro-capitalist) Eastern European politician offers one possible 
scenario in which Konanov-as-Yeltsin asks, quite calmly and without theatrics, to 
discuss commercial landing rights, the World Trade Organization, and nuclear 
compatibility, all of which signal his pro-Western reform agenda. That Konanov, who 
spends his entire day at the White House shouting unintelligibly at everyone sent to 
placate him, saves his most rational moments for Bartlet gives West Wing viewers the 
opportunity to consider the likely possibility that what they have learned from the 
news media over the course of the past decade (i.e., between 1989 and November 
2000, when “The Lame Duck Congress” originally aired) about Yeltsin’s drunken 
irrationality, his garrulousness, and his frequent political capriciousness may not, in 
fact, be the whole story, that perhaps what one journalist termed Yeltsin’s “Mad 
Czar” façade is a carefully crafted public performance quite often intended to appease 
his critics in Russia.52  
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 Precisely because it utilizes televisual technology to present a fictionalized 
depiction of what might have transpired between Bush and Yeltsin in 1989, The West 
Wing is able to offer its audience a chance to learn about the “real” Boris Yeltsin, 
albeit through a double simulacra in which fictional Yeltsin stand-in Vassily Konanov 
is played by famous Russian actor Eugene (Yevgeni) Lazarev.53 There is widespread 
agreement in “The Lame Duck Congress” that Konanov is “crazy,” and neither Chief 
of Staff Leo McGarry nor President Bartlet disagrees with that assessment. But Leo 
does defend the Democratic Bartlet administration’s Eastern European reform agenda 
(which mirrors that of the Clinton administration), arguing that, although Konanov 
(like Yeltsin) is undoubtedly certifiable, “he’s our kind of crazy.” So, just as Clinton 
stuck with reformist Yeltsin, Bartlet sticks with Konanov, because a “crazy” reformer 
prone to drunken flamboyance is, from the perspective of U.S. policymakers, 
significantly better than a communist/totalitarian dictator.  
 This election-season episode of The West Wing, the first of six in the series 
that specifically address U.S. interests in Eastern Europe, offers the most explicit 
endorsement by Sorkin of Clinton’s Russia policy in support of Democratic 
presidential hopeful Al Gore, and of the reformist agenda of Yeltsin and his hand-
picked successor, Vladimir Putin. But it does so while reifying a conceptualization of 
post-Soviet Eastern Europe and its white male reformers as fools in the 
Shakespearean tradition who, through a combination of cunning and humor, “tickle, 
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coax and cajole their supposed betters into truth, or something akin to it.”54 Sorkin 
and co-writer Paul Redford recycle this dramaturgical strategy in a third-season 
episode entitled “Enemies Foreign and Domestic,” which originally aired on May 1, 
2002, in which White House Deputy Communications Director Sam Seaborn is 
charged with negotiating the logistics of an upcoming U.S.-Russia summit with two 
(white, male) officials from the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC. Although I will 
return later to a more fulsome analysis of this episode, it is enough to know for the 
moment that these two characters operate within the episode’s narrative structure as 
classic fools in the Shakespearean tradition: Their concern for seemingly irrelevant 
details (such as the presidents’ wardrobes and the U.S. first lady’s preference for 
shrimp over herring), in combination with their flagrant inability to use or understand 
colloquial English, operate concomitantly not only as the primary source of humor in 
this largely somber West Wing installment, but also as the pivot on which the 
episode’s narrative turns. In “The Lame Duck Congress” and “Enemies Foreign and 
Domestic,” The West Wing makes clear that the weighty responsibilities of political 
and economic reform in Eastern Europe are in the hands of well-meaning, but largely 
befuddled, elite white men, the result of which being that Yeltsin’s Russia, although 
gendered masculine, is represented on The West Wing as a particular performance of 
Eastern European masculinity that is pro-Western, yes, but potentially incompetent 
and ineffectual—an understanding already ubiquitous in U.S. popular and political 
culture through media coverage of Yeltsin himself. 
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Cold War Hold-Outs 
In keeping with and reflective of the contemporaneous concern among “real-life” 
U.S. policymakers that powerful and increasingly popular conservative forces within 
Russia and throughout Eastern Europe could at least undermine, if not entirely derail, 
reform projects in the region, the version of Russian masculinity presented on The 
West Wing, along with the fragile Eastern European reform process it both represents 
and is responsible for, is continuously threatened by what one character refers to as 
the “cold war hold-outs, the ex-Soviets walking around,”55 most of whom never 
actually appear as characters on The West Wing. But through a televisual depiction of 
just three of these anti-Western ideologues as culturally intelligible female-bodied 
characters whose physical appearance and overall demeanor identify them as femmes 
fatales in the classic Hollywood tradition, The West Wing warns its viewers that 
protecting U.S. interests in Russia means continued U.S. support for the reformers, 
regardless of their unpredictability and including newly-elected Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, whose pro-Western credentials were very much in question. The 
representation of Eastern European women in The West Wing as femmes fatales 
deviates little from what Glajar and Radulescu contend have been the largely negative 
representations of Eastern European women as “alluring, slightly Oriental or exotic 
temptresses with an edge of vampirism.”56  
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 A familiar dramatic archetype “whose evil characteristics cause her to either 
unconsciously bring destruction or consciously seek vengeance,” the femme fatale’s 
origins “are intimately related to the biblical Eve and the narrative of the Fall in the 
book of Genesis.” Her “most striking characteristic” is that “she never really is what 
she seems to be.”57 This destabilizing ambiguity operates as a foundation from which 
(usually male) painters, playwrights, novelists, filmmakers, and other creators of 
popular culture have historically drawn their inspiration for depicting the attendant 
characteristics that have become variously synonymous with the femme fatale: 
destructive curiosity, greed, temptation, sin, and rampant sexuality. This archetype 
functions dramaturgically as “an articulation of fears surrounding the loss of stability 
and centrality of the self, the ‘I,’ the ego.” As a result, “she harbors a threat which is 
not entirely legible, predictable, or manageable” and transforms “the threat of the 
woman into a secret, something which must be aggressively revealed, unmasked, 
discovered.” It is this characteristic that makes the femme fatale “fully compatible 
with the epistemological drive of narrative, the hermeneutic structuration of the 
classical text.”58 In other words, because of the disruption to self-identity caused by 
her inherent ambiguity and potential for erratic changeability, the femme fatale shares 
the qualities of a literary or filmic narrative in that the entity whose self-identity has 
been disrupted is only able to reconstitute it by getting to the end of the story, by 
revealing the “truth” that lies beyond the surface ambiguity. 
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 On The West Wing, the ability of the show’s protagonists and, through them, 
its viewers, to get to the “truth” of U.S.-Russian relations is hindered by the puzzling 
(and potentially duplicitous) ambiguity of three Eastern European woman characters 
(one is Ukrainian, two are Russian) who, in their varying degrees of bellicosity and 
indignation as demonstrated via their interactions with series protagonists, represent 
the sorts of personalities with whom the United States would be forced to deal should 
the men in charge of pro-Western political and economic reform efforts be ousted 
from power. As I mentioned above, the first of these femmes fatales, whom one of the 
senior staffers posits is either “a security attaché or a hooker,” accompanies Ukrainian 
legislator Vassily Konanov to the White House in “The Lame Duck Congress.” 
Deputy Chief of Staff Josh Lyman makes this assessment of who and what this 
woman is well before West Wing viewers have met her, and the discursive pairing of 
these two seemingly incongruous professions conjures for his fictional colleagues and 
the “real-life” viewing audience a gendered Russian imaginary reliant upon cold war-
era assumptions about and Orientalist stereotypes of female KGB officers engaging in 
sexpionage as a means of accomplishing Soviet intelligence goals.59 Thus, before 
meeting her, viewers already assume that this unnamed Eastern European woman 
must be white, relatively young, probably beautiful, and dressed provocatively, the 
result of which is that even if she does turn out to be just a security attaché, she 
constitutes a titillating combination of exoticism and the potential for 
(hetero)sexualized violence. When viewers do finally get a glimpse of her, she fulfills 
all their heteronormative fantasies—that is, until she scorns Josh’s job title (i.e., 
                                                 
 




Deputy Chief of Staff) and rebukes him for using a “tone” with which to address 
Konanov, causing Josh to respond rather more in earnest than not, “Oh, how I miss 
the cold war.”  
 What is most interesting about the operationalization of the femme fatale 
archetype in “The Lame Duck Congress,” though, is that while this woman’s “true” 
identity is never explicitly revealed to either viewers or White House staffers (she is 
never referred to by name and is listed in the episode’s credits as “Russian Woman”), 
Chief of Staff Leo McGarry reveals in a brief conversation with the President’s 
personal aide Charlie Young that he believes that she is most likely a security attaché, 
which, of course, does not preclude the possibility that she may also use sex as a tool 
of her trade: 
Charlie: The girl’s not bad looking. 
Leo:  Go to work. 
Charlie: You think she knows how to kill me? 
Leo:  Yes. 
 
The ability of this woman to kill Charlie reflects Soviet-era Soviet intelligence 
technologies, but because Konanov is a post-Soviet reformer, the possibility that she 
will do so is virtually non-existent—despite the fact that her negative treatment of 
Josh is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of the hostility and violence of which she is 
capable if provoked. But Konanov remains in charge throughout, thus making clear to 
West Wing viewers the ability of post-Soviet Eastern European reformers to quell the 
potentially violent hostility of the more irrationally conservative tendencies of the 





 Another of the “cold war hold-outs” depicted on The West Wing on November 
29, 2000, just three weeks later, is the Russian ambassador to the United States, who 
appears in another election-season episode entitled “Galileo” in which fictional U.S. 
president Josiah Bartlet and Chief of Staff Leo McGarry attempt to track down the 
cause of a fire in a Russian oil refinery. Unlike the unnamed sex worker/security 
attaché in “The Lame Duck Congress,” however, the Russian ambassador is the only 
Eastern European character in “Galileo.” Whereas “The Lame Duck Congress” offers 
a point-counterpoint morality tale in which the potential for conservative politics 
accompanied by disruptive, (hetero)sexualized violence is contained as long as the 
white, male, pro-Western reformers, as confused as they may be, remain in charge, 
“Galileo” offers no such comfort to its viewers. In its depiction of the Russian 
ambassador as (by U.S. cultural standards) a conventionally beautiful, white, 
heterosexual woman who is hostile and argumentative, this episode trafficks 
problematically in a gendered imaginary that renders the Russian Federation 
ideologically “backward,” militarily ineffectual, and quite literally feminized via the 
televisual portrayal of its ambassador by a female-bodied actor, Charlotte Cornwell.   
 Simultaneously, however, “Galileo” is also a perfect example of the constant 
political tension manifest on The West Wing between ardent American nationalism 
and a critique of normative political culture and policymaking inside the D.C. 
Beltway. Although it does utilize the femme fatale archetype to symbolize and warn 
its U.S. viewers of the failures of select Russian reform efforts, particularly in the 
areas of nuclear non-proliferation and military restructuring, “Galileo” envisions a 




States admits its own complicity in the cold war and acknowledges the need to come 
to terms with those mistakes in order to successfully work with its former adversary 
in the achievement of mutual geopolitical objectives in the twenty-first century. 
  With these two seemingly oppositional pedagogical projects at work within 
one episode, I am intrigued by the discursive links between the fictional world created 
in “Galileo” and the “real-life” politics of the historical moment in which the episode 
first aired. I wonder what difference it makes to the conceptualization of post-Soviet 
Russia in U.S. popular and political culture that, on The West Wing, the Russian 
ambassador is a woman. What and how does such a representation mean within the 
context of U.S.-Russian relations, particularly given that, in “real life,” a woman has 
never served as Soviet/Russian ambassador to the United States, or vice versa? What 
are the discourses in and around this episode that necessitated the part be written for a 
woman? And how is that woman, whom viewers are encouraged by the narrative to 
accept unquestioningly as the Russian ambassador, rhetorically situated within The 
West Wing’s depiction of high-stakes international diplomacy between two former(?) 
political and ideological adversaries? 
Ubiquitous media coverage in the weeks immediately preceding the episode’s 
November 29, 2000 premier of the controversial U.S. presidential election between 
Gore and Bush notwithstanding, one likely reading of “Galileo” is as a critique by 
episode co-writers Kevin Falls and Aaron Sorkin of the U.S. response to the tragic 
deaths of 118 Russian naval personnel on Saturday, August 12, 2000, when the 
Kursk, a five-year-old Russian nuclear submarine, sank in the Barents Sea just north 




outlets first learned of it through Russian sources, and continued unabated until well 
into October. Early coverage amounted to little more than daily progress reports, first 
of delayed, then failed, Russian-led rescue missions, stormy Arctic waters, multiple 
refusals, and then—finally, four days later—reluctant acceptance by Moscow of 
NATO offers of assistance.60 But once Western journalists were able to better piece 
together the slivers of available information, more reflective coverage focused on the 
Kursk as a powerful and effective metaphor. When it went into service in 1995, 
Russia’s latest and greatest nuclear submarine was, according to the Boston Globe, 
“proof, and a potent symbol, that Russia still had the military might to defend its 
interests around the world.” But when it plummeted to the bottom of the Barents Sea 
on August 12, it became  
[…] a symbol of something entirely different: of Russia’s inability to keep its 
nuclear Navy maintained and its crews trained, and of the dangers this implies 
for the rest of the rusting fleet of ‘floating Chernobyls’ that make up the bulk 
of the country’s submarine force.61  
Thus, the Kursk, simply the most recent in a long history of Soviet and Russian naval 
disasters, became a symbol of the weakened Russian military-industrial complex as 
well as the environmental and public health risks posed by deteriorating and/or 
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mishandled Soviet-era nuclear weaponry. According to one interview with former 
Soviet naval officer Aleksandr Nikitin, the “accident [sketched] a pretty accurate 
picture of the state of the navy.”62 And San Francisco Times science writer Carl T. 
Hall warned that “a much wider-ranging disaster may be unfolding with the slow 
decay of the Soviet-era war machine.” Citing low troop morale and a Russian military 
budget crisis, he chronicles the myriad health and environmental problems that will 
result should the radioactive materials from Soviet-era subs and the “hundreds of 
other old chunks of war apparatus that nobody is talking about” leak into the ocean. 
Hall’s article calls attention to a potentially catastrophic environmental and public 
health hazard that, when the Kursk went down in August 2000, had been on the back 
burner in various international policy arenas for more than a decade.63 
Meanwhile, new Russian President Vladimir Putin, who had been elected just six 
months before in what he in his inaugural address termed Russia’s first legal and 
peaceful transfer of power,64 was being skewered in both Russian and English for 
remaining on vacation in the Crimean resort town of Soch’i during the first days of 
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the crisis rather than making himself visible as the leader of a grieving nation.65 In a 
rather surreal paradox U.S. media coverage of the goings-on in the Arctic Circle 
trumped even that of the Democratic National Convention, which was held that year 
in Los Angeles from August 14 through August 17. According to the New York 
Times, by late afternoon on the third day of the Democratic National Convention, 
most of the major networks and all of the internet news sites had drifted from the non-
events in Los Angeles to the drama unfolding in the Barents Sea. Only ABC and the 
cable news channels continued to cover the convention as their lead story.66 And 
given the focus of the U.S. news media from August well into the last weeks of 
October on the Kursk tragedy as an all-too-real example of the tenuous grasp Russia 
had on its own armed forces and nuclear arsenals, both presidential candidates, 
ironically, continued their dogged fixation on domestic issues in the last weeks of the 
campaign, virtually ignoring anything related to global events or to the impact those 
events would (or should) have on U.S. foreign policy.67  
 Not even the Kursk tragedy, with its weighty symbolism, could persuade 
either candidate to break free of neo-realist assumptions about the U.S. “victory” in 
the cold war. This triumphalist mindset was conspicuously manifest in both 
candidates’ deft ability to talk superficially about how they would manage “nuclear 
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rivals” China and Russia, while touting the seemingly incongruous virtues of 
unilateral military intervention and international cooperation as equally-valid ways of 
spreading U.S.-style “democracy” and “freedom.”68 Remarkably, apocalyptic reports 
of the environmental threat posed by the Kursk and other discarded and/or damaged 
radioactive materials were not enough to rouse even environmentalist Gore from his 
post-Soviet stupor, and Bush’s plan for U.S.-Russian relations was recycled from the 
Reagan-Bush, Sr. years, replete with graduates of those administrations’ foreign 
policy and national security teams, including Republican Vice-Presidential nominee, 
Dick Cheney, and Soviet expert Condoleeza Rice. In retrospect, the hope of John 
Gray, a professor at the London School of Economics, that “the loss of the Kursk 
might stir some new thinking on western policy toward Russia” and force the United 
States and its NATO allies to self-reflexively examine their own role in creating the 
circumstances that have made post-Soviet Russia what it is was too much to ask.69 
Where local/national politics failed to engage the global/transnational, though, 
The West Wing picked up the slack. Already made aware of the weakness of Russia’s 
economy,70 its crumbling military-industrial complex, and the incompetence of its 
military personnel, initial reports in “Galileo” of a fire in a Russian oil refinery come 
as no surprise to West Wing viewers, nor does the eventual revelation, arrived at by 
the fictional United States’ superior surveillance and intelligence capabilities, that 
Moscow has kept the truth of this incident from even its own domestic media. So, 
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armed with satellite photographs of a fire not in an oil refinery, as the Russian media 
originally reported and the Russian ambassador continues to claim, but in a 
disintegrating nuclear missile silo, Leo summons her to the White House. The 
structure of this short scene is fascinating in that it is the ambassador rather than Leo 
who initiates the (hetero)sexualized banter right from the start—and in complete 
opposition to the professional, respectful demeanor with which Leo approaches her.71 
Leo:  (Walking into his office, smiling, right arm extended in preparation 
for a handshake.) Madame Ambassador. 
Nad’ya: Leo. (Standing, she smiles as they shake hands. Clearly, they know 
each other.)  
Leo:  Thank you for coming. (He moves to the back of his desk and lays 
down the file folders with which he entered the office.) 
Nad’ya: You look handsome, Leo. / 
Leo: (Not looking at her, shuffling through the piles on his desk in an 
attempt to locate something.) Thank you. You look very nice 
yourself. / (Cut to medium shot of Nad’ya.) 
Nad’ya: You get more handsome every year. / (Cut to medium shot of Leo 
behind his desk, mildly amused and most certainly bewildered. / 
Cut back to Nad’ya.) And you’re having your suits hand made 
now. / 
Leo: (Finally, she’s got his attention as, almost in disbelief, he asks:) 
Nad’ya, are you hitting on me? / 
Nad’ya: (She answers with the skill and aplomb worthy of a  seasoned 
diplomat—which she is.) I was sorry to hear about your divorce. / 
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Leo then puts an abrupt stop to the frivolity, insisting that they turn to the issue at 
hand: 
Leo: (Holding the blue file folder for which he was looking, he emerges 
from behind his desk and walks toward her, stating with matter-of-
fact certainty:) You have a fire in a missile silo. / 
Nad’ya: (Responding with equal resolve.) It is an oil refinery. / 
 
And they revert to the diplomatic version (albeit fictionalized) of the cold war-era 
game of cat-and-mouse, which dominates the remainder of this scene.72 
Leo: (Losing his patience and holding up the blue file folder in his right 
hand, Leo approaches Nad’ya.) These are keyhole satellite 
photographs. / (Cut to close-up of Nad’ya.) Would you point, 
please, / (Cut to close-up of Leo.) to the oil refinery in these 
pictures? / (Cut back to Nad’ya.) 
Nad’ya: I’m not in a position to comment on matters of national security. / 
(Cut back to Leo, who tosses the folder on the coffee table.) 
Leo: Okay. Can you please tell me how an oil refinery explosion would 
affect national security? / (Cut back to Nad’ya.) 
Nad’ya: This is really a matter to be taken up with the foreign minister. 
Leo: I’m taking it up with the Russian Ambassador to the United States. 
/ (Cut to close-up of Leo.) Is your country ready to deny that there 
was an explosion at Siko Silo 14D? /  
 
With no response from the ambassador, Leo finally puts his cards on the table as the 
camera slowly closes in on Nad’ya and then cuts to a parallel close-up of Leo: 
Leo:  We know how to deal with these kinds of emergencies. / We have 
guys who train for it all the time. Ask us for help. 
 
End of scene. 
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The idea that national identity is often (and perhaps even primarily) defined in 
relation to that which it (presumably) is not has a long intellectual genealogy, 
although, as I discussed at length in chapter 1, scholars have just recently begun 
considering this notion in terms of gender and/or other dimensions of difference. In 
the above scene, Leo, bearing the unassuming good will of the U.S. (while stern and, 
arguably, a bit paternalistic, he is professional and respectful), is made vulnerable by 
the unsolicited and obviously unexpected sexual advances of a woman whose 
features, although beautiful by U.S. cultural standards, are strikingly similar to the 
wicked queen Malificent in Walt Disney’s animated feature Sleeping Beauty (1959). 
This likeness is particularly intriguing given the feminist scholarship on Disney that 
points to the continued portrayal of its female villains as either grotesquely 
overweight or, like The West Wing’s Nad’ya, tall, thin and angular, always possessed 
of a potentially dangerous sexuality, and almost always post-menopausal.73  
The destabilizing effect that Nad’ya’s arrival has on the narrative is signaled 
by the opening shot of this scene, which takes place before Leo arrives. The camera 
frames the doorway to Leo’s office and slowly moves in to focus on a rather terse 
encounter already in progress between Margaret, Leo’s assistant, and the ambassador. 
To fully understand how and why this scene makes meaning, it is crucial to keep in 
mind that West Wing audiences already know and like Margaret. Although a 
supporting character, the easy relationship she enjoys with Leo is a frequent source of 
humor, and audiences trust her because Leo trusts her. Margaret, standing, is in full 
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view, while the ambassador is sitting, her back to the camera. The viewer is able to 
see only the back of her head and hear her brusque, one-word responses to Margaret, 
who wants simply to offer her refreshment or assistance while she awaits Leo’s 
imminent arrival. While this is going on, though, and the camera continues to 
approach from behind the ambassador’s right shoulder, Nad’ya holds up her left hand 
and uses the digits of her right hand to examine the neatly trimmed fingernails on her 
left. When considered in combination with what and how the camera frame the 
viewer’s witnessing of the ambassador’s disinterest in Margaret’s kindness, this 
feline-esque action signals the potential danger of this mysterious newcomer, made 
unambiguous by the implicit connection in this scene between the ambassador’s 
sexualized Otherness and what the viewer already knows is a radioactive fire burning 
out of control in Russia’s Oblast’ region. It is clear that Nad’ya is attempting to use 
her sexuality to delay as long as possible the inevitable conversation for which she 
knows she has been called to the office of the White House Chief of Staff. In The 
West Wing’s masculinist, heterosexist world of geopolitics, Nad’ya will use any 
strategy necessary to keep Leo off balance, thereby leaving the United States and its 
NATO allies vulnerable to whatever consequences could result from a failing Soviet-
era military infrastructure. In this scenario, then, a woman’s sexuality, characterized 
by secrecy and duplicity and made explicitly equivalent to Russian national identity, 
is a blatant threat to U.S. national security. 
 In retaliation, President Bartlet, wielding the full patriarchal, heterosexualized 
power of the United States and its military might, turns the tide. The camera pans 




Nad’ya’s back is to the door, rendering her vulnerable in that she is unable to see 
anyone who may enter the room behind her. Despite this, she is in complete control 
of the conversation: 
Nad’ya: Any inspection team will have to include neutral representatives. 
Leo: Who do you want? 
Nad’ya: The Finns. / 
Leo: I’ll take it to the State Department, but they’re not gonna want to 
accept limits on the inspection team. / 
Nad’ya: No one enters our country without approval. / 
Leo: They’ll agree to notification, but not approval. / 
Nad’ya: And I’m going to insist on notification and approval.’ In addition, 
results from the inspection will remain in the country— / 
Leo: Nad’ya! 
Nad’ya: Leo.’ Soil samples, / (Unbeknownst to her, Bartlet appears in the 
doorway behind her right shoulder.) carbon residue, photographs 
and photographic negatives’— /  
Leo: Listen— (He notices Bartlet.) 
Nad’ya: All that must / remain under Russian control. (Bartlet slams the 
door.) 
 
They stand: Leo first, / then Nad’ya, who is slightly rattled, although quite 
adept at hiding it. /) 
 
Bartlet: Your paranoia was a lot sexier back when you guys were 
Communist, Nad’ya. / 
Nad’ya: Mr. President. (Wholly without conviction.) How good to see you. / 
Bartlet: From where do you get the nerve to try and dictate terms on this?’ 
Are you insane? / (Close-up on Nad’ya, Leo behind her.) / (Cut 
back to close-up of Bartlet.) Your missile regiment is in a 
horrifying state of disrepair. Your best-trained operators have left 
or died. / (Close-up on Nad’ya, who swallows almost 
imperceptibly.) / The ones you’ve got aren’t paid very much—
when they’re paid at all.’ They don’t have enough to train with.’ 
Your ICBMs are well beyond their warrantee life.’ (Bartlet begins 
moving toward her.)  Not seven weeks ago,’ you mistook a 
Norwegian weather rocket for a submarine-launched trident 
missile’ (He stops, standing face to face with her.) / ‘cause the 
cross-tack information never made it to the Russian CNC system.’ 
/ (Cut to close-up of Leo.) Leo, at the time the SS-19 exploded,’ / it 
was being drained of its liquid hydrogen’ in an attempt by 
deserting soldiers to’ (Interrupting himself, he turns to address 
Leo.) — wait for it. / 




Bartlet: Steal the warhead. / (Close-up on Nad’ya.) / When were you gonna 
tell us about that?’ Do you realize how dangerous that— / 
Nad’ya: Mr. President, you shouldn’t be concerned with the welfare of the 
Russian people. / 
Bartlet: Well, I am concerned with the welfare of the Russian people, but 
that’s not what they pay me for.’ / You guys fall asleep at the 
switch in Minsk, / (Cut to Leo.) and I’ve got a whole hemisphere 
hiding under the bed.’ / How do you not tell us this is going on?’ 
How do you not ask us for help? / 
Nad’ya: We’ll not need help finding the leaders of the black market 
network— / 
Bartlet: Yeah, thanks.’ We’re sending in NATO inspectors. / 
Nad’ya: Leo and I were just discussing the terms. 
Leo: The terms are / we’re sending in NATO inspectors, or he’s taking a 
walk to the press room. / 
Bartlet: Get your foreign minister on the phone.’ / (Bartlet walks to the 
door.) I really don’t know from where you guys get the nerve. / 
Nad’ya:    (She turns sharply to look at Bartlet.) From a long, hard winter. 
Mr. President. 
 
End of scene. 
 
 Viewers are implicitly drawn into the above conversation as allies of Leo, 
President Bartlet, and the United States by the camera’s subtle inclusion of the open 
door behind Nad’ya at the beginning of the scene. This is the door through which 
viewers first enter Leo’s office in this episode and through which they first encounter 
a stranger whom they assume is the Russian ambassador, whose arrival at the White 
House has been much-anticipated throughout the episode. In that opening shot, which 
reveals Margaret’s rebuffed attempts to make the ambassador comfortable, the viewer 
is positioned as an invisible eavesdropper as the camera slowly—and cautiously—
approaches from behind the stranger’s right shoulder, almost as if stalking the as-yet-
unidentified woman sitting in the chair. But in the scene described above, rather than 
actually being that which is not seen, the camera flips the viewers’ subjectivity, 




prominent the potential for someone to approach unseen behind her, Nad’ya’s 
position in the scene is weakened, because the camera enables viewers’ realization of 
the potential for someone to sneak in behind her—as they have already done. 
Consequently, the arrival of President Bartlet through that very door and 
unbeknownst to Nad’ya as she argues with Leo is not surprising. Nor is it surprising 
that, wielding the masculinist and heterosexist military might of the United States, he 
is able to save the day and force a diplomatic resolution to the issue by revealing to 
Leo that, in addition to lying about the location of the fire, the Russian government 
also neglected to reveal that it was caused by the draining of liquid hydrogen from an 
active nuclear warhead. 
 While Bartlet’s obdurate tactics here are, arguably, not unusual in the 
fictionalized universe of diplomatic and international relations on The West Wing, 
they take on a disturbing, (hetero)sexualized, and threatening timbre considering the 
highly gendered role each participant assumes in the scene. Most obvious is the 
specific dramaturgical function of each character within the episode’s narrative 
structure. In offering U.S.-led NATO assistance to quell the radioactive blaze in the 
missile silo, Leo epitomizes the benevolence of the U.S. and its western allies, but 
viewers know he is being deceived, even potentially seduced, by Russia, a titillating 
and treacherous femme fatale whose retrograde cold war-era duplicity and antagonism 
threatens the health and security of the entire global community. Nad’ya’s potent and 
transgressive sexuality serves as a metaphor for the fact that Russia, via the sinking of 
the Kursk and “Galileo’s” fictional explosion of a nuclear warhead, is leaking 




negotiations between Leo and Nad’ya only after he learns the real cause of the fire, 
signifies the stellar investigative and intelligence capabilities of the “real-life” United 
States, which enable the episode’s protagonists and, with them, West Wing viewers, to 
get to the “truth” of what is going on in Russia, despite the obstacles erected by the 
wily Russian ambassador. 
 Additionally, Nad’ya is physically trapped between Leo and Bartlet, who is, 
very literally, blocking all of her potential escape routes. Thus, in “Galileo,” Russia is 
physically caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place, and the Leo-Nad’ya-
Bartlet triangle explicitly signifies the principal themes that constituted U.S. news 
media coverage of the Kursk tragedy earlier that year: 
1. The threat of nuclear proliferation, particularly the illegal traffic in nuclear 
technology, and the potential consequences of environmental 
contamination as a result of Russia’s disintegrating military-industrial 
complex, including poorly trained and underpaid personnel, old 
technology, and a lack of financial resources. 
2. An attitude perceived as arrogance because Putin took so long to ask for 
NATO assistance.74  
3. The continued deception by the Russian government of well-meaning 
Western officials as well as foreign and Russian media (and, by extension, 
innocent civilians in Russia and around the world), which signaled a return 
to, or perhaps a continuance of, cold war-era tactics, which The West 
Wing’s Chief of Staff terms in “Galileo” a “cold war mentality.” 
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 This last issue, the “real-life” unwillingness of the Russian government to tell 
the truth about the Kursk, is what necessitates the inclusion of a femme fatale within 
the narrative structure of “Galileo.” Nad’ya’s actions in The West Wing’s fictional 
universe mirror exactly those of the Russian government in dealing with the “real-
life” sinking of the Kursk. Ostensibly unwilling to admit to the incompetence of its 
naval personnel and the poor condition of its submarine fleet, the Russian navy 
initially reported and continued to posit during the investigation of the Kursk 
wreckage that the explosion that downed Russia’s newest nuclear submarine was the 
result of a collision with another vessel, possibly an abandoned World War II-era 
underwater mine. But, just as in “Galileo,” U.S. intelligence accounts differed from 
the Russian assessment, and investigators learned that not only was the explosion 
caused by the submarine’s own torpedoes, thus signaling a problem with either the 
weaponry or the crew or both, but that the Kursk may actually have been testing a 
new type of torpedo.75 Similarly, in “Galileo,” the fire is initially reported to be in an 
oil refinery, and Nad’ya, the fictional Russian government’s official representative, 
insists that this is so—regardless of U.S. evidence to the contrary. Additionally, she 
neglects to mention to Leo the fact that the fire was caused by the draining of liquid 
hydrogen in an attempt by deserting Russian soldiers to steal a nuclear warhead. This 
information, which Nad’ya (as Russia) ostensibly keeps from Leo (as the United 
States), reifies precisely what West Wing viewers have learned about what one 
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character terms the “troubling state of the Russian military.” Nad’ya’s obstinacy and 
hostility toward Leo’s offers of assistance in quelling the fire mirror that of the 
Russian government in the early days of the Kursk crisis, when Russian president 
Vladimir Putin repeatedly refused NATO offers of assistance. The narrative structure 
of “Galileo,” then, follows precisely that of the U.S. news media’s coverage of the 
Kursk tragedy, replete with duplicitous and inflexible (i.e., ex-Soviet) government 
officials, all of whom are collapsed in “Galileo” into one femme fatale whose 
existence signals to viewers that the protagonists will be engaged during the episode 
in a project of discovery that requires learning the “truth” about what is going on in 
Russia. Nad’ya thus becomes a dramaturgical necessity indicating that what is is not 
in any way what it seems to be.  
 As I mentioned briefly above, though, “Galileo” seems to engage in two 
simultaneous and apparently contradictory pedagogical projects. The first is to warn 
U.S. viewers of the potential dangers Russia continues to pose to U.S. national 
security as a result of its aging weaponry, unskilled and underpaid personnel, and the 
threat of nuclear proliferation via accidents (such as the Kursk and Chernobyl) and/or 
the intentional pilfering of nuclear technology by deserting soldiers. As I have 
demonstrated, this lesson is proffered using a gendered imaginary in which Russia is 
a femme fatale in the classic Hollywood tradition. Thus, it would be fairly easy to 
make the case that “Galileo” is not only anti-Russian but also profoundly Orientalist 
and sexist in its assignation of qualities belonging to a highly stylized and 
heterosexualized feminine performance to the entirety of the Russian Federation as it 




 But despite writer/creator Aaron Sorkin’s penchant for beating the drum of 
American nationalism, The West Wing as a text tends toward the center-left of the 
U.S. political spectrum. Consequently, fictional U.S. President Bartlet imagines a 
very different transnational encounter between him and Nad’ya, one in which she 
would permit NATO cooperation with the Russian military: 
In the Oval Office. Wide shot of the room as Bartlet moves toward the 
front of his desk. Leo follows. 
 
Bartlet: Did they think we weren’t gonna see it, Leo? 
Leo: (Resigned.) It’s a cold war mentality. 
Bartlet: If they ask, we could help. 
Leo: I wouldn’t wait for the phone to ring. 
Bartlet: Yeah. / (Reverse angle as Bartlet turns to lean his right side 
against the front of the desk. The back of Leo’s shoulder and 
head are in the right corner of the shot.) Yeah. Galileo Galilei.’ 
He sat in a cathedral in Pisa.’ He watched a lamp suspended 
from the ceiling as it oscillated back and forth.’ / (The 
camera’s focus is Leo; Barlet’s right shoulder is in the left 
corner of the shot.) He used his pulse to keep time and 
discovered that the period of oscillation was independent’ of 
the size of the arc. / (Close-up of Bartlet.) And a few years 
later, he contradicted the theory that a heavier body’ falls faster 
than a lighter one.’ Which took some guts back in 1609 when 
you consider’ that the theory he was contradicting was 
Aristotle’s./  
 
By making Bartlet’s benevolent desire to assist Russia despite its “cold war 
mentality” (of which Leo accuses only Russia while absolving the U.S. of the same 
haunting) discursively analogous with Galileo’s seventeenth-century revolutionary 
astronomical theories, this episode problematically reinforces the notion that the 
alleged end of the cold war has ushered in an era in which Russia and the United 
States, along with their allies, can work together to build a global democratic peace. 




cooperation Bartlet envisions by conjuring the history of “a long, cold winter” left 
unresolved.76 Thus, their conversation ends where it should rightly begin, with a 
ghost.  
 “Galileo” was very much a part of the (admittedly limited) post-Kursk critique 
of U.S./Western complicity in Russia’s economic, military, and political morass at the 
end of the 1990s, of which the Kursk and its 118 crewmen were the most recent 
casualties. Although pundits generally agreed that Russian leaders should certainly be 
held accountable for the loss of the Kursk and its crew, they insisted that U.S. foreign 
policy objectives throughout the 1990s, including NATO expansion into Eastern 
Europe and the (at that time) on-going conversation in the U.S. about creating a 
national missile defense system in violation of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty, caused Russia’s increasing distrust of the U.S. and its allies. 
Consequently, with its national security at stake, the Russian Federation pumped 
money it did not have into its military establishment until, according to two analysts 
from the Brookings Institute, the United States had “more to fear from Russia’s 
weakness than from its strength.”77 British political philosopher John Gray, 
expanding his analysis beyond Russia’s military and economic woes to incorporate a 
                                                 
 
76 Nad’ya’s retort about “a long, cold winter” could easily be interpreted as a general reference to the 
cold war; however, it is possible that Nad’ya may also be reminding Bartlet of the sacrifices made by 
the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front during World War II (which is known in Russia as the Great 
Patriotic or Great Fatherland War), particularly during the sieges of Leningrad and Stalingrad by the 
German army during which more than one million civilians in Leningrad alone died of starvation, 
stress, and/or exposure. Because the Soviet Union’s Western allies delayed opening the Western front, 
the lesson for the Soviet Union was that it could not count on anyone’s support or assistance. For 
detailed information, see David M. Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944 (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 2002); and John Barber and Andrei Dzeniskevich, ed., Life and Death in 
Besieged Leningrad, 1941-44 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
 
77 Clifford Gaddy and Michael O’Hanlon, “The Russian Submarine Disaster,” San Diego Union-




concern for the country’s humanitarian and demographic crises, called on Western 
governments to self-reflexively accept partial responsibility for “Russia’s desperate 
plight” and to rethink their approach toward Russia.78 “Galileo” may well have been 
Sorkin’s contribution to this way of thinking about U.S. Russia policy. 
  Interestingly, Nad’ya is the diminutive form of Nadezhda, a woman’s name 
meaning hope in Russian. Given its ubiquity in English-language discourse about the 
Soviet Union and Russia (made especially prominent by the famous Nadezhdas, 
Krupskaya and Mandelshtam79), it is possible that Sorkin’s use of it in “Galileo” is 
merely an accident. On the other hand, keeping in mind his political leanings to the 
left and the episode’s advocacy of the potential for collaboration between the U.S. 
and Russia, it is feasible to think about the name of the fictional Russian ambassador 
as Sorkin’s own one-word foreign policy directive. It may also be feasible to 
conceptualize this episode, the highly problematic woman-as-nation trope 
notwithstanding, as a theoretical treatise on the objectives of post-Soviet U.S. Russia 
policy. Because it is Nad’ya who forecloses the possibility of further negotiation in 
the face of what she interprets as the hubris of American triumphalism, she is the 
agent of change within the episode’s narrative structure; it is she who shifts from 
villain to potential hero by being the only one of the Leo-Nad’ya-Bartlet trio to get 
past the empty rhetoric of cold war-era cat-and-mouse diplomacy—even as she never 
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once yields any ground by confirming the accuracy of U.S. intelligence data. Instead, 
she tosses the unresolved problem of the “long, cold winter” back at President Bartlet, 
which forces him and Leo to rethink how the United States approaches Russia. 
 
Peter Chigorin as Vladimir Putin: Bartlet’s Last Best Hope 
Co-writers Paul Redford and Aaron Sorkin incorporate a similar plot twist into a third 
season (and post-9/11) episode entitled “Enemies Foreign and Domestic” in which 
only the willingness and ability of recently-elected Russian president Peter Chigorin 
to creatively expand the parameters of U.S.-Russian relations manages to save a 
planned U.S.-Russia summit endangered by the actions of cold war-era Russian 
military and diplomatic leaders. Viewers first learn about Chigorin in the episode’s 
opening scene when one White House senior staffer refutes another’s claim that the 
Russians have “finally elect[ed] a reformer” by retorting rather sarcastically, “twenty 
years in the KGB and an election that would make Tammany Hall look like the 
League of Women Voters?”  
 The obvious surface similarities between the biographies of the fictional 
Chigorin and the “real-life” Putin immediately enabled West Wing viewers to locate 
this episode within the context of contemporaneous “real-life” U.S. concerns about 
Russia’s allegiances in the Bush administration’s new “war on terror.” Russia’s 
geographical expanse and complicated cultural heritage have long been the cause of 
great angst and uncertainty as Russian intellectuals and world leaders alike have for 
centuries debated whether Russia’s natural alliances lie with the global East or West, 




after 9/11,80 this debate became significantly more nuanced as Western fears about a 
nationalist conservative backlash in Russia grew. U.S. news coverage of Russia’s 
response to the events of September 11 cited Russian economic interests and the 
challenge to political cohesion within the country as the main reasons that the United 
States should remain wary of any sort of U.S.-Russian alliance in the “war on terror.” 
Most obviously, should Putin ally Russia’s fortunes with the United States- and 
NATO, crucial Russian defense contracts as well as its long-term diplomatic 
relationships with “axis of evil” members Iran, North Korea, and Iraq81 would be in 
serious jeopardy, thus signaling the magnitude of Russia’s foreign policy decisions 
after 9/11.82 According to one journalist, the events of that day “effectively pushed 
Mr. Putin into choosing between a Russia allied with no one, and a Russia bound to 
the West,” and it was widely believed among Western pundits at the time that he 
chose the latter. But Putin’s alliance with the West in general and the Bush 
administration in particular won him few friends at home in Russia, where he was not 
only “perilously far ahead of public opinion in his campaign to bind Russia to the 
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Atlantic alliance of democracies,”83 but also out of step with the opinions of “the 
military and political elites on whom his power partly rest[ed].”84 What was 
interpreted by some in Russia as Putin’s post-9/11 capitulation to the United States on 
NATO expansion, the presence of U.S. troops in the former Soviet republics of 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 U.S.-
Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty roused the ire of powerful political factions, and 
Western pundits wondered if Putin, whose pro-Western credentials had been very 
much in doubt since Yeltsin catapulted him to power in late 1999,85 would be able to 
sustain the support he offered to the United States. 
 When it aired on May 1, 2002, “Enemies Foreign and Domestic” joined this 
cacophony. Asking, “Whose side is Russia—and Putin—really on?,” the episode 
complicated this question before answering it by demonstrating the tug-of-war 
between multiple political factions in post-Soviet Russia, all of whom could 
potentially be the “foreign enemies” of the episode’s title, rather than presenting that 
country as a unified political entity. On the one hand, the depiction of newly-elected 
Russian President Chigorin’s surreptitious and indirect attempt to thwart his own 
military’s ability to sustain its Soviet-era defense contracts with Iran suggests to West 
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Wing viewers that “real-life” Russian leaders, particularly Putin, should, as the United 
States worked to build a global coalition to fight the “war on terror,” be given the 
benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, though, even as this post-9/11 episode seems, 
in the end, to efficiently dispense with the notion that Russia remains a menace to 
U.S. national security, its discursive equation of Russia’s military, diplomatic, and 
atomic energy officials, whose alliance with Iran jeopardizes not only the pro-
Western reforms in Russia, but also U.S. hopes for a global democratic peace, with a 
Russian femme fatale warn U.S. viewers that there still exist in Russian politics what 
one West Wing character terms “cold war hold-outs, the ex-Soviets running around” 
who are well-positioned to undermine pro-Western political and economic reforms 
and the politicians (such as the fictional Chigorin and the “real-life” Putin) who may 
support them. To underscore this latter point, the U.S.-Russian summit for which the 
Bartlet administration is preparing throughout “Enemies Foreign and Domestic” is 
nearly derailed by those “cold war hold-outs” who have begun selling Russian 
nuclear technology to Iran in fulfillment of Soviet-era defense contracts. It is only the 
off-screen ingenuity of Chigorin, who manages to circumnavigate “the old [Soviet] 
diplomatic corps” to get a message through to Bartlet that he would like to add 
nuclear non-proliferation to the summit agenda, that convinces the U.S. president to 
throw caution to the wind and keep his appointment with Chigorin in Helsinki. 
 Interestingly, the narrative structure of this episode’s opening scene provides 
crucial clues for use in answering the question posed by the episode about Russia’s 
allegiances in the “war on terror.” Through the heated discussion of U.S. Russia 




believe that “Enemies Foreign and Domestic” will focus on preparations for Bartlet’s 
upcoming summit in Helsinki with Chigorin. But this conversation is, quite literally, 
interrupted by the actions of Islamic fundamentalists in Saudi Arabia. According to a 
news report out of Riyadh, the religious police have prevented several girls from 
escaping the fire that enveloped their school because they were not appropriately 
dressed. This news sends Bartlet press secretary C.J. Cregg, whom West Wing 
viewers already know from previous episodes to be a champion of Muslim women,86 
into a quiet rage and reorients the episode’s narrative away from the upcoming U.S.-
Russia summit and toward Islamic radicalism in the Middle East. Frequent West Wing 
viewers, though, are too savvy to be fooled by this apparent narrative shift from one 
set of foreign policy concerns to another. It is simply too easy. Aaron Sorkin’s West 
Wing scripts are, generally speaking, celebrations of complexity and nuance, often 
involving upwards of three or more simultaneous plots per episode. These multiple 
plots often intersect in surprising ways, meaning that the introduction in the early 
moments of any Sorkin-authored West Wing episode of one possible narrative that is 
then interrupted by another signals the likely possibility that the two will be in some 
way interconnected. In the case of “Enemies Foreign and Domestic,” the structure of 
the episode’s opening scene signals to viewers that, by episode’s end, the new 
Russian president will be linked somehow to U.S. concerns about Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
 Thus, through the convergence of several interrelated plots focusing 
simultaneously on U.S. policies in Russia and the Middle East, it is “Enemies Foreign 
                                                 
 
86 See especially “The Women of Qumar,” The West Wing, DVD, directed by Alex Graves (November 




and Domestic” that most plainly marks The West Wing’s post-9/11 dramaturgical 
shift from a focus on the pros and cons of U.S. Russia policy and the post-Soviet 
political and economic transition throughout Eastern Europe to an almost singular 
concern for the growth of Islamic fundamentalism through a fictionalized depiction of 
the “real-life” Bush administration’s “war on terror.”87 But while this episode does 
signal a major shift in the Bartlet administration’s foreign policy—a shift that 
mirrored that of the “real-life” United States in the wake of the events of September 
11, 2001—it also justifies continued U.S. suspicion of Russia by making conservative 
political forces discursively equivalent to a Russian femme fatale, Russian journalist 
Ludmilla Koss. 
 Before she appears on-screen, viewers learn that Koss, who is the D.C. 
correspondent for the Moscow-based Russian-language newspaper Novaya Gazeta, 
has been banned from the upcoming U.S.-Russia summit by Chigorin’s people 
because, according to C.J., she “supported the other guy.”88 Consequently, Koss has 
requested White House press credentials to cover the summit, and C.J. asks 
communications director Toby Ziegler to meet with her to facilitate her request. This 
expository information about the as-yet-unseen Koss relies on contemporaneous U.S. 
media coverage of “real-life” Russian President Putin’s crackdown on Moscow’s 
independent media and, consequently, his apparent disregard for democratic values, 
                                                 
 
87 In episodes at the end of season three and the beginning of season four, the “real-life” “war on 
terror” takes the form of a military conflict between the United States and the fictional Middle Eastern 
country of Qumar. 
 
88 Published in Moscow, Novaya Gazeta (Новая Газета) is a twice-weekly tabloid covering social 
and political topics of interest to its roughly 550,000 readers. It is owned in part by former Soviet 
Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and is known for its scathing critiques of Russian government policies. Its 





particularly free speech and the freedom of expression. Disgusted by what appears to 
be Chigorin’s anti-democratic behavior, Toby agrees immediately to meet with Koss, 
adding indignantly, “It’s time to teach these Stoli drinking Tchiakovskys a thing or 
two about free press American style: You don’t ban those who supported your 
opponent. You make them wallow in their loserdom by covering your victory.” 
 Thus the stage is set for Toby’s meeting with Koss, and with everything 
viewers know about Chigorin so far—twenty years in the KGB, a questionable 
election process, penalizing reporters who disagree with him, and the selling of 
nuclear technology to Iran—they are predisposed to like Koss, particularly given the 
cultural capital and heroic reputation that “real-life” Novaya Gazeta reporter Anna 
Politkovskaya enjoyed in the United States.89 But Koss’s meeting with Toby begins 
to complicate these predispositions, and viewers learn immediately that Koss is 
hardly the victimized journalist she had seemed when C.J. was describing her plight. 
Firstly, Koss is all business. Unlike the Russian ambassador’s sexualized repartee 
with Leo in “Galileo,” Koss refuses to engage in any sort of friendly banter with 
Toby, despite his best efforts. She is also mildly combative when he does not 
immediately grant her request to cover the summit. He wants to discuss it with the 
U.S. State Department to ensure that credentialing her in explicit opposition to 
Chigorin’s wishes is “not a grotesquely insulting thing to do to a new president from 
whom the United States is hoping for quite a bit.” She asks sardonically, “Oh, so your 
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first amendment only extends as far as is polite?” to which Toby responds, “No. It 
extends further than that, but it only protects us.”  
 Koss’s undisguised hostility toward Toby works in tandem with the 
expository information provided in this scene about Novaya Gazeta to further 
dissuade West Wing viewers from making quick and potentially erroneous 
assumptions about Chigorin (or Putin). Viewers learn in this scene that, according to 
Koss, of all the newspapers published daily in Russia, Novaya Gazeta has the highest 
circulation. Toby then counters her with a touch of sarcasm accompanied by a wry 
smile: “It’s hard to tell if that’s because of your reporting, your editorials, or the 
naked women on page three.” This thinly-disguised condemnation of Novaya Gazeta 
is later confirmed by a State Department representative who argues that allowing 
Koss to cover the summit would be like “if [the Russians] credentialed The Inquirer.” 
The negative assessment of the publication serves also to sully Koss’s reputation as a 
journalist, so it comes as no surprise that, in his attempts to learn why Chigorin has 
banned her from the summit, Toby has acquired several articles that have enabled him 
to come to the conclusion that she is, quite simply, a bad journalist who wants the 
privileges of being a member of a free press without any of the responsibility: 
Toby: By the way, I found out why Chigorin and his people have such a 
problem with you. 
Koss: It’s because I don’t flatter them. 
Toby: No. It’s because you stink. 
Koss: I beg your pardon?  
Toby: You can beg all you want, you’re not gonna get it. Last month, you 
alleged the Chigorin government bombed several apartment buildings 
based on an unattributed source. It was refuted, you never retracted it.  
Koss: The government’s case was all over the television. 
Toby: Last week, you wrote a cover story about President Chigorin’s mother-
in-law moving closer to the Kremlin. (Koss rolls her eyes and stands, 




Koss: Well, that’s her decision.  
Toby: You reported the failing grades of the Defense Minister’s twelve year-
old son. Does that even count as journalism? (Koss stares at Toby, 
refusing to respond.) Does that do anything but bring ridicule on a 
defenseless kid? We’ve got people like you here. On cable and on the 
Internet. And there’s no one anywhere on the ideological spectrum 
who doesn’t roll their eyes when their names are spoken out loud. 
(Koss smiles disdainfully as Toby walks back to his desk.) We’ve 
always had free press here. We take it for granted. But how can you… 
(Long shot of Koss standing from behind Toby’s right shoulder, his 
right arm extended in the air as he crumples his printout of her article 
on the Defense Minister’s son.) …treat it like this? (He tosses the 
crumpled article away in disgust. She watches it go without a word.) 
You should give up your space and put another naked woman in there. 
Anyway, here are your credentials. 
 
Koss walks to the desk, clearly expecting him to hand them to her; 
instead, he shoves them toward her roughly and turns away. Forced to 
pick them up herself from his desk, Koss does so and promptly exits 
Toby’s office. 
 
 The most crucial information that viewers learn from Toby’s interaction with 
Koss in this episode is that Chigorin’s dislike of and actions toward her are not 
arbitrary or necessarily related to any sort of anti-democratic tendencies on his part. 
Consequently, it is Koss, the obstructionist and duplicitous femme fatale, who holds 
the key not only to the successful decipherment of Chigorin’s true political and 
ideological stripes, but also to the episode’s larger question about Russia’s allegiances 
in the “war on terror.” Interestingly, Koss does not at any point reveal the specific 
ideological or political differences between herself and Chigorin that have caused her 
to be so critical of him, and as Toby (and with him, the viewers) unravels the truth 
behind Chigorin’s antipathy for Koss, this lack becomes a glaringly present absence 
that further suggests that, despite evidence to the contrary, Chigorin may not be the 
anti-democratic cold war hold-out he initially seemed to be. Koss’s dislike of him is 




 The combination in this Russian femme fatale of a dislike for the pro-Western 
Chigorin and, according to Toby, a patent lack of respect for free speech in particular 
and democratic values in general means that she operates dramaturgically in this 
episode as the gendered televisual representation of those otherwise unseen “cold war 
hold-outs, the ex-Soviets walking around” whose ways of thinking, being, and doing 
are not only anti-Western and anti-American, but also of another time. They espouse 
what Leo in “Galileo” calls a “cold war mentality.” But, as is demonstrated quite 
effectively by the barely-averted diplomatic disaster between Russia and the United 
States in “Enemies Foreign and Domestic,” these feminized “cold war hold-outs” 
remain a potent threat not only to pro-Western reform efforts in Russia and those 
leaders who support them (like Chigorin and the “real-life” Putin), but also to U.S. 
national security through the threat of nuclear proliferation to declared U.S. enemies 
in the Middle East. 
 As this episode reminds its viewers, the power of a free and independent 
media is potentially enormous, which, in Russia’s case, is both good and bad. 
According to Koss, Novaya Gazeta has the highest circulation of all the daily 
newspapers published in Russia. It is also, as viewers learn, vociferously critical of 
the Chigorin government, which by the end of “Enemies Foreign and Domestic,” is 
the equivalent to being anti-Western and anti-American. The conservative and 
oppositional Novaya Gazeta, whose representative in the U.S. is the tabloid journalist 
Koss, thus has the potential to exert enormous influence over a wide range of issues 
and to promote anti-Western ideas and agendas throughout Russia. Consequently, 




chosen to ally himself and his country with U.S. interests, its unnuanced depiction of 
a Russian femme fatale advocates caution with regard to a U.S.-Russian alliance in 
the “war on terror.” Clearly, the continued existence of these latent but powerful anti-
Western, cold war-era ideologues, symbolized by Ludmilla Koss, could potentially 
stymie or topple Chigorin-as-Putin, one result of which would be an Iranian nuclear 
program. 
 
 Whose “Cold War Mentality?” 
In this chapter, I have mapped the fictionalized depiction of U.S.-Russian relations on 
The West Wing and demonstrated through a feminist discursive analysis of three 
relevant episodes, “The Lame Duck Congress” (November 8, 2000), “Galileo” 
(November 29, 2000), and “Enemies Foreign and Domestic” (May 1, 2002), the ways 
in which Orientalist assumptions about and fears of gender as a category of identity 
are offered up within the series’ narrative structure to argue that white Eastern 
European men working for pro-Western political and economic reform, although 
confused and potentially vulnerable, are a better option for protecting U.S. interests 
than the powerful retrograde conservatism whose advocates are explicitly gendered 
feminine via their collective embodiment in the classic femme fatale archetype. I have 
also argued that through this dramaturgical strategy, which was the result of the 
unique intersection of the progressive political ideologies of the show’s creative team 
with contemporaneous U.S. political culture during the show’s seven-year run, the 
series offered a meta-narrative reminiscent of the cold war. In this meta-narrative, a 




national interests through its diplomatic and economic ties to U.S. enemies in the 
Middle East. Simultaneously, select episodes seem to advocate specific changes to 
“real-life” U.S. Russia policy that, if made, would force a measure of self-reflexivity 
in the formation and implementation of that policy.  
 What is most interesting about this dual pedagogical mission, however, is that 
it is, in the end, the Russian characters, rather than the show’s American protagonists, 
whose actions and persuasive diplomatic strategies offer an idealized alternative path 
for U.S.-Russian relations. In “Galileo,” for example, it is the Russian ambassador 
who, in the final showdown with Bartlet, lays bare the cold war triumphalist 
arrogance of the United States. Although she operates dramaturgically as the 
episode’s femme fatale, she is the only one willing to cut through the morass of cold 
war-era U.S.-Soviet diplomacy to remind Bartlet that the United States is partially to 
blame for the history of distrust between their two countries. Similarly, in “Enemies 
Foreign and Domestic,” Russian President Chigorin, who does not ever appear on 
screen, takes the risk of surreptitiously defying his own military elites and diplomatic 
corps not only by making the decision to add nuclear non-proliferation to the summit 
agenda, but also in getting his message through to a wary Bartlet. I mentioned briefly 
above that the two seemingly-befuddled Russian Embassy officials sent to negotiate 
the logistics of the summit operate unexpectedly as the pivot on which this episode’s 
narrative turns. It is through them that Chigorin passes his message to Bartlet, who is 
only convinced of its authenticity by Deputy Communications Director Sam Seaborn, 
who recognizes it as having been written by the Russian president rather than one of 




Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Percy Fitzwallace, flummoxed by 
Chigorin’s unorthodoxy, exclaims only half-jokingly, “You’re telling me that foreign 
policy of this magnitude is conducted through Sam, and I’m still alive?” 
 It is rather ironic that in the fictionalized depiction of post-Soviet U.S.-
Russian relations on The West Wing so much emphasis is placed on latent (and 
feminized) conservative forces in Russia that threaten to undermine pro-Western 
reform efforts and, consequently, U.S. national security, yet the existence of “cold 
war hold-outs” among U.S. political, military, and diplomatic elites is rarely 
explicitly critiqued. Throughout “Enemies Foreign and Domestic,” Deputy Chief of 
Staff Josh Lyman posits a hunch (which eventually turns out to be accurate) that, 
given Russia’s inability to satisfactorily fulfill its Soviet-era defense contracts with 
Iran for conventional weaponry, perhaps Iran is pressing Russia’s Ministry for 
Atomic Energy (MINATOM) to provide them with nuclear technologies. Although 
Admiral Fitzwallace, Leo, and the president immediately reject this theory, Josh 
remains unconvinced by their intransigence and broaches the subject again in a 
private conversation with Leo in which they are supposed to be coming up with a 
plausible excuse that will gracefully excuse Bartlet from the upcoming U.S.-Russia 
summit in Helsinki: 
Josh: How can you guys, all of you, be so sure it’s not MINATOM and the 
other cold war hold-outs, the ex-Soviets walking around? There are 
issues on the table: there’s NATO expansion, the Caspian pipeline— 
Leo: (Interrupting, his voice raised.) You don’t get to put a bomb in Iran! 
There are no other issues on the table right now. We’re gonna have to 
fly over there and blow this thing up, and given what they’re 
manufacturing there, I don’t know if that’s possible. We were all so 
smart: Russia’s hobbled, the next conflict’s gonna be in the Middle 
East. Turns out it is in the Middle East. With the Russians. 




Leo: What question? 
Josh: Chigorin just took office four months ago. How can you be sure it’s 
not a rogue thing? 
Leo: I don’t want a leak, Josh. Everyone’s proceeding like we’re going? 
Josh: Yes. How can you be sure? 
Leo: I can’t. 
 
This admission by the same character who, in “Galileo,” accused Russia’s political 
leadership of harboring a “cold war mentality” in its dealings with the United States, 
reveals that U.S. leaders are similarly encumbered. But his refusal to suggest to the 
president the possibility that Josh may be right indicates that, unlike some of the 
Russians depicted on The West Wing, U.S. leaders are not willing (or, perhaps, not 
able) to alter their thinking.  
 Series writer/creator Aaron Sorkin, though, gives Bartlet and Leo another 
chance to live up to the fictional Russians’ diplomatic challenge in a fourth season 
episode entitled “Evidence of Things Not Seen.”90 In this episode, which marked The 
West Wing’s final depiction of U.S.-Russian relations, Bartlet must, without revealing 
its mission, ask Chigorin’s permission for U.S. military personnel to enter 
Kaliningrad to retrieve a downed U.S. spy plane that was taking pictures of “illegal 
nuclear transfers in the region.”91 Working with a team of experts, Leo suggests to 
Bartlet that he tell Chigorin that the plane was photographing evidence of coastal 
erosion in the Baltic Sea on behalf of Finland. Although skeptical (Bartlet asks Leo, 
“This phone call that you’re going to set up with Chigorin? It’s, like, for a White 
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House bloopers reel or something?”), he authorizes the call, during which Chigorin, 
rather predictably, reacts to Bartlet’s obfuscation with justified hostility.  
 Frustrated with cold war-era tactics that clearly “[aren’t] working anymore,” 
Bartlet finally comes clean, making the case to Chigorin that the illegal traffic in 
nuclear weaponry and technologies is “as big a problem for you as it is for us,” but 
pointing out, too, that Russia’s continued unwillingness or inability to put an end to it 
has forced the U.S. into the position of having to protect its own national interests. 
Bartlet then puts a deal on the table: He offers to share with Chigorin the intelligence 
collected by the spy plane if Chigorin will permit the U.S. to enter Kaliningrad and 
get the plane. If not, Bartlet will order the plane detonated, and no one will see the 
pictures. Arguing that the two leaders need to trust each other, Bartlet conjures the 
cold war ghost he mistakenly ignored when dealing with the Russian ambassador in 
“Galileo” by reminding Chigorin that “[o]ur two countries have stopped the world 
from annihilating itself for sixty years because of conversations like this one.”  
 The shift in Barlet’s tactics from lying to truth-telling in dealing with the 
Russian president in this episode is admirable, and it eventually pays off when 
Chigorin agrees to the deal. But given contemporaneous “real life” news coverage of 
Russia’s staunch opposition to the Iraq war being waged almost unilaterally by the 
Bush administration and in direct opposition to several permanent members of the 
UN Security Council, Russia among them (I discuss this further in chapter 8), I 
cannot help but wonder whether the stand-off between Russia and the United States 
depicted in “Evidence of Things Not Seen,” particularly its resolution in favor of the 




U.S.-Russian relations. According to one New York Times journalist, contrary to 
statements from both countries that emphasized the continued partnership between 
presidents Putin and Bush, “on most major strategic issues resolved since Sept. 11, 
2001, Russia has resisted, then grudgingly accepted, American dictates that it has 
been powerless to change.”92  
 The West Wing’s Nad’ya and Chigorin are Russian political elites who, to 
varying degrees, advocate a new direction for U.S.-Russian relations, and Chigorin, in 
“Enemies Foreign and Domestic,” even goes so far as to covertly undermine the 
actions of his own military and diplomatic officials to risk enacting the trust between 
the two leaders that Bartlet does not get around to advocating until a year later in 
“Evidence of Things Not Seen”—and then only when backed into a proverbial 
diplomatic corner. Yet, despite the fact that it is Nad’ya and Chigorin who represent 
the idealized cooperative future that Sorkin imagines for the U.S. and Russia, they 
must still bow to U.S. dictates, Nad’ya to NATO inspections and Chigorin to U.S. 
intelligence gathering over Kaliningrad. Both actions, if taken in “real-life,” would 
breach the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, immediately gendering U.S.-
Russian relations as the unwilling violation of a feminized Russia by a masculinist 
United States. The fictionalized depiction of U.S.-Russian relations on The West Wing 
thus offers a confusing and often incongruous pedagogical legacy that, in the end, not 
only justifies continued U.S. suspicion of a feminized Russia, but also legitimates the 
“cold war mentality” with which U.S. policymakers, both fictional and non-, continue 
to formulate and enact U.S. Russia policy in the post-Soviet era.
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The Cultural Politics of Cold War: 








 According to its public relations materials, Washington, DC’s International 
Spy Museum, which opened to the public in July 2002—just ten months after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center—houses 
“the largest collection of international espionage artifacts ever placed on public 
display.”2 The museum’s permanent collection is divided into five thematic exhibits 
through which visitors move in sequence. The first, “School for Spies,” orients 
museum-goers to the world of international espionage by exploring the reasons 
individuals may choose such a career, how they are recruited and trained, and the 
tools and technologies by which they go about doing their jobs. Visitors then move 
into the next exhibit, “The Secret History of History,” which chronicles the history of 
global espionage up to the early twentieth century. The third exhibit, “Spies Among 
Us,” explores spycraft during World War II with a focus on the efforts of celebrities 
such as chef Julia Child, singer Josephine Baker, and actor Marlene Dietrich. “War of 
the Spies,” by far the largest of the five exhibits,” focuses on the cold war, while “The 
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21st Century,” which consists of a single film entitled Ground Truth, addresses the 
challenges current intelligence professionals face in the wake of 9/11.  
 Wildly popular with tourists because of its family-friendly atmosphere and 
high-tech interactive multimedia exhibits that enable visitors to explore “the craft, 
practice, history and contemporary role of espionage,”3 the museum has become an 
integral component of the District of Columbia Revitalization Act. Passed by the U.S. 
Congress in 1997, the Act’s intent is to facilitate a massive city-wide effort to grow 
the DC business community, provide more jobs for DC residents, and create more 
housing, retail, and entertainment options for tourists and locals alike.4 Additionally, 
the museum’s geographical location at 800 F Street, NW, just blocks from the White 
House, down the street from FBI headquarters, and within short walking distance of 
dozens of major national tourist sites, in conjunction with its extended emphasis on 
what I will demonstrate is the right(eous)ness and success of U.S. intelligence efforts, 
implicitly signals its affiliation with the ostensibly unlimited and superior power of 
the U.S. nation-state and its various security apparatuses. 
 In this chapter, I conceptualize the International Spy Museum as performance 
in the sense described by performance studies scholar Richard Schechner, who argues 
that to interrogate a cultural text as performance “means to investigate what the 
object does, how it interacts with other objects or beings.”5 Museum scholars agree 
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that regardless of the inevitable contestability of their exhibits, “museums remain 
powerful and subtle authors and authorities whose cultural accounts are not easily 
dislodged.”6 As “critically important educational institutions,” museums “possess a 
power to shape collective values and social understandings” via “symbolic politics” 
that “invoke ideals, recast realities and manufacture meanings.”7 Consequently, 
museums operate as performative pedagogical sites and are therefore inextricable 
from the histories, legacies, and processes of nationalisms, colonialisms, and 
globalization. But, as “spaces where cultures of knowledge, education, entertainment 
and national politics intersect,” museums are subject to the interpretation of their 
visitors, who already possess varying degrees of knowledge about the exhibits before 
they even step inside.8 Given their membership in a kaleidoscope of knowledge-
making media, “[m]useum exhibitions are bolted together out of the rhetorical 
fragments taken from more specific discourses and practices that have not always 
been fabricated with objective detachment, passive gazing, and dispassionate 
consideration.”9 Museums and their exhibits are thus performative in that they “help 
to forge reality, and then they organize the collective rites of this unstable reality’s 
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reception that will write authoritative accounts of the past, present, and future in their 
displays.” They “serve as ontologies, telling us what reality really is.”10  
 At the International Spy Museum, “reality” is forged through high tech 
multimedia exhibits and special programming meant to entertain visitors while 
simultaneously teaching them the history of spycraft. These concomitant goals, to 
entertain and to educate, are constitutive of the museum’s mission. What, though, is 
the “reality” being discursively created by the museum and its exhibits? And through 
what means are the “facts” of that “reality” being conveyed to the museum’s visitors? 
To answer these questions, I first provide some crucial historical and contextual 
information necessary for making sense of the centrality of nuclear proliferation and 
the cold war to the museum’s story of international espionage. I then delineate the 
ways in which the International Spy Museum operates as a performance of a 
particular “reality” of its own construction, focusing on the specific textual, visual, 
aural, and architectural methods by which it seeks to accomplish its mission to 
“educate the public about espionage in an engaging manner and to provide a dynamic 
context that fosters understanding of its important role in, and impact on, current and 
historic events.”11 Because the International Spy Museum makes no map of its 
exhibits available to its visitors—a clever component of its performance ostensibly 
meant to heighten for museum-goers the sense of “secrecy” and the pleasure of 
discovery—I have chosen to present relevant portions of my journey through the 
museum in narrative form in an attempt to guide readers through those parts of the 
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museum that are most salient to my work in this chapter. I demonstrate that the 
“reality” depicted in the museum’s story of international espionage (1) presents as 
fact the guilt of convicted Soviet spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for passing the 
“secret” of nuclear technology on to the U.S.S.R., (2) positions the Soviet 
Union/Russia as always already a feminized enemy of the just and virtuous United 
States based on the former’s apparently historical predilection for irrational state-
sponsored violence and terror, and (3) assumes the unquestioned legitimacy and 
integrity of U.S. covert intelligence networks operating in apparent self-defense 
against those entities (most notably the Soviet Union and communists, but also 
including non-state-based actors such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization and 
Al’Queda) whom the U.S. claims threaten the national security of the U.S. and its 
allies. In short, I am concerned in this chapter with what is being taught, how, and for 
what purposes(s). I argue that at the International Spy Museum, the cold war, 
constituted by the feminized duplicity of the Soviet Union (which, in turn, was 
enabled by the traitorous activities of the Rosenbergs), is used to legitimate and 
justify the current “war on terror.” 
 
 
A Cold War Museum 
Indeed, the cold war and, more specifically, the U.S. “victory” over the Soviet Union 
are at the center of the museum’s story of international espionage. This is hardly 
surprising given that, as I will discuss in greater detail later, the majority of the 
museum’s decision-makers are current and former U.S. intelligence professionals 




majority of the espionage technologies and artifacts displayed as part of the 
museum’s permanent collection were developed during and utilized as part of the 
cold war, and stories of cold war-era spycraft constitute the bulk of the museum’s 
narrative.  
 
 Although we are told by a docent that the elevator for which we are waiting 
will take us up to the start of the museum’s exhibits on international espionage, my 
experience has already started, for not four feet above my head, hanging from a rope, 
is a replica of the toppled statue of Stalin’s first security chief, Feliks Dzerzhinsky, 
which, until August 22, 1991, stood outside KGB headquarters in Moscow. The 
accompanying placard reports Dzerzhinsky’s pioneering and violent efforts to purge 
the Soviet Union of its internal dissenters. And again, after a short elevator ride up to 
the start of the exhibits, I am confronted with another, more contemporary warning 
about the dangers of communism and the legacies of the cold war: a larger-than-life 
black and white portrait of a North Korean soldier guarding the border between 
democratic South Korea and communist North Korea at Panmujon. We are then 
ushered into a small, dimly lit movie theatre that seats approximately forty or fifty 
people. An orientation film ostensibly intended to contextualize what we are about to 
see in the museum describes the half-century-long ideological conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union as “a new type of conflict, fought not by soldiers, 
but mostly by spies” and explicitly identifies the cold war as “the intelligence 
community’s finest hour.” My trek through the museum has yet to begin, and already 




maintained by militarized, state-based terror, remains a salient threat, and that the 
cold war was the catalyst for the development of contemporary spycraft. 
 
 As is clear from these first moments inside the museum, its narrative succeeds 
in marking identities, particularly highly politicized notions of “us” and “them,” for 
its visitors, all of whom are rhetorically interpellated into an imagined community of 
U.S.-based intelligence insiders. According to the museum’s story of international 
espionage, “us” is the United States and its NATO allies, while “them” is any entity 
that threatens the national security of the United States and its allies. Most frequently, 
these security threats are explicitly identified throughout the museum’s exhibits, 
programming, and public relations materials as the Soviet Union and communists 
(further proof of the museum’s focus on the cold war), but several non-state-based 
actors that have emerged since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, such as the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army, and Al’Queda, are 
identified, as well.  
 In a brochure advertising the museum’s collection of espionage artifacts, for 
example, the museum hails its reader (the prospective museum-goer), promising that 
visitors will “[s]ee the storm clouds gathering as World War II drew near and 
clandestine German and Russian spy rings operated right under our noses.”12 The use 
of the inclusive pronoun “our” makes clear that the museum’s success as a story of 
international espionage relies heavily on visitors’ collective belief, made possible by 
canonical national/ist narratives that facilitate and encourage cultural amnesia as well 
                                                 
 




as an intolerance for ambiguity and nuance,13 that the Federal Bureau of Intelligence 
(FBI) and, by extension, the U.S. government are always the “good guys.” Not 
surprisingly, this narrative ignores the fact that, in the United States, some of the most 
egregious violations of personal freedoms and civil liberties have been committed by 
the FBI against U.S. citizens affiliated to various degrees with the political left.14 
Exhibits throughout the museum demonstrate the many ways in which the Soviet 
Union’s Committee for State Security (Komityet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or 
KGB) sought classified information in and from the United States (for example, the 
Soviet Union’s failed attempt to incorporate microscopic surveillance devices into the 
infrastructure of the new U.S. embassy in Moscow during its construction in the 
1980s), implicitly lauding the success of U.S. intelligence for foiling their effort. 
However, reciprocal espionage attempts by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are 
deemed just, while KGB counter-intelligence efforts are negatively valanced 
throughout the museum’s narrative. 
                                                 
 
13 Luke argues that museums create worlds in which the artifacts on display are removed from their 
contexts and, thus, placed seemingly outside politics, adding to the feeling of objectivity and 
generalized truth. By removing items from their social and political context, museums make those 
items devoid of historical specificity and, instead, situate them in some generalized, mythic past that no 
one still living remembers.  
 
14 The International Spy Museum did curate and host a special, limited engagement exhibit in 2006 
entitled The Enemy Within. Now on tour throughout the United States, this exhibit “reveals dramatic 
episodes in American history, from 1776 to the present, when the U.S. was attacked at home” and 
describes the ways in which how “the country acted—and sometimes over-reacted—resulted in the 
evolution of U.S. counterintelligence and security measures.” International Spy Museum, 
http://www.spymuseum.org/about/exhibits_enemy.php# (accessed April 22, 2008). It addresses some 
of the more questionable tactics the U.S. government has used to quell internal dissent, including a 
section on the FBI’s Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which targeted organizations and 
people suspected of being subversive, including the NAACP, Martin Luther King, Jr., the CPUSA, and 
the entire New Left political movement. Formal COINTELPRO operations took place between 1956 
and 1971. For more information, please refer to Nelson Blackstock, COINTELPRO: The FBI’s Secret 
War on Political Freedom (Atlanta: Pathfinder Press, 1990); and Ward Churchill and Jim Vander 
Wall, ed., The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI’s Secret Wars against Dissent in the 




 The museum’s marketing materials also reveal the presumed U.S.-based 
perspective of its prospective visitors by promising that they will “learn how the 
biggest secret of the 20th Century—the atom bomb—was stolen by Soviet spies.” This 
statement remains contestable in its assumption that scientific technology can ever be 
“secret,” or even proprietary, but also participates in and reifies the cold war-era 
hypothesis that the Soviet Union could not possibly have developed nuclear 
technology on its own, thus pointing to the necessity of hunting down the traitorous 
spies operating “right under our noses” during World War II. Such language also 
assumes that visitors to this ostensibly “apolitical” and “nonbiased” museum are not, 
themselves, communists and/or former loyal Soviet citizens who would consider the 
attainment of the atomic bomb by their country only fitting—especially considering 
the fact that when the Manhattan Project to develop an atomic weapon was begun in 
the United States during World War II, the U.S. government invited its allies France 
and Great Britain to join in the research while excluding the U.S.S.R., which was, at 
that time, also an ally of the United States. 
 Given the volume of cold war-era artifacts on display (some of which I will 
discuss specifically), and the rhetorical centrality of the cold war to its attempt to tell 
the history of international espionage, the International Spy Museum cannot help but 
be a cold war museum. Unlike Washington, DC’s other national museums, most of 
which cannot be “extricated from the global war between two cultural systems during 
the Cold War” because of their implicit mission to glorify the universal value of the 
arts and promote American artists, events and artifacts as symbols of democracy,15 
                                                 
 




the International Spy Museum is temporally removed by more than a decade from the 
period normally associated with the cold war (i.e., roughly 1945 through 1989/1991). 
Although not explicitly in the cold war (and, thus, seemingly outside the conflict), the 
museum is very much a history of the cold war—which, given the contestability of 
the “cold war” as a cultural referent (which I discuss in chapter 1), actually puts the 
museum right back in it. The International Spy Museum’s cold war story reflects the 
political and ideological perspectives of the United States rather than those of the 
now-defunct Soviet Union. Consequently, the fact that there is only one extant 
participating nation-state—the United States—left to tell the story raises critical 
questions about how that story is told, under what circumstances, to whom, how, and 
for what purpose(s). 
 
Atomic Secrets 
In August 1945, the United States effectively ended the Second World War in East 
Asia by using two of its new atomic bombs to obliterate the cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, Japan.16 Four years later, on September 24, 1949, the New York Times 
published U.S. President Harry Truman’s announcement that “within recent weeks an 
atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.” In this statement, issued to the print media 
via White House advisor Charles G. Ross, Truman reminded the American public 
that, due to the nature of scientific research, “no single nation could, in fact, have a 
monopoly of atomic weapons.” According to Truman and his Secretary of State Dean 
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weapons have been used in warfare. For more on Truman’s decision to use the atomic bombs within 





Acheson, who held a news conference at the United Nations General Assembly 
following the public release of Truman’s historic statement, there would be no 
alterations to U.S. foreign policy as a result of this event. Acheson reassured the press 
of the accuracy of Truman’s earlier statement that plans had been made for what had 
all along been the expectation of “the eventual development of this new force by 
other nations.” For U.S. policymakers, then, the apparent acquisition and successful 
use of nuclear technology by the Soviet Union was not unexpected and was therefore 
met with apparent nonchalance. When confronted by a barrage of reporters on his 
way out of a Cabinet meeting, for example, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson 
calmly asked them not to “overplay it.” Similarly, General Omar N. Bradley, 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a statement urging the American people 
to remain calm: “We have anticipated it for four years and it calls for no change in 
our basic defense plan.”17  
Despite the prevailing appearance of equanimity among policymakers in the 
wake of the revelation that the Soviet Union possessed the “secret” of nuclear 
technology, New York Times columnist Anne O’Hare McCormick called 1949 the 
“epochal post-war year.”18 Echoing her colleague, New York Times reporter William 
L. Laurence, who claimed that the Soviet atomic explosion marked “the end of the 
first period of the atomic age and the beginning of the second,”19 McCormick mused 
that the first phase, begun with the U.S. war-time atomic attacks on Hiroshima and 
                                                 
 
17 Anthony Leviero, “U.S. Reaction Firm,” New York Times, September 24, 1949. 
 
18 Anne O’Hare McCormick, “The Epochal Post-War Year is 1949,” New York Times, September 26, 
1949. 
 
19 William L. Laurence, “Soviet Achievement Ahead of Predictions by 3 Years,” New York Times, 




Nagasaki, lasted only as long as the United States alone had the knowledge and 
ability to use nuclear technology and was thus able to prevent the escalation of 
violence. This period of U.S. atomic dominance was shattered in the wake of 
Truman’s statement, which made clear the fact that the U.S.S.R. remained a threat to 
declared U.S. objectives for a lasting post-war peace.20 According to McCormick, the 
Soviet Union’s atomic explosion would require a reevaluation of the “temporary 
sense of safety” that accompanied the widely-held assumption “that [the United 
States] would never use [its atomic bomb] to start a war and that nobody else would 
dare to start a war without it.” 
Within twenty-four hours of Truman’s statement, the Soviet Union responded, 
acknowledging via a radio broadcast that Moscow did, indeed, have in its military 
arsenal the ability to create and employ atomic weapons. The broadcast also 
emphasized that this was hardly a revelation given that Soviet Minister of Foreign 
Affairs V. M. Molotov had informed the United States of this fact in November 1947. 
According to Molotov, the so-called atomic “secret” had been non-existent since at 
least that time. As for the alleged “atomic explosion” recently monitored by U.S. 
intelligence sources, Moscow’s official news agency reported that “[t]he Soviet 
Union is working on many projects which require large-scale blasting,” which “might 
draw attention beyond the confines of the Soviet Union.”21 At no point did the 
                                                 
 
20 This U.S. objective was explicitly iterated by Acheson in his comments at the United Nations 
following Truman’s announcement. According to Acheson, “The entire foreign policy of this 
Government is directed toward the organization and preservation of peace. It is only through the 
success of those efforts that we will avoid the increased hardships and perils of war.” “Acheson 
Comment on Atom News,” New York Times, September 24, 1949. 
 
21 “Soviet Union Has ‘Atomic Weapon,’ Moscow Says as to U.S. Statement,” New York Times, 




U.S.S.R. confirm that it had detonated a nuclear weapon, and Truman was careful in 
his announcement to refer to the event ambiguously as an “atomic explosion” without 
specifically identifying its cause or method. 
 In a front-page article published alongside Truman’s statement in the New 
York Times and journalist Anthony Leviero’s piece on official U.S. reaction to the 
alleged Soviet atomic test, reporter William L. Laurence implicitly takes on both 
Truman and Leviero over Truman’s use of the term “atomic explosion.” In what is 
largely a scientific article concerning the ways in which nuclear explosions are 
monitored, measured, and recorded, Laurence argues that if the United States had 
gathered enough intelligence to determine the existence of an explosion at all, what 
Truman ambiguously termed an “atomic explosion” could have been nothing but the 
explosion of an atomic bomb. What is most intriguing about this article, though, is 
that its content is actually in disagreement with its headline. Entitled “Soviet 
Achievement Ahead of Predictions by 3 Years,” Laurence contends in this piece that 
rather than being ahead, the Soviet Union was actually just getting caught up. 
Scientists had predicted that the U.S.S.R. would not attain nuclear capability until at 
least 1952, but Laurence points out that such predictions were made based on the 
erroneous assumption that Soviet scientists did not begin working to develop the 
technology until after the U.S. revealed the existence of its own atomic weapons at 
the close of World War II. Predictions and timelines of nuclear proliferation were 
thus made without taking into consideration the likelihood that, like the United States, 
the Soviet Union used the discovery of nuclear fission in 1934 as a catalyst for 




assume that [the U.S.S.R.] had been working on it in secrecy since January 1939 and 
that it thus took them ten, rather than four years, to reach the stage of testing their first 
atom bomb,” thus putting the Soviet Union four years behind the United States in this 
regard. 
 Two days after Truman’s statement, a New York Times article entitled “Soviet 
Atom Gains Laid to U.S. Laxity” reported on the efforts of Republican 
Representative Harold H. Velde of Illinois and Democratic Senator Herbert R. 
O’Connor of Maryland to restrict U.S. immigration laws to prevent the “infiltration” 
of the United States by communist agents and sympathizers. According to Velde and 
O’Connor, the U.S. government had been careless in permitting known “subversive 
activities” to go on unimpeded, including the continued operation within the United 
States of more than 150 American communists and Soviet agents “engaged in a 
Russian attempt to obtain atomic secrets.”22 As signaled by this article, two 
simultaneous conversations, one about the alleged precipitous attainment of nuclear 
technology by the Soviet Union, the other concerning illegal immigration were 
quickly conflated, and concerns about domestic “infiltration” and the stealing of U.S. 
national security “secrets” by foreign and American communists led to questions 
about how it was that the U.S.S.R. was able to develop and test an atomic weapon a 
full three years ahead of schedule. Little attention was given to Molotov’s claim that 
he had informed the United States of Soviet nuclear capability in 1947, because 
policymakers believed then, as they did in 1949, that the Soviets had neither the 
scientific expertise nor the industrial infrastructure to develop, build, and test such a 
                                                 
 




weapon. Thus, according to the narrative constructed in the wake of the Soviet 
Union’s 1949 “atomic explosion,” there could be only one possibility: U.S.-based 
communist spies working inside and/or closely affiliated with the Manhattan Project 
must have passed “secret” information to the Soviet Union.23 The United States, 
unwilling to acknowledge Soviet scientific expertise, initiated a hunt for the guilty 
parties, the most legendary of whom are Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. 
 
The Rosenburgs as Discursive Phenomena 
Given the notoriously anti-communist politics of the American 1950s, it is perhaps no 
coincidence that on June 19, 1953, almost three years before the heralded premier of 
Twentieth Century Fox’s first feature-length film version of Anastasia (which I 
discussed in chapter 5), U.S. Communist Party members Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, 
having been convicted in federal court of conspiracy to commit espionage, were 
executed at New York’s Sing Sing federal prison for allegedly participating in a 
successful plan to supply the Soviet Union with the “secret” of the atomic bomb. The 
circumstances surrounding their arrest, indictment, trial, and subsequent appeals were 
convoluted, and the fact of their execution remains politically charged. Since the 
declassification in 1995 of crucial U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) documents, 
there has been a resurgent interest in closing the book on the Rosenberg case once 
and for all. Known collectively as “Venona,” these files of Soviet transmissions, 
decrypted by U.S. government operatives in the late 1940s, are considered by many 
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the final word in the Rosenberg case: they allegedly prove that at least Julius and 
maybe Ethel were indeed involved in direct espionage against the United States on 
behalf of the Soviet Union during World War II.24 Despite what appears to be 
resoundingly damning evidence, though (especially concerning Julius’s involvement), 
Rosenberg supporters remain vigilant in pointing to repeated instances of judicial 
misconduct before, during, and after the trial, the political aspirations and affiliations 
of the presiding judge and some members of the prosecution, the alleged inadequacies 
and/or inexperience of the Rosenbergs’ attorney, and the cultural environment of 
virulent anti-communism and anti-Semitism that they contend dramatically affected 
the outcome of the trial and all but guaranteed that the Rosenbergs’ appeals would be 
unsuccessful.25  
 In her discussion of the cultural milieu in which the Rosenberg trial took 
place, feminist literary scholar Virginia Carmichael focuses on the linkages and 
conflations that bolstered conservative anti-communism between 1950 (the year of 
the Rosenbergs’ arrest) and 1953 (the year of their execution), particularly those 
between communism, treason, and dissent. As a result of this conflation, anyone who 
strayed from the conservative (Christian) agenda, including liberals; radicals; Jews; 
immigrants; leftist artists and intellectuals; and labor, civil, and women’s rights 
activists and organizations, became suspect and were effectively rendered 
“communist” in U.S. popular and political culture. This led not only to ruined careers 
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and public ostracism, but also to the eventual implosion of the political left as a result 
of internal disagreements and self-imposed censorship. But regardless of the “truth” 
of their guilt or innocence, the Rosenbergs were swept up in the summer of 1950 into 
a discursive maelstrom in which every identity by which they could possibly have 
defined themselves was in direct opposition to the accepted norm of that historical 
moment. Both Ethel and Julius were active members of the Communist Party in the 
era of McCarthy, HUAC, and the Korean War, the latter of which framed their arrest, 
trial, and execution.26 They made their lives and raised their children in Manhattan’s 
Lower East Side, a well-known center of Jewish life and culture in the United States. 
They were working class during the (arguably rhetorical) ascendance of middle-class 
prosperity. They were the Jewish children of Russian immigrants living in a country 
with an overwhelmingly white, Christian body politic at a time of increased paranoia 
concerning the domestic “infiltration” of foreigners and the concomitant conflation of 
Jews with communist ideology. 27 The predominant national/ist narrative of post-war 
America required significant adjustment to accommodate the anathema that the 
Rosenbergs represented. And Ethel Rosenberg, by virtue of her femaleness in 
combination with her alleged participation in the network of pro-Soviet atomic spies, 
was a direct threat to the heteropatriarchal norms of American capitalism in which 
women are apolitical homemakers and caretakers of children while their husbands go 
off to (white collar) jobs.  
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South Korea on July 27, 1953; the Rosenbergs were executed on June 19 of that same year. 
 
27 While both Julius’ parents were from Russia, Ethel’s mother had emigrated from Austria. Her father, 




 The tacit rules and regulations of domestic “containment” affected not only 
the media’s portrayal of Rosenberg and her public persona, but also the discursive 
milieu from which emerged the prosecution’s rhetoric and, ultimately, the rationale 
that allowed presiding Judge Irving Kaufman to sentence her to death. As early as 
August 12, 1950, for example, prosecuting attorney Myles J. Lane linked 
Rosenberg’s actions with contemporaneous military conflict, arguing, “if the crime 
with which she is charged had not occurred perhaps we would not have the present 
situation in Korea.”28 Returning less than a year later to that same theme in his 
sentencing statement, Kaufman called the Rosenbergs’s crime “worse than murder,” 
asserting that their actions were the direct catalyst for “the Communist aggression in 
Korea” as well the potential for “millions more” casualties incurred there and 
elsewhere as a result of their egregious breach of U.S. national security.29  
 Thinking through the use of Ethel Rosenberg as a femme fatale of the cold war 
triumphalist mythscape requires an historicized conceptualization of American 
national identity. Acceptable roles for women in the United States after World War II 
were very few and highly prescribed, and the heteropatriarchal nuclear family was 
vigorously deployed by policymakers and pundits as the first line of defense against 
treason and subversive activity.30 The trouble with the Rosenbergs, though, was that 
not only had they apparently functioned quite successfully as Soviet operatives within 
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the very structure that was supposed to protect against such activity, but it was Ethel 
Rosenberg, the wife and homemaker, who was made, rhetorically if not in practice, 
responsible for it. According to the New York Times, which printed its stories on the 
Rosenberg case verbatim from FBI press releases,31 it was she who “recruit[ed] her 
brother, David Greenglass, 28, to obtain classified, that is, secret information 
concerning the atomic bomb for the Soviet Union.”32  
 This explicit attribution to Ethel Rosenberg of setting in motion the events that 
led to the Soviet Union’s nuclear capability was the first of many. It found its way 
into the prosecution’s rhetoric and, arguably, into the minds of the jury, which was 
not sequestered at any point during the trial and thus had access to the print media’s 
ubiquitous coverage. It also served as an implicit explanation for other examples of 
Rosenberg’s purportedly aberrant behavior. According to subsequent news reports, 
she had the audacity, when investigators appeared at her door after her husband’s 
arrest, to insist on her Constitutional right to see a search warrant and call an attorney. 
She was also consistently derided during the trial for her “refusal to demonstrate 
feeling, a refusal interpreted as a sign of arrogance, disdain, contempt, or absence of 
remorse and increasingly read as evidence of guilt in a cold and unnatural woman.”33 
With regard to the fate of their young children, she bore the brunt of the interpretive 
coverage, which accused her of being an “unnatural” mother who chose loyalty to her 
political commitments over the responsibilities of motherhood. The bottom line for 
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Judge Kaufman was that Rosenberg, a “mature woman—almost three years older 
than her husband and almost seven years older than her younger brother,” failed in 
her responsibility to dissuade them from their activities. Instead, she “encouraged and 
assisted the cause” and, as such, was “a full-fledged partner in this crime.”34  
 Within the narrow confines of what was considered acceptable behavior for 
women in the decade or so following 1945, the mounting rhetoric identifying 
Rosenberg as the communist ring-leader of a costly espionage operation was easy to 
interpret: she manipulated her husband and brother, breached national security, 
refused to cooperate with those charged with protecting the American body politic, 
abandoned her sons, and not once demonstrated an ounce of remorse for any of it. 
The alleged crimes of Ethel Rosenberg require that she, both literally and figuratively, 
be disappeared as punishment for not only violating the laws of the United States, but 
also the gendered norms of cold war-era domestic containment. In the twisted logic of 
this particular narrative, Rosenberg is guilty of something, and whether that 
something is conspiracy to commit espionage or betraying the men in her life (and, 
with them, the heteropatriarchal nuclear family-as-America), she deserved to die. 
 
The Rosenbergs at the International Spy Museum 
The International Spy Museum explicitly marks September 23, 1949—that day on 
which President Harry Truman announced the Soviet Union’s first atomic 
explosion—as the commencement of the cold war, and, despite the continuing 
controversy concerning the degree to which Julius and/or Ethel Rosenberg were 
                                                 
 




involved (or not) in enabling Soviet scientists, the Rosenbergs are positioned in the 
museum’s narrative as central figures in the espionage network that made the events 
of that day possible. The Rosenbergs and the cold war are thus co-constitutive in the 
museum’s narrative. According to the museum, were it not for the Rosenberg’s 
actions, the cold war would not have existed, and were it not for the cold war, neither 
would the Rosenbergs as discursive phenomena. 
 
 I am first introduced to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in an exhibit entitled 
“Atomic Spies.” To stand in this small, square room whose grey walls are a grid is 
like standing on a Star Trek holodeck. Or maybe inside a Rubics Cube. Beginning 
with a replica of a letter by Albert Einstein to Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
requesting/warning the U.S. President that the United States should research and 
build an atomic weapon to pre-empt Nazi Germany, this room uses the U.S. 
government’s timeline of events as constructed for the Rosenberg trial to visually 
demonstrate the flow of information concerning the “secret” of the atomic bomb from 
communist agents in the United States to scientists in the Soviet Union. According to 
the (white, male) voiceover that accompanies the real-time mapping of the alleged 
“spy network” on a wall of the exhibit, “Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, codenames 
‘Liberal’ and ‘Ethel,’ provided Soviets with stolen defense and military documents.” 
He was an “active spy,” she his “supportive wife.”
 35 
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 Upon leaving “Atomic Spies,” I encounter an enormous wall mural of 
“nuclear weapons on parade in Moscow” and a placard reading: 
NUCLEAR AGE BEGINS 
In conventional wars, armies battle in plain site. In the Cold War, spies and 
governments wrestled in the shadows. It was a new type of conflict, fought not 
by soldiers but mostly by spies. 
World War II left the U.S.S.R. controlling Eastern Europe, dividing a 
continent and, increasingly, the globe. Nations chose sides between two 
superpowers, fueling in time undercover struggles that sparked regional flare-
ups…but without igniting World War III. 
Past the mural, at the end of a short, grey hallway is the universal sign for a nuclear 
fall-out shelter. Following the only path available to me, I turn the corner and head 
down the drab concrete stairs, ostensibly into a fall-out shelter. The walls of the 
staircase are decorated by posters advertising several U.S. cold war-era films, and a 
(white, male) voice over in the guise of a contemporaneous radio newscaster and 
quoting from the text of the press release issued by the White House on September 22, 
1949, reports that Truman has announced that an atomic explosion has occurred in 
the Soviet Union. Then, quoting from a 1953 statement issued by President Dwight D. 
                                                                                                                                           
  This lack of evidentiary support for Rosenberg’s involvement continued with the release of the 
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Eisenhower to explain why he refused the Rosenbergs clemency in the hours before 
their execution, the voiceover reports: 
By immeasurably increasing the chances of atomic war, the Rosenbergs may 
have condemned to death tens of millions of innocent people all over the 
world. The execution of two humans is a grave matter. But even graver is the 
thought of millions of dead whose deaths may be directly attributable to what 
these spies have done. 
 
 As visitors come to the bottom of this long, concrete staircase repeatedly 
labeled with the infamously foreboding symbol for a nuclear fall-out shelter, they file 
through a short, dark hallway and out into a sporadically lit area cordoned off by 
chain link fencing that form the transparent “walls” of the area’s various exhibits. 
Located immediately to the left is the International Spy Museum’s 
presentation of information concerning the political and ideological tensions of the 
1950s. The display, entitled “Red Scare” and designed to suggest a nuclear fall-out 
shelter, features a black and white composite film, which includes portions of Walt 
Disney’s manifestly anti-communist testimony before HUAC, as well as various clips 
of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s vigorous defense of his attempts to expose communists 
and communist sympathizers in the United States. The film is just over two minutes 
long and automatically repeats itself as museum-goers venture behind the guardrail of 
a wheelchair ramp to view the artifacts on display in two glass cases built into the 




accompanying placards. Together, these constitute the museum’s take on the socio-
historical context in which the Rosenbergs’ trial and execution took place.  
After the immediacy of the video, a familiar technology to which visitors are 
instantly drawn, the display’s white lighting plays on their propensity to read from 
left to right, subtly focusing the brightest lights on the left-hand side of the exhibit 
and thus urging them toward the largest glass display case. Prominently mounted 
above this case, painted in black on what appears to be an aged, white shingle, is a 
quotation attributed to former Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev explicitly 
acknowledging the Rosenbergs’ “significant help in accelerating the production of 
our atomic bomb.” The glass case itself contains replicas of pamphlets and public 
relations materials intended during the Rosenbergs’ incarceration between 1950 and 
1953 to raise either awareness of their plight and/or money for their costly and 
lengthy appeals process. A significantly smaller glass display case, located down and 
to the immediate right of the larger one, houses a replica of the infamous Jell-O box 
that Julius Rosenberg is said to have used as a signal linking two of his operatives, 
Harry Gold and David Greenglass, at the Los Alamos atomic research facility in June 
1945. The original, the museum reports, was used by the prosecution during the trial 
and is currently located with the Rosenberg trial documents in the U.S. National 
Archives in Washington, DC. What the museum does not mention, however, is that 
its replica Jell-O box is actually a replica of a replica: the “original,” assuming it ever 
existed, has never been located, and prosecutors Myles Lane and Roy Cohn readily 




fabricated solely for demonstrative use in the courtroom.36 Nor does the museum 
mention that the quotation attributed to Khruschev, on which the museum relies (in 
conjunction with its subsequent display concerning the top-secret Venona program, to 
which I will return shortly) as definitive proof of the Rosenbergs’ guilt, is taken from 
an edited, English-language edition of his published memoirs that was posthumously 
transcribed from cassette tapes said to have been created by Khruschev, but not 
verifiable by voice-print. Additionally, since the Rosenbergs had already been 
executed as traitors who had provided the “secret” of the atomic bomb to the Soviet 
Union, it would not have been in the Soviet Union’s best interests for Khruschev to 
have done anything but confirm the findings of the FBI. Why, after all, would he 
reveal the existence of undiscovered intelligence operatives? Using Khruschev’s 
memoirs, then, for the final word on the Rosenberg case is most definitely 
problematic.37 
 The conspicuous absence from this display of any discussion of judicial and 
prosecutorial misconduct during, as well as the potentially illegal activities of the FBI 
in making, the Rosenberg case forces a glaring critique of the ideological 
positionalities of the museum’s creators and decision-makers. Although a wall 
placard, entitled “Julius and Ethel Rosenberg: Guilty or Innocent?” seems at first to 
ask museum-goers to come to their own conclusions about the case, its question is 
merely rhetorical, as the museum has already made the decision on behalf of its 
visitors. Leaving no room for debate or conversation, the placard affirms that “[f]rom 
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1943 to 1946 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, an ideological New York couple with two 
young sons, were at the center of a spy network feeding industrial, military, and 
atomic secrets to the Soviets.”  
 Given the painstaking recuperative work of Rosenberg supporters and other 
progressive activists and intellectuals in the decades since the 1950s, it is surprising 
that the International Spy Museum presents as part of its “reality” the unambiguous 
guilt of the Rosenbergs, particularly given the wrongs perpetrated against leftists of 
all ideological persuasions by, most notably, the FBI and the Department of Justice’s 
COINTELPRO. The placard mentions that “[w]hen Julius was caught and refused to 
talk, the FBI arrested Ethel, too, in hopes of breaking her husband.” But this (illegal 
and ultimately unsuccessful) government-sanctioned effort to leverage Rosenberg 
against her husband in an attempt to secure his confession passes without comment in 
the museum’s narrative, as does the FBI’s lack of evidentiary support linking her to 
the crime of which she was accused. Although the display does acknowledge the 
“widespread sympathy and doubt” that accompanied the Rosenbergs’ conviction and 
execution, accompanied by a picture of a pro-Rosenberg rally in France, the United 
States and its institutions exist outside that doubt. No mention is made of the U.S.-
based activisms that occurred during and since the Rosenberg case to draw attention 
to the inadequacies of the trial and attempt to situate it within the context of 
McCarthyism. This is particularly ironic given that the museum itself would not be 
able to report the “facts” as it does were it not for the success of a 1970s lawsuit 
brought against the federal government by the Rosenbergs’ sons under the Freedom 




FBI’s questionable tactics in making the government’s case against the Rosenbergs. 
According to the museum, the Rosenbergs “were found guilty and sentenced to die in 
the electric chair,” but who it was that found them guilty and sentenced them to die 
remains intentionally ambiguous in order to avoid implicating the U.S. government. 
 The need for this ambiguity is further substantiated and legitimized via the 
dramaturgical unimportance to the museum’s narrative of another placard containing 
the museum’s only acknowledgment of the persecutions suffered in the United States 
by the political left in the era of McCarthy. The museum concedes that while “[s]ome 
spies were uncovered in the process, […] history has shown that most of the accused 
were innocent, their lives and reputations destroyed by the Communist witch-hunt.” 
Not only is this placard positioned well below eye-level in the display’s darkest area 
and obscured by the shadow cast by the television (on which the short composite 
film, “Red Scare,” runs continuously), but it is also the last informational piece in an 
unusually (for this museum) text-heavy display, which itself comes more than half-
way through the museum—long after visitors have stopped attempting to read 
everything. Located unobtrusively behind the guardrail of a ramp that makes this 
portion of the museum accessible to patrons in wheelchairs, the display is also 
difficult to get to. Given these potential obstacles, which museum-goers could use as 
an excuse to pass entirely by or gloss over the substantive information presented in 
the display, it is the anti-communist sentiment expressed in the video by Walt Disney, 
along with the prominence of the quotation from Khruschev’s memoirs, that work 
concomitantly to bolster museum-goers’ existing beliefs in both the legitimacy of 




creator of family entertainment and amusement parks,38 thinks communism is “un-
American,” then it undoubtedly must be. And who else but Nikita Khruschev, a 
former leader of the Soviet Union, would know the “truth” about the Rosenbergs’ 
involvement in his country’s attainment of nuclear technology? 
 The placard’s written text calling McCarthyism a “witch-hunt”—assuming 
visitors read it—thus contradicts the predominant message promulgated by the 
display’s audio-visual materials, which, in their conclusive condemnation of the 
Rosenbergs, operate in conjunction with the evidentiary support provided by the 
museum in the form of subsequent informational materials concerning the NSA’s top-
secret Venona project. A series of placards reports the 1995 declassification of 
hundreds of decrypted World War Two-era Soviet transmissions to and about agents 
(including one called “Liberal,” whom decoders have identified as Julius Rosenberg) 
operating within the territorial boundaries of the United States. It features FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover’s contention that “Communism, in reality, is not a political 
party, it is a way of life, an evil and malignant way of life.” Hoover’s sentiment, like 
the quotation attributed to Khruschev, is painted in black ink on an aged, white 
shingle and prominently displayed at the start of the Venona exhibit, thus squelching 
any potential for an oppositional, or even nuanced, interpretation of the museum’s 
story of Venona and its import to the Rosenberg case. 
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 Another potential obstacle to museum-goers’ ability to become aware of 
and/or process the almost-critique of McCarthyism offered by the small placard is 
actually the sequence in which information concerning the Rosenberg case is 
presented as part of the museum’s story of international espionage. As described in 
my touring narrative above, before visitors reach the simulated nuclear fall-out shelter 
in which the “Red Scare” display is located, they are presented with two specific 
references to the Rosenbergs’ central involvement in the Soviet Union’s attainment of 
nuclear technology. The first is the small grey room entitled “Atomic Spies,” which 
describes the development of nuclear weaponry and the alleged means by which that 
technology ended up in the hands of Soviet scientists. The second occurs via a white, 
male voiceover in the grey, concrete stairwell leading down to the simulated fall-out 
shelter. With these two specific references to the Rosenbergs immediately preceding 
the “Red Scare” exhibit, museum-goers already know what they did (from “Atomic 
Spies”) and what happened to them (by listening to the voiceover in the stairwell), 
which leaves visitors with no practical reason to put in the extra effort of navigating 
behind the wheelchair ramp’s guardrail to read the informational placards. Add to this 
the prominent anti-communist rhetoric in the exhibit, itself, which is readily 
discernible with a cursory glance while walking down the ramp and ahead to the 
Venona exhibit, and it becomes clear that the sequence of information presented on 
the Rosenbergs serves to confirm rather than challenge what visitors probably already 
knew before coming to the museum: the Rosenbergs were guilty, and communism is 
bad. Thus, the museum’s take on the Rosenberg case, like its interpretation of the 




U.S.-based cultural text, to make meaning within the cold war triumphalist mythscape 
as well as the power of the white men who speak on behalf of or (in the case of 
Khruschev) in support of the U.S. state in the museum’s exhibits. From Hoover and 
Disney to the white, male voiceover reporting Eisenhower’s reasons for denying the 
Rosenbergs’ appeal for clemency, it is the institutions of the U.S. nation-state—its 
media, its politicians, its decision-makers—that are used to prove the Rosenbergs’ 
guilt and, by association, the inherent malignancy of communism and the Soviet 
Union. 
 
The Origins of State-Based Terror 
Although there is only one path through the International Spy Museum, exhibits and 
displays are arranged so that visitors can pick and choose to interact with those that 
are most intriguing to them. There are, however, three areas of the museum through 
which museum-goers must pass in order to get to the remainder of the exhibits, each 
of which features a concentrated narrative of a specific historical moment of import to 
the international history of espionage. One of these is “Atomic Spies” in which the 
Rosenbergs are explicitly identified as part of a network of communist agents. 
Another is the concrete stairwell in which the Soviet atomic explosion and the 
Rosenbergs’ execution are announced.39 The first, though, through which museum-
goers are obligated to pass is an exhibit entitled “Red Terror” that is designed to 
replicate the office of feared Soviet intelligence officer Feliks Dzerzhinsky, the 
                                                 
 





toppled statue of whom hangs ominously overhead as museum-goers are boarding the 
elevator that takes them up to the start of the exhibits. 
 
 At the end of a long, red hallway, prominently visible from about twenty-five 
yards away, is a large, highly sexualized black and white portrait of one of history’s 
most well-known (if least successful) spies, Margaretha Zelle, who, as exotic dancer 
Mata Hari, spied for Germany during World War I and, in 1917, was executed by 
France for her efforts. Although Mata Hari’s portrait seems, at first glance, to mark 
the end of the corridor, upon reaching it, I immediately discover that, although 
hidden behind a scarlet velvet curtain, a doorway disguised as an immense wooden 
bookshelf, emblazoned with the words “Doorway to Hell,” has been left ajar, 
revealing a secret room. I can hear men singing vigorously in Russian. Displayed on 
the bookshelf/door are Russian-language versions of novels by James Bond creator 
Ian Fleming, a book entitled U studentova kommunisti (For Communist Students) by 
Uri German and a series of books collectively entitled Zhizn zamechatelnii ludei (The 
Lives of Famous People), with editions on Russian revolutionaries Vladimir Lenin 
and Sofia Perovskaya. The room behind the great wooden bookshelf/door is square, 
dark, and overwhelmingly red. A deep scarlet rug protects the very Russian 
parquetted floor, dark shades are drawn over the windows, and a series of still black 
and white images moves across them from left to right accompanied by a medley of 
Soviet-era choral music. The room is meant to be the office of Soviet security chief 
Feliks Dzerzhinsky. His portrait hangs on the wall to the left, next to those of Lenin 




In front of me are his desk and his phone and his chair. And to my left is the secret 
entrance to Moscow’s feared Butyrka Prison, to which Soviet citizens were sent, 
never to be heard from again. Had they been executed? Were they sent to the gulag? 
Some of the faces that comprise the scrolling images are blacked out, evidence of 
having been “disappeared” during the Stalinist purges, and the accompanying text 
reports that “8 million Soviet citizens were arrested for crimes against the state. 
700,000 were executed.” 
 
 Although its moniker and artifacts refer specifically to the Stalinist purges of 
1937/38, when millions of Soviet citizens were “disappeared” in an effort to remove 
dissident members of the Communist Party, this multi-media exhibit purports to tell 
the history of Russia’s “long tradition of secret police” that “defin[ed] the art of ruling 
by fear.” A wall placard attributed to museum board member and intelligence 
historian H. Keith Melton (who is also on the faculty of the Centre for 
Counterintelligence and Security Studies40) tracks the alleged continuity in tactics 
throughout Russian and Soviet history to suppress the activities of subversive groups: 
Russia has a long tradition of secret police. The OKHRANA [sic] served the 
Czar, keeping watch over subversive groups. When the Bolsheviks seized 
power, they created the Cheka, the group responsible for the Red Terror. As 
the Cheka grew and evolved, it was renamed the GPU, then the OGPU. Stalin 
                                                 
 





recognized it as the NKVD. In 1954, it became the infamous KGB; then in 
1992, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the FSB.41 
By unequivocally linking the strategies and tactics of tsarist Russia with those of the 
Russian Federation via those of the Soviet Union, the exhibit points to an apparent 
meta-historical predilection in that geographical area of the world for state-based 
violence (regardless of its leaders or political structures) and names the October 
Revolution that brought the Bolsheviks to power as the origin of the use of “terror 
and torture as political tools.” According to a wall placard, “[t]he Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917 reshaped world politics. It also transformed spying, initiating a 
new era in which governments institutionalized espionage to control their own 
citizens.”  
 In thinking about how the museum constructs its narrative about the history of 
international espionage, it is interesting to consider the ways in which “Atomic Spies” 
and “Red Terror” are discursively symmetrical and metonymically interconnected 
within that narrative. Each of these exhibits attempts to elicit visitors’ intellectual and 
emotional engagement with its particular story through an immersive experience in 
the specific time, space and place of that story. In the case of “Red Terror,” museum-
goers find themselves in NKVD chief Feliks Dzerzhinsky’s Moscow office during the 
earliest days of the Stalinist purges and are encouraged to imagine that they are 
awaiting interrogation and probable imprisonment and/or execution. In “Atomic 
Spies,” museum-goers experience the Soviet Union’s first atomic explosion in 1949 
through several interconnected stimuli, including a voiceover launch countdown that 
                                                 
 




begins in English and ends in Russian, a film clip of a burgeoning mushroom cloud, 
lights that blink rapidly on and off, a roaring audio track and a floor that shakes 
violently, causing unsuspecting visitors to momentarily lose their balance. With the 
exception of the concrete staircase that leads down to the simulated fall-out shelter, 
no other portion of the museum relies so exclusively on these immersive theatrical 
techniques. This makes both “Red Terror” and “Atomic Spies” spaces in which 
museum-goers become involuntary performers on a stage created by the sights and 
sounds of the exhibit.  
 Several strategies operate in tandem to construct these exhibits as performance 
spaces. First, each is housed in a square room whose physical openness is in stark 
contrast to the dimly lit alcoves and angled walls that define the museum’s other 
exhibits, all of which (with the exception of “Red Terror” and “Atomic Spies”) are 
intentionally designed to force museum-goers to peer into nooks and crannies and 
search behind angled walls. The physical location within those exhibits of placards 
and artifacts, most of which are displayed at a height that facilitates equal 
accessibility to them by children as well as adults, forces adults to look down and 
children to look up, thus manipulating the bodies of museum-goers into an 
involuntary physical performance throughout the museum. To look down, adults must 
collapse their shoulders and deliberately adjust their center of gravity; to look up, 
children must stand on their toes. Both age groups are thus off balance, and neither is 
able to get a clear view of the information presented without expending some 
physical effort. This forced physical performance enhances the pedagogical mission 




of espionage through the physical embodiment of the experience. Variances in 
lighting color and strength, along with an almost chaotic array of audio-visual stimuli, 
reinforces a feeling of surveillance and secrecy. Thus, visitors’ perception of their 
new-found ability to see clearly the information presented in both “Red Terror” and 
“Atomic Spies” encourages them to fully engage with those materials. 
 Secondly, the presentation of information in these two exhibits is done 
primarily through visual imagery and sound rather than a preponderance of written 
text. This strategy mirrors that of the museum, in general, but “Red Terror” and 
“Atomic Spies” differ in their 360-degree arrangement of those technologies; thus, 
each room’s design as an open diorama whose walls are sparsely populated with 
pictures, artifacts, and text-based informational placards, in conjunction with the aural 
and visual stimulation provided by each exhibit, promotes a singular attention to the 
exhibit’s narrative as well as a performance enacted as part of that narrative.  
 Lastly, as I have mentioned, visitors are obligated to pass through each exhibit 
on their way to subsequent areas of the museum. Given these factors, the narrative 
importance of “Red Terror” and “Atomic Spies” to the museum-as-text is manifest in 
their structural prominence; they are the architectural variant of literary theory’s 
parallel structure and, as such, discursively promote the notion (with which most 
adult viewers likely already come to the museum) that the Soviet Union’s (and, by 
geographical and historical association, the Russian Federation’s) irrational 
predilection for terrorizing its own people inherently means that it cannot be trusted 
to safely wield nuclear technology. In sequential order, the story told in “Red Terror” 




“Red Scare” to explain the origins of the cold war: Russia’s inherent and meta-
historical reliance on terror to control its own citizens became, with the Soviet 
attainment of atomic weaponry, a direct threat to U.S. national security, thus offering 
sound justification for the cold war. 
 
(Hetero)Sexpionage 
The museum’s use of the cold war to justify the “war on terror” is heavily reliant 
upon efficient operation of gendered discursive configurations, which the museum 
wields quite adeptly. But unlike many museums, which have been forced in the wake 
of feminist critique to reorient their narratives to include the stories and experiences 
of women, the International Spy Museum features them quite prominently in a 
number of exhibits. Not only are there two women on the museum’s advisory 
committees,42 but the stories of female spies and the testimonies of women CIA 
operatives appear throughout the museum, whether to provide further information 
concerning a particular historical event or as experts lending their opinions 
concerning the future of U.S.-based intelligence operations in the wake of 9/11. Thus, 
it is not the absence of women’s voices and experiences that forces a feminist critique 
of the museum; rather, it is the explicit conflation of female sexuality with the threat 
of enemy espionage and the dangers of state-based violence that operates in tandem 
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with the museum’s covert use of heteronormative notions of masculinity and 
femininity to emasculate the Soviet Union (and, by extension, the Russian 
Federation) in order to bolster the museum’s history of the cold war and its 
performative justification of the continuance of cold war-era strategies in U.S. foreign 
policy after 9/11. 
 Feminist film critic Laura Mulvey has discussed the systemic and normative 
masculinist perspective, what she terms the “male gaze,” through which audiences of 
all genders have grown accustomed to viewing realistic film narratives. She argues 
that female characters (and the actors who portray them) traditionally fulfill an 
“exhibitionist role” in which they are “simultaneously looked at and displayed;”43 
they are included within the filmic narrative only as erotic spectacle, serving both the 
(male) characters within the on-screen universe of the film as well as the film’s 
spectators. Rarely does the visual presence of women become necessary to the 
progress of the filmic narrative, thus creating “[a]n active/passive heterosexual 
division of labour” in which women exist to be looked at and men to drive the 
narrative. According to Mulvey, 
This is made possible through the processes set in motion by structuring the 
film around a main controlling figure with whom the spectator can identify. 
As the spectator identifies with the main male protagonist, he projects his look 
onto that of his like, his screen surrogate, so that the power of the male 
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protagonist as he controls events coincides with the active power of the erotic 
look, both giving a satisfying sense of omnipotence.44 
I have already discussed at length the strategies by which the International Spy 
Museum, in its marketing materials and exhibits, interpellates visitors into a 
community of U.S.-based intelligence insiders whose enemies are communists, the 
U.S.S.R./Russia and any individuals or groups that threaten the national security of 
the United States and its allies. Whatever their means and methods, U.S. and NATO 
espionage victories over these enemies are touted as warranted and legitimate, while 
defeats are used to justify increased spycraft. With this chicken-and-egg logic, 
visitors to the International Spy Museum are implicitly asked to identify with the 
museum’s (masculine) protagonist, the United States, and to share its desire to 
eliminate its historical enemy, the Soviet Union, which, like the female characters of 
traditional filmic narrative, exists as a passive object meant to serve as dramaturgical 
proof of the hero’s virility.  
 For example, the introductory display to an exhibit entitled “The Secret 
History of History,” which aims to demonstrate the historical longevity of intelligence 
work as a viable strategy of global politics, reminds museum-goers that espionage is 
“the world’s second oldest profession,” thus making an explicit connotative and 
discursive link between prostitution and the secrecy, excitement, and potential 
duplicity of covert intelligence work. This link succeeds because it depends upon the 
public perception of sex work in a specifically U.S.-based context. Although selling 
one’s own or purchasing another’s body for money is illegal in the United States 
                                                 
 




(with the notable exception of the state of Nevada), and both actions are 
conceptualized and discussed in largely negative terms, there is, of course, no dearth 
of known “red light districts” across the country. This incongruous relationship 
between law and practice results in a disconcerting public schizophrenia in that the 
national body politic understands the logic behind the simple formula presented by its 
lawmakers: sex work is bad, therefore sex work is illegal. However, the illegality of 
prostitution, in combination with its existence within a capitalist, heteropatriarchal, 
and homophobic social structure, even while given broad lip service as distasteful, is 
also simultaneously sexually titillating because the premise on which it rests 
(prostitution is bad) is actually not accurate for those individual (usually male) 
customers who choose to hire a (usually female) sex worker. The International Spy 
Museum expertly exploits this schizophrenia, the tension between law, practice, and 
male (hetero)sexual desire, to promote and tell its story of international espionage.  
 This tension is unavoidably manifest in the museum’s store, through which all 
visitors must pass to exit the museum. Several different products, including mugs, 
magnets, t-shirts, and postcards, feature a World War II-era propaganda poster 
warning U.S. naval officers and enlisted men to “beware of female spies” for fear that 
women were “being employed by the enemy to secure information from Navy men, 
on the theory that they [were] less liable to be suspected than male spies.” Also 
available for purchase is a print of another World War II-era propaganda poster that 
warns male soldiers to “Keep mum [because] she’s not so dumb!” In this image, three 
white, male military officers are in competition with each other for the favors of one 




and defiant gaze at the (presumably male) viewer continue, even more than fifty years 
after the poster’s original publication, to work in conjunction with the (in)famously 
beguiling and destructive femmes fatales of Hollywood’s “reel life” to signal the 
woman’s identity as a “real life” femme fatale.45  
 On display in the museum is a KGB-issue 4.5 mm single-shot pistol disguised 
as a tube of bright red lipstick. This weapon could, of course, be convincingly carried 
and wielded only by female operatives, thus pointing to the use of what journalist 
David Lewis calls “sexpionage” in his exposé on the alleged institutionalized and 
systemic exploitation of sexual acts by Soviet intelligence.46 Interestingly, not only is 
a replica of this artifact sold (presumably to female visitors) in the museum store as a 
pen disguised as a plastic tube of red lipstick, but it was also featured prominently in 
the museum’s marketing and public relations efforts in preparation for the museum’s 
July 2002 opening. Included as the fifth of fifteen full color images in the museum’s 
initial press preview of its collection, the gun is introduced as “The Kiss of Death” 
and described as “easily hidden in a purse,” thus gendering feminine the anonymous 
KGB operative to whom the weapon was issued.47 National Public Radio’s coverage 
of the museum’s opening also featured “The Kiss of Death” in its abridged on-line 
photo gallery of the museum’s collection,48 and museum creator Milton Maltz 
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referred specifically to it in an interview conducted by NPR’s Tavis Smiley, 
explaining that the pistol was “given to every female KGB agent either to protect 
herself or to commit an assassination.”49  
 The lipstick gun’s location within the museum reveals the reason it was relied 
on so prominently in the museum’s initial public relations efforts. Included as part of 
the “School for Spies” exhibit, which aims to illustrate the technical aspects of 
spycraft via artifacts and interactive demonstrations, the lipstick pistol is prominently 
displayed in a glass case directly across from the exhibit’s chief attraction, the James 
Bond Austin Healey, thus providing a discursive link between the materiality of “real 
life” Soviet intelligence tactics and the knowledge of the filmic “reel life” cold war-
era world of James Bond—particularly the “Bond girls,” several of whom were not 
only classic femmes fatales, but Soviet spies as well—with which (at least) adult 
visitors likely come to the museum. The museum’s wall placard points out that the 
lipstick pistol “delivered the ultimate ‘kiss of death,’” thus identifying female 
sexuality as a potentially fatal tool of espionage and associating Russian/Soviet 
women with the traits and characteristics of the Hollywood femme fatale. 
  
 On a repeat visit to the museum, as I turn away from the portrait of Mata 
Hari, I already know that behind the red curtain to my left is the secret door to Feliks 
Dzerzhinsky’s office and the exhibit entitled “Red Terror.” I can hear the Soviet 
anthems being sung, luring me into the dark. I peek in to see the blacked-out faces of 
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the disappeared moving slowly across the drawn window shades. But I ignore all that 
and, instead, choose to wander to my right, into what appears to be a  ladies’ 
dressing room of the Victorian era. 
 
 Should visitors choose to explore this room to the right, they learn about the 
deeds and experiences of nineteenth-century woman-spies, most of whom included in 
this display spied for the Confederacy during the U.S. Civil War and were thus 
enemies of the United States. Mulvey points the scopophiliac voyeurism of cinema, 
which “arises from pleasure in using another person as an object of sexual stimulation 
through sight.”50 In extrapolating her analysis for thinking about the International Spy 
Museum, the fact that museum-goers learn about these women spies (who were 
enemies of the United States) while located in what is presumably their dressing 
room, a private space into which visitors to their homes in the nineteenth century 
would most certainly not have been invited, is evidence of the tacit permission given 
by the museum to, in the language of espionage, penetrate their perimeter and learn 
their secrets. Unlike filmic narratives, which, by virtue of their sheer public-ness, 
Mulvey acknowledges as seemingly “remote from the undercover world of the 
surreptitious observation of an unknowing and unwilling victim,”51 the International 
Spy Museum exists solely to reveal this “undercover world” for its visitors. This 
objective is most explicitly introduced via what could arguably be considered a 
metaphor for rape (i.e. visitors invade what is traditionally the private space of 
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women), thus pointing to the museum’s successful manipulation of gendered 
discursive configurations to tell its story of international espionage. 
 Moreover, coming immediately after the revealing portrait of Mata Hari in the 
hallway, this display continues the museum’s implicit conversation, begun with the 
“Kiss of Death” lipstick pistol and the linkage between sex work and spycraft, of the 
ways in which female spies used duplicitous sexuality to deceive their (ostensibly 
male) victims into sharing secrets and breaching national security. This conversation 
forms the foundation of what museum-goers know about the history of espionage up 
to this point in the museum’s narrative and, as such, proves crucial as they are 
introduced for the first time in “Red Terror” to the Soviet Union as not only the 
enemy of the United States, but also as the originator of state-based terror. Even while 
reading placards, examining artifacts, and watching the short informational film in the 
Victorian dressing room, visitors are able to hear “Red Terror” before they see it: the 
sound of male voices singing what sounds like a robust nationalistic and/or 
militaristic anthem subtly permeates the museum’s coverage of Civil War-era 
woman-spies. This incongruous conflation of sounds and information, in combination 
with the physical and psychological feeling that one is moving deeper and deeper into 
a space that has heretofore been not only entirely unknown, but also forbidden, 
discursively connects “Red Terror” and the Soviet Union with the sexualized tactics 
of woman-spies, from Mata Hari to the anonymous “real-life” KGB agent whose 





 The “real-life” failure of this female KGB agent operates as a subtle metaphor 
in the museum’s story of cold war-era espionage: her failure, and, with it, the demise 
of the Soviet Union, enables not only the very existence of the International Spy 
Museum, whose holdings are largely Soviet in origin, but also the geopolitical 
ascendance of the United States as the world’s sole “superpower.” According to its 
own press materials, the museum owes its existence in large part to the failures of 
various intelligence operations, for these failures have facilitated knowledge of 
certain tactics and technologies that were, by no means and under no circumstances, 
intended for the eyes and ears of any group other than that which used them.52 The 
United States, as the “winner” of the cold war, need not reveal its intelligence tactics 
and is thus able to remain largely unnamed as a participant in the more unsavory and 
morally questionably aspects of espionage required to wage cold war—not to mention 
a global “war on terror.” But because the Soviet Union “lost” the cold war, ceasing to 
exist in the process, its intelligence techniques ultimately failed and were 
subsequently discovered by historians and U.S. intelligence operatives (the burial site 
of the Romanovs is a case in point, as is the lipstick pistol and the strength of the 
U.S.S.R.’s nuclear ballistic missile submarines). This “loss” caused by the failure of 
Soviet intelligence activities, in combination with that country’s apparent irrationality 
stemming from its allegedly historical predilection for state-based terror, results in the 
rhetorical emasculation of the historical Soviet Union and its contemporary successor 
state, the Russian Federation, within the cold war triumphalist narrative as presented 
in the International Spy Museum. The majority of exhibits and artifacts on public 
                                                 
 




display at the International Spy Museum, because they are Soviet in origin, provide 
cumulative and conclusive evidence of the United States’ alleged superiority over the 
U.S.S.R., an abjection deployed rhetorically as part of the museum’s story of 
international espionage only to reinforce what museum-goers already know: the U.S. 
won the cold war, thus exposing the weaknesses underlying the Soviet system—
including in its espionage techniques. 
 
The Cold War as Cautionary Tale 
I want to make clear that I am in no way a Soviet apologist, nor is it my intention to 
entirely discredit the information presented throughout the museum concerning the 
U.S.S.R.’s startlingly efficient use of state-based violence and the global threat of 
nuclear annihilation imposed by the precarious relations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union in the second half of the twentieth century. Rather, my objective 
in this chapter has been to interrogate not only the “reality” of the history of 
espionage as it is discursively created by the International Spy Museum and its 
exhibits, but also the means by which the “facts” of that “reality” are being 
promulgated within the context of its post-9/11 historical moment—especially when 
taking into consideration the museum’s power and influence as a site of public 
pedagogy in the nation’s capitol city. An explicitly educational institution whose 
mission is to “educate the public about espionage in an engaging manner and to 
provide a dynamic context that fosters understanding of its important role in, and 
impact on, current and historic events,”53 the International Spy Museum prides itself 





on its commitment to “the apolitical presentation of the history of espionage in order 
to provide visitors with nonbiased, accurate information” about “an all-but-invisible 
profession that has shaped history and continues to have a significant impact on world 
events.”54 It seeks to fulfill this mission through permanent and special exhibits in 
conjunction with innovative programming that includes DC city tours highlighting 
“some of the most notorious spy cases ever to unfold in the nation’s capital,”55 annual 
lecture series and workshops, a speaker series, and a variety of children’s events, 
from themed birthday parties to scavenger hunts. But the museum’s choice of 
language to describe itself relies heavily on the positivist assumption that “accuracy” 
can be achieved, that stories about the past can be told without bias, and that it is 
possible for the museum and its exhibits to exist outside politics. The power of the 
museum to tell its story within and from the perspective of cold war triumphalism 
(and in a time, space, and place very much affected by the events of September 11, 
2001 and the subsequent “war on terror”) not only remains unacknowledged, but is 
explicitly denied. 
 For example, the museum’s explanation of its exigency via an explicit linkage 
to the geopolitics of its post-9/11 moment is echoed in a July 2002 letter from George 
W. Bush on the occasion of the museum’s grand opening. In this letter, displayed 
prominently in the museum’s lobby, Bush congratulates the museum’s founder, 
Malrite Company Chairman and former U.S. intelligence analyst Milton Maltz, for 
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his “tireless efforts to create the Nation’s [sic] first public museum dedicated to 
presenting the story of intelligence gathering throughout world history.”56 The letter, 
an official document issued by the White House and mounted on a plaque paid for by 
the Republican National Committee, also emphasizes the museum’s significance for 
its time, space, and place: Its “efforts in educating all Americans on the important role 
intelligence has played in shaping world events is,” according to Bush, “particularly 
timely as we fight the war against terrorism.” By explicitly situating the museum’s 
raison d’etre within contemporary geopolitics as constituted by the post-9/11 “war on 
terror,” the prominent display of Bush’s letter in the museum’s lobby effectively 
nullifies the museum’s own claim that it exists as “a private and independent entity 
with no links to any government agency, foreign or domestic.”57 
 Bush’s letter also works in conjunction with the museum’s symbolic and 
geographical location at the center of an ambitious urban revitalization and historic 
preservation project in the District of Columbia’s Penn Quarter to lend credibility and 
legitimacy to the museum’s narrative. According to a DC government press release 
issued in anticipation of the museum’s July 2002 opening, the International Spy 
Museum, which is located within walking distance of the National Mall, just blocks 
from the White House, and down the street from FBI headquarters (figure 6), “is 
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projected to boost local economic development through 150 new jobs, $2 million in 
new annual tax revenue and increased tourism for the region.”58 Indeed, it has 
succeeded exponentially, drawing more than 700,000 visitors in its first year of 
operation (July 2002-July 2003) and surpassing expectations concerning revenue 
 
 
Figure 6: Locating the International Spy Museum in D.C. 
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from the museum gift shop, private dining, and special events.59 Calling its merger of 
the public and private sectors a “new business model that is thriving during a time 
when tourism dollars are hard to come by,” the museum’s “positive influence on the 
local tourism and business community has been recognized” with several regional 
and national awards citing the museum’s ability to draw people to DC’s downtown 
area, its leadership in the effort to revitalize the F Street corridor and its commitment 
to providing employment opportunities for DC residents.60  
 The meticulous neighborhood revitalization efforts of the museum’s 
designers, who worked closely with the DC Historic Preservation Division, to 
renovate while “carefully preserv[ing]” the architectural integrity of the five historic 
buildings which house the museum’s exhibits and administrative offices at 800 F 
Street NW have also been lauded as superior examples of urban renewal.61 The 
International Spy Museum, with its renovated buildings, permanent exhibits, up-scale 
dining space, gift shop, café, and active calendar of special events, is, quite literally, 
transforming the neighborhood between the National Mall and Washington, DC’s 
Convention Center. And although the museum, which is privately owned and 
operated by the Cleveland-based Malrite Company and relies for a good chunk of its 
                                                 
 
59 What the museum does not take into account in its press materials is the fact that its record first year 
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successes and failures of intelligence gathering in predicting the events of September 11, 2001, and 
locating Al’Queda leader Osama bin Laden. 
 
60 International Spy Museum, “International Spy Museum Exceeds First Year Expectations,” press 
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multi-million dollar annual operating budget on admission fees, food concessions, 
and gift shop sales, “competes for visitors with over 100 museums in the greater DC 
metropolitan area, most offering free admission,”62 it is its “engaging interactive 
exhibits, the rich atmosphere provided by state-of-the-art immersive environments 
and the compelling personal stories of real spies” that have made the International 
Spy Museum “a must-see destination”—despite its high admission fees.63 
 The museum’s claim to be devoid of politics, that it focuses “on human 
intelligence, not political ideology,”64 is particularly intriguing in light of the fact that 
the museum’s founding Board of Directors and Advisors was comprised of career 
intelligence officers and/or military personnel from the United Kingdom, the former 
Soviet Union, and the United States.65 Day-to-day operations at the museum are 
overseen by founding Executive Director Peter J. Earnest, a thirty-six-year veteran of 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who served in the Clandestine Service in 
Eastern Europe during the 1970s and was later the intelligence organization’s chief 
spokesperson. Other members of the founding Board of Directors and Advisors 
included a former Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner (1977-
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1981), a former Deputy Chief of Staff for U.S. Army Intelligence, retired Lieutenant 
General Claudia J. Kennedy, former FBI director of Counterintelligence, Intelligence, 
and Security Programs, and historian H. Keith Melton, who, like many of his 
colleagues on the Board, is on the faculty of the Centre for Counterintelligence and 
Security Studies in Alexandria, Virginia.66 And, as I have mentioned, Maltz was, 
himself, a U.S. naval intelligence analyst. The affiliations of the museum’s Board of 
Directors and Advisors with the military and intelligence communities, along with the 
prominent display of President Bush’s congratulatory letter and in its lobby and its 
centrality, both physical and symbolic, to DC’s revitalization efforts, reveal a political 
perspective (if not an ideology) heavily supportive of militarism and securitization 
situated within the museum’s complex historical moment of production and 
operation—a moment defined by an ongoing war against “terror” arguably being 
fueled in large part by cold war triumphalism.  
 Had the United States not “won” the cold war, its policymakers and pundits 
would not, since 9/11, have been able to utilize the widespread belief in the 
superiority of its political, economic, and military structures, along with the 
right(eous)ness of its heteropatriarchal capitalist democracy and professed 
commitment to human rights, to wage the “war on terror,” which has been billed as 
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the U.S.-led liberation of oppressed peoples from Islamic fundamentalisms. But, since 
it did “win” the cold war, the United States and its affiliated pedagogical institutions 
(such as the International Spy Museum) are free to promulgate narratives that present 
as normative and inevitable the geopolitical realities of the current historical moment 
without regard for either the contestability of those narratives or the myriad ways in 
which the geopolitical realities to which they refer may well have been quite 
different. 
 Additionally, by deploying a rhetoric of universality, anonymity, and lack of 
accountability in its press materials and exhibits, the museum effectively writes the 
United States out of the cold war—even while simultaneously positioning that 
country as that conflict’s rightful victor and the Soviet Union as its antagonist. For 
example, as part of the “School for Spies” area, which orients museum visitors to the 
tools, techniques, and technologies of espionage, an interactive console simulating a 
submarine sonar station demonstrates the methods by which ballistic missile 
submarines tracked each other during the cold war. According to the cursory 
historical information provided on the console’s computer screens, these nuclear 
submarines were developed by unidentified nation-states in order to protect their 
nuclear weapons from being destroyed in first-strike attacks launched by their 
adversaries, who also counted nuclear weapons as part of their enormous military 
arsenals. This narrative, displayed on the console’s computer screens, is accompanied 
by a visual depiction of these unspecified countries separated by a vast ocean. 
Although the visual depiction seems to go out of its way to avoid assigning particular 




atomic stockpiles, the amorphous shape on the left-hand (i.e., west) side of the 
computer screen, meant to represent the landmass of one of two great fictional 
adversaries, is drawn in the general shape of the United States’ Atlantic coastline. The 
other, separated from its enemy by a large ocean, is drawn as a solid mass lurking 
ominously on the right-hand (i.e., east) side of the screen. Such a visual geographic 
depiction of the strategic use of ballistic submarines throughout the cold war is 
clearly reliant upon museum-goers’ familiarity with the hemispheric orientation of a 
Mercator world map, which hangs in hundreds of thousands of classrooms across the 
United States and around the world.  
 The exhibit’s façade of anonymity is further compromised by history. During 
the 1950s, when ballistic submarines were first developed and utilized to defend 
against potential first-strike military engagements, only the Soviet Union, the United 
States, and U.S. ally the United Kingdom possessed nuclear capabilities.67 The story 
told by this exhibit, therefore, can only be about the half-century conflict between the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R., between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which is confirmed by 
an accompanying wall placard that comments explicitly upon the overwhelming 
nuclear power afforded the Soviet Union by just one of its typhoon class submarines, 
pointing out that such a submarine possessed several times more destruction power 
than the “bomb dropped on Hiroshima.”  
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 Interestingly, nowhere in this exhibit—or in the entirety of the museum’s 
story of the history of international espionage that relies so heavily on the “secret” 
and use of nuclear technology—is there any mention of exactly who or what was 
responsible for this last act. That an atomic bomb was simply “dropped on 
Hiroshima,” rather than having been dropped by something or someone, is exemplary 
of the passive language used throughout the museum to circumnavigate not only the 
complicity of the United States in the commencement and continuance of the cold 
war, but also the striking similarities between the tactics and technologies employed 
by the U.S. and those used by the U.S.S.R., which the museum repeatedly points to as 
examples of horrific human rights violations and as sizeable global threats. Nowhere 
in the museum is it mentioned, for example, that the United States remains the only 
nation-state to have ever actually detonated an atomic bomb as part of its war-time 
military strategy, yet the destructive power of the Soviet Union’s nuclear ballistic 
missile submarines—which were never used in warfare—is candidly cited. While the 
museum’s narrative explicitly names the Soviet Union as the perpetrator of various 
crimes, it simultaneously renders the United States a passive observer of the cold war. 
 
 At the end of my journey through the museum, just as I’m leaving the history 
of cold war espionage behind me, I come face-to-face with a fierce, multi-headed 
dragon backlit in bright white. A quotation attributed to former CIA Director James 
Woolsey on the occasion of the Soviet Union’s demise warns, “We have slain a large 
dragon, but we now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous 




small screening room in which a short documentary is being shown that describes the 
demands placed on the intelligence community since 9/11. The film, made exclusively 
for the International Spy Museum, reports that the intelligence demands of the 
twenty-first century are different from those during the cold war. Now spycraft must 
concern itself not only with state-based threats, but also those posed by ethnic 
nationalisms, religious fundamentalisms, paramilitary groups, and terrorists. A series 
of still photographs accompanied by a white, male voiceover reminds viewers what 
can happen when intelligence fails. These photographs, all taken in the aftermath of 
incredible violence, are labeled “Tokyo,” “Beirut,” “World Trade Center, 1993,” 
“Oklahoma City,” “Kenya,” “Yemen,” “Madrid,” “London,” and, lastly, “World 
Trade Center, 2001.” According to the film, cold-war era intelligence technologies 
that locate and count only heavy weapons and machinery (i.e., nuclear missiles, 
tanks, and troop movements) are insufficient to avoid similar attacks in the future. 
Consequently, the film argues, what is needed is increased intelligence and defense 
spending in order to repel new kinds of enemies. 
 
 My task in this chapter has been to explore the “reality” created by the 
International Spy Museum and its exhibits and to interrogate the methods by which 
the “truth” of that “reality” is conveyed to museum visitors. Through an analysis that 
conceptualizes the museum as performance by taking into account the rhetoric of its 
promotional materials, the content, design, and architectural lay-out of its exhibits, as 
well as its economic importance to and physical location in the District of Columbia, 




interconnected narratives: (1) the role of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in enabling the 
Soviet Union to develop nuclear technology and thus igniting the cold war, (2) the 
U.S.S.R. and its successor state, Russia, as always already feminized enemies of the 
United States, and (3) the indisputable integrity of U.S. intelligence networks. The 
museum’s geographical location, in conjunction with its emphasis on the successful 
work of U.S. intelligence agencies, implicitly signals the museum’s affiliation with 
the ostensibly unlimited and superior power of the U.S. nation-state and its various 
security apparatuses. This affiliation is bolstered by President Bush’s letter on display 
in the museum’s lobby. Second, through the explicit conflation of female 
heterosexuality with the dangers of state-based violence and the threat of 
Soviet/Russian espionage, the cold war is deployed as a discursive construct used to 
justify the “war on terror.” Lastly, the loosely chronological story of international 
espionage told by the museum’s permanent exhibits draws explicitly on contemporary 
geopolitics, particularly the so-called “war on terror,” thereby taking full advantage of 
the museum’s post-9/11 salience by exploiting the anxiety of museum-goers to 
advocate for their continued support, both rhetorical and financial, of contemporary 
intelligence efforts as an integral part of U.S. national security. For example, the 
museum’s unsophisticated narrative of the Rosenbergs’ assumed guilt offers an 
implicit post-9/11 moral lesson. The extraordinary and unprecedented breach of 
national security for which they were allegedly responsible is held up as an example 
of what happens when the territorial borders of the United States are indiscriminately 
flung open, when ideas are allowed to flow freely and “subversive” groups are 




“contained” the U.S.S.R. and its attempted ideological and intelligence “infiltration” 
of the United States during the period commonly known as the “cold war” can now 
be legitimately deployed in the contemporary “war on terror” by the U.S. security 
establishment against any and all “dissenters,” including Islamic fundamentalists and 
illegal immigrants. The International Spy Museum operates effectively as a site of 
national(ist) remembrance that constructs a heroic history of one nation-state (the 
United States) in the wake of its “victory” over an(O)ther (the Soviet Union). 
 My concern with the museum, then, is not that it presents one 
(overwhelmingly negative) story about the Soviet Union (and the Russian 
Federation), but that it does not explicitly acknowledge, first, that its story is not the 
only story and, second, that it lacks self-reflexivity. That the museum’s history of cold 
war espionage does not include an architectural and narrative discursive equivalent to 
“Red Terror” pointing to the wrongs perpetrated by the U.S. against its own citizens 
in the name of “national security” reveals the museum’s confinement to realist 
definitions of “terror” and “security” as well as the triumphalist biases of its creators 
and decision-makers. As a result, this museum, which is simultaneously in and of the 
cold war, has put itself in position to identify for one million visitors each year not 
only the legacy/ies of that conflict, but also the contemporary political realities of 
another. Thus historically and politically located, the museum explicitly and 






Conclusion: Casualties of Cold War 
 
 
“We were all so smart. 
[We thought:] Russia’s hobbled, the next conflict’s gonna be in the Middle East.  





 Throughout this dissertation I have explored the narrative and visual 
depictions of Russia and Russians in several American popular and political culture 
texts in an attempt to expose the gendered, racialized, and heteronormative discursive 
configurations that constitute the framework of meaning within which the United 
States conducted its relations with the Russian Federation in the decade between the 
demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. I have 
made clear the myriad ways in which gendered Russian imaginaries were explicitly 
deployed as part of the American triumphalist mythscape to bolster support for, 
justify, and legitimate U.S. geopolitical unilateralism. 
 This is not to say, however, that the Russian Federation remains blameless. It 
has been extraordinarily difficult to attempt a feminist analysis of U.S.-Russian 
relations between 1991 and 2003 which explicitly incorporates a critique of American 
nationalism’s triumphalist mythscape without appearing to let Russia entirely off the 
hook for what happened there after the demise of the Soviet Union. I am well aware 
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that the disastrous implementation of U.S. policies in the region was, in many ways, 
facilitated by Russian politicians and policymakers.2 But, as historian and Russia 
expert Stephen Cohen has argued steadily over the course of the last decade and a 
half, the mistakes, assumptions, and triumphalist arrogance of the United States since 
1991 must be reckoned with and accounted for if the U.S. wishes to avoid what he 
terms a “new American cold war” with the recently-emboldened Russian Federation.3 
 My work here has been an effort to contribute to that endeavor by focusing on 
the ideological causes of U.S. Russia policy rather than the material consequences of 
its implementation. I have attempted to demonstrate how the Russian Federation’s 
recycling in the early 1990s of gendered tropes from the Russian Empire’s Silver Age 
became heavily influential in American conceptualizations of post-Soviet Russia, thus 
offering a partial answer to the question I pose in chapter 1. “What,” I ask, “might be 
the consequences when the gendered signifier of the nation travels across borders and 
is deployed in an entirely different geographical, cultural, and/or historical context 
from that out of which it emerged?”  
 The answer is in the “casualties of cold war” to which I refer in this 
dissertation’s title. Put simply, these are the tangible and intangible damages inflicted 
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during and as a result of the decades-long confrontation between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. The notion of “tangible damages” refers, first and most 
obviously, to the loss of life in cold war-era conflicts such as Korea, Viet Nam, and 
Afghanistan as both the Soviet Union and the United States attempted to incorporate 
peripheral nation-states into their respective spheres of influence by backing, 
respectively, anti-capitalist or anti-communist regimes. According to Ellen Schrecker, 
these actions served to “[bolster] otherwise weak and repressive regimes, while 
encouraging the militarization that seriously deformed those nations’ societies” and 
continue, even almost twenty years after the alleged end of the cold war, to have clear 
geopolitical repercussions.4 A second “tangible damage” inflicted by the cold war 
remains “the national security state that produced and was produced by the 
militarization of American foreign policy.” This led to the extraordinary growth in the 
unilateral powers of the U.S. president, while  
[…] the American people came to be seen as an obstacle to the conduct of the 
Cold War. Uninformed and unaware of the dangers the United States 
supposedly faced, they had to be induced to acquiesce in whatever measures 
the nation’s leaders believed were necessary to protect national security.5 
The militarization of national security thus enabled a lack of accountability on the 
part of the U.S. government; it need not justify its actions to anyone, and, just as after 
the events of September 11, 2001 and during the contemporary “war on terror,” 
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violations of human rights and civil liberties accompanied the concealment of 
government ineptitude.6 
 A third “tangible damage” is the increased traffic in Russian women and girls 
for work in the global sex industry—including to the United States. The discursive 
traffic in gendered Russian imaginaries in the conduct of U.S.-Russian relations, 
particularly those that depict post-Soviet Russia as a helpless, feminized victim, help 
to sustain the material traffic in women from Russia for work in the U.S. sex industry. 
As I demonstrate in chapter 3, the assumptions which helped to shape the Freedom 
Support Act were simultaneously dependent upon the notion of a weakened, 
feminized Russia in urgent need of assistance, and on the continuation of a cold war-
era conceptualization of the Russian Federation as duplicitous, irrational, and 
maleficent. The neocolonial metaphors and analogies used throughout the 
congressional hearings to formulate a post-Soviet U.S. Russia policy reveal an 
explicit imperialist hubris rooted in racialized, gendered discursive configurations 
reminiscent of the colonial strategies of past empires. Additionally, the 
implementation throughout the early 1990s of the provisions of the Freedom Support 
Act contributed mightily to the material impoverishment of an overwhelming number 
of Russians, the large majority of them women. Some of these women were then 
integrated, whether forcibly or otherwise, into the global sex industry and made their 
way to the United States, usually as part of Russian organized criminal networks that 
continue to operate with very little restraint from U.S. law enforcement in the New 
York-New Jersey metropolitan area, the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, and 
                                                 
 




Florida tourist hubs such as Orlando, Miami, and Ft. Lauderdale.7 The United States 
is thus both materially and discursively complicit in the continuing traffic in Russian 
women for work in the U.S. sex industry. 
 Because my work here has been focused on the causes of U.S. Russia policy 
rather than their consequences, I have been most interested in the intangible damages 
inflicted by the cold war, particularly what Schrecker refers to as “the polarizing habit 
of mind”8 and Cohen terms “resurgent cold war orthodoxies,”9 that have rendered 
impossible U.S. foreign policy epistemologies that exist outside a concern for 
militarized national security. But in identifying unfortunate but significant legacy of 
the cold war, both Schrecker and Cohen ignore the effects of gendered, racialized, 
heteronormative discourse on U.S. foreign policy and, with it, the invisibility of a 
violent, militarized masculinity determined to protect and defend a vulnerable nation. 
Since the demise of the Soviet Union and, more recently, the events of September 11, 
2001, Americans have been reminded of the United States’ alleged exceptionalism, 
an idea whose maintenance requires, paradoxically, both the vigilant protection of a 
nation always already susceptible to internal and external threats (including, for 
instance, from communists, feminists, illegal immigrants, homosexuals, and 
“terrorists”) as well as a commitment to expansionism, which has historically been 
accomplished through military occupation and economic globalization. And the 
discursive configurations used to construct and maintain these two facets of American 
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nationalism have relied heavily on the gendered, racialized language of colonial 
(masculinized) conquest justified by perceived (feminized) threats. There is, as 
Naomi Klein illustrates through her investigation of the implementation of U.S.-led 
economic “reform” efforts in Russia during the 1990s, an obvious and disturbing 
discursive link between the American pastoral narratives of Annette Kolodny’s 
analyses of gendered American nationalism (which I discuss at length in chapter 2) 
and the expansionist policies of neoliberalism, which has become the standard-bearer 
of global economic “development” programs over the course of the last three 
decades. Calling Russia’s “transition” from communism to capitalism “one of the 
greatest crimes committed against a democracy in modern history,” Klein explicitly 
likens the neoliberal economic policies implemented there to colonialism. She argues 
that in place of the land, the state became “a colonial frontier” in which “corporate 
conquistadors,” operating in the legal and political void created by the hurried and 
intentional dismantling of communism, gobbled up state assets seemingly overnight, 
resulting in enormous wealth for a precious few—including key U.S. government 
contractors—and a startling increase in poverty, alcohol consumption, HIV/AIDS, 
violent crime, and suicide for the many. According to Klein, “Russia’s ‘economic 
reforms’ can claim credit for the impoverishment of 72 million people in only eight 
years.”10 
 As Klein rightly points out, though, the “extreme acts of terror” committed by 
U.S.-based economic consultants and Western financial institutions as part of 
Russia’s economic “reform” could only succeed if there were legitimate reasons for 
                                                 
 




them to continue.11 The co-constitutive elements of American nationalism (paranoia 
and expansionism, which were quite obviously manifest as legislators debated the 
Freedom Support Act) require the identification of feminized and/or emasculated 
“enemies” that will first threaten the nation and then become the focus of U.S. actions 
that are billed as defensive, rather than offensive. So, despite the fact that Russian 
military and economic structures were nearing total collapse in the early 1990s, 
Russia was depicted in American popular and political culture as a vengeful nation 
bent upon reclaiming its superpower status.12 As I demonstrate in chapters 3 and 4, a 
perceived need to protect itself against this potential threat legitimized the United 
States’ desire to be involved in the early stages of post-Soviet Russian nation-
building. And, later, in the mid- to late-nineties, as reports spread about the apparent 
failures of U.S. Russia policy, Russia was condemned by U.S. media and political 
pundits as a country whose “transition” to capitalist democracy was being held 
hostage by corrupt “communist hardliners” with a “Soviet mentality.”13 Both these 
rhetorical strategies, when combined, justified staying the course mapped out early on 
by neoliberal economic theorists, enabled increased attempts by Russian leaders, 
particularly Boris Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor, former KGB officer Vladimir 
Putin, to circumnavigate democratic processes by cracking down on political dissent 
that threatened to undermine economic “reform.” These strategies also overtly 
manipulated U.S. cold war-era paranoia about Soviet expansionism and the 
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infiltration of communism to fuel an American cultural imaginary of Russia as—
still—an always already feminized and/or emasculated enemy against which the 
militarized, masculine United States must continue to protect itself.  
 And it is no wonder: Cohen’s frank assessment of U.S. policy toward Russia 
in the first post-Soviet decade is that it was profoundly hypocritical. While U.S. 
leaders Clinton and Bush posed for photographs with their Russian counterparts 
Yeltsin and Putin, proclaiming a strategic U.S.-Russia partnership, they 
simultaneously exploited post-Soviet Russia’s weaknesses by encircling that country 
with U.S. and/or NATO military installations, blatantly intervening in Russia’s 
domestic affairs, and continuing “familiar cold war double standards condemning 
Moscow for doing what Washington does—such as seeking allies and military bases 
in former Soviet republics, using its assets (oil and gas in Russia’s case) as aid to 
friendly governments and regulating foreign money in its political life.”14 As I 
discussed briefly in chapter 5, these anti-Russian U.S. policies fostered distrust in 
Russia and clearly demonstrate, first, that, the recent “chill” in U.S.-Russian relations 
is not, despite the rhetoric of U.S. pundits, entirely the fault of former Russian 
President (and current Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin, and, second, that in 
Washington at least, the cold war is far from over. Cohen asserts that “Putin’s 
Kremlin,” while getting an oft- (but not always) deserved bad wrap from U.S. 
politicians and American media outlets, has “[reacted] largely to a decade of broken 
U.S. promises and Yeltsin’s boozy compliance” with U.S. policies.15  
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Russia’s Geopolitical Resurgence 
Through a reading of Russian press coverage of Russia’s response to NATO 
expansion in the 1990s, political scientist K.M. Fierke demonstrates the ways in 
which Russia’s relationship with the West, particularly with the United States, during 
the first post-Soviet decade is best categorized as a “Machiavella strategy,” a “gender 
game” reliant upon the discursive deployment of gender hierarchies in relations 
between nation-states.16 While the (masculine) approach prescribed by Niccolo 
Machiavelli in The Prince requires, if not both fear and love, then at least fear, as well 
as the power to “[manipulate] images and [construct] public realities,” its feminine 
counterpart depends on “an alternative strategy” in which weak actors “’best’ the 
enemy” by transforming it into an “unwitting ally.” According to Fierke,  
[…] besting places the Prince in a position where his actions must be 
consistent with his image of goodness and justice or risk exposing the 
ruthlessness underlying his strategy to the full light of day, thereby dissolving 
the appearance. In the process, new spaces are created for a more equal 
dialogue between the strong and the weak.”17  
 This, Fierke contends, is how Russia conducted its foreign policy with the 
West during the latter part of the 1990s. She identifies three stages in post-Soviet 
Russia’s redefinition of its relationship with the West. Between 1991 and 1993, an 
economically, politically, and militarily weakened Russia lacked its own voice and 
                                                 
 
16 K.M. Fierke, “Besting the West: Russia’s Machiavella Strategy,” International Feminist Journal of 
Politics 1, no. 3 (1999): 403-34. 
 




was “servile to and dependent on the West.” In 1994, Russia “became ‘tough,’ 
overcompensating for her [sic] weakness,” which resulted in “increased isolation.” 
But in the last half of the 1990s, Russia implemented its Machiavella strategy. The 
country “began to reassert an identity that assumed greatness, that stood firm while 
weak,” and that enabled it “to act rather than react in an attempt to change the game 
so that her [sic] own interests would be taken into account against the background of 
NATO’s expansion eastward.”18 For example, by publicly offering to join NATO 
rather than opposing its expansion, Russia forced the U.S. into “a position of having 
to respond in kind or risk being exposed as the agent in creating a new division of 
Europe.” As Fierke points out, “[f]or NATO to press ahead, oblivious to Russian 
concerns, would present NATO as an expansionary power in the traditional sense, 
rather than as a peaceful and restrained anchor of stability.”19 Having stopped 
“reacting to the moves of the dominant player,” itself a feminized role within the 
heteronormative geopolitical framework of neorealism, Russia won a victory by 
changing the rules of the gender game: it “made the unthinkable [i.e., Russia joining 
NATO] not only thinkable but possible” and transformed feminized weakness into a 
performance of feminized strength.20 
 Although a signatory of the Partnership for Peace, Russia, of course, is not, as 
of June 2008, a member of NATO, nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future.21 
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Although Putin was among the first to speak with Bush and offer his condolences and 
support after 9/11, and although Russia has been a staunch supporter of the 
subsequent U.S.-led “war on terror” in the form of crucial Middle East intelligence 
(the result of its long engagement with the region) and access to former Soviet air 
bases in Central Asia, U.S.-Russian relations has suffered exponentially since the 
Bush administration unilaterally withdrew in 2002 from the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, claimed the borrowed Central Asian bases as its own, 
incorporated several former Soviet and Soviet-influenced states into NATO,22 and 
continued its indictment of Russia’s domestic and foreign conduct.23 But Russia’s 
success at the turn of the century in forcing the United States to take notice of Russian 
opposition to a variety of U.S. foreign policy goals laid the foundation for its explicit 
and vocal opposition to a U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq in 2003, an opposition 
that marked an explicit shift in the Russian gender game: forced during the 1990s as a 
result of its economic, political, and military weakness to enact a Machiavella 
strategy, Russia was by 2003, in a position to act from a position of geopolitical 
strength and, arguably, in response to its treatment, both material and discursive, by 
the U.S. since 1991. 
                                                                                                                                           
For more information, see “The Partnership for Peace,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
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 The “truth” of U.S. “victory” and Soviet “defeat” in the cold war has become 
so pervasive in the American national(ist) narrative that prominent cold warriors from 
both U.S. political parties (including residents Clinton and Bush and their Secretaries 
of State, Madeleine Albright and Condoleeza Rice) have been spectacularly ignorant 
of the Russian Federation’s economic and geopolitical resurgence that has made it “a 
critical linchpin of the 21st century.”24 Not only is Russia in possession of an 
enormous stockpile of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass 
destruction—as well as the materials and technical expertise to develop more—it is, 
geographically-speaking, the largest country on earth, home to more than 140 million 
people, including twenty to twenty-five million Muslims. It shares a 2,600-mile 
border with China, and nearly a quarter of the world’s people, many of whom belong 
to conflicting ethnic and religious groups, live on its borders. Russia’s economy, 
which, as I discuss in chapters 3 and 5, collapsed entirely in 1998, has grown about 7 
percent a year since 2002, and the country has paid off a $200 billion foreign debt. It 
continues to exert its resurgent economic and military influence throughout the NIS, 
Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East—often (and understandably) in explicit 
opposition to U.S. objectives in those same regions. And, most importantly for my 
purposes, Russia is the world’s second-largest producer of oil after Saudi Arabia, 
which, in combination with its long-standing economic and diplomatic relationships 
with Islamic countries throughout Central Asia and the Middle East, positions it at the 
vortex of contemporary U.S.-Middle East politics.25  
                                                 
 






After 2008: Competing Masculinities 
The significance of Russia to U.S. success (or failure) in the Middle East was made 
most visible in March 2003, when, following reports that Iraq was in violation of a 
1991 United Nations resolution banning its production and use of weapons of mass 
destruction, a coalition of primarily U.S. and U.K. forces invaded that country against 
the express wishes of several UN Security Council members—including the Russian 
Federation, which, as a permanent member, retains the power to unilaterally veto any 
and all resolutions. Russia, along with Germany and France, made abundantly clear in 
the weeks leading up to the U.S.-led invasion its objection to the use of military force 
in Iraq,26 and Russia’s insistent and vocal disapproval made that country the focus of 
a geopolitical diplomatic meltdown and forced the United States to conduct a 
potentially illegal war without the support of the international community.27  
 Since then—and since 9/11 more broadly as a result of Bush’s insistence 
throughout the fall of 2001 that the U.S. be able to create a national missile defense 
system in violation of the ABM Treaty—U.S.-Russian relations have been 
superficially civil, often conducted through informal “manly” activities such as 
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clearing brush on Bush’s Texas ranch or salt water fishing at the Bush family resort in 
Maine.28 These informal summits between Presidents Bush and Putin provided the 
American press with fantastic opportunities to showcase in print and in pictures the 
American president’s (and, consequently, the United States’) virule, rugged 
masculinity. In his coverage of the November 2001 Bush-Putin summit in Crawford, 
Texas, for example, journalist David B. Sanger made a point of contrasting Bush’s 
mesquite barbecuing and “Reagan-like” brush clearing with Putin’s “business casual” 
attire and woeful lack of cowboy boots that, on the ranch, “is the surest giveaway […] 
of a cityslicker.”29 Bush’s superior masculinity is implicitly operationalized in this 
narrative as not only in opposition to, but also in gendered hierarchical relationship 
with, Putin’s urban (and urbane) effeteness. Like the Diesel advertisement with which 
I began this dissertation, this narrative draws explicitly on the mythical American 
cowboy, the solitary, independent Marlboro Man associated in the popular American 
mythos with notions of “Manifest Destiny” and nineteenth-century westward 
expansion—an imperialist endeavor that, as Annette Kolodny demonstrates, was rife 
with violently heteronormative rhetoric depicting masculine heroes demonstrating 
their mastery over “virgin” land. 
 The depiction of rugged American masculinity writ on the body of the U.S. 
president shifted slightly in May 2003 when, just weeks after the U.S.-led invasion of 
Iraq, Bush landed on the deck of the U.S. aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln in full 
flight regalia (figure 7) to deliver a speech proclaiming a victorious end to combat 
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operations in Iraq. Not to be outdone in the gender game, Putin posed for his own set 
of photographs during his August 2007 fishing vacation to southern Siberia (figure 8). 
Upon their public release, the pictures became the catalyst for a “squall of gossip and 
speculation” among Russians and in the international community about what, if any, 
political message Putin was trying to send, to whom, and why.30  
 While these respective images of American and Russian national identity are, 
of course, meant for a constituency of their domestic audiences, they are also 





Figure 7: Bush as fighter pilot Figure 8: Putin as rugged outdoorsman 
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particularly within the context of Russia’s recent geopolitical resurgence that has 
enabled it to flip the gender game again and rejoin the ranks of powerful (masculine) 
nation-states. These presidential images of competing masculinities are visual 
manifestations of the gendered, racialized, and heteronormative discursive foreign 
policy tactics of both countries in the wake of the “war on terror” and the diplomatic 
crisis that pitted Russia against the United States over the invasion of Iraq. As a 
signifier of American national identity, the iconic photograph of Bush on the aircraft 
carrier declaring victory in Iraq in 2003, much like that of Ronald Reagan taken atop 
his white steed in 1980, is the dream of every political operative in its use of the 
constitutive elements of heteropatriarchal American nationalism to depict the (white, 
male) U.S. Commander-in-Chief and representative-in-chief as a strong patriarch 
ready to lead his country. But what is strikingly different here from not only the 
Diesel ad and the picture of Reagan, but also pictures of Bush, himself, clearing brush 
bedecked in jeans and a white cowboy hat (figure 9), is the explicit militarization of 
the U.S. president and, with him, the American national(ist) narrative in the wake of 
9/11.  
 In contrast, the image of rugged outdoorsman Putin draws explicitly on the 
American Marlboro Man mythos promulgated in U.S. presidential iconography,31 
although the prominent display on Putin’s bare chest of a Russian Orthodox cross 
makes obvious the translation of this image for a Russian cultural context that has  
                                                 
 
31 Indeed, one news article actually labels Putin “Siberia’s Marlboro Man.” “Siberia’s Marlboro Man: 
Bare-Chested Putin Answers Call of the Wild,” Spiegel Online, August 14, 2007, 





Figure 9: Bush as rancher 
 
come to rely heavily on the (very conservative) Russian Orthodox Church for the 
formation of a post-Soviet Russian national identity. But given the downward 
trajectory of Bush’s popularity among American voters, and the steady decrease in 
American support for the U.S. occupation of Iraq since Bush declared victory on the 
U.S.S. Lincoln in May 2003, it may well be the case that “[h]anging out eating 
hamburgers at a family barbecue in Kennebunkport may be all very well for lily-
livered presidents, but world leaders who are real men prefer to go fishing in 
Siberia.”32 After all, it is Putin, not Bush, who was named Time magazine’s 2007 
Person of the Year, and it is he, as Prime Minister, who remains at the top echelons of 
Russian government and world politics. At the moment, Putin—and Russia—are 
winning the gender game that is U.S.-Russian relations. 












1905 Russo-Japanese War; Russia is soundly defeated. 
1905 February: First Russian Revolution forces Tsar Nicholas II to create a parliamentary 
system. 
1913 Romanov tercentenary. 
1914 Start of the Great War (World War I). 
1917 February: Second Russian Revolution brings down the monarchy and installs a liberal 
democratic government under the leadership of Alexander Kerensky. 
1917 Third Russian Revolution, also known as the October Revolution or the Bolshevik 
Revolution, brings the Bolshevik Party to power under the leadership of V. I. Lenin. 
1918 March: Lenin signs the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, surrendering to Germany and withdrawing 
Russia from the war. 
July: Nicholas II, his wife, and five children are summarily executed by Bolshevik soldiers 
in Ekaterinberg, Russia. 
1918-1921 Russian Civil War between the Red and White Armies; monarchists, liberal democrats, and 
an international coalition of anti-communist forces (including the United States) make an 
unsuccessful attempt to oust the Bolsheviks from power. 
1922 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics created. 
1923 Death of Lenin; ascension of Stalin to Communist Party leadership. 
1930 U.S. officially recognizes the U.S.S.R. 
1937-1938 Height of the purges in the U.S.S.R. 
1938-1945 The Great Patriotic War (World War II); U.S.S.R. is a wartime ally of France, Great 
Britain, and the U.S. against Nazi Germany and the Axis Powers. 
1945 U.S. reveals its nuclear prowess when it deploys its new atomic bombs to quell the 
Japanese, forcing them to surrender and, consequently, ending the war in the Pacific. 
1949 U.S.S.R. successfully conducts its first atomic explosion. 
1950-1953 Korean War; also the arrest, trial, and execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. 
1953 Death of Stalin. 
1956 Khruschev’s “secret speech” denouncing Stalin. 
November: Hungarian revolution. 
1980s Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev initiates major reforms of the Soviet system, 
colloquially termed perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). 
1989 November: Fall of Berlin Wall. 
1990 October: Reunification of Germany. 
1991 August: Under the leadership of its president, Boris Yeltsin, Russia declares independence 
from the Soviet Union. 
December: Dissolution of U.S.S.R. 
1992 October: U.S. President Bush signs the Freedom Support Act authorizing U.S. aid to the 
Newly Independent States (N.I.S.) of the former Soviet Union. 
Early 1990s Several corpses are found in a makeshift grave near Ekaterinburg, Russia; DNA tests later 
reveal that they are, indeed, the remains of the Romanovs. 
1998 July: The remains of the Romanovs are interred in St. Petersburg’s Cathedral of Saints Peter 
and Paul. 
August: Russia’s economy collapses. 
1999 December: Yeltsin appoints former KGB head Vladimir Putin as Acting President of 
Russia. 
2000 March: Putin is elected President. 
2001 September: Al’Queda terrorists destroy targets in New York City and Washington, DC, 
igniting a U.S.-led global “war on terror”. 
2003 March: Despite the express opposition of Russia and several other member of the UN 








Hearings Comprising the Partial Legislative History 
of U.S. Public Law 102-511, the Freedom Support Act of 1992 
 
DATE HEARING TITLE COMMITTEE SUMMARY 
June 6, 1991 The Soviet Crisis and the US 
Interest: Future of the Soviet 
Military 
Senate Subcommittee on 
European Affairs, 
Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
Explored the relationship 
between the Soviet military 
and the Soviet economy as 
well as the military’s role in 
shifting political situation. 
 
June 19, 1991 The Soviet Crisis and the US 
Interest: Future of the Soviet 
Economy 
Senate Subcommittee on 
European Affairs, 
Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
Legislators tried ascertain 
the best way(s) by which 
the U.S. may be able to 
assist the U.S.S.R. transition 




and October 30, 
1991 
Consolidating Free-Market 
Democracy in the Former 
Soviet Union 
Senate Subcommittee on 
European Affairs, 
Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
Began the assistance debate 
regarding whether to 
provide assistance and, if 
so, what types and how. 
Legislators were concerned 
with what a new U.S.S.R. 
would/ should look like, and 
how best to get there. 
 
January 21, 1992 United States Policy toward 
the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) 
House Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle 
East, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 
An assessment of U.S. 
policy in the days after the 
demise of the Soviet Union. 
Legislators wanted to know 
what, if anything, should be 
done that the U.S. was not 
already doing. 
 
February 25, 1992 State Department Resource 
Needs for US Representation 
in the CIS 
House Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle 
East and Subcommittee 
on International 
Operations, Committee 
on Foreign Affairs 
Congress wanted to know if 
the George H.W. Bush plan 
to open embassies in all the 
former Soviet republics 
without additional funds 
was feasible. 
February 26, 1992 Developments in Europe; 
and Consideration of H. 
Con. Res. 156, Concerning 
the Emancipation of the 
Baha’i Community of Iran 
House Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle 
East, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 
Testimony by State Dept. 
official regarding the status 
of aid to former Soviet 
Union. 
March 18, 1992 Democracy Building in the 
Former Soviet Union 
House Subcommittee on 
International Operations, 
Committee on Foreign 
Affairs 
Explored the activities and 
organizations that were 
involved in democracy-
building throughout the 









March 19, 1992 US Assistance to the New 
Independent States: 
Recommendation from US 
Non-Profit Organizations 
Senate Subcommittee on 
European Affairs, 
Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
A continuation of the on-
going conversation in 
Congress about how the US 
might best help the 
transition to free-market 
democracies in NIS, this 
time with advice from 
select representatives from 
US-based non-profit 
organizations. 
April 1, 1992 United States Assistance to 
the Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
House Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle 
East, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 
Focused on economic 
reform questions facing 
Russia and key issues 
facing the US, especially 
the status of economic 
reforms, the status of 
Russia’s negotiations with 
the IMF, Russia’s 
assistance needs, the IMF’s 
assistance program, and 
recommendations for US 
policy and assistance. 
 
April 8, 1992 Environmental and Energy 
Challenges in Eastern 
Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union 
Senate Subcommittee on 
European Affairs, 
Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
Hearing was convened to 
hear testimony concerning 
the potential threat posed to 
US national and global 
environmental security by 
aging nuclear reactors 
operating in the former 
Soviet Union. 
 
April 9, 1992 US Assistance to the New 
Independent States: 
Recommendations from US 
Business and Agriculture 
Senate Subcommittee on 
European Affairs, 
Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
As a continuation of the 
conversation about the 
possible forms of US aid to 
the NIS, this hearing 
explored how the US might 
assist the NIS while also 
positively impacting US 
businesses and US workers. 
 
April 9, 1992 Developments in Europe House Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle 
East, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 
Hearing held to learn about 
general developments in 
Europe from a State 
Department representative, 
but the committee was 
particularly interested in 
the political and economic 
situation in the former 
Soviet Union as well as the 
status of proposed and 







April 9, 1992 Legislation Authorizing 
Assistance to the Former 
Soviet Union, S. 2532 
Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations 
Concerned with US role in 
the continuing transition 
of the NIS into capitalist 
democracies. 
 
May 5, 1992 Protecting Minority Rights 
in the New Independent 
States and Eastern Europe: 
The Role of the United States 
Senate Subcommittee on 
European Affairs, 
Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
Explored the role the 
United States might play 
in responding to reports of 
human rights abuses 




May 6, 1992 The Role of Children’s 
Educational Television in the 
Transformation of the 
Former Soviet Union 
Senate Subcommittee on 
European Affairs, 
Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
Within the context of the 
areas in which the United 
States is best suited to 
offer assistance and 




television throughout the 
former Soviet Union. 
 
May 14, 1992 US Assistance to the New 
Independent States 
Senate Subcommittee on 
European Affairs, 
Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
Anticipating a political 
battle in Congress over 
what had by that time 
become the Freedom 
Support Act, this hearing 
gave Bush administration 
officials and supporters 
the opportunity to tell 
Congress about the 








Congressional Hearings Concerning  
U.S.-Russian Relations before August 1998 
 
 
DATE HEARING TITLE COMMITTEE SUMMARY 
February 8, 1994 Impact of IMF/World 
Bank Policies Toward 




Housing, and Urban 
Affairs 
Hearing convened to ascertain 
what is happening with the Russian 
economy. What do Russians need 
to do to ensure successful 
economic reform?  
 
June 13, 1996 Effectiveness of US 
Assistance Programs in 
Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, 





Question in this hearing is, “Are 
programs in Russia being 
implemented effectively?” 
Witnesses are from various US 
government agencies involved in 
reform efforts. The concern is that 
US aid is not doing any good, and 
Congress wants to know if the US 
should change its methods. 
 
March 11, 1997 US Assistance to the 
Newly Independent States 





Hearing held within context of 
Clinton’s request to increase aid to 
the NIS; Congress would rather 
decrease it, so Clinton 
administration witnesses defend 
the request, called the “Partnership 
for Freedom” initiative. 
 
March 12, 1997 US Relations with Russia 






Large for the NIS, has been asked 
to tell the committee about the 
state of US-Russian relations, 
especially regarding NATO 
expansion and Russia’s sale of 
weapons to and possible nuclear 
cooperation with Iran. There is 
also a concern for capital flight 
from Russia and corruption within 
the Russian government. There is 
also a discussion of the current 
Russian political situation: a high 
number of communists in the 
Duma and a general increase in 
conservative nationalism. 
 
March 26, 1998 Review of US Assistance 
Programs to Russia, 





Clinton administration invited to 
address the concern among 
committee members about the 
ongoing sale of Russian weapons 
technology to Iran, China, and 
Cuba. Legislators also ask about 
the seeming lack of stability in 
Russian political leadership as well 
as the lack of cooperation from 





July 16, 1998 The United States and 





Held to review political and 
economic developments in and US 
policy toward Russia. Critiques of 
Russian foreign policy from a US 
perspective, particularly Russian 
arms sales to various countries and 









Congressional Hearings Concerning 
U.S.-Russian Relations after August 1998 
 
DATE HEARING TITLE COMMITTEE SUMMARY 
September 17, 
1998 
The United States and 





Legislators want to know 
whether (1) Russia has been 
lying to the US with regard to 
aid disbursement and progress 
toward reforms and (2) the 
Clinton administration has 
been ignoring signals that 
reform efforts are not working. 
Continuing concern that 
Russia is selling weapons 
technology to Iran.  
 






Human rights here are a 
concern, especially reports of 
the torture and beating of 
soldiers, anti-Semitism, lack 
of religious freedom, and civil 
liberties violations, 
particularly freedom of the 
press.  
 
June 9, 1999 Assisting Russia: What 
Have We Achieved 




Russia received $6 billion in 
direct US assistance since 
1993 and close to $20 billion 
in IMF loans, most of which 
cannot be accounted for or 
paid back, so the committee 
wants to know where it all 
went. Gender concerns are 
mentioned here for the first 
time in any congressional 
hearings about Russia by US 
administration/government 
officials: According to the 
witness, US AID is developing 
new strategies and “integrating 
gender concerns” (11). 
Belligerence abounds at this 
hearing as everyone tries to 
figure out who to blame for 
the problems in Russia. 
 
June 10, 1999 Russian Economic 
Turmoil 
House Committee 
on Banking and 
Financial Services 
Purpose: To examine the 
status of the Russian economy 
and US policy toward 
economic reform in that 
country. It is widely 




crisis and that IMF structural 
adjustment programs failed. 
Legislators want to create an 
environment in Russia that 
fosters foreign investment, but 
they remains concerned about 
anti-Americanism, lack of 
accountability for American 
tax-payer monies, corruption, 
crime, and inflation. One 
witness mentions Russia’s 
health crisis, environmental 
problems, and declining 
educational system. 
 
June 28, 1999 The Sex Trade: 
Trafficking of Women 
and Children in 






A few members of Congress 
have recently learned that sex 
trafficking occurs and are bent 
on stopping it. This hearing 
brings together expert anti-
trafficking witnesses to report 
to the committee what they 
know about the situation. 
August 4, 1999 H.R. 1356, The 
Freedom from Sexual 













Trafficking in Women 











Part of attempts by select 
members of the House of 
Representatives to get the US 
to pass a comprehensive anti-
sex trafficking law that 
punishers traffickers rather 
than the “victims” and 




Corruption in Russia 




Purpose: To examine 
allegations of corruption in 
Russia and to see whether the 
Clinton administration was 
aware of and/or contributed to 
the problem. Chairperson 
Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) 
stresses that they are not there 
to debate about whether the 
US should be engaged in 
Russia; that is a done deal. 
Concern is expressed 
regarding the Russian mafia: 
Senator John Kerry (D-
Massachusetts) asks about 




crime, but does not mention 
sex trafficking; nor does 
Senator Paul Wellstone (D-
Minnesota). Biden points out 
that the very people on this 
committee who are now 
critiquing US Russia policy 
(especially shock therapy) are 
the ones who advocated it in 




Corruption in Russia 




Purpose: To examine 
corruption in Russia and 
figure out where to go from 
here. One witness lays out 
specific provisions for US 
Russia policy going forward, 
while another encourages the 
US to refocus its assistance 
programs toward establishing 
the rule of law. Another, an 
expert on organized crime, 
discusses prostitution, 
gambling, and drugs as part of 
these networks’ activities. He 
specifically mentions 
trafficking of women and 
children as happening in the 
US to underscore the 
transnational nature of the 
problem. According to the 
witnesses, it has not been US 
money that has been wasted, 
but IMF loans. 
 
October 6, 1999 US Policy Toward 
Russia, Part I: 




This hearing exploring charges 
of corruption and 
mismanagement of aid monies 
in Russia continues theme of 
Senate hearing in which the 
Clinton administration is being 
blamed. The situation in 
Russia is grim, and corruption 
is rampant; perhaps Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin is not 
the reformer he claimed to be? 
One witness argues, “We 
shouldn’t restrict out policy 
connectivity to Russia to a few 
cozy relationships among 
people who speak English and 
IMF-ise” (14). 
 
October 7, 1999 US Policy Toward 
Russia, Part II: 




How widespread is the 
corruption in Russia? Does it 




Russian Government given the links between his 
family and a Swiss company? 
Are US-based investors, 
advisors, and pundits 
benefiting from the continued 
capital flight of IMF monies 
from Russia? 
October 19, 1999 US Policy Toward 





Clinton administration official 
Strobe Talbott is invited to 
address US Russia policy 
within the context of 
Congress’s reexamination of 
that policy in order that he 
may defend the Clinton 
administration’s lack of 
action. According to Talbott, 
Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright divides US Russia 
policy into two categories, 
arms control and support for 
internal transformation, but 
Congress is currently 
unwilling to authorize more 
funds for these objectives.  
 
There is also concern among 
legislators about transnational 
networks of Islamic 
fundamentalists supporting 
Chechnya, especially countries 
from “the Arabian peninsula 
to South Asia” (12). Talbott 
suggests that Russia needs to 
see its problem in the 
Caucases as a global threat 
and work together as part of 
an international community. 
 
Concern that the transfer of 
technology and weapons to 
Iran is happening with the 
knowledge and maybe even 




2000 and April 4, 
2000 
International 









First hearing on trafficking in 
the Senate; convened to learn 
more about the transnational 
traffic of women and children 
for all sorts of forced labor, 
particularly sex work. 
March 7, 2002 Monitoring and 
Combating Trafficking 





Hearing convened to examine 
how well the TVPA is 
working and if any changes 
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